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authorDavid Woodhouse <dwmw2@infradead.org>2018-10-22 19:49:54 +0200
committerNicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>2018-11-10 02:23:14 +0100
commitecbb2fca9301ef22b15beb30c4c0303b29846935 (patch)
tree28568a5d29802e457a3ca4285f5945ed2508069a /ssl/t1_lib.c
parentHonour mandatory digest on private key in has_usable_cert() (diff)
downloadopenssl-ecbb2fca9301ef22b15beb30c4c0303b29846935.tar.xz
openssl-ecbb2fca9301ef22b15beb30c4c0303b29846935.zip
Add EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid()
Rather than relying only on mandatory default digests, add a way for the EVP_PKEY to individually report whether each digest algorithm is supported. Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7408)
Diffstat (limited to 'ssl/t1_lib.c')
-rw-r--r--ssl/t1_lib.c55
1 files changed, 30 insertions, 25 deletions
diff --git a/ssl/t1_lib.c b/ssl/t1_lib.c
index 2e785a909b..91353e738a 100644
--- a/ssl/t1_lib.c
+++ b/ssl/t1_lib.c
@@ -2496,8 +2496,7 @@ static int tls12_get_cert_sigalg_idx(const SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu)
static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
{
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
- int mdnid, pknid, default_mdnid;
- int mandatory_md = 0;
+ int mdnid, pknid, supported;
size_t i;
/* TLS 1.2 callers can override lu->sig_idx, but not TLS 1.3 callers. */
@@ -2505,39 +2504,45 @@ static int has_usable_cert(SSL *s, const SIGALG_LOOKUP *sig, int idx)
idx = sig->sig_idx;
if (!ssl_has_cert(s, idx))
return 0;
- /* If the EVP_PKEY reports a mandatory digest, allow nothing else. */
- ERR_set_mark();
- switch (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
- &default_mdnid)) {
- case 2:
- mandatory_md = 1;
- break;
- case 1:
- break;
- default: /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
- * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
- ERR_pop_to_mark();
- }
if (s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs != NULL) {
for (i = 0; i < s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgslen; i++) {
lu = tls1_lookup_sigalg(s->s3->tmp.peer_cert_sigalgs[i]);
if (lu == NULL
|| !X509_get_signature_info(s->cert->pkeys[idx].x509, &mdnid,
&pknid, NULL, NULL)
- || (mandatory_md && mdnid != default_mdnid))
+ /*
+ * TODO this does not differentiate between the
+ * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
+ * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
+ * signing certificate.
+ */
+ || mdnid != lu->hash
+ || pknid != lu->sig)
continue;
- /*
- * TODO this does not differentiate between the
- * rsa_pss_pss_* and rsa_pss_rsae_* schemes since we do not
- * have a chain here that lets us look at the key OID in the
- * signing certificate.
- */
- if (mdnid == lu->hash && pknid == lu->sig)
- return 1;
+
+ ERR_set_mark();
+ supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+ mdnid);
+ if (supported == 0)
+ continue;
+ else if (supported < 0)
+ {
+ /* If it didn't report a mandatory NID, for whatever reasons,
+ * just clear the error and allow all hashes to be used. */
+ ERR_pop_to_mark();
+ }
+ return 1;
}
return 0;
}
- return !mandatory_md || sig->hash == default_mdnid;
+ supported = EVP_PKEY_supports_digest_nid(s->cert->pkeys[idx].privatekey,
+ sig->hash);
+ if (supported == 0)
+ return 0;
+ else if (supported < 0)
+ ERR_clear_error();
+
+ return 1;
}
/*