Patches from Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> to get Kerberos 5 in

SSL according to RFC 2712.  His comment is:

This is a patch to openssl-SNAP-20010702 to support Kerberized SSL
authentication.  I'm expecting to have the full kssl-0.5 kit up on
sourceforge by the end of the week.  The full kit includes patches
for mod-ssl, apache, and a few text clients.  The sourceforge URL
is http://sourceforge.net/projects/kssl/ .

Thanks to a note from Simon Wilkinson I've replaced my KRB5 AP_REQ
message with a real KerberosWrapper struct.  I think this is fully
RFC 2712 compliant now, including support for the optional
authenticator field.  I also added openssl-style ASN.1 macros for
a few Kerberos structs; see crypto/krb5/ if you're interested.

14 files changed, 1641 insertions, 173 deletions

diff --git a/Configure b/Configure
index a76f7060d6..b20e663328 100755
--- a/Configure
+++ b/Configure
@@ -723,6 +723,7 @@ if ($no_krb5
 	}
 else
 	{
+	my ($lresolv, $lpath, $lext);
 	if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Hh]eimdal$/)
 		{
 		$withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/heimdal"
@@ -732,7 +733,7 @@ else
 			if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "";
 		$cflags="-DKRB5_HEIMDAL $cflags";
 		}
-	if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Mm][Ii][Tt]$/)
+	if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^[Mm][Ii][Tt]/)
 		{
 		$withargs{"krb5-dir"} = "/usr/kerberos"
 			if $withargs{"krb5-dir"} eq "";
@@ -740,9 +741,27 @@ else
 			"/lib -lgssapi_krb5 -lkrb5 -lcom_err -lk5crypto"
 			if $withargs{"krb5-lib"} eq "";
 		$cflags="-DKRB5_MIT $cflags";
+		$withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ s/^[Mm][Ii][Tt][._-]*//;
+		if ($withargs{"krb5-flavor"} =~ /^1[._-]*[01]/)
+			{
+			$cflags="-DKRB5_MIT_OLD11 $cflags";
+			}
+		}
+	LRESOLV:
+	foreach $lpath ("/lib", "/usr/lib")
+		{
+		foreach $lext ("a", "so")
+			{
+			$lresolv = "$lpath/libresolv.$lext";
+			last LRESOLV	if (-r "$lresolv");
+			$lresolv = "";
+			}
 		}
+	$withargs{"krb5-lib"} .= " -lresolv"
+		if ("$lresolv");
 	$withargs{"krb5-include"} = "-I".$withargs{"krb5-dir"}."/include"
-		if $withargs{"krb5-include"} eq "" && $withargs{"krb5-dir"} ne "";
+		if $withargs{"krb5-include"} eq "" &&
+		   $withargs{"krb5-dir"} ne "";
 	}
 
 # The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no
diff --git a/Makefile.org b/Makefile.org
index a7353151d5..f3258d3048 100644
--- a/Makefile.org
+++ b/Makefile.org
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ SDIRS=  \
 	des rc2 rc4 rc5 idea bf cast \
 	bn ec rsa dsa dh dso engine rijndael \
 	buffer bio stack lhash rand err objects \
-	evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui
+	evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 comp ocsp ui krb5
 
 # tests to perform.  "alltests" is a special word indicating that all tests
 # should be performed.
@@ -458,7 +458,7 @@ depend:
 	do \
 	if [ -d "$$i" ]; then \
 		(cd $$i && echo "making dependencies $$i..." && \
-		$(MAKE) SDIRS='${SDIRS}' DEPFLAG='${DEPFLAG}' MAKEDEPPROG='${MAKEDEPPROG}' depend ) || exit 1; \
+		$(MAKE) SDIRS='${SDIRS}' DEPFLAG='${DEPFLAG}' MAKEDEPPROG='${MAKEDEPPROG}' KRB5_INCLUDES='${KRB5_INCLUDES}' depend ) || exit 1; \
 	fi; \
 	done;
 
diff --git a/apps/s_server.c b/apps/s_server.c
index 6ed23490f1..269b28dfd1 100644
--- a/apps/s_server.c
+++ b/apps/s_server.c
@@ -863,8 +863,10 @@ static int sv_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 		if ((con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL)
                         {
-                        kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
-                        kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
+                        kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVICE,
+								KRB5SVC);
+                        kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_KEYTAB,
+								KRB5KEYTAB);
                         }
 #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 		if(context)
@@ -1249,6 +1251,13 @@ static int www_body(char *hostname, int s, unsigned char *context)
 	if (!BIO_set_write_buffer_size(io,bufsize)) goto err;
 
 	if ((con=SSL_new(ctx)) == NULL) goto err;
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
+	if ((con->kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new()) != NULL)
+		{
+		kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_SERVICE, KRB5SVC);
+		kssl_ctx_setstring(con->kssl_ctx, KSSL_KEYTAB, KRB5KEYTAB);
+		}
+#endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 	if(context) SSL_set_session_id_context(con, context,
 					       strlen((char *)context));
 
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
index ae92ad9954..bd033f85ec 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
+++ b/crypto/asn1/asn1.h
@@ -822,6 +822,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(ASN1_STRING, DISPLAYTEXT)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_PRINTABLESTRING)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME)
diff --git a/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c b/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c
index 188311ccd9..804d2eeba2 100644
--- a/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c
+++ b/crypto/asn1/tasn_typ.c
@@ -91,6 +91,9 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_T61STRING)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_IA5STRING)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_IA5STRING)
 
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)
+
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_TYPE(ASN1_UTCTIME)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_UTCTIME)
 
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/Makefile.ssl b/crypto/krb5/Makefile.ssl
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..8994b486a4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/krb5/Makefile.ssl
@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+#
+# OpenSSL/krb5/Makefile.ssl
+#
+
+DIR=	krb5
+TOP=	../..
+CC=	cc
+INCLUDES= -I.. -I$(TOP) -I../../include
+CFLAG=-g
+INSTALL_PREFIX=
+OPENSSLDIR=     /usr/local/ssl
+INSTALLTOP=/usr/local/ssl
+MAKE=		make -f Makefile.ssl
+MAKEDEPPROG=	makedepend
+MAKEDEPEND=	$(TOP)/util/domd $(TOP) -MD $(MAKEDEPPROG)
+MAKEFILE=	Makefile.ssl
+AR=		ar r
+
+CFLAGS= $(INCLUDES) $(CFLAG)
+
+GENERAL=Makefile README
+TEST=
+APPS=
+
+LIB=$(TOP)/libcrypto.a
+LIBSRC= krb5_asn.c
+
+LIBOBJ= krb5_asn.o
+
+SRC= $(LIBSRC)
+
+EXHEADER= krb5_asn.h
+HEADER=	$(EXHEADER)
+
+ALL=    $(GENERAL) $(SRC) $(HEADER)
+
+top:
+	(cd ../..; $(MAKE) DIRS=crypto SDIRS=$(DIR) sub_all)
+
+all:	lib
+
+lib:	$(LIBOBJ)
+	$(AR) $(LIB) $(LIBOBJ)
+	$(RANLIB) $(LIB)
+	@touch lib
+
+files:
+	perl $(TOP)/util/files.pl Makefile.ssl >> $(TOP)/MINFO
+
+links:
+	$(TOP)/util/point.sh Makefile.ssl Makefile ;
+	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../include/openssl $(EXHEADER)
+	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../test $(TEST)
+	$(PERL) $(TOP)/util/mklink.pl ../../apps $(APPS)
+
+install:
+	@for i in $(EXHEADER) ; \
+	do  \
+	(cp $$i $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i; \
+	chmod 644 $(INSTALL_PREFIX)$(INSTALLTOP)/include/openssl/$$i ); \
+	done;
+
+tags:
+	ctags $(SRC)
+
+tests:
+
+lint:
+	lint -DLINT $(INCLUDES) $(SRC)>fluff
+
+depend:
+	$(MAKEDEPEND) $(INCLUDES) $(DEPFLAG) $(LIBSRC)
+
+dclean:
+	$(PERL) -pe 'if (/^# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE/) {print; exit(0);}' $(MAKEFILE) >Makefile.new
+	mv -f Makefile.new $(MAKEFILE)
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *.o *.obj lib tags core .pure .nfs* *.old *.bak fluff
+
+# DO NOT DELETE THIS LINE -- make depend depends on it.
+
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/asn1.h ../../include/openssl/asn1t.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/bio.h ../../include/openssl/bn.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/crypto.h ../../include/openssl/e_os2.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/krb5_asn.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslconf.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/opensslv.h ../../include/openssl/safestack.h
+krb5_asn.o: ../../include/openssl/stack.h ../../include/openssl/symhacks.h
+krb5_asn.o: krb5_asn.c
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.c b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..08d169ba52
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.c
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
+/* krb5_asn.c */
+/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project,
+** using ocsp/{*.h,*asn*.c} as a starting point
+*/
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    licensing@OpenSSL.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_ENCDATA) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_ENCDATA, etype,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(KRB5_ENCDATA, kvno,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  1),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_ENCDATA, cipher,		ASN1_OCTET_STRING,2)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_ENCDATA)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_ENCDATA)
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_PRINCNAME) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_PRINCNAME, nametype,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF(KRB5_PRINCNAME, namestring, ASN1_GENERALSTRING, 1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
+
+
+/* [APPLICATION 1] = 0x61 */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_TKTBODY) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, tktvno,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, realm, 		ASN1_GENERALSTRING, 1),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, sname,		KRB5_PRINCNAME,	  2),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_TKTBODY, encdata,		KRB5_ENCDATA,	  3)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_TKTBODY)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(KRB5_TICKET) = 
+	ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION, 1,
+			KRB5_TICKET, KRB5_TKTBODY)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(KRB5_TICKET)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_TICKET)
+
+
+/* [APPLICATION 14] = 0x6e */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_APREQBODY) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_APREQBODY, pvno,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_APREQBODY, msgtype,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  1),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_APREQBODY, apoptions,	ASN1_BIT_STRING,  2),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_APREQBODY, ticket, 	KRB5_TICKET,	  3),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_APREQBODY, authenticator,	KRB5_ENCDATA,	  4),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_APREQBODY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_APREQBODY)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(KRB5_APREQ) = 
+	ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION, 14,
+			KRB5_APREQ, KRB5_APREQBODY)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(KRB5_APREQ)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_APREQ)
+
+
+/*  Authenticator stuff 	*/
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_CHECKSUM) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_CHECKSUM, ctype,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_CHECKSUM, checksum,	ASN1_OCTET_STRING,1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_CHECKSUM)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_CHECKSUM)
+
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_ENCKEY) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_ENCKEY,	ktype,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_ENCKEY,	keyvalue,	ASN1_OCTET_STRING,1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_ENCKEY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_ENCKEY)
+
+
+/* SEQ OF SEQ; see ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT() below */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_AUTHDATA) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHDATA,	adtype,		ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHDATA,	addata, 	ASN1_OCTET_STRING,1)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_AUTHDATA)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHDATA)
+
+
+/* [APPLICATION 2] = 0x62 */
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY) = {
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	avno,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  0),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	crealm,	ASN1_GENERALSTRING, 1),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	cname,	KRB5_PRINCNAME,	  2),
+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	cksum,	KRB5_CHECKSUM,	  3),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	cusec,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  4),
+	ASN1_EXP(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	ctime,	ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME, 5),
+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	subkey,	KRB5_ENCKEY,	  6),
+	ASN1_EXP_OPT(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	seqnum,	ASN1_INTEGER,	  7),
+	ASN1_EXP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT
+		    (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY,	authorization,	KRB5_AUTHDATA, 8),
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY)
+
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(KRB5_AUTHENT) = 
+	ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_EXPTAG|ASN1_TFLG_APPLICATION, 2,
+			KRB5_AUTHENT, KRB5_AUTHENTBODY)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(KRB5_AUTHENT)
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHENT)
+
diff --git a/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..c9f573cef7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/krb5/krb5_asn.h
@@ -0,0 +1,256 @@
+/* krb5_asn.h */
+/* Written by Vern Staats <staatsvr@asc.hpc.mil> for the OpenSSL project,
+** using ocsp/{*.h,*asn*.c} as a starting point
+*/
+
+/* ====================================================================
+ * Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+ * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+ * are met:
+ *
+ * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. 
+ *
+ * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+ *    notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
+ *    the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
+ *    distribution.
+ *
+ * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
+ *    software must display the following acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
+ *    endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+ *    prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
+ *    openssl-core@openssl.org.
+ *
+ * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
+ *    nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
+ *    permission of the OpenSSL Project.
+ *
+ * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
+ *    acknowledgment:
+ *    "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
+ *    for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)"
+ *
+ * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
+ * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
+ * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
+ * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
+ * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+ * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
+ * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
+ * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
+ * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
+ * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
+ * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
+ * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+ * ====================================================================
+ *
+ * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
+ * (eay@cryptsoft.com).  This product includes software written by Tim
+ * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef HEADER_KRB5_ASN_H
+#define HEADER_KRB5_ASN_H
+
+/*
+#include <krb5.h>
+*/
+#include <openssl/safestack.h>
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+extern "C" {
+#endif
+
+
+/*	ASN.1 from Kerberos RFC 1510
+*/
+
+/*	EncryptedData ::=   SEQUENCE {
+**		etype[0]                      INTEGER, -- EncryptionType
+**		kvno[1]                       INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+**		cipher[2]                     OCTET STRING -- ciphertext
+**	}
+*/
+typedef	struct	krb5_encdata_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*etype;
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*kvno;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING		*cipher;
+	}	KRB5_ENCDATA;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_ENCDATA)
+
+/*	PrincipalName ::=   SEQUENCE {
+**		name-type[0]                  INTEGER,
+**		name-string[1]                SEQUENCE OF GeneralString
+**	}
+*/
+typedef	struct	krb5_princname_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*nametype;
+	STACK_OF(ASN1_GENERALSTRING)	*namestring;
+	}	KRB5_PRINCNAME;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
+
+
+/*	Ticket ::=	[APPLICATION 1] SEQUENCE {
+**		tkt-vno[0]                    INTEGER,
+**		realm[1]                      Realm,
+**		sname[2]                      PrincipalName,
+**		enc-part[3]                   EncryptedData
+**	}
+*/
+typedef	struct	krb5_tktbody_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*tktvno;
+	ASN1_GENERALSTRING		*realm;
+	KRB5_PRINCNAME			*sname;
+	KRB5_ENCDATA			*encdata;
+	}	KRB5_TKTBODY;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY) KRB5_TICKET;
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_TKTBODY)
+
+
+/*	AP-REQ ::=      [APPLICATION 14] SEQUENCE {
+**		pvno[0]                       INTEGER,
+**		msg-type[1]                   INTEGER,
+**		ap-options[2]                 APOptions,
+**		ticket[3]                     Ticket,
+**		authenticator[4]              EncryptedData
+**	}
+**
+**	APOptions ::=   BIT STRING {
+**		reserved(0), use-session-key(1), mutual-required(2) }
+*/
+typedef	struct	krb5_ap_req_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*pvno;
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*msgtype;
+	ASN1_BIT_STRING			*apoptions;
+	KRB5_TICKET			*ticket;
+	KRB5_ENCDATA			*authenticator;
+	}	KRB5_APREQBODY;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_APREQBODY) KRB5_APREQ;
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_APREQBODY)
+
+
+/*	Authenticator Stuff	*/
+
+
+/*	Checksum ::=   SEQUENCE {
+**		cksumtype[0]                  INTEGER,
+**		checksum[1]                   OCTET STRING
+**	}
+*/
+typedef	struct	krb5_checksum_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*ctype;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING		*checksum;
+	}	KRB5_CHECKSUM;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_CHECKSUM)
+
+
+/*	EncryptionKey ::=   SEQUENCE {
+**		keytype[0]                    INTEGER,
+**		keyvalue[1]                   OCTET STRING
+**	}
+*/
+typedef struct  krb5_encryptionkey_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*ktype;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING		*keyvalue;
+	}	KRB5_ENCKEY;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_ENCKEY)
+
+
+/*	AuthorizationData ::=   SEQUENCE OF SEQUENCE {
+**		ad-type[0]                    INTEGER,
+**              ad-data[1]                    OCTET STRING
+**	}
+*/
+typedef struct	krb5_authorization_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*adtype;
+	ASN1_OCTET_STRING		*addata;
+	}	KRB5_AUTHDATA;
+
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHDATA);
+
+			
+/*	-- Unencrypted authenticator
+**	Authenticator ::=    [APPLICATION 2] SEQUENCE    {
+**		authenticator-vno[0]          INTEGER,
+**		crealm[1]                     Realm,
+**		cname[2]                      PrincipalName,
+**		cksum[3]                      Checksum OPTIONAL,
+**		cusec[4]                      INTEGER,
+**		ctime[5]                      KerberosTime,
+**		subkey[6]                     EncryptionKey OPTIONAL,
+**		seq-number[7]                 INTEGER OPTIONAL,
+**		authorization-data[8]         AuthorizationData OPTIONAL
+**	}
+*/
+typedef struct	krb5_authenticator_st
+	{
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*avno;
+	ASN1_GENERALSTRING		*crealm;
+	KRB5_PRINCNAME			*cname;
+	KRB5_CHECKSUM			*cksum;
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*cusec;
+	ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME		*ctime;
+	KRB5_ENCKEY			*subkey;
+	ASN1_INTEGER			*seqnum;
+	KRB5_AUTHDATA			*authorization;
+	}	KRB5_AUTHENTBODY;
+
+typedef STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY) KRB5_AUTHENT;
+DECLARE_STACK_OF(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY)
+
+
+/*  DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(type) = DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS_name(type, type) =
+**	type *name##_new(void);
+**	void name##_free(type *a);
+**	DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, name, name) =
+**	 DECLARE_ASN1_ENCODE_FUNCTIONS(type, itname, name) =
+**	  type *d2i_##name(type **a, unsigned char **in, long len);
+**	  int i2d_##name(type *a, unsigned char **out);
+**	  DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(itname) = OPENSSL_EXTERN const ASN1_ITEM itname##_it
+*/
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_ENCDATA)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_PRINCNAME)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_TKTBODY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_APREQBODY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_TICKET)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_APREQ)
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_CHECKSUM)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_ENCKEY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHDATA)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHENTBODY)
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(KRB5_AUTHENT)
+
+
+/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
+/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+ * made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
+ */
+
+#ifdef  __cplusplus
+}
+#endif
+#endif
+
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.c b/ssl/kssl.c
index a8b7cc4cc8..a92c87273d 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.c
+++ b/ssl/kssl.c
@@ -56,15 +56,26 @@
  */
 
 
-/*	ssl/kssl.c  --  Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
+/*  ssl/kssl.c  --  Routines to support (& debug) Kerberos5 auth for openssl
 **
-**	19990701	VRS 	Started.
+**  19990701	VRS 	Started.
+**  200011??	Jeffrey Altman, Richard Levitte
+**          		Generalized for Heimdal, Newer MIT, & Win32.
+**          		Integrated into main OpenSSL 0.9.7 snapshots.
+**  20010413	Simon Wilkinson, VRS
+**          		Real RFC2712 KerberosWrapper replaces AP_REQ.
 */
 
 #include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
 #include <string.h>
+#define _XOPEN_SOURCE /* glibc2 needs this to declare strptime() */
+#include <time.h>
+
 #include <openssl/ssl.h>
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/objects.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
 
 /* 
  * When OpenSSL is built on Windows, we do not want to require that
@@ -104,6 +115,15 @@
 #define krb5_kt_resolve          kssl_krb5_kt_resolve           
 #define krb5_auth_con_init       kssl_krb5_auth_con_init        
 
+#define krb5_principal_compare   kssl_krb5_principal_compare
+/* macro  #define krb5_kt_get_entry        kssl_krb5_kt_get_entry  */
+#define krb5_decrypt_tkt_part    kssl_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part
+#define krb5_timeofday           kssl_krb5_timeofday
+#define krb5_rc_default           kssl_krb5_rc_default
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_initialize   kssl_krb5_rc_initialize
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_get_lifespan kssl_krb5_rc_get_lifespan
+#define krb5_krb5_rc_destroy      kssl_krb5_rc_destroy
+
 /* Prototypes for built in stubs */
 void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context, krb5_data *);
 void kssl_krb5_free_principal(krb5_context, krb5_principal );
@@ -117,6 +137,19 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
                                  krb5_const krb5_data *,
                                  krb5_const_principal, krb5_keytab, 
                                  krb5_flags *,krb5_ticket **);
+
+krb5_boolean kssl_krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context, krb5_const_principal,
+                                         krb5_const_principal);
+krb5_error_code krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *,
+				      krb5_ticket *);
+krb5_error_code krb5_timeofday(krb5_context context, krb5_int32 *timeret);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_default(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache *rc);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+				     krb5_deltat lifespan);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc,
+				     krb5_deltat *lifespan);
+krb5_error_code krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context context, krb5_rcache rc);
+
 krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5_context,
                                           krb5_auth_context  *,
                                           krb5_const krb5_flags,
@@ -144,10 +177,12 @@ krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal(krb5_context context,
 krb5_error_code kssl_krb5_auth_con_free(krb5_context,krb5_auth_context);
 
 /* Function pointers (almost all Kerberos functions are _stdcall) */
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)=NULL;
-static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)(krb5_context, krb5_const char *,
-                                                    krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_data_contents)(krb5_context, krb5_data *)
+	=NULL;
+static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_principal)(krb5_context, krb5_principal )
+	=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code(_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_resolve)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
 static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_kt_default)(krb5_context,
                                                      krb5_keytab *)=NULL;
 static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_ticket)(krb5_context, 
@@ -158,33 +193,27 @@ static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_rd_req)(krb5_context,
                                                  krb5_const_principal, 
                                                  krb5_keytab, krb5_flags *,
                                                  krb5_ticket **)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended) (krb5_context,
-                                                           krb5_auth_context  *,
-                                                           krb5_const krb5_flags,
-                                                           krb5_data  *,
-                                                           krb5_creds  *,
-                                                           krb5_data  * )=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_mk_req_extended)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *,
+			 krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_data *, krb5_creds *,
+			 krb5_data * )=NULL;
 static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_init_context)(krb5_context *)=NULL;
 static void (_stdcall *p_krb5_free_context)(krb5_context)=NULL;
 static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_default)(krb5_context,
                                                      krb5_ccache  *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)(krb5_context,
-                                                             krb5_const char  *,
-                                                             krb5_const char  *,
-                                                             krb5_int32,
-                                                             krb5_principal  *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)(krb5_context,
-                                                          krb5_const krb5_flags,
-                                                          krb5_ccache,
-                                                          krb5_creds  *,
-                                                          krb5_creds  *  *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)(krb5_context,
-                                                        krb5_auth_context  *)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)(krb5_context context, 
-                                                           krb5_ccache cache,
-                                                           krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
-static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)(krb5_context,
-                                                        krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_sname_to_principal)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_const char *, krb5_const char *,
+			 krb5_int32, krb5_principal *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_get_credentials)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_const krb5_flags, krb5_ccache,
+			 krb5_creds *, krb5_creds **)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_init)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context *)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_cc_get_principal)
+			(krb5_context context, krb5_ccache cache,
+			 krb5_principal *principal)=NULL;
+static krb5_error_code (_stdcall *p_krb5_auth_con_free)
+			(krb5_context, krb5_auth_context)=NULL;
 static int krb5_loaded = 0;     /* only attempt to initialize func ptrs once */
 
 /* Function to Load the Kerberos 5 DLL and initialize function pointers */
@@ -222,6 +251,20 @@ load_krb5_dll(void)
 		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_free_ticket" );
 	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rd_req =
 		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rd_req" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_principal_compare =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_principal_compare" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_decrypt_tkt_part" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_timeofday =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_timeofday" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_default =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_default" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_initialize =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_initialize" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_get_lifespan" );
+	(FARPROC) p_krb5_rc_destroy =
+		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_rc_destroy" );
 	(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_default =
 		GetProcAddress( hKRB5_32, "krb5_kt_default" );
 	(FARPROC) p_krb5_kt_resolve =
@@ -412,6 +455,92 @@ kssl_krb5_rd_req(krb5_context con, krb5_auth_context * pacon,
 		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	}
 
+krb5_boolean
+krb5_principal_compare(krb5_context con, krb5_const_principal princ1,
+                krb5_const_principal princ2)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_principal_compare )
+		return(p_krb5_principal_compare(con,princ1,princ2);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5_context con, krb5_const krb5_keyblock *keys,
+                krb5_ticket *ticket)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part )
+		return(p_krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(con,keys,ticket);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_timeofday(krb5_context con, krb5_int32 *timeret)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_timeofday )
+		return(p_krb5_timeofday(con,timeret);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_default(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache *rc)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_rc_default )
+		return(p_krb5_rc_default(con,rc);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_initialize(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat lifespan)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_rc_initialize )
+		return(p_krb5_rc_initialize(con, rc, lifespan);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_get_lifespan(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc, krb5_deltat *lifespanp)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan )
+		return(p_krb5_rc_get_lifespan(con, rc, lifespanp);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
+krb5_error_code
+krb5_rc_destroy(krb5_context con, krb5_rcache rc)
+	{
+	if (!krb5_loaded)
+		load_krb5_dll();
+
+	if ( p_krb5_rc_destroy )
+		return(p_krb5_rc_destroy(con, rc);
+	else
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	}
+
 /* Structure definitions  */
 #ifndef NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE
 #ifndef krb5_x
@@ -432,31 +561,37 @@ typedef struct _krb5_cc_ops
 	{
 	krb5_magic magic;
 	char  *prefix;
-	char  * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *,
-		const char  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_principal));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_creds  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_flags, krb5_creds  *,
-		krb5_creds  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_principal  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_cc_cursor  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+	char  * (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_name)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *resolve)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *, const char  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *gen_new)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *init)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *destroy)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *close)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *store)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_creds  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *retrieve)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+		krb5_flags, krb5_creds  *, krb5_creds  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_princ)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_principal  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_first)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *get_next)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
 		krb5_cc_cursor  *, krb5_creds  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_cc_cursor  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *end_get)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_cc_cursor  *));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *remove_cred)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
 		krb5_flags, krb5_creds  *));
-	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags) KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache,
-		krb5_flags));
+	krb5_error_code (KRB5_CALLCONV *set_flags)
+		KRB5_NPROTOTYPE((krb5_context, krb5_ccache, krb5_flags));
 	} krb5_cc_ops;
 #endif /* NO_DEF_KRB5_CCACHE */
 
@@ -468,8 +603,10 @@ kssl_krb5_cc_get_principal
 	if ( p_krb5_cc_get_principal )
 		return(p_krb5_cc_get_principal(context,cache,principal));
 	else
-		return(krb5_x ((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
+		return(krb5_x
+			((cache)->ops->get_princ,(context, cache, principal)));
 	}
+#else
 #endif  /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS || OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32 */
 
 char
@@ -498,6 +635,120 @@ char
 	}
 
 
+/*	Given KRB5 enctype (basically DES or 3DES), return
+*/
+EVP_CIPHER *
+kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype)
+        {
+	switch (enctype)
+		{
+	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_CRC:
+	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD4:
+	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_MD5:
+	case ENCTYPE_DES_CBC_RAW:
+#if ! defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+	case ENCTYPE_DES_HMAC_SHA1:
+#endif
+				return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_cbc();
+				break;
+	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA:
+	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_RAW:
+#if ! defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+	case ENCTYPE_DES3_CBC_SHA1:
+#endif
+				return (EVP_CIPHER *) EVP_des_ede3_cbc();
+				break;
+	default:                return (EVP_CIPHER *) NULL;
+				break;
+		}
+	}
+
+
+/*	Return true:1 if p "looks like" the start of the real authenticator
+**	described in kssl_skip_confound() below.  The ASN.1 pattern is
+**	"62 xx 30 yy" (APPLICATION-2, SEQUENCE), where xx-yy =~ 2, and
+**	xx and yy are possibly multi-byte length fields.
+*/
+int 	kssl_test_confound(unsigned char *p)
+	{
+	int 	len = 2;
+	int 	xx = 0, yy = 0;
+
+	if (*p++ != 0x62)  return 0;
+	if (*p > 0x82)  return 0;
+	switch(*p)  {
+		case 0x82:  p++;          xx = (*p++ << 8);  xx += *p++;  break;
+		case 0x81:  p++;          xx =  *p++;  break;
+		case 0x80:  return 0;
+		default:    xx = *p++;  break;
+		}
+	if (*p++ != 0x30)  return 0;
+	if (*p > 0x82)  return 0;
+	switch(*p)  {
+		case 0x82:  p++; len+=2;  yy = (*p++ << 8);  yy += *p++;  break;
+		case 0x81:  p++; len++;   yy =  *p++;  break;
+		case 0x80:  return 0;
+		default:    yy = *p++;  break;
+		}
+
+	return (xx - len == yy)? 1: 0;
+	}
+
+/*	Allocate, fill, and return cksumlens array of checksum lengths.
+**	This array holds just the unique elements from the krb5_cksumarray[].
+**	array[n] == 0 signals end of data.
+*/
+int 	*populate_cksumlens(void)
+	{
+	int 		i, j, n = krb5_max_cksum+1;
+	static int 	*cklens = NULL;
+
+#ifdef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+	if (!cklens && !(cklens = (int *) calloc(sizeof(int), n)))  return NULL;
+
+	for (i=0; i < krb5_max_cksum; i++)  {
+		if (!krb5_cksumarray[i])  continue;	/*  array has holes  */
+		for (j=0; j < krb5_max_cksum; j++)  {
+			if (cklens[j] == 0)  {
+				cklens[j] = krb5_cksumarray[i]->checksum_length;
+				break;		/*  krb5 elem was new: add   */
+				}
+			if (cklens[j] == krb5_cksumarray[i]->checksum_length)  {
+				break;		/*  ignore duplicate elements */
+				}
+			}
+		}
+#endif	/* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+	return cklens;
+	}
+
+/*	Return pointer to start of real authenticator within authenticator, or
+**	return NULL on error.
+**	Decrypted authenticator looks like this:
+**		[0 or 8 byte confounder] [4-24 byte checksum] [real authent'r]
+**	This hackery wouldn't be necessary if MIT KRB5 1.0.6 had the
+**	krb5_auth_con_getcksumtype() function advertised in its krb5.h.
+*/
+unsigned char	*kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype etype, unsigned char *a)
+	{
+	int 		i, cklen, conlen;
+	static int 	*cksumlens = NULL;
+	unsigned char	*test_auth;
+
+	conlen = (etype)? 8: 0;
+
+	if (!cksumlens  &&  !(cksumlens = populate_cksumlens()))  return NULL;
+	for (i=0; (cklen = cksumlens[i]) != 0; i++)
+		{
+		test_auth = a + conlen + cklen;
+		if (kssl_test_confound(test_auth))  return test_auth;
+		}
+
+	return NULL;
+	}
+
+
 /*	Set kssl_err error info when reason text is a simple string
 **		kssl_err = struct { int reason; char text[KSSL_ERR_MAX+1]; }
 */
@@ -522,10 +773,10 @@ print_krb5_data(char *label, krb5_data *kdata)
 	printf("%s[%d] ", label, kdata->length);
 	for (i=0; i < kdata->length; i++)
                 {
-		if (isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
+		if (0 &&  isprint((int) kdata->data[i]))
                         printf(	"%c ",  kdata->data[i]);
 		else
-                        printf(	"%02x", kdata->data[i]);
+                        printf(	"%02x ", (unsigned char) kdata->data[i]);
 		}
 	printf("\n");
         }
@@ -570,7 +821,8 @@ print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
 		return;
 		}
 #ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype, keyblk->keyvalue->length);
+	printf("%s\n\t[et%d:%d]: ", label, keyblk->keytype,
+					   keyblk->keyvalue->length);
 	for (i=0; i < keyblk->keyvalue->length; i++)
                 {
 		printf("%02x",(unsigned char *)(keyblk->keyvalue->contents)[i]);
@@ -587,21 +839,52 @@ print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk)
         }
 
 
+/*	Display contents of krb5_principal_data struct, for debugging
+**	(krb5_principal is typedef'd == krb5_principal_data *)
+*/
+void
+print_krb5_princ(char *label, krb5_principal_data *princ)
+        {
+	int 	i, j;
+
+	printf("%s principal Realm: ", label);
+	if (princ == NULL)  return;
+	for (i=0; i < princ->realm.length; i++)  putchar(princ->realm.data[i]);
+	printf(" (nametype %d) has %d strings:\n", princ->type,princ->length);
+	for (i=0; i < princ->length; i++)
+                {
+		printf("\t%d [%d]: ", i, princ->data[i].length);
+		for (j=0; j < princ->data[i].length; j++)  {
+			putchar(princ->data[i].data[j]);
+			}
+		printf("\n");
+		}
+	return;
+        }
+
+
 /*	Given krb5 service (typically "kssl") and hostname in kssl_ctx,
-**	Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.
+**	Return encrypted Kerberos ticket for service @ hostname.
+**	If authenp is non-NULL, also return encrypted authenticator,
+**	whose data should be freed by caller.
+**	(Originally was: Create Kerberos AP_REQ message for SSL Client.)
 **
-**	19990628	VRS 	Started.
+**	19990628	VRS 	Started; Returns Kerberos AP_REQ message.
+**	20010409	VRS 	Modified for RFC2712; Returns enc tkt.
+**	20010606	VRS 	May also return optional authenticator.
 */
 krb5_error_code
 kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
-                /* OUT    */	krb5_data *krb5_app_req, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
+                /* OUT    */	krb5_data **enc_ticketp,
+                /* UPDATE */	krb5_data *authenp,
+                /* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR *kssl_err)
 	{
 	krb5_error_code		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
 	krb5_auth_context	krb5auth_context = NULL;
 	krb5_ccache 		krb5ccdef = NULL;
 	krb5_creds		krb5creds, *krb5credsp = NULL;
-	krb5_data 		krb5in_data;
+	krb5_data		krb5_app_req;
 
 	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
 	memset((char *)&krb5creds, 0, sizeof(krb5creds));
@@ -635,7 +918,8 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text,KSSL_ERR_MAX,
                         "krb5_sname_to_principal() fails for %s/%s\n",
                         kssl_ctx->service_host,
-                        (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name: KRB5SVC);
+                        (kssl_ctx->service_name)? kssl_ctx->service_name:
+						  KRB5SVC);
 		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT;
 		goto err;
 		}
@@ -663,26 +947,65 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 		goto err;
 		}
 
-	krb5in_data.data = NULL;
-	krb5in_data.length = 0;
+	*enc_ticketp = &krb5credsp->ticket;
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+	kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->session.keytype;
+#else
+	kssl_ctx->enctype = krb5credsp->keyblock.enctype;
+#endif
 
 	krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
 	/*	caller should free data of krb5_app_req  */
-        if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
-                0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp, krb5_app_req)) != 0)
+	/*  20010406 VRS deleted for real KerberosWrapper
+	**  20010605 VRS reinstated to offer Authenticator to KerberosWrapper
+	*/
+	krb5_app_req.length = 0;
+	if (authenp)
                 {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
-                        "krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
-		goto err;
+		krb5_data	krb5in_data;
+		unsigned char	*p;
+		long		arlen;
+		KRB5_APREQBODY	*ap_req;
+
+		authenp->length = 0;
+		krb5in_data.data = NULL;
+		krb5in_data.length = 0;
+		if ((krb5rc = krb5_mk_req_extended(krb5context,
+			&krb5auth_context, 0, &krb5in_data, krb5credsp,
+			&krb5_app_req)) != 0)
+			{
+			kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ,
+				"krb5_mk_req_extended() fails.\n");
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+		arlen = krb5_app_req.length;
+		p = krb5_app_req.data;
+		ap_req = (KRB5_APREQBODY *) d2i_KRB5_APREQ(NULL, &p, arlen);
+		if (ap_req)
+			{
+			authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+					ap_req->authenticator, NULL);
+			if (authenp->length  && 
+				(authenp->data = malloc(authenp->length)))
+				{
+				unsigned char	*p = authenp->data;
+				authenp->length = i2d_KRB5_ENCDATA(
+						ap_req->authenticator, &p);
+				}
+			}
+
+		if (ap_req)  KRB5_APREQ_free((KRB5_APREQ *) ap_req);
+		if (krb5_app_req.length)  krb5_xfree(krb5_app_req.data);
 		}
 #ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
-	else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
+	if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->session))
                 {
 		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
                         "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
 		}
 #else
-	else if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
+	if (kssl_ctx_setkey(kssl_ctx, &krb5credsp->keyblock))
                 {
 		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT,
                         "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
@@ -695,14 +1018,102 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 	kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if (krb5creds.client)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.client);
-	if (krb5creds.server)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5creds.server);
-	if (krb5auth_context)	krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context, krb5auth_context);
+	if (krb5creds.client)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+							krb5creds.client);
+	if (krb5creds.server)	krb5_free_principal(krb5context,
+							krb5creds.server);
+	if (krb5auth_context)	krb5_auth_con_free(krb5context,
+							krb5auth_context);
 	if (krb5context)	krb5_free_context(krb5context);
 	return (krb5rc);
 	}
 
 
+/*  Given d2i_-decoded asn1ticket, allocate and return a new krb5_ticket.
+**  Return Kerberos error code and kssl_err struct on error.
+**  Allocates krb5_ticket and krb5_principal; caller should free these.
+**
+**	20010410	VRS	Implemented krb5_decode_ticket() as
+**				old_krb5_decode_ticket(). Missing from MIT1.0.6.
+**	20010615	VRS 	Re-cast as openssl/asn1 d2i_*() functions.
+**				Re-used some of the old krb5_decode_ticket()
+**				code here.  This tkt should alloc/free just
+**				like the real thing.
+*/
+krb5_error_code
+kssl_TKT2tkt(	/* IN     */	krb5_context	krb5context,
+		/* IN     */	KRB5_TKTBODY	*asn1ticket,
+		/* OUT    */	krb5_ticket	**krb5ticket,
+		/* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR *kssl_err  )
+        {
+        krb5_error_code			krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+	krb5_ticket 			*new5ticket = NULL;
+	ASN1_GENERALSTRING		*gstr_svc, *gstr_host;
+
+	*krb5ticket = NULL;
+
+	if (asn1ticket == NULL  ||  asn1ticket->realm == NULL  ||
+		asn1ticket->sname == NULL  || 
+		asn1ticket->sname->namestring == NULL  ||
+		asn1ticket->sname->namestring->num < 2)
+		{
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"Null field in asn1ticket.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+		}
+
+	if ((new5ticket = (krb5_ticket *) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_ticket)))==NULL)
+		{
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"Unable to allocate new krb5_ticket.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		return ENOMEM;		/*  or  KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;	*/
+		}
+
+	gstr_svc  = (ASN1_GENERALSTRING*)asn1ticket->sname->namestring->data[0];
+	gstr_host = (ASN1_GENERALSTRING*)asn1ticket->sname->namestring->data[1];
+
+	if ((krb5rc = kssl_build_principal_2(krb5context,
+			&new5ticket->server,
+			asn1ticket->realm->length, asn1ticket->realm->data,
+			gstr_svc->length,  gstr_svc->data,
+			gstr_host->length, gstr_host->data)) != 0)
+		{
+		free(new5ticket);
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"Error building ticket server principal.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		return krb5rc;		/*  or  KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;	*/
+		}
+
+	krb5_princ_type(krb5context, new5ticket->server) =
+			asn1ticket->sname->nametype->data[0];
+	new5ticket->enc_part.enctype = asn1ticket->encdata->etype->data[0];
+	new5ticket->enc_part.kvno = asn1ticket->encdata->kvno->data[0];
+	new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.length =
+			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length;
+	if ((new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data =
+		calloc(1, asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length)) == NULL)
+		{
+		free(new5ticket);
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"Error allocating cipher in krb5ticket.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		return KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+		}
+	else
+		{
+		memcpy(new5ticket->enc_part.ciphertext.data,
+			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->data,
+			asn1ticket->encdata->cipher->length);
+		}
+
+	*krb5ticket = new5ticket;
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+
 /*	Given krb5 service name in KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx (typically "kssl"),
 **		and krb5 AP_REQ message & message length,
 **	Return Kerberos session key and client principle
@@ -711,24 +1122,27 @@ kssl_cget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 **	19990702	VRS 	Started.
 */
 krb5_error_code
-kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
-		/* IN     */	char *msg, int msglen,
-		/* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR *kssl_err  )
+kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx,
+		/* IN     */	krb5_data		*indata,
+		/* OUT    */	krb5_ticket_times	*ttimes,
+		/* OUT    */	KSSL_ERR		*kssl_err  )
         {
         krb5_error_code			krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
         static krb5_context		krb5context = NULL;
 	static krb5_auth_context	krb5auth_context = NULL;
 	krb5_ticket 			*krb5ticket = NULL;
+	KRB5_TKTBODY 			*asn1ticket = NULL;
+	unsigned char			*p;
 	krb5_keytab 			krb5keytab = NULL;
+	krb5_keytab_entry		kt_entry;
 	krb5_principal			krb5server;
-	krb5_data			krb5in_data;
-	krb5_flags			ap_option;
 
 	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
 
 	if (!kssl_ctx)
                 {
-		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT, "No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+					"No kssl_ctx defined.\n");
 		goto err;
 		}
 
@@ -792,21 +1206,89 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 		}
 
 	/*	Actual Kerberos5 krb5_recvauth() has initial conversation here
-	**	o	check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
+	**	o	check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAUTHVERS
+	**		unless KRB5_RECVAUTH_SKIP_VERSION
 	**	o	check KRB5_SENDAUTH_BADAPPLVERS
 	**	o	send "0" msg if all OK
 	*/
 
-	krb5in_data.data = msg;
-	krb5in_data.length = msglen;
-	if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context, &krb5in_data,
-                krb5server, krb5keytab, &ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)
-                {
+	/*  20010411 was using AP_REQ instead of true KerberosWrapper
+	**
+	**  if ((krb5rc = krb5_rd_req(krb5context, &krb5auth_context,
+	**			&krb5in_data, krb5server, krb5keytab,
+	**			&ap_option, &krb5ticket)) != 0)  { Error }
+	*/
+
+	p = indata->data;
+	if ((asn1ticket = (KRB5_TKTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_TICKET(NULL, &p,
+						(long) indata->length)) == NULL)
+		{
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"d2i_KRB5_TICKET() ASN.1 decode failure.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	
+	/* Was:  krb5rc = krb5_decode_ticket(krb5in_data,&krb5ticket)) != 0) */
+	if ((krb5rc = kssl_TKT2tkt(krb5context, asn1ticket, &krb5ticket,
+					kssl_err)) != 0)
+		{
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"Error converting ASN.1 ticket to krb5_ticket.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	if (! krb5_principal_compare(krb5context, krb5server,
+						  krb5ticket->server))  {
+		krb5rc = KRB5_PRINC_NOMATCH;
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"server principal != ticket principal\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((krb5rc = krb5_kt_get_entry(krb5context, krb5keytab,
+			krb5ticket->server, krb5ticket->enc_part.kvno,
+			krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype, &kt_entry)) != 0)  {
 		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
-                        "krb5_rd_req() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
+			"krb5_kt_get_entry() fails with %x.\n", krb5rc);
 		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
 		goto err;
 		}
+	if ((krb5rc = krb5_decrypt_tkt_part(krb5context, &kt_entry.key,
+			krb5ticket)) != 0)  {
+		BIO_snprintf(kssl_err->text, KSSL_ERR_MAX,
+			"krb5_decrypt_tkt_part() failed.\n");
+		kssl_err->reason = SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	else  {
+		krb5_kt_free_entry(krb5context, &kt_entry);
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+		{
+		int i; krb5_address **paddr = krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs;
+		printf("Decrypted ticket fields:\n");
+		printf("\tflags: %X, transit-type: %X",
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags,
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_type);
+		print_krb5_data("\ttransit-data: ",
+			&(krb5ticket->enc_part2->transited.tr_contents));
+		printf("\tcaddrs: %p, authdata: %p\n",
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->caddrs,
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->authorization_data);
+		printf("\tcaddrs:\n");
+		for (i=0; paddr[i] != NULL; i++)
+			{  krb5_data d;
+			d.length=paddr[i]->length; d.data=paddr[i]->contents;
+			print_krb5_data("\t\tIP: ", &d);
+			}
+		printf("\tstart/auth/end times: %d / %d / %d\n",
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime,
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime,
+			krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime);
+		}
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+		}
 
 	krb5rc = KRB5_NO_TKT_SUPPLIED;
 	if (!krb5ticket  ||	!krb5ticket->enc_part2  ||
@@ -829,13 +1311,26 @@ kssl_sget_tkt(	/* UPDATE */	KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,
 		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
                         "kssl_ctx_setkey() fails.\n");
 		}
+	else if (krb5ticket->enc_part2->flags & TKT_FLG_INVALID)
+                {
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_TKT_INVALID;
+                kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET,
+                        "invalid ticket from krb5_rd_req.\n");
+		}
 	else	krb5rc = 0;
 
+	kssl_ctx->enctype	= krb5ticket->enc_part.enctype;
+	ttimes->authtime	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.authtime;
+	ttimes->starttime	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.starttime;
+	ttimes->endtime 	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.endtime;
+	ttimes->renew_till	= krb5ticket->enc_part2->times.renew_till;
+
  err:
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
 	kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
+	if (asn1ticket) 	KRB5_TICKET_free((KRB5_TICKET *) asn1ticket);
         if (krb5keytab)         krb5_kt_close(krb5context, krb5keytab);
 	if (krb5ticket) 	krb5_free_ticket(krb5context, krb5ticket);
 	if (krb5server) 	krb5_free_principal(krb5context, krb5server);
@@ -860,7 +1355,8 @@ kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx)
         {
 	if (kssl_ctx == NULL)  return kssl_ctx;
 
-	if (kssl_ctx->key)  		memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0, kssl_ctx->length);
+	if (kssl_ctx->key)  		memset(kssl_ctx->key, 0,
+							      kssl_ctx->length);
 	if (kssl_ctx->key)  		free(kssl_ctx->key);
 	if (kssl_ctx->client_princ) 	free(kssl_ctx->client_princ);
 	if (kssl_ctx->service_host) 	free(kssl_ctx->service_host);
@@ -953,6 +1449,10 @@ kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text)
 krb5_error_code
 kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
         {
+	int 		length;
+	krb5_enctype	enctype;
+	krb5_octet FAR	*contents = NULL;
+
 	if (!kssl_ctx)  return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
 
 	if (kssl_ctx->key)
@@ -963,8 +1463,18 @@ kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
 
 	if (session)
                 {
-		kssl_ctx->enctype = session->enctype;
-		kssl_ctx->length  = session->length;
+
+#ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
+		length = session->keyvalue->length;
+		enctype = session->keytype;
+		contents = session->keyvalue->contents;
+#else
+		length = session->length;
+		enctype = session->enctype;
+		contents = session->contents;
+#endif
+		kssl_ctx->enctype = enctype;
+		kssl_ctx->length  = length;
 		}
 	else
                 {
@@ -980,7 +1490,7 @@ kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session)
 		return KSSL_CTX_ERR;
 		}
 	else
-		memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, session->contents, session->length);
+		memcpy(kssl_ctx->key, contents, length);
 
 	return KSSL_CTX_OK;
         }
@@ -1026,11 +1536,269 @@ void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data)
 #ifdef KRB5_HEIMDAL
 	data->length = 0;
 	free(data->if (data->data) data);
+#elif defined(KRB5_MIT_OLD11)
+	if (data->data)  {
+		krb5_xfree(data->data);
+		data->data = 0;
+		}
 #else
 	krb5_free_data_contents(NULL, data);
 #endif
 	}
 
+
+/*  Helper function for kssl_validate_times().
+**  We need context->clockskew, but krb5_context is an opaque struct.
+**  So we try to sneek the clockskew out through the replay cache.
+**	If that fails just return a likely default (300 seconds).
+*/
+krb5_deltat	get_rc_clockskew(krb5_context context)
+	{
+	krb5_rcache 	rc;
+	krb5_deltat 	clockskew;
+
+	if (krb5_rc_default(context, &rc))  return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+	if (krb5_rc_initialize(context, rc, 0))  return KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+	if (krb5_rc_get_lifespan(context, rc, &clockskew))  {
+		clockskew = KSSL_CLOCKSKEW;
+		}
+	(void) krb5_rc_destroy(context, rc);
+	return clockskew;
+	}
+
+
+/*  kssl_validate_times() combines (and more importantly exposes)
+**  the MIT KRB5 internal function krb5_validate_times() and the
+**  in_clock_skew() macro.  The authenticator client time is checked
+**  to be within clockskew secs of the current time and the current
+**  time is checked to be within the ticket start and expire times.
+**  Either check may be omitted by supplying a NULL value.
+**  Returns 0 for valid times, SSL_R_KRB5* error codes otherwise.
+**  See Also: (Kerberos source)/krb5/lib/krb5/krb/valid_times.c
+**  20010420 VRS
+*/
+krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(	krb5_timestamp atime,
+					krb5_ticket_times *ttimes)
+	{
+	krb5_deltat 	skew;
+	krb5_timestamp	start, now;
+	krb5_error_code	rc;
+	krb5_context	context;
+
+	if ((rc = krb5_init_context(&context)))	 return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+	skew = get_rc_clockskew(context); 
+	if ((rc = krb5_timeofday(context,&now))) return SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET;
+	krb5_free_context(context);
+
+	if (atime  &&  labs(atime - now) >= skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW;
+
+	if (! ttimes)  return 0;
+
+	start = (ttimes->starttime != 0)? ttimes->starttime: ttimes->authtime;
+	if (start - now > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV;
+	if ((now - ttimes->endtime) > skew)  return SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf("kssl_validate_times: %d |<-  | %d - %d | < %d  ->| %d\n",
+		start, atime, now, skew, ttimes->endtime);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	return 0;
+	}
+
+
+/*  Decode and decrypt given DER-encoded authenticator, then pass
+**  authenticator ctime back in *atimep (or 0 if time unavailable).
+**  Returns krb5_error_code and kssl_err on error.  A NULL 
+**  authenticator (authentp->length == 0) is not considered an error.
+**  Note that kssl_check_authent() makes use of the KRB5 session key;
+**  you must call kssl_sget_tkt() to get the key before calling this routine.
+*/
+krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(
+			/* IN     */	KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx,
+                        /* IN     */   	krb5_data	*authentp,
+			/* OUT    */	krb5_timestamp	*atimep,
+			/* OUT    */    KSSL_ERR	*kssl_err  )
+	{
+        krb5_error_code		krb5rc = 0;
+	KRB5_ENCDATA		*dec_authent = NULL;
+	KRB5_AUTHENTBODY	*auth = NULL;
+	krb5_enctype		enctype;
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;
+	EVP_CIPHER		*enc = NULL;
+	unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+	unsigned char		*p, *unenc_authent, *tbuf = NULL;
+	int 			padl, outl, unencbufsize;
+	struct tm		tm_time, *tm_l, *tm_g;
+	time_t			now, tl, tg, tz_offset;
+
+	*atimep = 0;
+	kssl_err_set(kssl_err, 0, "");
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+	authentp = NULL;
+#else
+#if	KRB5CHECKAUTH == 0
+	authentp = NULL;
+#endif
+#endif	/* KRB5CHECKAUTH */
+
+	if (authentp == NULL  ||  authentp->length == 0)  return 0;
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf("kssl_check_authent: authenticator[%d]:\n",authentp->length);
+	p = authentp->data; 
+	for (padl=0; padl < authentp->length; padl++)  printf("%02x ",p[padl]);
+	printf("\n");
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	unencbufsize = 2 * authentp->length;
+	if ((unenc_authent = calloc(1, unencbufsize)) == NULL)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+			"Unable to allocate authenticator buffer.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	p = authentp->data;
+	if ((dec_authent = d2i_KRB5_ENCDATA(NULL, &p,
+					(long) authentp->length)) == NULL) 
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+                        "Error decoding authenticator.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+		goto err;
+		}
+
+	enctype = dec_authent->etype->data[0];	/* should = kssl_ctx->enctype */
+	enc = kssl_map_enc(enctype);
+	memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);       /* per RFC 1510 */
+
+	EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx, enc, kssl_ctx->key, iv);
+	EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, unenc_authent, &outl,
+			dec_authent->cipher->data, dec_authent->cipher->length);
+	if (outl > unencbufsize)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+                        "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx, &(unenc_authent[outl]), &padl);
+	outl += padl;
+	if (outl > unencbufsize)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+                        "Buffer overflow decrypting authenticator.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf("kssl_check_authent: decrypted authenticator[%d] =\n", outl);
+	for (padl=0; padl < outl; padl++) printf("%02x ",unenc_authent[padl]);
+	printf("\n");
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+	if ((p = kssl_skip_confound(enctype, unenc_authent)) == NULL)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+                        "confounded by authenticator.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	outl -= p - unenc_authent;
+
+	if ((auth = (KRB5_AUTHENTBODY *) d2i_KRB5_AUTHENT(NULL, &p,
+							  (long) outl))==NULL)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+                        "Error decoding authenticator body.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_AP_ERR_BAD_INTEGRITY;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	if ((tbuf = calloc(1, auth->ctime->length + 1)) == NULL)
+		{
+		kssl_err_set(kssl_err, SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT,
+			"Unable to allocate atime buffer.\n");
+		krb5rc = KRB5KRB_ERR_GENERIC;
+		goto err;
+		}
+	else	strncpy(tbuf, auth->ctime->data, auth->ctime->length);
+	
+	if (strptime(tbuf, "%Y%m%d%H%M%S", &tm_time) != NULL)
+		{
+		now  = time(&now);
+		tm_l = localtime(&now); 	tl = mktime(tm_l);
+		tm_g = gmtime(&now);		tg = mktime(tm_g);
+		tz_offset = tg - tl;
+
+		*atimep = mktime(&tm_time) - tz_offset;
+		}
+
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+	printf("kssl_check_authent: client time %s = %d\n", tbuf, *atimep);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+
+ err:
+	if (tbuf)		free(tbuf);
+	if (auth)		KRB5_AUTHENT_free((KRB5_AUTHENT *) auth);
+	if (dec_authent)	KRB5_ENCDATA_free(dec_authent);
+	if (unenc_authent)	free(unenc_authent);
+	return krb5rc;
+	}
+
+
+/*  Replaces krb5_build_principal_ext(), with varargs length == 2 (svc, host),
+**  because I dont't know how to stub varargs.
+**  Returns krb5_error_code == ENOMEM on alloc error, otherwise
+**  passes back newly constructed principal, which should be freed by caller.
+*/
+krb5_error_code  kssl_build_principal_2(
+			/* UPDATE */	krb5_context	context,
+			/* OUT    */	krb5_principal	*princ,
+			/* IN     */	int rlen,  const char *realm,
+			/* IN	  */	int slen,  const char *svc,
+			/* IN	  */	int hlen,  const char *host)
+	{
+	krb5_data		*p_data = NULL;
+	krb5_principal		new_p = NULL;
+        char			*new_r = NULL;
+
+	if ((p_data = (krb5_data *) calloc(2, sizeof(krb5_data))) == NULL  ||
+	    (new_p = (krb5_principal) calloc(1, sizeof(krb5_principal_data)))
+			== NULL)  goto err;
+	new_p->length = 2;
+	new_p->data = p_data;
+
+	if ((new_r = calloc(1, rlen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
+	memcpy(new_r, realm, rlen);
+	krb5_princ_set_realm_length(context, new_p, rlen);
+	krb5_princ_set_realm_data(context, new_p, new_r);
+
+	if ((new_p->data[0].data = calloc(1, slen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
+	memcpy(new_p->data[0].data, svc, slen);
+	new_p->data[0].length = slen;
+
+	if ((new_p->data[1].data = calloc(1, hlen + 1)) == NULL)  goto err;
+	memcpy(new_p->data[1].data, host, hlen);
+	new_p->data[1].length = hlen;
+	
+	krb5_princ_type(context, new_p) = KRB5_NT_UNKNOWN;
+	*princ = new_p;
+	return 0;
+
+ err:
+	if (new_p  &&  new_p[0].data)	free(new_p[0].data);
+	if (new_p  &&  new_p[1].data)	free(new_p[1].data);
+	if (new_p)	free(new_p);
+	if (new_r)	free(new_r);
+	return ENOMEM;
+	}
+
+
 #else /* !OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 
 #if defined(PEDANTIC) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
diff --git a/ssl/kssl.h b/ssl/kssl.h
index ef0fc847b1..7319b3daf2 100644
--- a/ssl/kssl.h
+++ b/ssl/kssl.h
@@ -96,6 +96,17 @@ typedef unsigned char krb5_octet;
 #define KRB5KEYTAB	"/etc/krb5.keytab"
 #endif
 
+#ifndef KRB5SENDAUTH
+#define KRB5SENDAUTH	1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KRB5CHECKAUTH
+#define KRB5CHECKAUTH	1
+#endif
+
+#ifndef KSSL_CLOCKSKEW
+#define	KSSL_CLOCKSKEW	300;
+#endif
 
 #define	KSSL_ERR_MAX	255
 typedef struct kssl_err_st  {
@@ -139,6 +150,8 @@ void print_krb5_keyblock(char *label, krb5_keyblock *keyblk);
 char *kstring(char *string);
 char *knumber(int len, krb5_octet *contents);
 
+EVP_CIPHER *kssl_map_enc(krb5_enctype enctype);
+
 
 /* Public (for use by applications that use OpenSSL with Kerberos 5 support */
 krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setstring(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which, char *text);
@@ -147,13 +160,21 @@ KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx_free(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
 void kssl_ctx_show(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx);
 krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setprinc(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, int which,
         krb5_data *realm, krb5_data *entity);
-krb5_error_code	kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  krb5_data *ap_req,
-        KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
-krb5_error_code	kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  char *msg, int msglen,
-        KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code	kssl_cget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  krb5_data **enc_tktp,
+        krb5_data *authenp, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+krb5_error_code	kssl_sget_tkt(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx,  krb5_data *indata,
+        krb5_ticket_times *ttimes, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
 krb5_error_code kssl_ctx_setkey(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_keyblock *session);
 void	kssl_err_set(KSSL_ERR *kssl_err, int reason, char *text);
 void kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(krb5_context context, krb5_data *data);
+krb5_error_code  kssl_build_principal_2(krb5_context context,
+			krb5_principal *princ, int rlen, const char *realm,
+			int slen, const char *svc, int hlen, const char *host);
+krb5_error_code  kssl_validate_times(krb5_timestamp atime,
+					krb5_ticket_times *ttimes);
+krb5_error_code  kssl_check_authent(KSSL_CTX *kssl_ctx, krb5_data *authentp,
+			            krb5_timestamp *atimep, KSSL_ERR *kssl_err);
+unsigned char	*kssl_skip_confound(krb5_enctype enctype, unsigned char *authn);
 
 #ifdef  __cplusplus
 }
diff --git a/ssl/s3_clnt.c b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
index a700c64417..93a87c4f12 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_clnt.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_clnt.c
@@ -785,13 +785,13 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 	 * certificate, which we don't include in s3_srvr.c */
 	x=sk_X509_value(sk,0);
 	sk=NULL;
- 	/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end */
+ 	/* VRS 19990621: possible memory leak; sk=null ==> !sk_pop_free() @end*/
 
 	pkey=X509_get_pubkey(x);
 
         /* VRS: allow null cert if auth == KRB5 */
-        need_cert =
-                ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms & (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
+        need_cert =	((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms
+			& (SSL_MKEY_MASK|SSL_AUTH_MASK))
                         == (SSL_aKRB5|SSL_kKRB5))? 0: 1;
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
@@ -801,11 +801,12 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
                 s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithms, need_cert);
 #endif    /* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-	if (need_cert  &&  ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
+	if (need_cert && ((pkey == NULL) || EVP_PKEY_missing_parameters(pkey)))
 		{
 		x=NULL;
 		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+			SSL_R_UNABLE_TO_FIND_PUBLIC_KEY_PARAMETERS);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
@@ -814,7 +815,8 @@ static int ssl3_get_server_certificate(SSL *s)
 		{
 		x=NULL;
 		al=SSL3_AL_FATAL;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_SERVER_CERTIFICATE,
+			SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
@@ -1427,65 +1429,121 @@ static int ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                         {
                         krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
                         KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
-                        krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;
+                        /*  krb5_data	krb5_ap_req;  */
+                        krb5_data	*enc_ticket;
+                        krb5_data	authenticator, *authp = NULL;
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX	ciph_ctx;
+			EVP_CIPHER	*enc = NULL;
+			unsigned char	iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+			unsigned char	tmp_buf[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+			unsigned char	epms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH 
+						+ EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+			int 		padl, outl = sizeof(epms);
 
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                         printf("ssl3_send_client_key_exchange(%lx & %lx)\n",
                                 l, SSL_kKRB5);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-                        /*
-                        **	Tried to send random tmp_buf[] as PMS in Kerberos ticket
-                        **	by passing  krb5_mk_req_extended(ctx,authctx,opts, tmp_buf, ...)
-                        **	but: I can't retrieve the PMS on the other side!  There is
-                        **	some indication in the krb5 source that this is only used
-                        **	to generate a checksum.  OTOH, the Tung book shows data
-                        **	("GET widget01.txt") being passed in krb5_mk_req_extended()
-                        **	by way of krb5_sendauth().  I don't get it.
-                        **	Until Kerberos goes 3DES, the big PMS secret would only be
-                        **	encrypted in 1-DES anyway.  So losing the PMS shouldn't be
-                        **	a big deal.
-                        */
-                        krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &krb5_ap_req,
-                                &kssl_err);
+			authp = NULL;
+#ifdef KRB5SENDAUTH
+			if (KRB5SENDAUTH)  authp = &authenticator;
+#endif	/* KRB5SENDAUTH */
+
+                        krb5rc = kssl_cget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, authp,
+				&kssl_err);
+			enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                         {
                         printf("kssl_cget_tkt rtn %d\n", krb5rc);
-                        kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
                         if (krb5rc && kssl_err.text)
-                                printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
+			  printf("kssl_cget_tkt kssl_err=%s\n", kssl_err.text);
                         }
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
                         if (krb5rc)
                                 {
-                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
-                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, kssl_err.reason);
+                                ssl3_send_alert(s,SSL3_AL_FATAL,
+						SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE);
+                                SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+						kssl_err.reason);
                                 goto err;
                                 }
 
-                        /*	Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
-                         */
-                        n = krb5_ap_req.length;
-                        memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
-                        if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
-                                kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
-
-                        /*	19991013 VRS -	3DES is kind of bogus here,
-                        **	at least until Kerberos supports 3DES.  The only
-                        **	real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
-                        **	the other key material ((s->) client_random, server_random)
-                        **	could be sniffed.  Mixing in these nonces should help
-                        **	protect against replay attacks, however.
-                        **
-                        **	Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
+			/*  20010406 VRS - Earlier versions used KRB5 AP_REQ
+			**  in place of RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper, as in:
+			**
+                        **  Send ticket (copy to *p, set n = length)
+                        **  n = krb5_ap_req.length;
+                        **  memcpy(p, krb5_ap_req.data, krb5_ap_req.length);
+                        **  if (krb5_ap_req.data)  
+                        **    kssl_krb5_free_data_contents(NULL,&krb5_ap_req);
                         **
-                        **	memcpy(s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
-                        **	s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
-                        */
+			**  Now using real RFC 2712 KerberosWrapper
+			**  (Thanks to Simon Wilkinson <sxw@sxw.org.uk>)
+			**  Note: 2712 "opaque" types are here replaced
+			**  with a 2-byte length followed by the value.
+			**  Example:
+			**  KerberosWrapper= xx xx asn1ticket 0 0 xx xx encpms
+			**  Where "xx xx" = length bytes.  Shown here with
+			**  optional authenticator omitted.
+			*/
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.Ticket		*/
+			s2n(enc_ticket->length,p);
+			memcpy(p, enc_ticket->data, enc_ticket->length);
+			p+= enc_ticket->length;
+			n = enc_ticket->length + 2;
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.Authenticator	*/
+			if (authp  &&  authp->length)  
+				{
+				s2n(authp->length,p);
+				memcpy(p, authp->data, authp->length);
+				p+= authp->length;
+				n+= authp->length + 2;
+				
+				free(authp->data);
+				authp->data = NULL;
+				authp->length = 0;
+				}
+			else
+				{
+				s2n(0,p);/*  null authenticator length	*/
+				n+=2;
+				}
+ 
+			if (RAND_bytes(tmp_buf,SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) <= 0)
+			    goto err;
+
+			/*  20010420 VRS.  Tried it this way; failed.
+			**	EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc, NULL,NULL);
+			**	EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(&ciph_ctx,
+			**				kssl_ctx->length);
+			**	EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,NULL, key,iv);
+			*/
+
+			memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);  /* per RFC 1510 */
+			EVP_EncryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc, kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+			EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx,epms,&outl,tmp_buf,
+						SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+			EVP_EncryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(epms[outl]),&padl);
+			outl += padl;
+			EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
+			/*  KerberosWrapper.EncryptedPreMasterSecret	*/
+			s2n(outl,p);
+			memcpy(p, epms, outl);
+			p+=outl;
+			n+=outl + 2;
+
                         s->session->master_key_length=
                                 s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-                                        s->session->master_key,	kssl_ctx->key,kssl_ctx->length);
+					s->session->master_key,
+					tmp_buf, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+
+			memset(tmp_buf, 0, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH);
+			memset(epms, 0, outl);
                         }
 #endif
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
diff --git a/ssl/s3_srvr.c b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
index 09fcc59d00..9fcf8c0fdf 100644
--- a/ssl/s3_srvr.c
+++ b/ssl/s3_srvr.c
@@ -66,6 +66,7 @@
 #include <openssl/objects.h>
 #include <openssl/evp.h>
 #include <openssl/x509.h>
+#include <openssl/krb5_asn.h>
 #include "ssl_locl.h"
 
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
@@ -1452,13 +1453,46 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KRB5
         if (l & SSL_kKRB5)
                 {
-                krb5_error_code	krb5rc;
-                KSSL_CTX	*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+                krb5_error_code		krb5rc;
+		krb5_data		enc_ticket;
+		krb5_data		authenticator;
+		krb5_data		enc_pms;
+                KSSL_CTX		*kssl_ctx = s->kssl_ctx;
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX		ciph_ctx;
+		EVP_CIPHER		*enc = NULL;
+		unsigned char		iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH];
+		unsigned char		pms[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH];
+		int 			padl, outl = sizeof(pms);
+		krb5_timestamp		authtime = 0;
+		krb5_ticket_times	ttimes;
 
                 if (!kssl_ctx)  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_new();
-                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx,
-                        s->init_buf->data, s->init_buf->length,
-                        &kssl_err)) != 0)
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		enc_ticket.length = i;
+		enc_ticket.data = p;
+		p+=enc_ticket.length;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		authenticator.length = i;
+		authenticator.data = p;
+		p+=authenticator.length;
+
+		n2s(p,i);
+		enc_pms.length = i;
+		enc_pms.data = p;
+		p+=enc_pms.length;
+
+		if (n != enc_ticket.length + authenticator.length +
+						enc_pms.length + 6)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+
+                if ((krb5rc = kssl_sget_tkt(kssl_ctx, &enc_ticket, &ttimes,
+					&kssl_err)) != 0)
                         {
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                         printf("kssl_sget_tkt rtn %d [%d]\n",
@@ -1471,34 +1505,71 @@ static int ssl3_get_client_key_exchange(SSL *s)
                         goto err;
                         }
 
+		/*  Note: no authenticator is not considered an error,
+		**  but will return authtime == 0.
+		*/
+		if ((krb5rc = kssl_check_authent(kssl_ctx, &authenticator,
+					&authtime, &kssl_err)) != 0)
+			{
+#ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
+                        printf("kssl_check_authent rtn %d [%d]\n",
+                                krb5rc, kssl_err.reason);
+                        if (kssl_err.text)
+                                printf("kssl_err text= %s\n", kssl_err.text);
+#endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
+                        SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+                                kssl_err.reason);
+                        goto err;
+			}
+
+		if ((krb5rc = kssl_validate_times(authtime, &ttimes)) != 0)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_SEND_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, krb5rc);
+                        goto err;
+			}
+
 #ifdef KSSL_DEBUG
                 kssl_ctx_show(kssl_ctx);
 #endif	/* KSSL_DEBUG */
 
-                /*	19991013 VRS -	3DES is kind of bogus here,
-                **	at least until Kerberos supports 3DES.  The only
-                **	real secret is the 8-byte Kerberos session key;
-                **	the other key material (client_random, server_random)
-                **	could be sniffed.  Nonces may help against replays though.
-                **
-                **	Alternate code for Kerberos Purists:
-                **
-                **	memcpy(s->session->master_key,	kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
-                **	s->session->master_key_length = kssl_ctx->length;
-                */
+		enc = kssl_map_enc(kssl_ctx->enctype);
+		memset(iv, 0, EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH);	/* per RFC 1510 */
+
+		EVP_DecryptInit(&ciph_ctx,enc,kssl_ctx->key,iv);
+		EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ciph_ctx, pms,&outl,
+					enc_pms.data, enc_pms.length);
+		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		EVP_DecryptFinal(&ciph_ctx,&(pms[outl]),&padl);
+		outl += padl;
+		if (outl > SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH)
+			{
+			SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
+			goto err;
+			}
+		EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ciph_ctx);
+
                 s->session->master_key_length=
                         s->method->ssl3_enc->generate_master_secret(s,
-                                s->session->master_key, kssl_ctx->key, kssl_ctx->length);
-                /*	Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here, but it caused problems for apache.
-                **	kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
-                **	if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
+                                s->session->master_key, pms, outl);
+
+                /*  Was doing kssl_ctx_free() here,
+		**  but it caused problems for apache.
+                **  kssl_ctx = kssl_ctx_free(kssl_ctx);
+                **  if (s->kssl_ctx)  s->kssl_ctx = NULL;
                 */
                 }
 	else
 #endif	/* OPENSSL_NO_KRB5 */
 		{
 		al=SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE;
-		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
+		SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL3_GET_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE,
+				SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE);
 		goto f_err;
 		}
 
diff --git a/ssl/ssl.h b/ssl/ssl.h
index e2e80dc93f..216afd917f 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl.h
+++ b/ssl/ssl.h
@@ -1459,13 +1459,17 @@ void ERR_load_SSL_strings(void);
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND				 280
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE				 278
 #define SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST				 279
+#define SSL_R_KRB5					 1104
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC				 1094
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED				 1095
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT				 1096
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ				 1097
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET				 1098
 #define SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT				 1099
-#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ				 1100
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ				 1108
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED			 1105
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV				 1106
+#define SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW				 1107
 #define SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH				 159
 #define SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT				 160
 #define SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG				 274
diff --git a/ssl/ssl_err.c b/ssl/ssl_err.c
index 481481b666..26410b9b2a 100644
--- a/ssl/ssl_err.c
+++ b/ssl/ssl_err.c
@@ -273,13 +273,17 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA SSL_str_reasons[]=
 {SSL_R_INVALID_COMMAND                   ,"invalid command"},
 {SSL_R_INVALID_PURPOSE                   ,"invalid purpose"},
 {SSL_R_INVALID_TRUST                     ,"invalid trust"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC                   ,"krb5 c cc princ"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED                   ,"krb5 c get cred"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT                       ,"krb5 c init"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ                     ,"krb5 c mk req"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET                 ,"krb5 s bad ticket"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT                       ,"krb5 s init"},
-{SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ                     ,"krb5 s rd req"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5                              ,"krb5"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_CC_PRINC                   ,"krb5 client cc principal (no tkt?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_GET_CRED                   ,"krb5 client get cred"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_INIT                       ,"krb5 client init"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_C_MK_REQ                     ,"krb5 client mk_req (expired tkt?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_BAD_TICKET                 ,"krb5 server bad ticket"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_INIT                       ,"krb5 server init"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_RD_REQ                     ,"krb5 server rd_req (keytab perms?)"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_EXPIRED                ,"krb5 server tkt expired"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_NYV                    ,"krb5 server tkt not yet valid"},
+{SSL_R_KRB5_S_TKT_SKEW                   ,"krb5 server tkt skew"},
 {SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH                   ,"length mismatch"},
 {SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT                  ,"length too short"},
 {SSL_R_LIBRARY_BUG                       ,"library bug"},