rand: move rand_{unix,vms,vxworks,win}.c without change to preserve history

Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)

4 files changed, 0 insertions, 1832 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 869c2d04dd..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,860 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE
-# define _GNU_SOURCE
-#endif
-#include "e_os.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include <openssl/crypto.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include "internal/dso.h"
-
-#ifdef __linux
-# include <sys/syscall.h>
-# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
-#  include <sys/shm.h>
-#  include <sys/utsname.h>
-# endif
-#endif
-#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/sysctl.h>
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-#if defined(__OpenBSD__)
-# include <sys/param.h>
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
-     || defined(__DJGPP__)
-# include <sys/types.h>
-# include <sys/stat.h>
-# include <fcntl.h>
-# include <unistd.h>
-# include <sys/time.h>
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void);
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-/*
- * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers.  The standard
- * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they
- * are available.
- *
- * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does
- * not require an extra library dependency.  Early versions of glibc
- * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers,
- * so this needs to be checked for.
- *
- * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't
- * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc).  This means
- * an extra check is needed.
- *
- * The final condition is:
- *      "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt"
- *
- * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised
- * macro that might be undefined.
- */
-# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0
-#  if defined(__GLIBC__)
-#   if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
-#    if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17)
-#     define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#    endif
-#   endif
-#  else
-#   define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY
-#  endif
-# endif
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
-          || defined(__DJGPP__) */
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE"
-#endif
-
-#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \
-    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
-    || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
-
-# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
-
-#  ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-#   error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-#   error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time."
-#  endif
-#  if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32)
-#   error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32"
-#  endif
-
-/*
- * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
- * generate a sequence of unpredictable data.  The algorithm relies upon the
- * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
- * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
- * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
- * it can be read.  If it is ported to an environment where execution speed
- * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
- * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results
- * would be far more predictable.  This should only be used for legacy
- * platforms.
- *
- * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte.
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    short int code;
-    int i, k;
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    struct timespec ts;
-    unsigned char v;
-#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
-    long duration;
-    extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#  else
-    long long duration;
-    extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#  endif
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/);
-
-    for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) {
-        /*
-         * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
-         * interference, etc.
-         */
-        for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
-            ts.tv_nsec = random();
-
-#  ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
-        /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us).  */
-        duration = 1;
-        s$sleep(&duration, &code);
-#  else
-        /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us).  */
-        duration = 1;
-        s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
-#  endif
-
-        /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */
-        clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-        v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF);
-        rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2);
-    }
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-# else
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \
-        (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD))
-#   error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-#   error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured"
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-#   if !defined(DEVRANDOM)
-#    error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured"
-#   endif
-#   define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
-#   define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-#   error "librandom not (yet) supported"
-#  endif
-
-#  if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-/*
- * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
- * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
- */
-static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
-    int mib[2];
-    size_t done = 0;
-    size_t len;
-
-    /*
-     * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
-     * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
-     */
-
-    /*
-     * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
-     * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
-     * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
-     * multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
-     */
-#if   defined(__FreeBSD__)
-    if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
-        errno = EINVAL;
-        return -1;
-    }
-#endif
-
-    /*
-     * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
-     * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0
-     * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting
-     * up to 256 bytes.
-     * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
-     */
-#if   defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
-    errno = ENOSYS;
-    return -1;
-#endif
-
-    mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
-    mib[1] = KERN_ARND;
-
-    do {
-        len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen;
-        if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
-            return done > 0 ? done : -1;
-        done += len;
-        buf += len;
-        buflen -= len;
-    } while (buflen > 0);
-
-    return done;
-}
-#  endif
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-
-#   if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom)
-#    if defined(__arm__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384)
-#    elif defined(__i386__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    355
-#    elif defined(__x86_64__)
-#     if defined(__ILP32__)
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318)
-#     else
-#      define __NR_getrandom   318
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__xtensa__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    338
-#    elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    349
-#    elif defined(__bfin__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    389
-#    elif defined(__powerpc__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    359
-#    elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64)
-#     if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 353)
-#     elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 313)
-#     elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32
-#      define __NR_getrandom   (__NR_Linux + 317)
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__hppa__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    (__NR_Linux + 339)
-#    elif defined(__sparc__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    347
-#    elif defined(__ia64__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    1339
-#    elif defined(__alpha__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    511
-#    elif defined(__sh__)
-#     if defined(__SH5__)
-#      define __NR_getrandom   373
-#     else
-#      define __NR_getrandom   384
-#     endif
-#    elif defined(__avr32__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    317
-#    elif defined(__microblaze__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    385
-#    elif defined(__m68k__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    352
-#    elif defined(__cris__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    356
-#    elif defined(__aarch64__)
-#     define __NR_getrandom    278
-#    else /* generic */
-#     define __NR_getrandom    278
-#    endif
-#   endif
-
-/*
- * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
- * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
- */
-static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
-{
-    /*
-     * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
-     * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
-     *
-     *   2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14
-     *
-     * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
-     * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
-     */
-
-    /*
-     * Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
-     *
-     * Known OSs that should support this:
-     * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0).
-     * - Solaris since 11.3
-     * - OpenBSD since 5.6
-     * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25
-     * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
-     */
-#  if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
-    extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
-
-    if (getentropy != NULL)
-        return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#  elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-    union {
-        void *p;
-        int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
-    } p_getentropy;
-
-    /*
-     * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't
-     * call this function often.
-     */
-    ERR_set_mark();
-    p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
-    ERR_pop_to_mark();
-    if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
-        return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
-#  endif
-
-    /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
-#  if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom)
-    return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
-#  elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
-    return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
-#  else
-    errno = ENOSYS;
-    return -1;
-#  endif
-}
-#  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */
-
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM };
-static struct random_device {
-    int fd;
-    dev_t dev;
-    ino_t ino;
-    mode_t mode;
-    dev_t rdev;
-} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)];
-static int keep_random_devices_open = 1;
-
-#   if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \
-       && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-static void *shm_addr;
-
-#    if !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-static void cleanup_shm(void)
-{
-    shmdt(shm_addr);
-}
-#    endif
-
-/*
- * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded.
- * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device
- * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy.  Subsequent starts
- * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this.
- */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
-    static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0;
-    static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL };
-    int kernel[2];
-    int shm_id, fd, r;
-    char c, *p;
-    struct utsname un;
-    fd_set fds;
-
-    if (!seeded) {
-        /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */
-        if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) {
-            /*
-             * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent.
-             *
-             * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that
-             * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes
-             * readable.  However, such kernels support the getentropy(2)
-             * system call and this should always succeed which renders
-             * this alternative but essentially identical source moot.
-             */
-            if (uname(&un) == 0) {
-                kernel[0] = atoi(un.release);
-                p = strchr(un.release, '.');
-                kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1);
-                if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0]
-                    || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0]
-                        && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) {
-                    return 0;
-                }
-            }
-            /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */
-            if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) {
-                if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) {
-                    FD_ZERO(&fds);
-                    FD_SET(fd, &fds);
-                    while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0
-                           && errno == EINTR);
-                } else {
-                    while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR);
-                }
-                close(fd);
-                if (r == 1) {
-                    seeded = 1;
-                    /* Create the shared memory indicator */
-                    shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1,
-                                    IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH);
-                }
-            }
-        }
-        if (shm_id != -1) {
-            seeded = 1;
-            /*
-             * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction.
-             * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem.
-             */
-            shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY);
-#    ifndef FIPS_MODULE
-            /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */
-            if (shm_addr != (void *)-1)
-                OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm);
-#    endif
-        }
-    }
-    return seeded;
-}
-#   else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */
-static int wait_random_seeded(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-#   endif
-
-/*
- * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is
- * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not
- * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing.
- * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening
- * another file.
- */
-static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd)
-{
-    struct stat st;
-
-    return rd->fd != -1
-           && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1
-           && rd->dev == st.st_dev
-           && rd->ino == st.st_ino
-           && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0
-           && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev;
-}
-
-/*
- * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error
- */
-static int get_random_device(size_t n)
-{
-    struct stat st;
-    struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
-    /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */
-    if (check_random_device(rd))
-        return rd->fd;
-
-    /* open the random device ... */
-    if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1)
-        return rd->fd;
-
-    /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */
-    if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) {
-        rd->dev = st.st_dev;
-        rd->ino = st.st_ino;
-        rd->mode = st.st_mode;
-        rd->rdev = st.st_rdev;
-    } else {
-        close(rd->fd);
-        rd->fd = -1;
-    }
-
-    return rd->fd;
-}
-
-/*
- * Close a random device making sure it is a random device
- */
-static void close_random_device(size_t n)
-{
-    struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n];
-
-    if (check_random_device(rd))
-        close(rd->fd);
-    rd->fd = -1;
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
-        random_devices[i].fd = -1;
-
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-    size_t i;
-
-    for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++)
-        close_random_device(i);
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-    if (!keep)
-        rand_pool_cleanup();
-
-    keep_random_devices_open = keep;
-}
-
-#  else     /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-#  endif    /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */
-
-/*
- * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful.
- *
- * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it
- * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected
- * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add
- * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources?
- *
- * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the
- * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source
- * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but
- * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without
- * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which
- * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount
- * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality,
- * possibility of blocking).
- */
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-#  if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#  else
-    size_t entropy_available;
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM)
-    {
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        ssize_t bytes;
-        /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
-        int attempts = 3;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
-            buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-            bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
-            if (bytes > 0) {
-                rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-                bytes_needed -= bytes;
-                attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
-            } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
-                break;
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM)
-    {
-        /* Not yet implemented. */
-    }
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
-    if (wait_random_seeded()) {
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        size_t i;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths);
-             i++) {
-            ssize_t bytes = 0;
-            /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
-            int attempts = 3;
-            const int fd = get_random_device(i);
-
-            if (fd == -1)
-                continue;
-
-            while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
-                buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-                bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
-
-                if (bytes > 0) {
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-                    bytes_needed -= bytes;
-                    attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */
-                } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
-                    break;
-                }
-            }
-            if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
-                close_random_device(i);
-
-            bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
-        }
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        if (entropy_available > 0)
-            return entropy_available;
-    }
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC)
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU)
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-#   endif
-
-#   if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD)
-    {
-        static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
-        size_t bytes_needed;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-        int i;
-
-        bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-        for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) {
-            size_t bytes = 0;
-            int num;
-
-            buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-            num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i],
-                                       buffer, (int)bytes_needed);
-            if (num == (int)bytes_needed)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-
-            rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-            bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
-        }
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-        if (entropy_available > 0)
-            return entropy_available;
-    }
-#   endif
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#  endif
-}
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \
-     || defined(__DJGPP__)
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        pid_t pid;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
-     * different process instances.
-     */
-    data.pid = getpid();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        int fork_id;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
-     * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety.
-     * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
-     * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
-     */
-    data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-
-/*
- * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating.
- * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock
- * is synchronized.
- */
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
-# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
-    {
-        struct timespec ts;
-
-        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
-     || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
-    {
-        struct timeval tv;
-
-        if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
-    }
-# endif
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution
- *
- * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data,
- * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result
- * is acceptable.
- */
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
-    uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-
-    if (res != 0)
-        return res;
-
-# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
-    return gethrtime();
-# elif defined(_AIX)
-    {
-        timebasestruct_t t;
-
-        read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ);
-        return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low);
-    }
-# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY)
-    {
-        struct timespec ts;
-
-#  ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME
-#  elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK)
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC
-#  else
-#   define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME
-#  endif
-
-        if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    }
-# endif
-# if defined(__unix__) \
-     || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L)
-    {
-        struct timeval tv;
-
-        if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0)
-            return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec);
-    }
-# endif
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS))
-          || defined(__DJGPP__) */
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 6b9fa2c725..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,614 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "e_os.h"
-
-#define __NEW_STARLET 1         /* New starlet definitions since VMS 7.0 */
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include <descrip.h>
-#include <dvidef.h>
-#include <jpidef.h>
-#include <rmidef.h>
-#include <syidef.h>
-#include <ssdef.h>
-#include <starlet.h>
-#include <efndef.h>
-#include <gen64def.h>
-#include <iosbdef.h>
-#include <iledef.h>
-#include <lib$routines.h>
-#ifdef __DECC
-# pragma message disable DOLLARID
-#endif
-
-#include <dlfcn.h>              /* SYS$GET_ENTROPY presence */
-
-#ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-#endif
-
-/*
- * DATA COLLECTION METHOD
- * ======================
- *
- * This is a method to get low quality entropy.
- * It works by collecting all kinds of statistical data that
- * VMS offers and using them as random seed.
- */
-
-/* We need to make sure we have the right size pointer in some cases */
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size save
-# pragma pointer_size 32
-#endif
-typedef uint32_t *uint32_t__ptr32;
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# pragma pointer_size restore
-#endif
-
-struct item_st {
-    short length, code;         /* length is number of bytes */
-};
-
-static const struct item_st DVI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   DVI$_ERRCNT},
-    {4,   DVI$_REFCNT},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   JPI$_BUFIO},
-    {4,   JPI$_CPUTIM},
-    {4,   JPI$_DIRIO},
-    {4,   JPI$_IMAGECOUNT},
-    {4,   JPI$_PAGEFLTS},
-    {4,   JPI$_PID},
-    {4,   JPI$_PPGCNT},
-    {4,   JPI$_WSPEAK},
-    /*
-     * Note: the direct result is just a 32-bit address.  However, it points
-     * to a list of 4 32-bit words, so we make extra space for them so we can
-     * do in-place replacement of values
-     */
-    {16,  JPI$_FINALEXC},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st JPI_item_data_64bit[] = {
-    {8,   JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I},
-    {8,   JPI$_LOGINTIM},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st RMI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   RMI$_COLPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_MWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_CEF},
-    {4,   RMI$_PFW},
-    {4,   RMI$_LEF},
-    {4,   RMI$_LEFO},
-    {4,   RMI$_HIB},
-    {4,   RMI$_HIBO},
-    {4,   RMI$_SUSP},
-    {4,   RMI$_SUSPO},
-    {4,   RMI$_FPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_COM},
-    {4,   RMI$_COMO},
-    {4,   RMI$_CUR},
-#if defined __alpha
-    {4,   RMI$_FRLIST},
-    {4,   RMI$_MODLIST},
-#endif
-    {4,   RMI$_FAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_PREADS},
-    {4,   RMI$_PWRITES},
-    {4,   RMI$_PWRITIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_PREADIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_GVALFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_WRTINPROG},
-    {4,   RMI$_FREFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_DZROFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_SYSFAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_ISWPCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFIO},
-    {4,   RMI$_MBREADS},
-    {4,   RMI$_MBWRITES},
-    {4,   RMI$_LOGNAM},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCALLS},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPREAD},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPWRITE},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCACHE},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCPU},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPHIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPSPLIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPFAULT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEW},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQ},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKAST},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNOTQD},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKSRCH},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKFND},
-    {4,   RMI$_NUMLOCKS},
-    {4,   RMI$_NUMRES},
-    {4,   RMI$_ARRLOCPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEPLOCPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_ARRTRAPK},
-    {4,   RMI$_TRCNGLOS},
-    {4,   RMI$_RCVBUFFL},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQNEWOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_ENQCVTOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_DEQOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_BLKOUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRIN},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIROUT},
-    /* We currently get a fault when trying these.  TODO: To be figured out. */
-#if 0
-    {140, RMI$_MSCP_EVERYTHING},   /* 35 32-bit words */
-    {152, RMI$_DDTM_ALL},          /* 38 32-bit words */
-    {80,  RMI$_TMSCP_EVERYTHING}   /* 20 32-bit words */
-#endif
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_PAGCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_HITS},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_MISSES},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_EXPCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_ALLOCF},
-    {4,   RMI$_LPZ_ALLOC2},
-    {4,   RMI$_ACCESS},
-    {4,   RMI$_ALLOC},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPCREATE},
-    {4,   RMI$_VOLWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPTURN},
-    {4,   RMI$_FCPERASE},
-    {4,   RMI$_OPENS},
-    {4,   RMI$_FIDHIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_FIDMISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_FILHDR_HIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRFCB_HIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRFCB_MISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRDATA_HIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_EXTHIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_EXTMISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_QUOHIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_QUOMISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_STORAGMAP_HIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_VOLLCK},
-    {4,   RMI$_SYNCHLCK},
-    {4,   RMI$_SYNCHWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ACCLCK},
-    {4,   RMI$_XQPCACHEWAIT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DIRDATA_MISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_FILHDR_MISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_STORAGMAP_MISS},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCCNTMAX},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCBATCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCINTCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCNETCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCSWITCHCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCBALSETCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_PROCLOADCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_BADFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_EXEFAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_HDRINSWAPS},
-    {4,   RMI$_HDROUTSWAPS},
-    {4,   RMI$_IOPAGCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_ISWPCNTPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_OSWPCNT},
-    {4,   RMI$_OSWPCNTPG},
-    {4,   RMI$_RDFAULTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_TRANSFLTS},
-    {4,   RMI$_WRTFAULTS},
-#if defined __alpha
-    {4,   RMI$_USERPAGES},
-#endif
-    {4,   RMI$_VMSPAGES},
-    {4,   RMI$_TTWRITES},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAG},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAK},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS01},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS2},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS01},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS2},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS01},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS2},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS01},
-    {4,   RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS2},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCK_INCMPLT},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKMSGS_IN},
-    {4,   RMI$_DLCKMSGS_OUT},
-    {4,   RMI$_MCHKERRS},
-    {4,   RMI$_MEMERRS},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st RMI_item_data_64bit[] = {
-#if defined __ia64
-    {8,   RMI$_FRLIST},
-    {8,   RMI$_MODLIST},
-#endif
-    {8,   RMI$_LCKMGR_REQCNT},
-    {8,   RMI$_LCKMGR_REQTIME},
-    {8,   RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINCNT},
-    {8,   RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINTIME},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUINTSTK},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUMPSYNCH},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUKERNEL},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUEXEC},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUSUPER},
-    {8,   RMI$_CPUUSER},
-#if defined __ia64
-    {8,   RMI$_USERPAGES},
-#endif
-    {8,   RMI$_TQETOTAL},
-    {8,   RMI$_TQESYSUB},
-    {8,   RMI$_TQEUSRTIMR},
-    {8,   RMI$_TQEUSRWAKE},
-};
-
-static const struct item_st SYI_item_data[] = {
-    {4,   SYI$_PAGEFILE_FREE},
-};
-
-/*
- * Input:
- * items_data           - an array of lengths and codes
- * items_data_num       - number of elements in that array
- *
- * Output:
- * items                - pre-allocated ILE3 array to be filled.
- *                        It's assumed to have items_data_num elements plus
- *                        one extra for the terminating NULL element
- * databuffer           - pre-allocated 32-bit word array.
- *
- * Returns the number of elements used in databuffer
- */
-static size_t prepare_item_list(const struct item_st *items_input,
-                                size_t items_input_num,
-                                ILE3 *items,
-                                uint32_t__ptr32 databuffer)
-{
-    size_t data_sz = 0;
-
-    for (; items_input_num-- > 0; items_input++, items++) {
-
-        items->ile3$w_code = items_input->code;
-        /* Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC */
-        if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC)
-            items->ile3$w_length = 4;
-        else
-            items->ile3$w_length = items_input->length;
-
-        items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = databuffer;
-        items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = 0;
-
-        databuffer += items_input->length / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
-        data_sz += items_input->length;
-    }
-    /* Terminating NULL entry */
-    items->ile3$w_length = items->ile3$w_code = 0;
-    items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = NULL;
-
-    return data_sz / sizeof(databuffer[0]);
-}
-
-static void massage_JPI(ILE3 *items)
-{
-    /*
-     * Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC
-     * The result of that item's data buffer is a 32-bit address to a list of
-     * 4 32-bit words.
-     */
-    for (; items->ile3$w_length != 0; items++) {
-        if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC) {
-            uint32_t *data = items->ile3$ps_bufaddr;
-            uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)*data;
-            size_t j;
-
-            /*
-             * We know we made space for 4 32-bit words, so we can do in-place
-             * replacement.
-             */
-            for (j = 0; j < 4; j++)
-                data[j] = ptr[j];
-
-            break;
-        }
-    }
-}
-
-/*
- * This number expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy.
- *
- * For the moment, we assume about 0.05 entropy bits per data bit, or 1
- * bit of entropy per 20 data bits.
- */
-#define ENTROPY_FACTOR  20
-
-size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    ILE3 JPI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
-    ILE3 RMI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) + 1];
-    ILE3 DVI_items[OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data) + 1];
-    ILE3 JPI_items[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data) + 1];
-    ILE3 RMI_items[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data) + 1];
-    ILE3 SYI_items[OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data) + 1];
-    union {
-        /* This ensures buffer starts at 64 bit boundary */
-        uint64_t dummy;
-        uint32_t buffer[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) * 2
-                        + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) * 2
-                        + OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data)
-                        + OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data)
-                        + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data)
-                        + OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data)
-                        + 4 /* For JPI$_FINALEXC */];
-    } data;
-    size_t total_elems = 0;
-    size_t total_length = 0;
-    size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR);
-    size_t bytes_remaining = rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool);
-
-    /* Take all the 64-bit items first, to ensure proper alignment of data */
-    total_elems +=
-        prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit),
-                          JPI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    total_elems +=
-        prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit),
-                          RMI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    /* Now the 32-bit items */
-    total_elems += prepare_item_list(DVI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data),
-                                     DVI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    total_elems += prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data),
-                                     JPI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    total_elems += prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data),
-                                     RMI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    total_elems += prepare_item_list(SYI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data),
-                                     SYI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]);
-    total_length = total_elems * sizeof(data.buffer[0]);
-
-    /* Fill data.buffer with various info bits from this process */
-    {
-        uint32_t status;
-        uint32_t efn;
-        IOSB iosb;
-        $DESCRIPTOR(SYSDEVICE,"SYS$SYSDEVICE:");
-
-        if ((status = sys$getdviw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, &SYSDEVICE, DVI_items,
-                                  0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items_64bit, 0, 0, 0))
-            != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items, 0, 0, 0))
-            != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$getsyiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, SYI_items, 0, 0, 0))
-            != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        /*
-         * The RMI service is a bit special, as there is no synchronous
-         * variant, so we MUST create an event flag to synchronise on.
-         */
-        if ((status = lib$get_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items_64bit, &iosb, 0, 0))
-            != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items, &iosb, 0, 0))
-            != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-        if ((status = lib$free_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-    }
-
-    massage_JPI(JPI_items);
-
-    /*
-     * If we can't feed the requirements from the caller, we're in deep trouble.
-     */
-    if (!ossl_assert(total_length >= bytes_needed)) {
-        ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_UNDERFLOW,
-                       "Needed: %zu, Available: %zu",
-                       bytes_needed, total_length);
-        return 0;
-    }
-
-    /*
-     * Try not to overfeed the pool
-     */
-    if (total_length > bytes_remaining)
-        total_length = bytes_remaining;
-
-    /* We give the pessimistic value for the amount of entropy */
-    rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length,
-                  8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR);
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        pid_t pid;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp
-     * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that
-     * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process
-     * instances.
-     */
-    data.pid = getpid();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
-    sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
-#else
-    sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
-#endif
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-/*
- * SYS$GET_ENTROPY METHOD
- * ======================
- *
- * This is a high entropy method based on a new system service that is
- * based on getentropy() from FreeBSD 12.  It's only used if available,
- * and its availability is detected at run-time.
- *
- * We assume that this function provides full entropy random output.
- */
-#define PUBLIC_VECTORS "SYS$LIBRARY:SYS$PUBLIC_VECTORS.EXE"
-#define GET_ENTROPY "SYS$GET_ENTROPY"
-
-static int get_entropy_address_flag = 0;
-static int (*get_entropy_address)(void *buffer, size_t buffer_size) = NULL;
-static int init_get_entropy_address(void)
-{
-    if (get_entropy_address_flag == 0)
-        get_entropy_address = dlsym(dlopen(PUBLIC_VECTORS, 0), GET_ENTROPY);
-    get_entropy_address_flag = 1;
-    return get_entropy_address != NULL;
-}
-
-size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    /*
-     * The documentation says that SYS$GET_ENTROPY will give a maximum of
-     * 256 bytes of data.
-     */
-    unsigned char buffer[256];
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    size_t bytes_to_get = 0;
-    uint32_t status;
-
-    for (bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1);
-         bytes_needed > 0;
-         bytes_needed -= bytes_to_get) {
-        bytes_to_get =
-            bytes_needed > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : bytes_needed;
-
-        status = get_entropy_address(buffer, bytes_to_get);
-        if (status == SS$_RETRY) {
-            /* Set to zero so the loop doesn't diminish |bytes_needed| */
-            bytes_to_get = 0;
-            /* Should sleep some amount of time */
-            continue;
-        }
-
-        if (status != SS$_NORMAL) {
-            lib$signal(status);
-            return 0;
-        }
-
-        rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get);
-    }
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-/*
- * MAIN ENTROPY ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS
- * ==================================
- *
- * These functions are called by the RAND / DRBG functions
- */
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    if (init_get_entropy_address())
-        return get_entropy_method(pool);
-    return data_collect_method(pool);
-}
-
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
-     * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
-     * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
-     */
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000
-    sys$gettim_prec(&data.time);
-#else
-    sys$gettim((void*)&data.time);
-#endif
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vxworks.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vxworks.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 427d50d263..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vxworks.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <version.h>
-#include <taskLib.h>
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
-/* none means none */
-# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS)
-# if _WRS_VXWORKS_MAJOR >= 7
-#   define RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB
-# else
-#   error "VxWorks <7 only support RAND_SEED_NONE"
-# endif
-#endif
-
-#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
-# include <randomNumGen.h>
-#endif
-
-/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */
-#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b))
-
-static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void)
-{
-    struct timespec ts;
-
-    if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0)
-        return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-
-static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void)
-{
-    uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
-    struct timespec ts;
-
-    if (res != 0)
-        return res;
-
-    if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0)
-        return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec);
-    return time(NULL);
-}
-
-/*
- * empty implementation
- * vxworks does not need to init/cleanup or keep open the random lib
- */
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
-     * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
-     * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
-     */
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_timer_bits();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        pid_t pid;
-        CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid;
-        uint64_t time;
-    } data;
-
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
-     * different process instances.
-     */
-    data.pid = getpid();
-    data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id();
-    data.time = get_time_stamp();
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB)
-    /* vxRandLib based entropy method */
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    if (bytes_needed > 0)
-    {
-        int retryCount = 0;
-        STATUS result = ERROR;
-        unsigned char *buffer;
-
-        buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-        while ((result != OK) && (retryCount < 10)) {
-            RANDOM_NUM_GEN_STATUS status = randStatus();
-
-            if ((status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_ENOUGH_ENTROPY)
-                    || (status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_MAX_ENTROPY) ) {
-                result = randBytes(buffer, bytes_needed);
-                if (result == OK)
-                    rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed);
-                /*
-                 * no else here: randStatus said ok, if randBytes failed
-                 * it will result in another loop or no entropy
-                 */
-            } else {
-                /*
-                 * give a minimum delay here to allow OS to collect more
-                 * entropy. taskDelay duration will depend on the system tick,
-                 * this is by design as the sw-random lib uses interrupts
-                 * which will at least happen during ticks
-                 */
-                taskDelay(5);
-            }
-            retryCount++;
-        }
-    }
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#else
-    /*
-     * SEED_NONE means none, without randlib we dont have entropy and
-     * rely on it being added externally
-     */
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-#endif /* defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) */
-}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 89f9d6f1f6..0000000000
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,192 +0,0 @@
-/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- *
- * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
- * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
- * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
- * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
- */
-
-#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
-#include <openssl/rand.h>
-#include "rand_local.h"
-#include "crypto/rand.h"
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-
-# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
-#  error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os"
-# endif
-
-# include <windows.h>
-/* On Windows Vista or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
-# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER > 1500 /* 1500 = Visual Studio 2008 */ \
-     && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
-#  define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-# endif
-
-# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-#  include <bcrypt.h>
-#  pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib")
-#  ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS
-#   define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L)
-#  endif
-# else
-#  include <wincrypt.h>
-/*
- * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
- * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
- */
-#  define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
-#  define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
-# endif
-
-size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-    HCRYPTPROV hProvider;
-# endif
-    unsigned char *buffer;
-    size_t bytes_needed;
-    size_t entropy_available = 0;
-
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU
-    entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool);
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-    if (buffer != NULL) {
-        size_t bytes = 0;
-        if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed,
-                            BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS)
-            bytes = bytes_needed;
-
-        rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-    }
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-# else
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-    if (buffer != NULL) {
-        size_t bytes = 0;
-        /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
-        if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
-                                 CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
-            if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-
-            CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
-        }
-
-        rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-    }
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-
-    bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
-    buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
-    if (buffer != NULL) {
-        size_t bytes = 0;
-        /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
-        if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL,
-                                 INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC,
-                                 CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) {
-            if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0)
-                bytes = bytes_needed;
-
-            CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
-        }
-        rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
-        entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-    }
-    if (entropy_available > 0)
-        return entropy_available;
-# endif
-
-    return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
-}
-
-
-int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        DWORD pid;
-        DWORD tid;
-        FILETIME time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to
-     * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for
-     * different process instances.
-     */
-    data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId();
-    data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
-    GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time);
-
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
-{
-    struct {
-        DWORD tid;
-        LARGE_INTEGER time;
-    } data;
-
-    /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */
-    memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
-
-    /*
-     * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer.
-     * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed
-     * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg).
-     */
-    data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId();
-    QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time);
-    return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
-}
-
-# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE)
-int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
-{
-    RAND_poll();
-    return RAND_status();
-}
-
-void RAND_screen(void)
-{
-    RAND_poll();
-}
-# endif
-
-int rand_pool_init(void)
-{
-    return 1;
-}
-
-void rand_pool_cleanup(void)
-{
-}
-
-void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
-{
-}
-
-#endif