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author | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-02-10 01:07:18 +0100 |
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committer | Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org> | 2012-02-10 01:07:18 +0100 |
commit | 5997efca83fedd16dff26549a2840a1e63a92e26 (patch) | |
tree | 5c01f16b79cb8afeda5de273043a62899b301d84 /ssl/d1_srtp.c | |
parent | oops, revert unrelated changes (diff) | |
download | openssl-5997efca83fedd16dff26549a2840a1e63a92e26.tar.xz openssl-5997efca83fedd16dff26549a2840a1e63a92e26.zip |
Submitted by: Eric Rescorla <ekr@rtfm.com>
Fix encoding of use_srtp extension to be compliant with RFC5764
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/d1_srtp.c')
-rw-r--r-- | ssl/d1_srtp.c | 69 |
1 files changed, 59 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/d1_srtp.c b/ssl/d1_srtp.c index c6fd68d6db..e9e6f5a67e 100644 --- a/ssl/d1_srtp.c +++ b/ssl/d1_srtp.c @@ -278,19 +278,25 @@ int ssl_add_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max return 1; } - if((ct*2) > maxlen) + if((2 + ct*2 + 1) > maxlen) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG); return 1; } + /* Add the length */ + s2n(ct * 2, p); for(i=0;i<ct;i++) { prof=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_value(clnt,i); s2n(prof->id,p); } + + /* Add an empty use_mki value */ + *p++ = 0; } - *len=ct*2; + + *len=2 + ct*2 + 1; return 0; } @@ -300,23 +306,48 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al { SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *cprof,*sprof; STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt=0,*srvr; + int ct; + int mki_len; int i,j; int id; int ret; - - if(len%2) + + /* Length value + the MKI length */ + if(len < 3) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + *al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 1; + } + + /* Pull off the length of the cipher suite list */ + n2s(d, ct); + len -= 2; + + /* Check that it is even */ + if(ct%2) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); + *al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 1; + } + + /* Check that lengths are consistent */ + if(len < (ct + 1)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return 1; } + clnt=sk_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_new_null(); - while(len) + while(ct) { n2s(d,id); - len-=2; + ct-=2; + len-=2; if(!find_profile_by_num(id,&cprof)) { @@ -328,6 +359,17 @@ int ssl_parse_clienthello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al } } + /* Now extract the MKI value as a sanity check, but discard it for now */ + mki_len = *d; + d++; len--; + + if (mki_len != len) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_CLIENTHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + *al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; + return 1; + } + srvr=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); /* Pick our most preferred profile. If no profiles have been @@ -364,7 +406,7 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max { if(p) { - if(maxlen < 2) + if(maxlen < 3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_ADD_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST_TOO_LONG); return 1; @@ -377,8 +419,9 @@ int ssl_add_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *p, int *len, int max } s2n(s->srtp_profile->id,p); - } - *len=2; + *p++ = 0; + } + *len=3; return 0; } @@ -391,7 +434,7 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al STACK_OF(SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE) *clnt; SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE *prof; - if(len!=2) + if(len!=3) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_PROTECTION_PROFILE_LIST); *al=SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; @@ -399,6 +442,12 @@ int ssl_parse_serverhello_use_srtp_ext(SSL *s, unsigned char *d, int len,int *al } n2s(d,id); + if (*d) /* Must be no MKI, since we never offer one */ + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_PARSE_SERVERHELLO_USE_SRTP_EXT,SSL_R_BAD_SRTP_MKI_VALUE); + *al=SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; + return 1; + } clnt=SSL_get_srtp_profiles(s); |