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* Copyright year updatesTomas Mraz2024-09-05173-173/+173
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Release: yes
* Improve base64 BIO correctness and error reportingViktor Dukhovni2024-08-303-48/+106
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Also improve related documentation. - The BIO_FLAGS_BASE64_NO_NL flag did not behave as advertised, only leading and trailing, but not internal, whitespace was supported: $ echo 'AA AA' | openssl base64 -A -d | wc -c 0 - Switching from ignored leading input to valid base64 input misbehaved when the length of the skipped input was one more than the length of the second and subsequent valid base64 lines in the internal 1k buffer: $ printf '#foo\n#bar\nA\nAAA\nAAAA\n' | openssl base64 -d | wc -c 0 - When the underlying BIO is retriable, and a read returns less than 1k of data, some of the already buffered input lines that could have been decoded and returned were retained internally for a retry by the caller. This is somewhat surprising, and the new code decodes as many of the buffered lines as possible. Issue reported by Michał Trojnara. - After all valid data has been read, the next BIO_read(3) should return 0 when the input was all valid or -1 if an error was detected. This now occurs in more consistently, but further tests and code refactoring may be needed to ensure this always happens. Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25253)
* doc: Document properties param for Argon2 KDFClemens Lang2024-08-291-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The Argon2 KDF uses OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES to fetch implementations of blake2bmac and blake2b512 if ctx->mac and ctx->md are NULL. This isn't documented in the manpage, so users that might, for example, want to fetch an instance of Argon2 with the -fips property query to obtain a working Argon2 KDF even though the default property query requires fips=yes are left wondering why this fails. Fortunately, EVP_KDF(3)/PARAMETERS already explains what the properties are used for, so we really just need to add a single line. Signed-off-by: Clemens Lang <cllang@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25306)
* Refactor OpenSSL 'EdDSA' EVP_SIGNATURE to allow use with EVP_PKEY functionsRichard Levitte2024-08-291-6/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add EVP_PKEY_{sign,verify}_message support for our Ed25519 and Ed448 implementations, including ph and ctx variants. Tests are added with test_evp stanzas. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24975)
* XOF / EVP_MD_size() changes.slontis2024-08-294-24/+67
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Added the function EVP_MD_CTX_get_size_ex() which checks for XOF and does a ctx get rather than just returning EVP_MD_size(). SHAKE did not have a get_ctx_params() so that had to be added to return the xoflen. Added a helper function EVP_MD_xof() EVP_MD_CTX_size() was just an aliased macro for EVP_MD_size(), so to keep it the same I added an extra function. EVP_MD_size() always returns 0 for SHAKE now, since it caches the value of md_size at the time of an EVP_MD_fetch(). This is probably better than returning the incorrect initial value it was before e.g (16 for SHAKE128) and returning tht always instead of the set xoflen. Note BLAKE2B uses "size" instead of "xoflen" to do a similar thing. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25285)
* doc: Document EVP_{TYPE}_CTX_get_algor etcRichard Levitte2024-08-272-0/+82
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25000)
* Amend the design of AlgorithmIdentifier parameter passingRichard Levitte2024-08-272-27/+57
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | I realised that any application that passes AlgorithmIdentifier parameters to and from a provider may also be interested in the full AlgorithmIdentifier of the implementation invocation. Likewise, any application that wants to get the full AlgorithmIdentifier from an implementation invocation may also want to pass AlgorithmIdentifier parameters to that same implementation invocation. These amendments should be useful to cover all intended uses of the legacy ctrls for PKCS7 and CMS: - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT - EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN It should also cover a number of other cases that were previously implemented through EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD, as well as all sorts of other cases where the application has had to assemble a X509_ALGOR on their own. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25000)
* Cleanups for FIPS indicator documentationslontis2024-08-2624-138/+273
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25195)
* Add FIPS indicator documentationslontis2024-08-262-26/+246
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25195)
* Add FIPS indicators to X25519 and X448.slontis2024-08-252-2/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | | X25519 and X448 are unapproved in FIPS 140-3 So always trigger the indicator callback if these Keys are used, and add "fips-indicator" getters that return 0. This has been added to keygen and key exchange. (KEM will also require it if ever becomes a FIPS algorithm). Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25246)
* doc: document the OSSL_SIGNATURE_PARAM_FIPS_VERIFY_MESSAGE parameterPauli2024-08-223-0/+13
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25211)
* Replace PKCS#1 v1.5 padding in RSA PCTJoachim Vandersmissen2024-08-211-0/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After December 31, 2023, SP 800-131Ar2 [0] no longer allows PKCS#1 v1.5 padding for RSA "key-transport" (aka encryption and decryption). There's a few good options to replace this usage in the RSA PCT, but the simplest is verifying m = (m^e)^d mod n, (where 1 < m < (n − 1)). This is specified in SP 800-56Br2 (Section 6.4.1.1) [1] and allowed by FIPS 140-3 IG 10.3.A. In OpenSSL, this corresponds to RSA_NO_PADDING. [0]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-131Ar2 [1]: https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.SP.800-56Br2 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23832)
* Add FIPS KMAC key checkslontis2024-08-213-2/+12
| | | | | | | | | | | This adds a FIPS indicator for KMAC key size. Note that 112 bits keys are still smaller than the sizes required to reach 128 bits for KMAC128 and 256 bits for KMAC256 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
* Add HMAC FIPS keysize check.slontis2024-08-213-9/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | HMAC has been changed to use a FIPS indicator for its key check. HKDF and Single Step use a salt rather than a key when using HMAC, so we need a mechanism to bypass this check in HMAC. A seperate 'internal' query table has been added to the FIPS provider for MACS. Giving HMAC a seprate dispatch table allows KDF's to ignore the key check. If a KDF requires the key check then it must do the check itself. The normal MAC dipatch table is used if the user fetches HMAC directly. Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25049)
* hashtable: Support lockless readsTomas Mraz2024-08-211-4/+7
| | | | | | | | | Also build it in the FIPS provider too and properly report error on insert when hashtable cannot be grown. Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24504)
* Refactor OpenSSL 'RSA' EVP_SIGNATURE to also include RSA+hash compositesRichard Levitte2024-08-211-0/+40
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | (in the code, "sigalg" is used to refer to these composite algorithms, which is a nod to libcrypto and libssl, where that term is commonly used for composite algorithms) To make this implementation possible, wrappers were added around the hash function itself, allowing the use of existing hash implementations through their respective OSSL_DISPATCH tables, but also retaining the dynamic fetch of hash implementations when the digest_sign / digest_verify functionality is used. This wrapper allows implementing the RSA+hash composites through simple initializer function and a custom OSSL_DISPATCH table for each. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
* Implement functionality for direct use of composite signature algorithmsRichard Levitte2024-08-213-44/+542
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The following API groups are extended with a new init function, as well as an update and final function, to allow the use of explicitly fetched signature implementations for any composite signature algorithm, like "sha1WithRSAEncryption": - EVP_PKEY_sign - EVP_PKEY_verify - EVP_PKEY_verify_recover To support this, providers are required to add a few new functions, not the least one that declares what key types an signature implementation supports. While at this, the validity check in evp_signature_from_algorithm() is also refactored; the SIGNATURE provider functionality is too complex for counters. It's better, or at least more readable, to check function combinations. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23416)
* Link to the place where signature options are definedHubert Kario2024-08-202-2/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | ca man page: link to section Signed-off-by: Hubert Kario <hkario@redhat.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25011)
* s390x: Add defines for new CPACF functionsIngo Franzki2024-08-191-0/+7
| | | | | | | | | | | | Add defines for new CPACF functions codes, its required MSA levels, and document how to disable these functions via the OPENSSL_s390xcap environment variable. Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25161)
* Add an indicator for AES GCM that returns if the iv has been generatedslontis2024-08-181-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | internally. This is not using a strict check since there may be applications that require the IV to be generated externally (e.g. java). Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25178)
* Revert "doc: add documentation for -eddsa_no_verify_digested fipsinstall option"Pauli2024-08-161-7/+0
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit b00ea9a6a2a72f5ac7b38e82c9a7b6796972fc36. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25192)
* Revert "doc: add verify-digested param for EdDSA"Pauli2024-08-161-11/+4
| | | | | | | | This reverts commit ab02a297eb3d7f314eea371038c0b8e4038f658b. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25192)
* Restrict FIPS EC Keygen to only allow curves with a security strengthslontis2024-08-152-2/+34
| | | | | | | | | | >=112 bits Add a FIPS indicator to EC keygen Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25008)
* Add FIPS Indicator for ECDH cofactor.slontis2024-08-152-0/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | FIPS KAS requires use of ECC CDH. The EC 'B' and 'K' curves have a cofactor that is not 1, and this MUST be multiplied by the private key when deriving the shared secret. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25139)
* Fix SSL_CTX_set1_groups documentation on preference ordersDavid Benjamin2024-08-151-13/+41
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The documentation currently describes SSL_CTX_set1_groups as a preference order, but this does not match the typical interpretation of "preference order" in OpenSSL and TLS. Typically, an application can order more secure options ahead of less secure ones and pick up TLS's usual downgrade protection guarantees. TLS 1.3 servers need to balance an additional consideration: some options will perform worse than others due to key share prediction. The prototypical selection procedure is to first select the set of more secure options, then select the most performant among those. OpenSSL follows this procedure, but it *unconditionally* treats all configured curves as equivalent security. Per discussion on GitHub, OpenSSL's position is that this is an intended behavior. While not supported by built-in providers, OpenSSL now documents that external providers can extend the group list and CHANGES.md explicitly cites post-quantum as a use case. With post-quantum providers, it's unlikely that application developers actually wanted options to be equivalent security. To avoid security vulnerabilities arising from mismatched expectations, update the documentation to clarify the server behavior. Per the OTC decision in https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/22203#issuecomment-1744465829, this documentation fix should be backported to stable branches. Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/23776)
* Document the new -testmode option to the speed commandMatt Caswell2024-08-141-0/+9
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25153)
* Add EDDSA FIPS self tests.slontis2024-08-141-4/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | See FIPS 140-3 IG Section 10.3.A Part 11 Indicates ECDSA requires a sign and verify test. Note 11 states that HashEdDSA is not required to be tested if PureEdDSA is tested. Note 12 indicates that both ED25519 and X448 need to be tested. Since ED uses the oneshot interface, additional API's needed to be exposed to the FIPS provider using #ifdef FIPS_MODULE. Changed ED25518 and ED448 to use fips=true in the FIPS provider. Updated documentation for provider lists for EDDSA. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/22112)
* Improve the EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_kem_op() documentationDmitry Belyavskiy2024-08-141-4/+6
| | | | | | | | Fixes #25142 Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25164)
* Encap/decap in pkeyutl - documentationDmitry Belyavskiy2024-08-131-0/+33
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25127)
* adds TLS signature algorithms list featureMichael Baentsch2024-08-133-0/+52
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24821)
* Restrict salt length for RSA-PSS in the FIPS providerpohsingwu2024-08-133-2/+19
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25115)
* doc: document -signature_digest_check option to fipsinstallPauli2024-08-121-0/+6
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25020)
* doc: docment key-check param for kbkdfPauli2024-08-081-0/+17
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25095)
* doc: document kbkdf key check argument for fipsinstallPauli2024-08-081-0/+7
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25095)
* Update BN_add.pod documentation so it is consistent with header declarationsJulieDzeze12024-08-071-10/+10
| | | | | | | | | CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24215)
* Remove the event queue codeMatt Caswell2024-08-071-201/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PR #18345 added some code for an event queue. It also added a test for it. Unfortunately this event queue code has never been used for anything. Additionally the test was never integrated into a test recipe, so it never actually gets invoked via "make test". This makes the code entirely dead, unnecessarily bloats the size of libssl and causes a decrease in our testing code coverage value. We remove the dead code. Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25100)
* doc: document pkcs15-padding-disabled param for RSAPauli2024-08-071-0/+13
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25070)
* doc: fix typosPauli2024-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25070)
* doc: document the fipsintsall option to disallow PKCS#1 version 1.5 padding ↵Pauli2024-08-071-2/+9
| | | | | | | | for key agreement & transport Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Dmitry Belyavskiy <beldmit@gmail.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25070)
* Fix typos found by codespellDimitri Papadopoulos2024-08-073-4/+4
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be> Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24949)
* Fix some small typosAndrew Dinh2024-08-071-1/+1
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25073)
* Implementation of the RFC 9579, PBMAC1 in PKCS#12 - documentationDmitry Belyavskiy2024-08-075-8/+91
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24577)
* Implementation of the RFC 9579, PBMAC1 in PKCS#12Dmitry Belyavskiy2024-08-071-0/+6
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24577)
* doc: add verify-digested param for EdDSAPauli2024-08-071-4/+11
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25032)
* doc: add documentation for -eddsa_no_verify_digested fipsinstall optionPauli2024-08-071-0/+7
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25032)
* Disallow DSA Keygen in the FIPS providerslontis2024-08-061-0/+19
| | | | | | | | | | This uses a FIPS indicator. Since DSA KeyGen is only useful for DSA signing, it reuses the DSA signing FIPS configuration option and settable ctx name. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
* Add KeyManagement keygen parameter getter/gettable functions.slontis2024-08-062-7/+27
| | | | | | | | | | | Added OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_get_params() and OSSL_FUNC_keymgmt_gen_gettable_params() This will allow a FIPS indicator parameter to be queried after keygen. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <ppzgs1@gmail.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24978)
* github: fix quoting in github workflow for jitter testsDimitri John Ledkov2024-08-052-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Nested quoting got ignore previously. And this way one can specify string name directly. Successfully run with Jitter at https://github.com/xnox/openssl/actions/runs/10223149419/job/28289017013 Reviewed-by: Neil Horman <nhorman@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Tom Cosgrove <tom.cosgrove@arm.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/25053)
* Add new configurable item `pbkdf2-lower-bound-check`pohsingwu2024-08-051-0/+6
| | | | | | | | | Since FIPS provider performs lower bound check by default from v3.0, the default value for new configurable item will be one. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24120)
* Add explicit indicator for PBKDF2pohsingwu2024-08-051-0/+10
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/24120)
generated by cgit v1.2.3 (git 2.39.1) at 2024-12-12 08:14:24 +0100