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Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13144)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13062)
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This change makes the naming more consistent, because three different terms
were used for the same thing. (The term libctx was used by far most often.)
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12621)
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Many of the new types introduced by OpenSSL 3.0 have an OSSL_ prefix,
e.g., OSSL_CALLBACK, OSSL_PARAM, OSSL_ALGORITHM, OSSL_SERIALIZER.
The OPENSSL_CTX type stands out a little by using a different prefix.
For consistency reasons, this type is renamed to OSSL_LIB_CTX.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12621)
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These were previously added as an internal API. But since the CMS code
needs them, other code might do too.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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Fixes #12983
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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Low level algorithm implementations have no business knowing about details
of the higher level CMS concept. This knowledge is therefore moved into the
CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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There is a large amount of CMS sepcific code in the algorithms. This is in
the wrong place and breaks layering. This code should be in the CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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There is quite a large amount of algorithm specific CMS code sitting in
the algorithm directories. However, this seems to break layering.
Algorithms really have no business knowing anything about CMS. Really it
should be the other way around. Where there is algorithm specific CMS code
it is the CMS layer that should know how to handle different algorithms.
Therefore we move this code into the CMS layer.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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We were downgrading a key in the CMS code. This is no longer necessary.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13088)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Note that with this commit the optional parameter is introduced, but
libssl still ignores it.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13018)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
GH: #13085
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Several embedded toolchains may provide dummy implemented getentropy()
function which always returns -1 and sets errno to the ENOSYS.
As a result the function SSL_CTX_new() fails to create a new context.
Fixes #13002
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13114)
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The default settings are now IEEE float.
CLA: Permission is granted by the author to the ITUGLIB team to use these modifications.
Fixes #12919
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13108)
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The temporary copy that's made didn't have a lock, which could end up
with a crash. We now handle locks a bit better, and take extra care to
lock it and keep track of which lock is used where and which lock is
thrown away.
Fixes #12876
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12978)
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orignal -> original
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13111)
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In OpenSSL 1.1.1 the script run_tests.pl has an effectiver
workaround to fall back to Test::Harness, if TAP::Harness
is not available. That code has substantially changed,
but it seems it should still fall back but doesn't.
Observed on SuSE Linux Enterprise Server 11 (SLES11).
Error messages:
Can't locate TAP/Parser.pm in @inc (@inc contains: /path/to/bld/openssl300/test/../util/perl /path/to/local/perl/lib/perl5 /usr/lib/perl5/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/site_perl/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/site_perl/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl .) at /path/to/local/perl/lib/perl5/parent.pm line 20.
BEGIN failed--compilation aborted at /path/to/bld/openssl300/test/run_tests.pl line 131.
and
Can't locate TAP/Harness.pm in @inc (@inc contains: /path/to/bld/openssl300/test/../util/perl /path/to/local/perl/lib/perl5 /usr/lib/perl5/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/site_perl/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/site_perl/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0/x86_64-linux-thread-multi /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl/5.10.0 /usr/lib/perl5/vendor_perl .) at /path/to/local/perl/lib/perl5/parent.pm line 20.
BEGIN failed--compilation aborted at /path/to/bld/openssl300/test/run_tests.pl line 215.
Concerning the fix: the docs for parent.pm show, that without
the "-norequire" it puts the require statement in a BEGIN block
which probably runs before the eval, to the loading is no
longer encapsulated by the eval. Without the additional require
line, the loading doesn't happen at all, so the availability
testing fails. Combining the "-norequire" and an explicit
"require" worked for me.
Tested on the original problem platform SLES 11, but also on
SLES 12 and 15, RHEL 6, 7 and 8 plus Solaris 10 Sparc.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12500)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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This makes it possible to easily deprecated selections of PEM
functions.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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This makes it possible to easily deprecated selections of ASN1
functions.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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The triggering macro that decides if a symbol is to be considered
deprecated is OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATEDIN_x_y[_z]. OpenSSL::ParseC
renames any OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_x_y[_z] by inserting "IN".
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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As opposed to DEPRECATEDIN_{major}_{minor}(), any use of these macros must
be guarded with a corresponding OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_{major}_{minor}:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
OSSL_DEPRECATEDIN_3_0 int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
#endif
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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It turns out that they have __declspec(deprecated) that correspond
pretty much to GCC's __attribute__((deprecated)), including for
messages.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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The macro value is changed to use deprecation messages where whose are
supported.
We also add the macro OSSL_DEPRECATED_FOR(), to be used whenever an
additional message text is desirable, for example to tell the user
what the deprecated is replaced with. Example:
OSSL_DEPRECATED_FOR(3.0,"use EVP_PKEY and EVP_PKEY_size() instead")
int RSA_size(const RSA *rsa);
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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The diverse DEPRECATEDIN_x_y_z macros are rewritten in terms of this macro.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13074)
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and error if so (since it shouldn't happen).
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13091)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13091)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13091)
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The functions i2d_PrivateKey(), try_key_value() i store_result.c and
X509_PUBKEY_set() were all essentially duplicating this functionality
to some degree.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13094)
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This adds OSSL_ENCODER_to_data() and OSSL_DECODER_from_data(). These
functions allow fairly simple rewrites of type-specific i2d and d2i
calls.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13094)
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There was a number of potential range conflicts between reason codes
from different places. Library specific reason codes are allowed to
start at 100, so it means that anything "global" is limited to the
range 1..99.
At the same time, we have the ERR_R_LIB_xxx reason codes, which have
the same numbers as ERR_LIB_xxx, potential range 1..255.
And then we have the common ERR_R_ reason codes, potential range in
OpenSSL 1.1.1 is 1..99, where fatal reasons occupy 64..99. For
OpenSSL 3.0-dev, the range for the common reason codes was pushed up
to 64..99 in an attempt to reduce the conflicts with the ERR_R_LIB_xxx
reason codes.
Currently existing conflicts in OpenSSL 1.1.1:
ERR_R_BUF_LIB and ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT have the same code.
There are currently no existing conflicts in OpenSSL 3.0-dev, but
considering that ERR_LIB_HTTP is 61, a few more modules and associated
ERR_R_LIB_xxx are going to sniff awfully close to 64, where the
common ERR_R_ codes currently start.
To avoid these range conflicts, the strategy to recognise common
reason codes is change to depend on a reason flag, ERR_RFLAG_COMMON,
and the common error codes themselves have moved start at 256, giving
them the potential range 256..2^18-1, and thus allowing ERR_R_LIB_xxx
the full range of library codes, 1..255.
The dual purpose ERR_R_FATAL is also handled in this change, by
allowing the rflags and reason codes to overlap by 1 bit, and make
both ERR_R_FATAL and ERR_RFLAG_FATAL have the same value, 2^18.
With this change, there's no need to worry about reason code conflicts
any more, every library specific range as well as the common range is
1..2^18-1.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13093)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13092)
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This makes use of the writer filters in OpenSSL::Ordinals.
Fixes #10395
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13092)
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OpenSSL::Ordinals::rewrite() and OpenSSL::Ordinals::write() now take
options, that are simply passed to OpenSSL::Ordinals::items(). The
'sort' option is forbidden, though, since write() already uses it, but
that means it's possible to filter the output.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13092)
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Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <kaishen.yy@antfin.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13097)
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CLA: trivial
Fixes #12996
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13036)
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This commit sets the error mark before calling old_priv_decode and if
old_priv_decode returns false, and if EVP_PKCS82PKEY is successful, the
errors are popped to the previously set mark.
The motivation for this is an issue we found when linking Node.js
against OpenSSL 3.0. Details can be found in the link below and the
test case provided in this commit attempts cover this.
Refs: https://github.com/danbev/learning-libcrypto#asn1-wrong-tag-issue
Refs: https://github.com/nodejs/node/issues/29817
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13073)
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Fixes #13082
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13087)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13087)
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Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13045)
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This unifies the behaviour of a single certificate with
an unknown CA certificate with a self-signed certificate.
The user callback can mask that error to retrieve additional
error information. So the user application can decide to
abort the connection instead to be forced by openssl.
This change in behaviour is backward compatible as user callbacks
who don't want to ignore UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE will
still abort the connection by default.
CLA: trivial
Fixes #11297
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13083)
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If an explicit decoder start type was provided then it wasn't being
handled correctly in all cases. Specifically if a PEM start type was
provided then the decoder would fail.
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13050)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13050)
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