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* adapt -portable to OpenSSL 1.1x APIDamien Miller2018-09-131-0/+2
| | | | Polyfill missing API with replacement functions extracted from LibreSSL
* upstream: hold our collective noses and use the openssl-1.1.x API indjm@openbsd.org2018-09-131-13/+34
| | | | | | OpenSSH; feedback and ok tb@ jsing@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: cacbcac87ce5da0d3ca7ef1b38a6f7fb349e4417
* upstream: Improve strictness and control over RSA-SHA2 signaturedjm@openbsd.org2018-07-031-15/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In ssh, when an agent fails to return a RSA-SHA2 signature when requested and falls back to RSA-SHA1 instead, retry the signature to ensure that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH matches the one in the signature itself. In sshd, strictly enforce that the public key algorithm sent in the SSH_MSG_USERAUTH message matches what appears in the signature. Make the sshd_config PubkeyAcceptedKeyTypes and HostbasedAcceptedKeyTypes options control accepted signature algorithms (previously they selected supported key types). This allows these options to ban RSA-SHA1 in favour of RSA-SHA2. Add new signature algorithms "rsa-sha2-256-cert-v01@openssh.com" and "rsa-sha2-512-cert-v01@openssh.com" to force use of RSA-SHA2 signatures with certificate keys. feedback and ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: c6e9f6d45eed8962ad502d315d7eaef32c419dde
* upstream: Ensure that D mod (P-1) and D mod (Q-1) are calculated injsing@openbsd.org2018-02-161-8/+10
| | | | | | | | | | constant time. This avoids a potential side channel timing leak. ok djm@ markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 71ff3c16be03290e63d8edab8fac053d8a82968c
* upstream commitjsing@openbsd.org2018-02-071-15/+6
| | | | | | | | Convert some explicit_bzero()/free() calls to freezero(). ok deraadt@ dtucker@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: f566ab99149650ebe58b1d4b946ea726c3829609
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2017-12-191-1/+4
| | | | | | log mismatched RSA signature types; ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 381bddfcc1e297a42292222f3bcb5ac2b7ea2418
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2017-12-191-6/+13
| | | | | | | | pass negotiated signing algorithm though to sshkey_verify() and check that the negotiated algorithm matches the type in the signature (only matters for RSA SHA1/SHA2 sigs). ok markus@ OpenBSD-Commit-ID: 735fb15bf4adc060d3bee9d047a4bcaaa81b1af9
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2017-07-211-1/+36
| | | | | | | remove post-SSHv1 removal dead code from rsa.c and merge the remaining bit that it still used into ssh-rsa.c; ok markus Upstream-ID: ac8a048d24dcd89594b0052ea5e3404b473bfa2f
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2017-05-081-4/+6
| | | | | | | Refuse RSA keys <1024 bits in length. Improve reporting for keys that do not meet this requirement. ok markus@ Upstream-ID: b385e2a7b13b1484792ee681daaf79e1e203df6c
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2016-09-141-4/+4
| | | | | | | handle certs in rsa_hash_alg_from_ident(), saving an unnecessary special case elsewhere. Upstream-ID: 901cb081c59d6d2698b57901c427f3f6dc7397d4
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2016-04-211-2/+3
| | | | | | make argument == NULL tests more consistent Upstream-ID: dc4816678704aa5cbda3a702e0fa2033ff04581d
* upstream commitmmcc@openbsd.org2015-12-181-5/+3
| | | | | | | | Remove NULL-checks before sshbuf_free(). ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 5ebed00ed5f9f03b119a345085e8774565466917
* upstream commitmmcc@openbsd.org2015-12-111-3/+2
| | | | | | | | Remove NULL-checks before free(). ok dtucker@ Upstream-ID: e3d3cb1ce900179906af36517b5eea0fb15e6ef8
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2015-12-111-6/+6
| | | | | | stricter encoding type checks for ssh-rsa; ok djm@ Upstream-ID: 8cca7c787599a5e8391e184d0b4f36fdc3665650
* upstream commitmarkus@openbsd.org2015-12-071-23/+113
| | | | | | | | implement SHA2-{256,512} for RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signatures (user and host auth) based on draft-rsa-dsa-sha2-256-03.txt and draft-ssh-ext-info-04.txt; with & ok djm@ Upstream-ID: cf82ce532b2733e5c4b34bb7b7c94835632db309
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2015-09-111-3/+3
| | | | | | | | openssh_RSA_verify return type is int, so don't make it size_t within the function itself with only negative numbers or zero assigned to it. bz#2460 Upstream-ID: b6e794b0c7fc4f9f329509263c8668d35f83ea55
* upstream commitdjm@openbsd.org2015-06-151-2/+2
| | | | | | return failure on RSA signature error; reported by Albert S Upstream-ID: e61bb93dbe0349625807b0810bc213a6822121fa
* support --without-openssl at configure timeDamien Miller2015-01-141-0/+3
| | | | | | | | Disables and removes dependency on OpenSSL. Many features don't work and the set of crypto options is greatly restricted. This will only work on system with native arc4random or /dev/urandom. Considered highly experimental for now.
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/06/24 01:13:21Damien Miller2014-07-021-127/+133
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [Makefile.in auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-rsa.c [auth2-none.c auth2-pubkey.c authfile.c authfile.h cipher-3des1.c [cipher-chachapoly.c cipher-chachapoly.h cipher.c cipher.h [digest-libc.c digest-openssl.c digest.h dns.c entropy.c hmac.h [hostfile.c key.c key.h krl.c monitor.c packet.c rsa.c rsa.h [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c [ssh-keygen.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-pkcs11.c [ssh-rsa.c sshbuf-misc.c sshbuf.h sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshkey.c sshkey.h [openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.c openbsd-compat/openssl-compat.h] New key API: refactor key-related functions to be more library-like, existing API is offered as a set of wrappers. with and ok markus@ Thanks also to Ben Hawkes, David Tomaschik, Ivan Fratric, Matthew Dempsky and Ron Bowes for a detailed review a few months ago. NB. This commit also removes portable OpenSSH support for OpenSSL <0.9.8e.
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/02/02 03:44:32Damien Miller2014-02-041-7/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | [auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-passwd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c cipher-3des1.c cipher.c clientloop.c gss-serv.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexecdhc.c kexgexc.c kexecdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c] [monitor.c monitor_wrap.c packet.c readpass.c rsa.c serverloop.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-ed25519.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c] convert memset of potentially-private data to explicit_bzero()
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/09 23:20:00Damien Miller2014-01-101-24/+30
| | | | | | | | | | | [digest.c digest.h hostfile.c kex.c kex.h kexc25519.c kexc25519c.c] [kexc25519s.c kexdh.c kexecdh.c kexecdhc.c kexecdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c] [kexgexs.c key.c key.h roaming_client.c roaming_common.c schnorr.c] [schnorr.h ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect2.c] Introduce digest API and use it to perform all hashing operations rather than calling OpenSSL EVP_Digest* directly. Will make it easier to build a reduced-feature OpenSSH without OpenSSL in future; feedback, ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/30 23:52:28Damien Miller2013-12-311-20/+3
| | | | | | | | | [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-pubkey.c compat.c compat.h ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] refuse RSA keys from old proprietary clients/servers that use the obsolete RSA+MD5 signature scheme. it will still be possible to connect with these clients/servers but only DSA keys will be accepted, and we'll deprecate them entirely in a future release. ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:37:18Damien Miller2013-12-291-3/+3
| | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] correct comment
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/12/27 22:30:17Damien Miller2013-12-291-18/+21
| | | | | | | | [ssh-dss.c ssh-ecdsa.c ssh-rsa.c] make the original RSA and DSA signing/verification code look more like the ECDSA/Ed25519 ones: use key_type_plain() when checking the key type rather than tediously listing all variants, use __func__ for debug/ error messages
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2013/05/17 00:13:13Darren Tucker2013-06-011-12/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [xmalloc.h cipher.c sftp-glob.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh.c sftp-common.c ssh-ecdsa.c auth2-chall.c compat.c readconf.c kexgexs.c monitor.c gss-genr.c cipher-3des1.c kex.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-pkcs11-client.c auth-options.c rsa.c auth2-pubkey.c sftp.c hostfile.c auth2.c servconf.c auth.c authfile.c xmalloc.c uuencode.c sftp-client.c auth2-gss.c sftp-server.c bufaux.c mac.c session.c jpake.c kexgexc.c sshconnect.c auth-chall.c auth2-passwd.c sshconnect1.c buffer.c kexecdhs.c kexdhs.c ssh-rsa.c auth1.c ssh-pkcs11.c auth2-kbdint.c kexdhc.c sshd.c umac.c ssh-dss.c auth2-jpake.c bufbn.c clientloop.c monitor_mm.c scp.c roaming_client.c serverloop.c key.c auth-rsa.c ssh-pkcs11-helper.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-keygen.c match.c channels.c sshconnect2.c addrmatch.c mux.c canohost.c kexecdhc.c schnorr.c ssh-add.c misc.c auth2-hostbased.c ssh-agent.c bufec.c groupaccess.c dns.c packet.c readpass.c authfd.c moduli.c] bye, bye xfree(); ok markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/08/31 09:58:37Damien Miller2010-08-311-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-options.c auth1.c auth2.c bufaux.c buffer.h kex.c key.c packet.c] [packet.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] Add buffer_get_cstring() and related functions that verify that the string extracted from the buffer contains no embedded \0 characters* This prevents random (possibly malicious) crap from being appended to strings where it would not be noticed if the string is used with a string(3) function. Use the new API in a few sensitive places. * actually, we allow a single one at the end of the string for now because we don't know how many deployed implementations get this wrong, but don't count on this to remain indefinitely.
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/16 14:07:35Damien Miller2010-08-031-4/+6
| | | | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] more timing paranoia - compare all parts of the expected decrypted data before returning. AFAIK not exploitable in the SSH protocol. "groovy" deraadt@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 23:13:16Damien Miller2010-07-161-3/+3
| | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c packet.c] [ssh-rsa.c] s/timing_safe_cmp/timingsafe_bcmp/g
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/07/13 11:52:06Damien Miller2010-07-161-3/+4
| | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c channels.c jpake.c key.c misc.c misc.h monitor.c] [packet.c ssh-rsa.c] implement a timing_safe_cmp() function to compare memory without leaking timing information by short-circuiting like memcmp() and use it for some of the more sensitive comparisons (though nothing high-value was readily attackable anyway); "looks ok" markus@
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/04/16 01:47:26Damien Miller2010-04-161-7/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [PROTOCOL.certkeys auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-rsa.c] [auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c key.c key.h myproposal.h ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c] [sshconnect.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] revised certificate format ssh-{dss,rsa}-cert-v01@openssh.com with the following changes: move the nonce field to the beginning of the certificate where it can better protect against chosen-prefix attacks on the signature hash Rename "constraints" field to "critical options" Add a new non-critical "extensions" field Add a serial number The older format is still support for authentication and cert generation (use "ssh-keygen -t v00 -s ca_key ..." to generate a v00 certificate) ok markus@
* - OpenBSD CVS SyncDamien Miller2010-02-261-3/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2010/02/26 20:29:54 [PROTOCOL PROTOCOL.agent PROTOCOL.certkeys addrmatch.c auth-options.c] [auth-options.h auth.h auth2-pubkey.c authfd.c dns.c dns.h hostfile.c] [hostfile.h kex.h kexdhs.c kexgexs.c key.c key.h match.h monitor.c] [myproposal.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.1 ssh-keygen.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.1 ssh.c ssh2.h sshconnect.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.8 sshd.c sshd_config.5] Add support for certificate key types for users and hosts. OpenSSH certificate key types are not X.509 certificates, but a much simpler format that encodes a public key, identity information and some validity constraints and signs it with a CA key. CA keys are regular SSH keys. This certificate style avoids the attack surface of X.509 certificates and is very easy to deploy. Certified host keys allow automatic acceptance of new host keys when a CA certificate is marked as sh/known_hosts. see VERIFYING HOST KEYS in ssh(1) for details. Certified user keys allow authentication of users when the signing CA key is marked as trusted in authorized_keys. See "AUTHORIZED_KEYS FILE FORMAT" in sshd(8) for details. Certificates are minted using ssh-keygen(1), documentation is in the "CERTIFICATES" section of that manpage. Documentation on the format of certificates is in the file PROTOCOL.certkeys feedback and ok markus@
* - (djm) [audit-bsm.c audit.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-pam.c]Damien Miller2006-09-011-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c auth-shadow.c auth-sia.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [auth2-gss.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c authfd.c authfile.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-aes.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c clientloop.c] [dh.c dns.c entropy.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c loginrec.c mac.c] [md5crypt.c monitor.c monitor_wrap.c readconf.c rsa.c] [scard-opensc.c scard.c session.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c] [ssh-keygen.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c] [sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c rc4.diff] [openbsd-compat/bsd-cray.c openbsd-compat/port-aix.c] [openbsd-compat/port-linux.c openbsd-compat/port-solaris.c] [openbsd-compat/port-uw.c] Lots of headers for SCO OSR6, mainly adding stdarg.h for log.h; compile problems reported by rac AT tenzing.org
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/08/03 03:34:42Damien Miller2006-08-051-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [OVERVIEW atomicio.c atomicio.h auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c] [auth-options.c auth-options.h auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c] [auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth.h auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c ] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfd.h authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c] [buffer.c buffer.h canohost.c channels.c channels.h cipher-3des1.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c dns.h fatal.c groupaccess.c] [groupaccess.h gss-genr.c gss-serv-krb5.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kex.h kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c] [key.h log.c log.h mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c misc.h moduli.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_mm.h monitor_wrap.c] [monitor_wrap.h msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c] [readconf.h readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scard.h scp.c servconf.c servconf.h] [serverloop.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-common.c] [sftp-common.h sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-gss.h ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c] [ssh.c ssh.h sshconnect.c sshconnect.h sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshlogin.h sshpty.c sshpty.h sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uidswap.h uuencode.c uuencode.h xmalloc.c xmalloc.h] [loginrec.c loginrec.h openbsd-compat/port-aix.c openbsd-compat/port-tun.h] almost entirely get rid of the culture of ".h files that include .h files" ok djm, sort of ok stevesk makes the pain stop in one easy step NB. portable commit contains everything *except* removing includes.h, as that will take a fair bit more work as we move headers that are required for portability workarounds to defines.h. (also, this step wasn't "easy")
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/07/22 20:48:23Damien Miller2006-07-241-1/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c] [auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-passwd.c auth2.c] [authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c bufbn.c buffer.c canohost.c channels.c] [cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c clientloop.c] [compat.c deattack.c dh.c dns.c gss-genr.c gss-serv.c hostfile.c] [includes.h kex.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c] [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c moduli.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c] [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c rsa.c] [progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c] [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c] [sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c ttymodes.c uidswap.c xmalloc.c] move #include <string.h> out of includes.h
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 13:17:03Damien Miller2006-03-261-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-options.c auth-passwd.c] [auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c] [auth2-chall.c auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c] [auth2-passwd.c auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c] [buffer.c canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-bf1.c] [cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c compress.c] [deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c fatal.c groupaccess.c hostfile.c kex.c] [kexdh.c kexdhc.c kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c] [mac.c match.c md-sha256.c misc.c monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c] [monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c] [readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c] [session.c sftp-client.c sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c] [sftp.c ssh-add.c ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c] [ssh-keysign.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c] Put $OpenBSD$ tags back (as comments) to replace the RCSID()s that Theo nuked - our scripts to sync -portable need them in the files
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/25 01:13:23Damien Miller2006-03-261-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | [buffer.c channels.c deattack.c misc.c scp.c session.c sftp-client.c] [sftp-server.c ssh-agent.c ssh-rsa.c xmalloc.c xmalloc.h auth-pam.c] [uidswap.c] change OpenSSH's xrealloc() function from being xrealloc(p, new_size) to xrealloc(p, new_nmemb, new_itemsize). realloc is particularly prone to integer overflows because it is almost always allocating "n * size" bytes, so this is a far safer API; ok deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 18:26:55Damien Miller2006-03-261-0/+1
| | | | | | [channels.c monitor.c session.c session.h ssh-agent.c ssh-keygen.c] [ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshlogin.c] annoying spacing fixes getting in the way of real diffs
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/20 17:17:23Damien Miller2006-03-261-1/+0
| | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] in a switch (), break after return or goto is stupid
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2006/03/19 18:51:18Damien Miller2006-03-251-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | [atomicio.c auth-bsdauth.c auth-chall.c auth-krb5.c auth-options.c] [auth-pam.c auth-passwd.c auth-rh-rsa.c auth-rhosts.c auth-rsa.c] [auth-shadow.c auth-skey.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c] [auth2-hostbased.c auth2-kbdint.c auth2-none.c auth2-passwd.c] [auth2-pubkey.c auth2.c authfd.c authfile.c bufaux.c buffer.c] [canohost.c channels.c cipher-3des1.c cipher-acss.c cipher-aes.c] [cipher-bf1.c cipher-ctr.c cipher.c cleanup.c clientloop.c compat.c] [compress.c deattack.c dh.c dispatch.c dns.c entropy.c fatal.c] [groupaccess.c hostfile.c includes.h kex.c kexdh.c kexdhc.c] [kexdhs.c kexgex.c kexgexc.c kexgexs.c key.c log.c loginrec.c] [loginrec.h logintest.c mac.c match.c md-sha256.c md5crypt.c misc.c] [monitor.c monitor_fdpass.c monitor_mm.c monitor_wrap.c msg.c] [nchan.c packet.c progressmeter.c readconf.c readpass.c rsa.c] [scard.c scp.c servconf.c serverloop.c session.c sftp-client.c] [sftp-common.c sftp-glob.c sftp-server.c sftp.c ssh-add.c] [ssh-agent.c ssh-dss.c ssh-keygen.c ssh-keyscan.c ssh-keysign.c] [ssh-rand-helper.c ssh-rsa.c ssh.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c] [sshconnect2.c sshd.c sshlogin.c sshpty.c sshtty.c ttymodes.c] [uidswap.c uuencode.c xmalloc.c openbsd-compat/bsd-arc4random.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-closefrom.c openbsd-compat/bsd-cygwin_util.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-getpeereid.c openbsd-compat/bsd-misc.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-nextstep.c openbsd-compat/bsd-snprintf.c] [openbsd-compat/bsd-waitpid.c openbsd-compat/fake-rfc2553.c] RCSID() can die
* - djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2005/06/17 02:44:33Damien Miller2005-06-171-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | [auth-rsa.c auth.c auth1.c auth2-chall.c auth2-gss.c authfd.c authfile.c] [bufaux.c canohost.c channels.c cipher.c clientloop.c dns.c gss-serv.c] [kex.c kex.h key.c mac.c match.c misc.c packet.c packet.h scp.c] [servconf.c session.c session.h sftp-client.c sftp-server.c sftp.c] [ssh-keyscan.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c sshconnect1.c sshconnect2.c sshd.c] make this -Wsign-compare clean; ok avsm@ markus@ NB. auth1.c changes not committed yet (conflicts with uncommitted sync) NB2. more work may be needed to make portable Wsign-compare clean
* - jakob@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/11/10 16:23:41Damien Miller2003-11-171-5/+5
| | | | | | | [bufaux.c bufaux.h cipher.c cipher.h hostfile.c hostfile.h key.c] [key.h sftp-common.c sftp-common.h sftp-server.c sshconnect.c sshd.c] [ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c uuencode.c uuencode.h] constify. ok markus@ & djm@
* - (dtucker) OpenBSD CVS SyncDarren Tucker2003-06-221-23/+14
| | | | | | | - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/06/18 11:28:11 [ssh-rsa.c] backout last change, since it violates pkcs#1 switch to share/misc/license.template
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/06/16 08:22:35Damien Miller2003-06-181-3/+3
| | | | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] make sure the signature has at least the expected length (don't insist on len == hlen + oidlen, since this breaks some smartcards) bugzilla #592; ok djm@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2003/02/12 09:33:04Damien Miller2003-02-241-2/+1
| | | | | [key.c key.h ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] merge ssh-dss.h ssh-rsa.h into key.h; ok deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/11/21 23:03:51Ben Lindstrom2002-12-231-2/+2
| | | | | | [auth-krb5.c auth1.c hostfile.h monitor_wrap.c sftp-client.c sftp-int.c ssh-add.c ssh-rsa.c sshconnect.c] KNF
* - stevesk@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/27 17:13:56Damien Miller2002-09-041-2/+3
| | | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] RSA_public_decrypt() returns -1 on error so len must be signed; ok markus@
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 22:20:30Ben Lindstrom2002-08-201-7/+93
| | | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] replace RSA_verify with our own version and avoid the OpenSSL ASN.1 parser for authentication; ok deraadt/djm
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/08/02 21:23:41Ben Lindstrom2002-08-201-3/+3
| | | | | [ssh-rsa.c] diff is u_int (2x); ok deraadt/provos
* - markus@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 10:41:47Ben Lindstrom2002-07-081-10/+8
| | | | | | [key.c monitor_wrap.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] don't allocate, copy, and discard if there is not interested in the data; ok deraadt@
* - deraadt@cvs.openbsd.org 2002/07/04 04:15:33Ben Lindstrom2002-07-081-1/+3
| | | | | [key.c monitor_wrap.c sftp-glob.c ssh-dss.c ssh-rsa.c] patch memory leaks; grendel@zeitbombe.org
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