| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
clarify that rsa-sha2-512 is the default signature scheme when RSA is in use.
Based on GHPR505 from SebastianRzk
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1d90df71636a04601685d2a10a8233bcc8d4f4c5
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8515f55a15f02836ba657df341415f63c60526ca
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
markus@
(yes, I know this expands to "the Digitial Signature Algorithm
signature algorithm)
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 961ef594e46dd2dcade8dd5721fa565cee79ffed
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Ed25519 public keys are very convenient due to their small size.
OpenSSH has supported Ed25519 since version 6.5 (January 2014).
OK djm@ markus@ sthen@ deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f498beaad19c8cdcc357381a60df4a9c69858b3f
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6ddfef94b0eb867ad88abe07cedc8ed581c07f0
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: abc95e550be9e6d9a7ff64b65c104c7be21ab19e
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
-Ohashalg=sha1|sha256 when outputting SSHFP fingerprints to allow algorithm
selection. bz3493 ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: e6e07fe21318a873bd877f333e189eb963a11b3d
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6765daefe26a6b648cc15cadbbe337596af709b7
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 7f80a53d54857ac6ae49ea6ad93c5bd12231d1e4
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
times and authorized_keys expiry-time options to accept dates in the UTC time
zone in addition to the default of interpreting them in the system time zone.
YYYYMMDD and YYMMDDHHMM[SS] dates/times will be interpreted as UTC if
suffixed with a 'Z' character.
Also allow certificate validity intervals to be specified in raw
seconds-since-epoch as hex value, e.g. -V 0x1234:0x4567890. This
is intended for use by regress tests and other tools that call
ssh-keygen as part of a CA workflow.
bz3468 ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 454db1cdffa9fa346aea5211223a2ce0588dfe13
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Based on github PR#303 from jsegitz with man page text from jmc@, ok markus@
djm@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5c4c57bdd7063ff03381cfb6696659dd3f9f5b9f
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
operations, where it will be interpreted to require that the private keys is
hosted in an agent; bz3429, suggested by Adam Szkoda; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: a7bc69873b99c32c42c7628ed9ea91565ba08c2f
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
works. The wording came mostly from the 8.2 OpenSSH release notes, addapted
to fit the man page. Then move the -O bits into the new section as is already
done for CERTIFICATES and MODULI GENERATION. Finally we can explain the
trade-offs of resident keys. While here, consistently refer to the FIDO
thingies as "FIDO authenticators", not "FIDO tokens".
input & OK jmc, naddy
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: dd98748d7644df048f78dcf793b3b63db9ab1d25
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6543acb00f4f38a23472538e1685c013ca1a99aa
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
already supported either sha512 (default) or sha256, but plumbing wasn't
there mostly by Linus Nordberg
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 1b536404b9da74a84b3a1c8d0b05fd564cdc96cd
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
options at present, so don't say otherwise in SYNOPSIS; spotted jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9cc43a18f4091010741930b48b3db2f2e4f1d35c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
matching of principals names against an allowed signers file.
Requested by and mostly written by Fabian Stelzer, towards a TOFU
model for SSH signatures in git. Some tweaks by me.
"doesn't bother me" deraadt@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8d1b71f5a4127bc5e10a880c8ea6053394465247
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
(-Oprint-pubkey) to dump the full public key to stdout; based on patch from
Fabian Stelzer; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0598000e5b9adfb45d42afa76ff80daaa12fc3e2
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 64be152e378c45975073ab1c07e0db7eddd15806
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
signatures support key lifetimes, and allow the verification mode to specify
a signature time to check at. This is intended for use by git to support
signing objects using ssh keys. ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 3e2c67b7dcd94f0610194d1e8e4907829a40cf31
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
connection do need to use the same parameters (ie groups), the DH-GEX
protocol takes care of that and both ends do not need the same contents in
the moduli file, which is what the previous text suggested. ok djm@ jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f0c18cc8e79c2fbf537a432a9070ed94e96a622a
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
provide a better error message if it's not correct. Prompted by bz#2879, ok
djm@ jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 484178a173e92230fb1803fb4f206d61f7b58005
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
PR#214 from rafork, ok markus@, mdoc correction jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d8f2853e7edbcd483f31b50da77ab80ffa18b4ef
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
the manpage-l10n project via bz#3223. feedback deraadt@, ok jmc@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab83af0daf18369244a72daaec6c4a58a9eb7e2c
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
the data needed to verify the attestation. Previously we were missing the
"authenticator data" that is included in the signature.
spotted by Ian Haken
feedback Pedro Martelletto and Ian Haken; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 8439896e63792b2db99c6065dd9a45eabbdb7e0a
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 92714b6531e244e4da401b2defaa376374e24be7
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When we know that a particular action will require a PIN, such as
downloading resident keys or generating a verify-required key, request
the PIN before attempting it.
joint work with Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 863182d38ef075bad1f7d20ca485752a05edb727
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
FIDO2 supports a notion of "user verification" where the user is
required to demonstrate their identity to the token before particular
operations (e.g. signing). Typically this is done by authenticating
themselves using a PIN that has been set on the token.
This adds support for generating and using user verified keys where
the verification happens via PIN (other options might be added in the
future, but none are in common use now). Practically, this adds
another key generation option "verify-required" that yields a key that
requires a PIN before each authentication.
feedback markus@ and Pedro Martelletto; ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 57fd461e4366f87c47502c5614ec08573e6d6a15
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Reorder parameters list in the first usage() case - Sentence rewording
ok dtucker@
jmc@ noticed usage() missed -a flag too
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f06b9afe91cc96f260b929a56e9930caecbde246
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cb7e9aa04ace01a98e63e4bd77f34a42ab169b15
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
binary key revocation list: ssh-keygen -lQf /path bz#3132; ok dtucker
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b76afc4e3b74ab735dbde4e5f0cfa1f02356033b
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 5cdaafab38bbdea0d07e24777d00bfe6f972568a
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
variable with that of the SecurityKeyProvider ssh/sshd_config(5) directive,
as the latter was more descriptive.
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 0488f09530524a7e53afca6b6e1780598022552f
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 94e9c1c066d42b76f035a3d58250a32b14000afb
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
rejig the challenge text a little;
ok djm
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 9f351e6da9edfdc907d5c3fdaf2e9ff3ab0a7a6f
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 08efad608b790949a9a048d65578fae9ed5845fe
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Allow writing to disk the attestation certificate that is generated by
the FIDO token at key enrollment time. These certificates may be used
by an out-of-band workflow to prove that a particular key is held in
trustworthy hardware.
Allow passing in a challenge that will be sent to the card during
key enrollment. These are needed to build an attestation workflow
that resists replay attacks.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 457dc3c3d689ba39eed328f0817ed9b91a5f78f6
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
from Markus:
use "principals" instead of principal, as allowed_signers lines may list
multiple.
When the signing key is a certificate, emit only principals that match
the certificate principal list.
NB. the command -Y name changes: "find-principal" => "find-principals"
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: ab575946ff9a55624cd4e811bfd338bf3b1d0faf
|
|
|
|
| |
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: b6c3f2f36ec77e99198619b38a9f146655281925
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
up the principal associated with a signature from an allowed-signers file.
Work by Sebastian Kinne; ok dtucker@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6f782cc7e18e38fcfafa62af53246a1dcfe74e5d
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
authenticator"
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 031bca03c1d1f878ab929facd561911f1bc68dfd
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
again
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 341749062c089cc360a7877e9ee3a887aecde395
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
other and reality ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cdf64454f2c3604c25977c944e5b6262a3bcce92
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
little; ok djm
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 491ce15ae52a88b7a6a2b3b6708a14b4aacdeebb
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
for all operations. These are intended to future-proof the API a little by
making it easier to specify additional fields for without having to change
the API version for each.
At present, only two options are defined: one to explicitly specify
the device for an operation (rather than accepting the middleware's
autoselection) and another to specify the FIDO2 username that may
be used when generating a resident key. These new options may be
invoked at key generation time via ssh-keygen -O
This also implements a suggestion from Markus to avoid "int" in favour
of uint32_t for the algorithm argument in the API, to make implementation
of ssh-sk-client/helper a little easier.
feedback, fixes and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 973ce11704609022ab36abbdeb6bc23c8001eabc
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
(lower); ok djm
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71dc28a3e1fa7c553844abc508845bcf5766e091
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
"ssh-keygen -K". This will save public/private keys into the current
directory.
This is handy if you move a token between hosts.
feedback & ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d57c1f9802f7850f00a117a1d36682a6c6d10da6
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
-compact;
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 6492c72280482c6d072be46236b365cb359fc280
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
FIDO/U2F-specific key flags. Instead these flags may be specified via -O.
ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f23ebde2a8a7e1bf860a51055a711cffb8c328c1
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Move all moduli generation options to live under the -O flag.
Frees up seven single-letter flags.
NB. this change break existing ssh-keygen commandline syntax for moduli-
related operations. Very few people use these fortunately.
feedback and ok markus@
OpenBSD-Commit-ID: d498f3eaf28128484826a4fcb343612764927935
|