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author | Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <matthias.st.pierre@ncp-e.com> | 2020-05-19 18:18:48 +0200 |
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committer | Pauli <paul.dale@oracle.com> | 2020-06-24 12:05:41 +0200 |
commit | b47cfbb5f66f14daf44ebc1bb5ab4d6af916386e (patch) | |
tree | 6f30009dccd696ea0bb3f508572ea231d0777b1e /providers | |
parent | params: add OSSL_PARAM helpers for time_t. (diff) | |
download | openssl-b47cfbb5f66f14daf44ebc1bb5ab4d6af916386e.tar.xz openssl-b47cfbb5f66f14daf44ebc1bb5ab4d6af916386e.zip |
rand: move rand_{unix,vms,vxworks,win}.c without change to preserve history
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)
Diffstat (limited to 'providers')
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c | 860 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c | 614 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c | 166 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c | 192 |
4 files changed, 1832 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..869c2d04dd --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_unix.c @@ -0,0 +1,860 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#ifndef _GNU_SOURCE +# define _GNU_SOURCE +#endif +#include "e_os.h" +#include <stdio.h> +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include <openssl/crypto.h> +#include "rand_local.h" +#include "crypto/rand.h" +#include <stdio.h> +#include "internal/dso.h" + +#ifdef __linux +# include <sys/syscall.h> +# ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT +# include <sys/shm.h> +# include <sys/utsname.h> +# endif +#endif +#if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) +# include <sys/types.h> +# include <sys/sysctl.h> +# include <sys/param.h> +#endif +#if defined(__OpenBSD__) +# include <sys/param.h> +#endif + +#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \ + || defined(__DJGPP__) +# include <sys/types.h> +# include <sys/stat.h> +# include <fcntl.h> +# include <unistd.h> +# include <sys/time.h> + +static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void); +static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void); + +/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */ +# define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b)) + +/* + * Check for the existence and support of POSIX timers. The standard + * says that the _POSIX_TIMERS macro will have a positive value if they + * are available. + * + * However, we want an additional constraint: that the timer support does + * not require an extra library dependency. Early versions of glibc + * require -lrt to be specified on the link line to access the timers, + * so this needs to be checked for. + * + * It is worse because some libraries define __GLIBC__ but don't + * support the version testing macro (e.g. uClibc). This means + * an extra check is needed. + * + * The final condition is: + * "have posix timers and either not glibc or glibc without -lrt" + * + * The nested #if sequences are required to avoid using a parameterised + * macro that might be undefined. + */ +# undef OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY +# if defined(_POSIX_TIMERS) && _POSIX_TIMERS > 0 +# if defined(__GLIBC__) +# if defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ) +# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 17) +# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY +# endif +# endif +# else +# define OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY +# endif +# endif +#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) + || defined(__DJGPP__) */ + +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) +/* none means none. this simplifies the following logic */ +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD +#endif + +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI) && !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) +# error "UEFI only supports seeding NONE" +#endif + +#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) \ + || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \ + || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) + +# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS) + +# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os" +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32) +# error "Unsupported HP-PA and IA32 at the same time." +# endif +# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32) +# error "Must have one of HP-PA or IA32" +# endif + +/* + * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to + * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the + * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses, + * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large + * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which + * it can be read. If it is ported to an environment where execution speed + * is more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the + * clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results + * would be far more predictable. This should only be used for legacy + * platforms. + * + * As a precaution, we assume only 2 bits of entropy per byte. + */ +size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + short int code; + int i, k; + size_t bytes_needed; + struct timespec ts; + unsigned char v; +# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA + long duration; + extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code); +# else + long long duration; + extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code); +# endif + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 4 /*entropy_factor*/); + + for (i = 0; i < bytes_needed; i++) { + /* + * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus + * interference, etc. + */ + for (k = 0; k < 99; k++) + ts.tv_nsec = random(); + +# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA + /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */ + duration = 1; + s$sleep(&duration, &code); +# else + /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */ + duration = 1; + s$sleep2(&duration, &code); +# endif + + /* Get wall clock time, take 8 bits. */ + clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts); + v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec & 0xFF); + rand_pool_add(pool, arg, &v, sizeof(v) , 2); + } + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ +} + +# else + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) && \ + (defined(OPENSSL_NO_EGD) || !defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)) +# error "Seeding uses EGD but EGD is turned off or no device given" +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) && !defined(DEVRANDOM) +# error "Seeding uses urandom but DEVRANDOM is not configured" +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS) +# if !defined(DEVRANDOM) +# error "OS seeding requires DEVRANDOM to be configured" +# endif +# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM +# define OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM) +# error "librandom not (yet) supported" +# endif + +# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND) +/* + * sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel + * Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure. + */ +static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + int mib[2]; + size_t done = 0; + size_t len; + + /* + * Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even + * without a range check, see comment in syscall_random() + */ + + /* + * On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support + * variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly + * when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a + * multiple of longs, which should never be the case. + */ +#if defined(__FreeBSD__) + if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) { + errno = EINVAL; + return -1; + } +#endif + + /* + * On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only + * filled in an int, leaving the rest uninitialized. Since NetBSD 4.0 + * it returns a variable number of bytes with the current version supporting + * up to 256 bytes. + * Just return an error on older NetBSD versions. + */ +#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000 + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; +#endif + + mib[0] = CTL_KERN; + mib[1] = KERN_ARND; + + do { + len = buflen > 256 ? 256 : buflen; + if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1) + return done > 0 ? done : -1; + done += len; + buf += len; + buflen -= len; + } while (buflen > 0); + + return done; +} +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) + +# if defined(__linux) && !defined(__NR_getrandom) +# if defined(__arm__) +# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_SYSCALL_BASE+384) +# elif defined(__i386__) +# define __NR_getrandom 355 +# elif defined(__x86_64__) +# if defined(__ILP32__) +# define __NR_getrandom (__X32_SYSCALL_BIT + 318) +# else +# define __NR_getrandom 318 +# endif +# elif defined(__xtensa__) +# define __NR_getrandom 338 +# elif defined(__s390__) || defined(__s390x__) +# define __NR_getrandom 349 +# elif defined(__bfin__) +# define __NR_getrandom 389 +# elif defined(__powerpc__) +# define __NR_getrandom 359 +# elif defined(__mips__) || defined(__mips64) +# if _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI32 +# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 353) +# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_ABI64 +# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 313) +# elif _MIPS_SIM == _MIPS_SIM_NABI32 +# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 317) +# endif +# elif defined(__hppa__) +# define __NR_getrandom (__NR_Linux + 339) +# elif defined(__sparc__) +# define __NR_getrandom 347 +# elif defined(__ia64__) +# define __NR_getrandom 1339 +# elif defined(__alpha__) +# define __NR_getrandom 511 +# elif defined(__sh__) +# if defined(__SH5__) +# define __NR_getrandom 373 +# else +# define __NR_getrandom 384 +# endif +# elif defined(__avr32__) +# define __NR_getrandom 317 +# elif defined(__microblaze__) +# define __NR_getrandom 385 +# elif defined(__m68k__) +# define __NR_getrandom 352 +# elif defined(__cris__) +# define __NR_getrandom 356 +# elif defined(__aarch64__) +# define __NR_getrandom 278 +# else /* generic */ +# define __NR_getrandom 278 +# endif +# endif + +/* + * syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call + * returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error. + */ +static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen) +{ + /* + * Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the + * get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by + * + * 2 * RAND_POOL_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^14 + * + * which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion + * between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check. + */ + + /* + * Do runtime detection to find getentropy(). + * + * Known OSs that should support this: + * - Darwin since 16 (OSX 10.12, IOS 10.0). + * - Solaris since 11.3 + * - OpenBSD since 5.6 + * - Linux since 3.17 with glibc 2.25 + * - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061) + */ +# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux) + extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak)); + + if (getentropy != NULL) + return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1; +# elif !defined(FIPS_MODULE) + union { + void *p; + int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length); + } p_getentropy; + + /* + * We could cache the result of the lookup, but we normally don't + * call this function often. + */ + ERR_set_mark(); + p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy"); + ERR_pop_to_mark(); + if (p_getentropy.p != NULL) + return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1; +# endif + + /* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */ +# if defined(__linux) && defined(__NR_getrandom) + return syscall(__NR_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0); +# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND) + return sysctl_random(buf, buflen); +# else + errno = ENOSYS; + return -1; +# endif +} +# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) */ + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) +static const char *random_device_paths[] = { DEVRANDOM }; +static struct random_device { + int fd; + dev_t dev; + ino_t ino; + mode_t mode; + dev_t rdev; +} random_devices[OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths)]; +static int keep_random_devices_open = 1; + +# if defined(__linux) && defined(DEVRANDOM_WAIT) \ + && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) +static void *shm_addr; + +# if !defined(FIPS_MODULE) +static void cleanup_shm(void) +{ + shmdt(shm_addr); +} +# endif + +/* + * Ensure that the system randomness source has been adequately seeded. + * This is done by having the first start of libcrypto, wait until the device + * /dev/random becomes able to supply a byte of entropy. Subsequent starts + * of the library and later reseedings do not need to do this. + */ +static int wait_random_seeded(void) +{ + static int seeded = OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID < 0; + static const int kernel_version[] = { DEVRANDOM_SAFE_KERNEL }; + int kernel[2]; + int shm_id, fd, r; + char c, *p; + struct utsname un; + fd_set fds; + + if (!seeded) { + /* See if anything has created the global seeded indication */ + if ((shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, 0)) == -1) { + /* + * Check the kernel's version and fail if it is too recent. + * + * Linux kernels from 4.8 onwards do not guarantee that + * /dev/urandom is properly seeded when /dev/random becomes + * readable. However, such kernels support the getentropy(2) + * system call and this should always succeed which renders + * this alternative but essentially identical source moot. + */ + if (uname(&un) == 0) { + kernel[0] = atoi(un.release); + p = strchr(un.release, '.'); + kernel[1] = p == NULL ? 0 : atoi(p + 1); + if (kernel[0] > kernel_version[0] + || (kernel[0] == kernel_version[0] + && kernel[1] >= kernel_version[1])) { + return 0; + } + } + /* Open /dev/random and wait for it to be readable */ + if ((fd = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY)) != -1) { + if (DEVRANDM_WAIT_USE_SELECT && fd < FD_SETSIZE) { + FD_ZERO(&fds); + FD_SET(fd, &fds); + while ((r = select(fd + 1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL)) < 0 + && errno == EINTR); + } else { + while ((r = read(fd, &c, 1)) < 0 && errno == EINTR); + } + close(fd); + if (r == 1) { + seeded = 1; + /* Create the shared memory indicator */ + shm_id = shmget(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM_SHM_ID, 1, + IPC_CREAT | S_IRUSR | S_IRGRP | S_IROTH); + } + } + } + if (shm_id != -1) { + seeded = 1; + /* + * Map the shared memory to prevent its premature destruction. + * If this call fails, it isn't a big problem. + */ + shm_addr = shmat(shm_id, NULL, SHM_RDONLY); +# ifndef FIPS_MODULE + /* TODO 3.0: The FIPS provider doesn't have OPENSSL_atexit */ + if (shm_addr != (void *)-1) + OPENSSL_atexit(&cleanup_shm); +# endif + } + } + return seeded; +} +# else /* defined __linux && DEVRANDOM_WAIT && OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM */ +static int wait_random_seeded(void) +{ + return 1; +} +# endif + +/* + * Verify that the file descriptor associated with the random source is + * still valid. The rationale for doing this is the fact that it is not + * uncommon for daemons to close all open file handles when daemonizing. + * So the handle might have been closed or even reused for opening + * another file. + */ +static int check_random_device(struct random_device * rd) +{ + struct stat st; + + return rd->fd != -1 + && fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1 + && rd->dev == st.st_dev + && rd->ino == st.st_ino + && ((rd->mode ^ st.st_mode) & ~(S_IRWXU | S_IRWXG | S_IRWXO)) == 0 + && rd->rdev == st.st_rdev; +} + +/* + * Open a random device if required and return its file descriptor or -1 on error + */ +static int get_random_device(size_t n) +{ + struct stat st; + struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n]; + + /* reuse existing file descriptor if it is (still) valid */ + if (check_random_device(rd)) + return rd->fd; + + /* open the random device ... */ + if ((rd->fd = open(random_device_paths[n], O_RDONLY)) == -1) + return rd->fd; + + /* ... and cache its relevant stat(2) data */ + if (fstat(rd->fd, &st) != -1) { + rd->dev = st.st_dev; + rd->ino = st.st_ino; + rd->mode = st.st_mode; + rd->rdev = st.st_rdev; + } else { + close(rd->fd); + rd->fd = -1; + } + + return rd->fd; +} + +/* + * Close a random device making sure it is a random device + */ +static void close_random_device(size_t n) +{ + struct random_device * rd = &random_devices[n]; + + if (check_random_device(rd)) + close(rd->fd); + rd->fd = -1; +} + +int rand_pool_init(void) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) + random_devices[i].fd = -1; + + return 1; +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ + size_t i; + + for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(random_devices); i++) + close_random_device(i); +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ + if (!keep) + rand_pool_cleanup(); + + keep_random_devices_open = keep; +} + +# else /* !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ + +int rand_pool_init(void) +{ + return 1; +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ +} + +# endif /* defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) */ + +/* + * Try the various seeding methods in turn, exit when successful. + * + * TODO(DRBG): If more than one entropy source is available, is it + * preferable to stop as soon as enough entropy has been collected + * (as favored by @rsalz) or should one rather be defensive and add + * more entropy than requested and/or from different sources? + * + * Currently, the user can select multiple entropy sources in the + * configure step, yet in practice only the first available source + * will be used. A more flexible solution has been requested, but + * currently it is not clear how this can be achieved without + * overengineering the problem. There are many parameters which + * could be taken into account when selecting the order and amount + * of input from the different entropy sources (trust, quality, + * possibility of blocking). + */ +size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +# else + size_t entropy_available; + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM) + { + size_t bytes_needed; + unsigned char *buffer; + ssize_t bytes; + /* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ + int attempts = 3; + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed); + if (bytes > 0) { + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + bytes_needed -= bytes; + attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */ + } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + break; + } + } + } + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_LIBRANDOM) + { + /* Not yet implemented. */ + } +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM) + if (wait_random_seeded()) { + size_t bytes_needed; + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t i; + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); + i++) { + ssize_t bytes = 0; + /* Maximum number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */ + int attempts = 3; + const int fd = get_random_device(i); + + if (fd == -1) + continue; + + while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) { + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed); + + if (bytes > 0) { + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + bytes_needed -= bytes; + attempts = 3; /* reset counter on successful attempt */ + } else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) { + break; + } + } + if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open) + close_random_device(i); + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); + } + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; + } +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC) + entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU) + entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + +# if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_EGD) + { + static const char *paths[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL }; + size_t bytes_needed; + unsigned char *buffer; + int i; + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && paths[i] != NULL; i++) { + size_t bytes = 0; + int num; + + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(paths[i], + buffer, (int)bytes_needed); + if (num == (int)bytes_needed) + bytes = bytes_needed; + + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); + } + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; + } +# endif + + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +# endif +} +# endif +#endif + +#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) \ + || defined(__DJGPP__) +int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + pid_t pid; + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to + * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for + * different process instances. + */ + data.pid = getpid(); + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + data.time = get_time_stamp(); + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + int fork_id; + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer. + * The fork_id adds some extra fork-safety. + * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed + * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg). + */ + data.fork_id = openssl_get_fork_id(); + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + data.time = get_timer_bits(); + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + + +/* + * Get the current time with the highest possible resolution + * + * The time stamp is added to the nonce, so it is optimized for not repeating. + * The current time is ideal for this purpose, provided the computer's clock + * is synchronized. + */ +static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void) +{ +# if defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY) + { + struct timespec ts; + + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); + } +# endif +# if defined(__unix__) \ + || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) + { + struct timeval tv; + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec); + } +# endif + return time(NULL); +} + +/* + * Get an arbitrary timer value of the highest possible resolution + * + * The timer value is added as random noise to the additional data, + * which is not considered a trusted entropy sourec, so any result + * is acceptable. + */ +static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void) +{ + uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); + + if (res != 0) + return res; + +# if defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux) + return gethrtime(); +# elif defined(_AIX) + { + timebasestruct_t t; + + read_wall_time(&t, TIMEBASE_SZ); + return TWO32TO64(t.tb_high, t.tb_low); + } +# elif defined(OSSL_POSIX_TIMER_OKAY) + { + struct timespec ts; + +# ifdef CLOCK_BOOTTIME +# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_BOOTTIME +# elif defined(_POSIX_MONOTONIC_CLOCK) +# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_MONOTONIC +# else +# define CLOCK_TYPE CLOCK_REALTIME +# endif + + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_TYPE, &ts) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); + } +# endif +# if defined(__unix__) \ + || (defined(_POSIX_C_SOURCE) && _POSIX_C_SOURCE >= 200112L) + { + struct timeval tv; + + if (gettimeofday(&tv, NULL) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(tv.tv_sec, tv.tv_usec); + } +# endif + return time(NULL); +} +#endif /* (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)) + || defined(__DJGPP__) */ diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..6b9fa2c725 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vms.c @@ -0,0 +1,614 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2001-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "e_os.h" + +#define __NEW_STARLET 1 /* New starlet definitions since VMS 7.0 */ +#include <unistd.h> +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "crypto/rand.h" +#include "rand_local.h" +#include <descrip.h> +#include <dvidef.h> +#include <jpidef.h> +#include <rmidef.h> +#include <syidef.h> +#include <ssdef.h> +#include <starlet.h> +#include <efndef.h> +#include <gen64def.h> +#include <iosbdef.h> +#include <iledef.h> +#include <lib$routines.h> +#ifdef __DECC +# pragma message disable DOLLARID +#endif + +#include <dlfcn.h> /* SYS$GET_ENTROPY presence */ + +#ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os" +#endif + +/* + * DATA COLLECTION METHOD + * ====================== + * + * This is a method to get low quality entropy. + * It works by collecting all kinds of statistical data that + * VMS offers and using them as random seed. + */ + +/* We need to make sure we have the right size pointer in some cases */ +#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 +# pragma pointer_size save +# pragma pointer_size 32 +#endif +typedef uint32_t *uint32_t__ptr32; +#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 +# pragma pointer_size restore +#endif + +struct item_st { + short length, code; /* length is number of bytes */ +}; + +static const struct item_st DVI_item_data[] = { + {4, DVI$_ERRCNT}, + {4, DVI$_REFCNT}, +}; + +static const struct item_st JPI_item_data[] = { + {4, JPI$_BUFIO}, + {4, JPI$_CPUTIM}, + {4, JPI$_DIRIO}, + {4, JPI$_IMAGECOUNT}, + {4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS}, + {4, JPI$_PID}, + {4, JPI$_PPGCNT}, + {4, JPI$_WSPEAK}, + /* + * Note: the direct result is just a 32-bit address. However, it points + * to a list of 4 32-bit words, so we make extra space for them so we can + * do in-place replacement of values + */ + {16, JPI$_FINALEXC}, +}; + +static const struct item_st JPI_item_data_64bit[] = { + {8, JPI$_LAST_LOGIN_I}, + {8, JPI$_LOGINTIM}, +}; + +static const struct item_st RMI_item_data[] = { + {4, RMI$_COLPG}, + {4, RMI$_MWAIT}, + {4, RMI$_CEF}, + {4, RMI$_PFW}, + {4, RMI$_LEF}, + {4, RMI$_LEFO}, + {4, RMI$_HIB}, + {4, RMI$_HIBO}, + {4, RMI$_SUSP}, + {4, RMI$_SUSPO}, + {4, RMI$_FPG}, + {4, RMI$_COM}, + {4, RMI$_COMO}, + {4, RMI$_CUR}, +#if defined __alpha + {4, RMI$_FRLIST}, + {4, RMI$_MODLIST}, +#endif + {4, RMI$_FAULTS}, + {4, RMI$_PREADS}, + {4, RMI$_PWRITES}, + {4, RMI$_PWRITIO}, + {4, RMI$_PREADIO}, + {4, RMI$_GVALFLTS}, + {4, RMI$_WRTINPROG}, + {4, RMI$_FREFLTS}, + {4, RMI$_DZROFLTS}, + {4, RMI$_SYSFAULTS}, + {4, RMI$_ISWPCNT}, + {4, RMI$_DIRIO}, + {4, RMI$_BUFIO}, + {4, RMI$_MBREADS}, + {4, RMI$_MBWRITES}, + {4, RMI$_LOGNAM}, + {4, RMI$_FCPCALLS}, + {4, RMI$_FCPREAD}, + {4, RMI$_FCPWRITE}, + {4, RMI$_FCPCACHE}, + {4, RMI$_FCPCPU}, + {4, RMI$_FCPHIT}, + {4, RMI$_FCPSPLIT}, + {4, RMI$_FCPFAULT}, + {4, RMI$_ENQNEW}, + {4, RMI$_ENQCVT}, + {4, RMI$_DEQ}, + {4, RMI$_BLKAST}, + {4, RMI$_ENQWAIT}, + {4, RMI$_ENQNOTQD}, + {4, RMI$_DLCKSRCH}, + {4, RMI$_DLCKFND}, + {4, RMI$_NUMLOCKS}, + {4, RMI$_NUMRES}, + {4, RMI$_ARRLOCPK}, + {4, RMI$_DEPLOCPK}, + {4, RMI$_ARRTRAPK}, + {4, RMI$_TRCNGLOS}, + {4, RMI$_RCVBUFFL}, + {4, RMI$_ENQNEWLOC}, + {4, RMI$_ENQNEWIN}, + {4, RMI$_ENQNEWOUT}, + {4, RMI$_ENQCVTLOC}, + {4, RMI$_ENQCVTIN}, + {4, RMI$_ENQCVTOUT}, + {4, RMI$_DEQLOC}, + {4, RMI$_DEQIN}, + {4, RMI$_DEQOUT}, + {4, RMI$_BLKLOC}, + {4, RMI$_BLKIN}, + {4, RMI$_BLKOUT}, + {4, RMI$_DIRIN}, + {4, RMI$_DIROUT}, + /* We currently get a fault when trying these. TODO: To be figured out. */ +#if 0 + {140, RMI$_MSCP_EVERYTHING}, /* 35 32-bit words */ + {152, RMI$_DDTM_ALL}, /* 38 32-bit words */ + {80, RMI$_TMSCP_EVERYTHING} /* 20 32-bit words */ +#endif + {4, RMI$_LPZ_PAGCNT}, + {4, RMI$_LPZ_HITS}, + {4, RMI$_LPZ_MISSES}, + {4, RMI$_LPZ_EXPCNT}, + {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOCF}, + {4, RMI$_LPZ_ALLOC2}, + {4, RMI$_ACCESS}, + {4, RMI$_ALLOC}, + {4, RMI$_FCPCREATE}, + {4, RMI$_VOLWAIT}, + {4, RMI$_FCPTURN}, + {4, RMI$_FCPERASE}, + {4, RMI$_OPENS}, + {4, RMI$_FIDHIT}, + {4, RMI$_FIDMISS}, + {4, RMI$_FILHDR_HIT}, + {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_HIT}, + {4, RMI$_DIRFCB_MISS}, + {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_HIT}, + {4, RMI$_EXTHIT}, + {4, RMI$_EXTMISS}, + {4, RMI$_QUOHIT}, + {4, RMI$_QUOMISS}, + {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_HIT}, + {4, RMI$_VOLLCK}, + {4, RMI$_SYNCHLCK}, + {4, RMI$_SYNCHWAIT}, + {4, RMI$_ACCLCK}, + {4, RMI$_XQPCACHEWAIT}, + {4, RMI$_DIRDATA_MISS}, + {4, RMI$_FILHDR_MISS}, + {4, RMI$_STORAGMAP_MISS}, + {4, RMI$_PROCCNTMAX}, + {4, RMI$_PROCBATCNT}, + {4, RMI$_PROCINTCNT}, + {4, RMI$_PROCNETCNT}, + {4, RMI$_PROCSWITCHCNT}, + {4, RMI$_PROCBALSETCNT}, + {4, RMI$_PROCLOADCNT}, + {4, RMI$_BADFLTS}, + {4, RMI$_EXEFAULTS}, + {4, RMI$_HDRINSWAPS}, + {4, RMI$_HDROUTSWAPS}, + {4, RMI$_IOPAGCNT}, + {4, RMI$_ISWPCNTPG}, + {4, RMI$_OSWPCNT}, + {4, RMI$_OSWPCNTPG}, + {4, RMI$_RDFAULTS}, + {4, RMI$_TRANSFLTS}, + {4, RMI$_WRTFAULTS}, +#if defined __alpha + {4, RMI$_USERPAGES}, +#endif + {4, RMI$_VMSPAGES}, + {4, RMI$_TTWRITES}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAG}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAK}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS01}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGS2}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS01}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGMAXS2}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS01}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPAGPEAKS2}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS01}, + {4, RMI$_BUFOBJPGLTMAXS2}, + {4, RMI$_DLCK_INCMPLT}, + {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_IN}, + {4, RMI$_DLCKMSGS_OUT}, + {4, RMI$_MCHKERRS}, + {4, RMI$_MEMERRS}, +}; + +static const struct item_st RMI_item_data_64bit[] = { +#if defined __ia64 + {8, RMI$_FRLIST}, + {8, RMI$_MODLIST}, +#endif + {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQCNT}, + {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_REQTIME}, + {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINCNT}, + {8, RMI$_LCKMGR_SPINTIME}, + {8, RMI$_CPUINTSTK}, + {8, RMI$_CPUMPSYNCH}, + {8, RMI$_CPUKERNEL}, + {8, RMI$_CPUEXEC}, + {8, RMI$_CPUSUPER}, + {8, RMI$_CPUUSER}, +#if defined __ia64 + {8, RMI$_USERPAGES}, +#endif + {8, RMI$_TQETOTAL}, + {8, RMI$_TQESYSUB}, + {8, RMI$_TQEUSRTIMR}, + {8, RMI$_TQEUSRWAKE}, +}; + +static const struct item_st SYI_item_data[] = { + {4, SYI$_PAGEFILE_FREE}, +}; + +/* + * Input: + * items_data - an array of lengths and codes + * items_data_num - number of elements in that array + * + * Output: + * items - pre-allocated ILE3 array to be filled. + * It's assumed to have items_data_num elements plus + * one extra for the terminating NULL element + * databuffer - pre-allocated 32-bit word array. + * + * Returns the number of elements used in databuffer + */ +static size_t prepare_item_list(const struct item_st *items_input, + size_t items_input_num, + ILE3 *items, + uint32_t__ptr32 databuffer) +{ + size_t data_sz = 0; + + for (; items_input_num-- > 0; items_input++, items++) { + + items->ile3$w_code = items_input->code; + /* Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC */ + if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC) + items->ile3$w_length = 4; + else + items->ile3$w_length = items_input->length; + + items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = databuffer; + items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = 0; + + databuffer += items_input->length / sizeof(databuffer[0]); + data_sz += items_input->length; + } + /* Terminating NULL entry */ + items->ile3$w_length = items->ile3$w_code = 0; + items->ile3$ps_bufaddr = items->ile3$ps_retlen_addr = NULL; + + return data_sz / sizeof(databuffer[0]); +} + +static void massage_JPI(ILE3 *items) +{ + /* + * Special treatment of JPI$_FINALEXC + * The result of that item's data buffer is a 32-bit address to a list of + * 4 32-bit words. + */ + for (; items->ile3$w_length != 0; items++) { + if (items->ile3$w_code == JPI$_FINALEXC) { + uint32_t *data = items->ile3$ps_bufaddr; + uint32_t *ptr = (uint32_t *)*data; + size_t j; + + /* + * We know we made space for 4 32-bit words, so we can do in-place + * replacement. + */ + for (j = 0; j < 4; j++) + data[j] = ptr[j]; + + break; + } + } +} + +/* + * This number expresses how many bits of data contain 1 bit of entropy. + * + * For the moment, we assume about 0.05 entropy bits per data bit, or 1 + * bit of entropy per 20 data bits. + */ +#define ENTROPY_FACTOR 20 + +size_t data_collect_method(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + ILE3 JPI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) + 1]; + ILE3 RMI_items_64bit[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) + 1]; + ILE3 DVI_items[OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data) + 1]; + ILE3 JPI_items[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data) + 1]; + ILE3 RMI_items[OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data) + 1]; + ILE3 SYI_items[OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data) + 1]; + union { + /* This ensures buffer starts at 64 bit boundary */ + uint64_t dummy; + uint32_t buffer[OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit) * 2 + + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit) * 2 + + OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data) + + OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data) + + OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data) + + OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data) + + 4 /* For JPI$_FINALEXC */]; + } data; + size_t total_elems = 0; + size_t total_length = 0; + size_t bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, ENTROPY_FACTOR); + size_t bytes_remaining = rand_pool_bytes_remaining(pool); + + /* Take all the 64-bit items first, to ensure proper alignment of data */ + total_elems += + prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data_64bit), + JPI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + total_elems += + prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data_64bit, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data_64bit), + RMI_items_64bit, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + /* Now the 32-bit items */ + total_elems += prepare_item_list(DVI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(DVI_item_data), + DVI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + total_elems += prepare_item_list(JPI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(JPI_item_data), + JPI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + total_elems += prepare_item_list(RMI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(RMI_item_data), + RMI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + total_elems += prepare_item_list(SYI_item_data, OSSL_NELEM(SYI_item_data), + SYI_items, &data.buffer[total_elems]); + total_length = total_elems * sizeof(data.buffer[0]); + + /* Fill data.buffer with various info bits from this process */ + { + uint32_t status; + uint32_t efn; + IOSB iosb; + $DESCRIPTOR(SYSDEVICE,"SYS$SYSDEVICE:"); + + if ((status = sys$getdviw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, &SYSDEVICE, DVI_items, + 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)) != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items_64bit, 0, 0, 0)) + != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$getjpiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, JPI_items, 0, 0, 0)) + != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$getsyiw(EFN$C_ENF, 0, 0, SYI_items, 0, 0, 0)) + != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + /* + * The RMI service is a bit special, as there is no synchronous + * variant, so we MUST create an event flag to synchronise on. + */ + if ((status = lib$get_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items_64bit, &iosb, 0, 0)) + != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$getrmi(efn, 0, 0, RMI_items, &iosb, 0, 0)) + != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = sys$synch(efn, &iosb)) != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + if (iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(iosb.iosb$l_getxxi_status); + return 0; + } + if ((status = lib$free_ef(&efn)) != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + } + + massage_JPI(JPI_items); + + /* + * If we can't feed the requirements from the caller, we're in deep trouble. + */ + if (!ossl_assert(total_length >= bytes_needed)) { + ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_UNDERFLOW, + "Needed: %zu, Available: %zu", + bytes_needed, total_length); + return 0; + } + + /* + * Try not to overfeed the pool + */ + if (total_length > bytes_remaining) + total_length = bytes_remaining; + + /* We give the pessimistic value for the amount of entropy */ + rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)data.buffer, total_length, + 8 * total_length / ENTROPY_FACTOR); + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +} + +int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + pid_t pid; + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp + * (where available, which is OpenVMS v8.4 and up) to ensure that + * the nonce is unique with high probability for different process + * instances. + */ + data.pid = getpid(); + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); +#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000 + sys$gettim_prec(&data.time); +#else + sys$gettim((void*)&data.time); +#endif + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +/* + * SYS$GET_ENTROPY METHOD + * ====================== + * + * This is a high entropy method based on a new system service that is + * based on getentropy() from FreeBSD 12. It's only used if available, + * and its availability is detected at run-time. + * + * We assume that this function provides full entropy random output. + */ +#define PUBLIC_VECTORS "SYS$LIBRARY:SYS$PUBLIC_VECTORS.EXE" +#define GET_ENTROPY "SYS$GET_ENTROPY" + +static int get_entropy_address_flag = 0; +static int (*get_entropy_address)(void *buffer, size_t buffer_size) = NULL; +static int init_get_entropy_address(void) +{ + if (get_entropy_address_flag == 0) + get_entropy_address = dlsym(dlopen(PUBLIC_VECTORS, 0), GET_ENTROPY); + get_entropy_address_flag = 1; + return get_entropy_address != NULL; +} + +size_t get_entropy_method(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + /* + * The documentation says that SYS$GET_ENTROPY will give a maximum of + * 256 bytes of data. + */ + unsigned char buffer[256]; + size_t bytes_needed; + size_t bytes_to_get = 0; + uint32_t status; + + for (bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1); + bytes_needed > 0; + bytes_needed -= bytes_to_get) { + bytes_to_get = + bytes_needed > sizeof(buffer) ? sizeof(buffer) : bytes_needed; + + status = get_entropy_address(buffer, bytes_to_get); + if (status == SS$_RETRY) { + /* Set to zero so the loop doesn't diminish |bytes_needed| */ + bytes_to_get = 0; + /* Should sleep some amount of time */ + continue; + } + + if (status != SS$_NORMAL) { + lib$signal(status); + return 0; + } + + rand_pool_add(pool, buffer, bytes_to_get, 8 * bytes_to_get); + } + + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +} + +/* + * MAIN ENTROPY ACQUISITION FUNCTIONS + * ================================== + * + * These functions are called by the RAND / DRBG functions + */ + +size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + if (init_get_entropy_address()) + return get_entropy_method(pool); + return data_collect_method(pool); +} + + +int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer. + * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed + * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg). + */ + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); +#if __CRTL_VER >= 80400000 + sys$gettim_prec(&data.time); +#else + sys$gettim((void*)&data.time); +#endif + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +int rand_pool_init(void) +{ + return 1; +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ +} diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..427d50d263 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_vxworks.c @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +/* + * Copyright 2019-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include <openssl/opensslconf.h> + +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "rand_local.h" +#include "crypto/rand.h" +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <version.h> +#include <taskLib.h> + +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) +/* none means none */ +# undef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +#endif + +#if defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS) +# if _WRS_VXWORKS_MAJOR >= 7 +# define RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB +# else +# error "VxWorks <7 only support RAND_SEED_NONE" +# endif +#endif + +#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) +# include <randomNumGen.h> +#endif + +/* Macro to convert two thirty two bit values into a sixty four bit one */ +#define TWO32TO64(a, b) ((((uint64_t)(a)) << 32) + (b)) + +static uint64_t get_time_stamp(void) +{ + struct timespec ts; + + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); + return time(NULL); +} + +static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void) +{ + uint64_t res = OPENSSL_rdtsc(); + struct timespec ts; + + if (res != 0) + return res; + + if (clock_gettime(CLOCK_MONOTONIC, &ts) == 0) + return TWO32TO64(ts.tv_sec, ts.tv_nsec); + return time(NULL); +} + +/* + * empty implementation + * vxworks does not need to init/cleanup or keep open the random lib + */ +int rand_pool_init(void) +{ + return 1; +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ +} + +int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer. + * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed + * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg). + */ + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + data.time = get_timer_bits(); + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + pid_t pid; + CRYPTO_THREAD_ID tid; + uint64_t time; + } data; + + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to + * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for + * different process instances. + */ + data.pid = getpid(); + data.tid = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_current_id(); + data.time = get_time_stamp(); + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ +#if defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) + /* vxRandLib based entropy method */ + size_t bytes_needed; + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + if (bytes_needed > 0) + { + int retryCount = 0; + STATUS result = ERROR; + unsigned char *buffer; + + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + while ((result != OK) && (retryCount < 10)) { + RANDOM_NUM_GEN_STATUS status = randStatus(); + + if ((status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_ENOUGH_ENTROPY) + || (status == RANDOM_NUM_GEN_MAX_ENTROPY) ) { + result = randBytes(buffer, bytes_needed); + if (result == OK) + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes_needed, 8 * bytes_needed); + /* + * no else here: randStatus said ok, if randBytes failed + * it will result in another loop or no entropy + */ + } else { + /* + * give a minimum delay here to allow OS to collect more + * entropy. taskDelay duration will depend on the system tick, + * this is by design as the sw-random lib uses interrupts + * which will at least happen during ticks + */ + taskDelay(5); + } + retryCount++; + } + } + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +#else + /* + * SEED_NONE means none, without randlib we dont have entropy and + * rely on it being added externally + */ + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +#endif /* defined(RAND_SEED_VXRANDLIB) */ +} diff --git a/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c new file mode 100644 index 0000000000..89f9d6f1f6 --- /dev/null +++ b/providers/implementations/rands/seeding/rand_win.c @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +/* + * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. + * + * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use + * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy + * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at + * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html + */ + +#include "internal/cryptlib.h" +#include <openssl/rand.h> +#include "rand_local.h" +#include "crypto/rand.h" +#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) + +# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS +# error "Unsupported seeding method configured; must be os" +# endif + +# include <windows.h> +/* On Windows Vista or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */ +# if defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER > 1500 /* 1500 = Visual Studio 2008 */ \ + && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600 +# define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM +# endif + +# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM +# include <bcrypt.h> +# pragma comment(lib, "bcrypt.lib") +# ifndef STATUS_SUCCESS +# define STATUS_SUCCESS ((NTSTATUS)0x00000000L) +# endif +# else +# include <wincrypt.h> +/* + * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from + * http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm + */ +# define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22 +# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider" +# endif + +size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ +# ifndef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM + HCRYPTPROV hProvider; +# endif + unsigned char *buffer; + size_t bytes_needed; + size_t entropy_available = 0; + + +# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC + entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + +# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDCPU + entropy_available = rand_acquire_entropy_from_cpu(pool); + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + +# ifdef USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + if (buffer != NULL) { + size_t bytes = 0; + if (BCryptGenRandom(NULL, buffer, bytes_needed, + BCRYPT_USE_SYSTEM_PREFERRED_RNG) == STATUS_SUCCESS) + bytes = bytes_needed; + + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + } + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# else + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + if (buffer != NULL) { + size_t bytes = 0; + /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */ + if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL, + CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) { + if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0) + bytes = bytes_needed; + + CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); + } + + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + } + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; + + bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/); + buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed); + if (buffer != NULL) { + size_t bytes = 0; + /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */ + if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, + INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, + CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT | CRYPT_SILENT) != 0) { + if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, bytes_needed, buffer) != 0) + bytes = bytes_needed; + + CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0); + } + rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes); + entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); + } + if (entropy_available > 0) + return entropy_available; +# endif + + return rand_pool_entropy_available(pool); +} + + +int rand_pool_add_nonce_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + DWORD pid; + DWORD tid; + FILETIME time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add process id, thread id, and a high resolution timestamp to + * ensure that the nonce is unique with high probability for + * different process instances. + */ + data.pid = GetCurrentProcessId(); + data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId(); + GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&data.time); + + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool) +{ + struct { + DWORD tid; + LARGE_INTEGER time; + } data; + + /* Erase the entire structure including any padding */ + memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data)); + + /* + * Add some noise from the thread id and a high resolution timer. + * The thread id adds a little randomness if the drbg is accessed + * concurrently (which is the case for the <master> drbg). + */ + data.tid = GetCurrentThreadId(); + QueryPerformanceCounter(&data.time); + return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0); +} + +# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0) && !defined(FIPS_MODULE) +int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam) +{ + RAND_poll(); + return RAND_status(); +} + +void RAND_screen(void) +{ + RAND_poll(); +} +# endif + +int rand_pool_init(void) +{ + return 1; +} + +void rand_pool_cleanup(void) +{ +} + +void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep) +{ +} + +#endif |