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-rw-r--r--CHANGES.md8
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_err.c3
-rw-r--r--crypto/dh/dh_key.c45
-rw-r--r--crypto/err/openssl.txt1
-rw-r--r--crypto/evp/exchange.c21
-rw-r--r--doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod17
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/dh.h1
-rw-r--r--include/crypto/dherr.h2
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/dherr.h1
-rw-r--r--include/openssl/evp.h2
-rw-r--r--test/dhtest.c116
-rw-r--r--test/evp_test.c2
-rw-r--r--util/libcrypto.num1
13 files changed, 135 insertions, 85 deletions
diff --git a/CHANGES.md b/CHANGES.md
index 10c471ab1b..54fc6855f0 100644
--- a/CHANGES.md
+++ b/CHANGES.md
@@ -23,6 +23,14 @@ OpenSSL 3.0
### Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
+ * A public key check is now performed during EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer().
+ Previously DH was internally doing this during EVP_PKEY_derive().
+ To disable this check use EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(dh, peer, 0). This
+ may mean that an error can occur in EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() rather than
+ during EVP_PKEY_derive().
+
+ *Shane Lontis*
+
* The EVP_PKEY_public_check() and EVP_PKEY_param_check() functions now work for
more key types including RSA, DSA, ED25519, X25519, ED448 and X448.
Previously (in 1.1.1) they would return -2. For key types that do not have
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
index 00a3110964..3652e89b3d 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_err.c
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA DH_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_INVALID_PARAMETER_NID),
"invalid parameter nid"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY), "invalid public key"},
+ {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_INVALID_SECRET), "invalid secret"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR), "kdf parameter error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET), "keys not set"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_DH, 0, DH_R_MISSING_PUBKEY), "missing pubkey"},
diff --git a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
index 3617e61e23..33ac134c51 100644
--- a/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+++ b/crypto/dh/dh_key.c
@@ -33,15 +33,16 @@ static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
static int dh_init(DH *dh);
static int dh_finish(DH *dh);
-static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
+/*
+ * See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.7.1.1
+ * Finite Field Cryptography Diffie-Hellman (FFC DH) Primitive
+ */
+int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
- BIGNUM *tmp;
+ BIGNUM *z = NULL, *pminus1;
int ret = -1;
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- int check_result;
-#endif
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
@@ -57,8 +58,9 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
- tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
- if (tmp == NULL)
+ pminus1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ z = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
+ if (z == NULL)
goto err;
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
@@ -73,22 +75,27 @@ static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
if (!mont)
goto err;
}
-/* TODO(3.0) : Solve in a PR related to Key validation for DH */
-#ifndef FIPS_MODULE
- if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
- ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
- goto err;
- }
-#endif
- if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->params.p, ctx,
+
+ /* (Step 1) Z = pub_key^priv_key mod p */
+ if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, z, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->params.p, ctx,
mont)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
+ /* (Step 2) Error if z <= 1 or z = p - 1 */
+ if (BN_copy(pminus1, dh->params.p) == NULL
+ || !BN_sub_word(pminus1, 1)
+ || BN_cmp(z, BN_value_one()) <= 0
+ || BN_cmp(z, pminus1) == 0) {
+ ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_DH, DH_R_INVALID_SECRET);
+ goto err;
+ }
+
/* return the padded key, i.e. same number of bytes as the modulus */
- ret = BN_bn2binpad(tmp, key, BN_num_bytes(dh->params.p));
+ ret = BN_bn2binpad(z, key, BN_num_bytes(dh->params.p));
err:
+ BN_clear(z); /* (Step 2) destroy intermediate values */
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
@@ -105,7 +112,7 @@ int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
/* compute the key; ret is constant unless compute_key is external */
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- ret = compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
+ ret = ossl_dh_compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
#else
ret = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
#endif
@@ -134,7 +141,7 @@ int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
/* rv is constant unless compute_key is external */
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
- rv = compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
+ rv = ossl_dh_compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
#else
rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
#endif
@@ -152,7 +159,7 @@ int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
static DH_METHOD dh_ossl = {
"OpenSSL DH Method",
generate_key,
- compute_key,
+ ossl_dh_compute_key,
dh_bn_mod_exp,
dh_init,
dh_finish,
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 0a407ba2dc..aed5b72cff 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -477,6 +477,7 @@ DH_R_DECODE_ERROR:104:decode error
DH_R_INVALID_PARAMETER_NAME:110:invalid parameter name
DH_R_INVALID_PARAMETER_NID:114:invalid parameter nid
DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY:102:invalid public key
+DH_R_INVALID_SECRET:128:invalid secret
DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR:112:kdf parameter error
DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET:108:keys not set
DH_R_MISSING_PUBKEY:125:missing pubkey
diff --git a/crypto/evp/exchange.c b/crypto/evp/exchange.c
index 5e098f0c3f..5bb038f118 100644
--- a/crypto/evp/exchange.c
+++ b/crypto/evp/exchange.c
@@ -317,10 +317,12 @@ int EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
#endif
}
-int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer)
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer,
+ int validate_peer)
{
- int ret = 0;
+ int ret = 0, check;
void *provkey = NULL;
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX *check_ctx = NULL;
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
@@ -335,6 +337,16 @@ int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer)
return -2;
}
+ if (validate_peer) {
+ check_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_pkey(ctx->libctx, peer, ctx->propquery);
+ if (check_ctx == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ check = EVP_PKEY_public_check(check_ctx);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(check_ctx);
+ if (check <= 0)
+ return -1;
+ }
+
provkey = evp_pkey_export_to_provider(peer, ctx->libctx, &ctx->keymgmt,
ctx->propquery);
/*
@@ -410,6 +422,11 @@ int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer)
#endif
}
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer)
+{
+ return EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(ctx, peer, 1);
+}
+
int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *pkeylen)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
index be5cf3945e..d61bb5512f 100644
--- a/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
+++ b/doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_derive.pod
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
=head1 NAME
EVP_PKEY_derive_init, EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex,
-EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, EVP_PKEY_derive
+EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex, EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, EVP_PKEY_derive
- derive public key algorithm shared secret
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, EVP_PKEY_derive
int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+ int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer,
+ int validate_peer);
int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer);
int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen);
@@ -26,8 +28,12 @@ more information about implicit fetches.
EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex() is the same as EVP_PKEY_derive_init() but additionally
sets the passed parameters I<params> on the context before returning.
-EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() sets the peer key: this will normally
-be a public key.
+EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex() sets the peer key: this will normally
+be a public key. The I<validate_peer> will validate the public key if this value
+is non zero.
+
+EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() is similiar to EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex() with
+I<validate_peer> set to 1.
EVP_PKEY_derive() derives a shared secret using I<ctx>.
If I<key> is NULL then the maximum size of the output buffer is written to the
@@ -103,11 +109,12 @@ L<EVP_KEYEXCH_fetch(3)>
The EVP_PKEY_derive_init(), EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer() and EVP_PKEY_derive()
functions were originally added in OpenSSL 1.0.0.
-The EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
+The EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex() and EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex() functions were
+added in OpenSSL 3.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
-Copyright 2006-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+Copyright 2006-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/include/crypto/dh.h b/include/crypto/dh.h
index b16ac8f42f..ab6115d986 100644
--- a/include/crypto/dh.h
+++ b/include/crypto/dh.h
@@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ int ossl_dh_params_todata(DH *dh, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
int ossl_dh_key_todata(DH *dh, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *bld, OSSL_PARAM params[]);
DH *ossl_dh_key_from_pkcs8(const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8inf,
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
+int ossl_dh_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
int ossl_dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret);
int ossl_dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret);
diff --git a/include/crypto/dherr.h b/include/crypto/dherr.h
index eb587f19ae..351d7da01b 100644
--- a/include/crypto/dherr.h
+++ b/include/crypto/dherr.h
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
- * Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 2020-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
diff --git a/include/openssl/dherr.h b/include/openssl/dherr.h
index 237de52522..5d2a762a96 100644
--- a/include/openssl/dherr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/dherr.h
@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
# define DH_R_INVALID_PARAMETER_NAME 110
# define DH_R_INVALID_PARAMETER_NID 114
# define DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY 102
+# define DH_R_INVALID_SECRET 128
# define DH_R_KDF_PARAMETER_ERROR 112
# define DH_R_KEYS_NOT_SET 108
# define DH_R_MISSING_PUBKEY 125
diff --git a/include/openssl/evp.h b/include/openssl/evp.h
index 26a97008ba..4268f1020d 100644
--- a/include/openssl/evp.h
+++ b/include/openssl/evp.h
@@ -1825,6 +1825,8 @@ int EVP_PKEY_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
int EVP_PKEY_derive_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx);
int EVP_PKEY_derive_init_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[]);
+int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer,
+ int validate_peer);
int EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *peer);
int EVP_PKEY_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key, size_t *keylen);
diff --git a/test/dhtest.c b/test/dhtest.c
index c293dab203..836d800c29 100644
--- a/test/dhtest.c
+++ b/test/dhtest.c
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
- * Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright 1995-2021 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -28,6 +28,8 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH
# include <openssl/dh.h>
+# include "crypto/bn_dh.h"
+# include "crypto/dh.h"
static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg);
@@ -233,6 +235,61 @@ static int cb(int p, int n, BN_GENCB *arg)
return 1;
}
+static int dh_computekey_range_test(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0, sz;
+ DH *dh = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *p = NULL, *q = NULL, *g = NULL, *pub = NULL, *priv = NULL;
+ unsigned char *buf = NULL;
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(p = BN_dup(&ossl_bignum_ffdhe2048_p))
+ || !TEST_ptr(q = BN_dup(&ossl_bignum_ffdhe2048_q))
+ || !TEST_ptr(g = BN_dup(&ossl_bignum_const_2))
+ || !TEST_ptr(dh = DH_new())
+ || !TEST_true(DH_set0_pqg(dh, p, q, g)))
+ goto err;
+ p = q = g = NULL;
+ sz = DH_size(dh);
+
+ if (!TEST_ptr(buf = OPENSSL_malloc(sz))
+ || !TEST_ptr(pub = BN_new())
+ || !TEST_ptr(priv = BN_new()))
+ goto err;
+
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_set_word(priv, 1))
+ || !TEST_true(DH_set0_key(dh, NULL, priv))
+ || !TEST_true(BN_set_word(pub, 1)))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Given z = pub ^ priv mod p */
+
+ /* Test that z == 1 fails */
+ if (!TEST_int_le(ossl_dh_compute_key(buf, pub, dh), 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* Test that z == 0 fails */
+ if (!TEST_ptr(BN_copy(pub, DH_get0_p(dh)))
+ || !TEST_int_le(ossl_dh_compute_key(buf, pub, dh), 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* Test that z == p - 1 fails */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_sub_word(pub, 1))
+ || !TEST_int_le(ossl_dh_compute_key(buf, pub, dh), 0))
+ goto err;
+ /* Test that z == p - 2 passes */
+ if (!TEST_true(BN_sub_word(pub, 1))
+ || !TEST_int_eq(ossl_dh_compute_key(buf, pub, dh), sz))
+ goto err;
+
+ ret = 1;
+err:
+ OPENSSL_free(buf);
+ BN_free(pub);
+ BN_free(g);
+ BN_free(q);
+ BN_free(p);
+ DH_free(dh);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/* Test data from RFC 5114 */
static const unsigned char dhtest_1024_160_xA[] = {
@@ -461,31 +518,6 @@ static const unsigned char dhtest_2048_256_Z[] = {
0xC2, 0x6C, 0x5D, 0x7C
};
-static const unsigned char dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y[] = {
- 0x45, 0x32, 0x5F, 0x51, 0x07, 0xE5, 0xDF, 0x1C, 0xD6, 0x02, 0x82, 0xB3,
- 0x32, 0x8F, 0xA4, 0x0F, 0x87, 0xB8, 0x41, 0xFE, 0xB9, 0x35, 0xDE, 0xAD,
- 0xC6, 0x26, 0x85, 0xB4, 0xFF, 0x94, 0x8C, 0x12, 0x4C, 0xBF, 0x5B, 0x20,
- 0xC4, 0x46, 0xA3, 0x26, 0xEB, 0xA4, 0x25, 0xB7, 0x68, 0x8E, 0xCC, 0x67,
- 0xBA, 0xEA, 0x58, 0xD0, 0xF2, 0xE9, 0xD2, 0x24, 0x72, 0x60, 0xDA, 0x88,
- 0x18, 0x9C, 0xE0, 0x31, 0x6A, 0xAD, 0x50, 0x6D, 0x94, 0x35, 0x8B, 0x83,
- 0x4A, 0x6E, 0xFA, 0x48, 0x73, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x87, 0xFF, 0x6B, 0x66, 0x1F,
- 0xA8, 0x82, 0xC6, 0x01, 0xE5, 0x80, 0xB5, 0xB0, 0x52, 0xD0, 0xE9, 0xD8,
- 0x72, 0xF9, 0x7D, 0x5B, 0x8B, 0xA5, 0x4C, 0xA5, 0x25, 0x95, 0x74, 0xE2,
- 0x7A, 0x61, 0x4E, 0xA7, 0x8F, 0x12, 0xE2, 0xD2, 0x9D, 0x8C, 0x02, 0x70,
- 0x34, 0x44, 0x32, 0xC7, 0xB2, 0xF3, 0xB9, 0xFE, 0x17, 0x2B, 0xD6, 0x1F,
- 0x8B, 0x7E, 0x4A, 0xFA, 0xA3, 0xB5, 0x3E, 0x7A, 0x81, 0x9A, 0x33, 0x66,
- 0x62, 0xA4, 0x50, 0x18, 0x3E, 0xA2, 0x5F, 0x00, 0x07, 0xD8, 0x9B, 0x22,
- 0xE4, 0xEC, 0x84, 0xD5, 0xEB, 0x5A, 0xF3, 0x2A, 0x31, 0x23, 0xD8, 0x44,
- 0x22, 0x2A, 0x8B, 0x37, 0x44, 0xCC, 0xC6, 0x87, 0x4B, 0xBE, 0x50, 0x9D,
- 0x4A, 0xC4, 0x8E, 0x45, 0xCF, 0x72, 0x4D, 0xC0, 0x89, 0xB3, 0x72, 0xED,
- 0x33, 0x2C, 0xBC, 0x7F, 0x16, 0x39, 0x3B, 0xEB, 0xD2, 0xDD, 0xA8, 0x01,
- 0x73, 0x84, 0x62, 0xB9, 0x29, 0xD2, 0xC9, 0x51, 0x32, 0x9E, 0x7A, 0x6A,
- 0xCF, 0xC1, 0x0A, 0xDB, 0x0E, 0xE0, 0x62, 0x77, 0x6F, 0x59, 0x62, 0x72,
- 0x5A, 0x69, 0xA6, 0x5B, 0x70, 0xCA, 0x65, 0xC4, 0x95, 0x6F, 0x9A, 0xC2,
- 0xDF, 0x72, 0x6D, 0xB1, 0x1E, 0x54, 0x7B, 0x51, 0xB4, 0xEF, 0x7F, 0x89,
- 0x93, 0x74, 0x89, 0x59
-};
-
typedef struct {
DH *(*get_param) (void);
const unsigned char *xA;
@@ -523,7 +555,7 @@ static int rfc5114_test(void)
unsigned char *Z1 = NULL;
unsigned char *Z2 = NULL;
const rfc5114_td *td = NULL;
- BIGNUM *bady = NULL, *priv_key = NULL, *pub_key = NULL;
+ BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL, *pub_key = NULL;
const BIGNUM *pub_key_tmp;
for (i = 0; i < (int)OSSL_NELEM(rfctd); i++) {
@@ -576,37 +608,9 @@ static int rfc5114_test(void)
OPENSSL_free(Z2);
Z2 = NULL;
}
-
- /* Now i == OSSL_NELEM(rfctd) */
- /* RFC5114 uses unsafe primes, so now test an invalid y value */
- if (!TEST_ptr(dhA = DH_get_2048_224())
- || !TEST_ptr(Z1 = OPENSSL_malloc(DH_size(dhA))))
- goto bad_err;
-
- if (!TEST_ptr(bady = BN_bin2bn(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y,
- sizeof(dhtest_rfc5114_2048_224_bad_y),
- NULL)))
- goto bad_err;
-
- if (!DH_generate_key(dhA))
- goto bad_err;
-
- if (DH_compute_key(Z1, bady, dhA) != -1) {
- /*
- * DH_compute_key should fail with -1. If we get here we unexpectedly
- * allowed an invalid y value
- */
- goto err;
- }
- /* We'll have a stale error on the queue from the above test so clear it */
- ERR_clear_error();
- BN_free(bady);
- DH_free(dhA);
- OPENSSL_free(Z1);
return 1;
bad_err:
- BN_free(bady);
DH_free(dhA);
DH_free(dhB);
BN_free(pub_key);
@@ -617,7 +621,6 @@ static int rfc5114_test(void)
return 0;
err:
- BN_free(bady);
DH_free(dhA);
DH_free(dhB);
OPENSSL_free(Z1);
@@ -793,6 +796,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
TEST_note("No DH support");
#else
ADD_TEST(dh_test);
+ ADD_TEST(dh_computekey_range_test);
ADD_TEST(rfc5114_test);
ADD_TEST(rfc7919_test);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(dh_test_prime_groups, OSSL_NELEM(prime_groups));
diff --git a/test/evp_test.c b/test/evp_test.c
index 2bb837e6e7..efcf4c5fee 100644
--- a/test/evp_test.c
+++ b/test/evp_test.c
@@ -1632,7 +1632,7 @@ static int pderive_test_parse(EVP_TEST *t,
EVP_PKEY *peer;
if (find_key(&peer, value, public_keys) == 0)
return -1;
- if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(kdata->ctx, peer) <= 0) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex(kdata->ctx, peer, 0) <= 0) {
t->err = "DERIVE_SET_PEER_ERROR";
return 1;
}
diff --git a/util/libcrypto.num b/util/libcrypto.num
index ce70b2fe65..b968e0da1f 100644
--- a/util/libcrypto.num
+++ b/util/libcrypto.num
@@ -5332,3 +5332,4 @@ TS_RESP_CTX_new_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:TS
X509_REQ_new_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_dup ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_dup ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
+EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer_ex ? 3_0_0 EXIST::FUNCTION:
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-11-30 01:32:26 +0100