| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14801)
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This change includes swapping the PUT and SPT configuration,
includes of sys/stat.h and sys/types.h in the correct scope
to be picked up by SPT definitions.
Fixes: #14698
Fixes: #14734
CLA: The author has the permission to grant the OpenSSL Team the right to use this change.
Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com>
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14736)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14751)
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The comment is bogus as that call for NID_sha256 does not do
anything else than looking up the string in an internal table.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14703)
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Instead, they should be cached per SSL_CTX.
This also addresses a threading issue where multiple attempts to write the
same location occur. The last one winning. Under 1.1.1, this wasn't an issue
but under 3.0 with library contexts, the results can and will be different.
Fixes #13456
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14715)
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CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14719)
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Commit 2664810 changed everything except the encoding.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14673)
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Following on from CVE-2021-3449 which was caused by a non-zero length
associated with a NULL buffer, other buffer/length pairs are updated to
ensure that they too are always in sync.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
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As the variable peer_sigalgslen is not cleared on ssl rehandshake, it's
possible to crash an openssl tls secured server remotely by sending a
manipulated hello message in a rehandshake.
On such a manipulated rehandshake, tls1_set_shared_sigalgs() calls
tls12_shared_sigalgs() with the peer_sigalgslen of the previous
handshake, while the peer_sigalgs has been freed.
As a result tls12_shared_sigalgs() walks over the available
peer_sigalgs and tries to access data of a NULL pointer.
This issue was introduced by c589c34e61 (Add support for the TLS 1.3
signature_algorithms_cert extension, 2018-01-11).
Signed-off-by: Peter Kästle <peter.kaestle@nokia.com>
Signed-off-by: Samuel Sapalski <samuel.sapalski@nokia.com>
CVE-2021-3449
CLA: trivial
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14589)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14596)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14585)
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Partial fix for #12964
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14473)
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Some functions that lock things are void, so we just return early.
Also make ossl_namemap_empty return 0 on error. Updated the docs, and added
some code to ossl_namemap_stored() to handle the failure, and updated the
tests to allow for failure.
Fixes: #14230
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14238)
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Fixes #14519
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14521)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14383)
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While all the standardized groups would fit within the old limit,
with the addition of providers, some might want to experiment with
new and unstandardized groups. As such, their names might not fit
within the old limit.
Define it as GROUP_NAME_BUFFER_LENGTH with value 64.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14502)
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A trivial PR to remove some commonly repeated words. It looks like this is
not the first PR to do this.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14420)
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If we have TLSv1.3 enabled then we must have at least one TLSv1.3 capable
group available. This check was not always working
Reviewed-by: Ben Kaduk <kaduk@mit.edu>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14430)
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Fixes #14294
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14295)
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If the EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl is deprecated the code will
generate deprecation warnings. So there is no point in marking
all EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl() calls with TODOs.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14367)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14310)
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Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14310)
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In ssl_create_cipher_list() we make a pass through the ciphers to
remove those which are disabled in the current libctx. We are
careful to not include such disabled TLS 1.3 ciphers in the final
consolidated cipher list that we produce, but the disabled ciphers
are still kept in the separate stack of TLS 1.3 ciphers associated
with the SSL or SSL_CTX in question. This leads to confusing
results where a cipher is present in the tls13_cipherlist but absent
from the actual cipher list in use. Keep the books in order and
remove the disabled ciphers from the 1.3 cipherlist at the same time
we skip adding them to the active cipher list.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12037)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14235)
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Additional renames done in encoder and decoder implementation
to follow the style.
Fixes #13622
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14155)
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The low level DH API has two functions for checking parameters:
DH_check_ex() and DH_check_params_ex(). The former does a "full" check,
while the latter does a "quick" check. Most importantly it skips the
check for a safe prime. We're ok without using safe primes here because
we're doing ephemeral DH.
Now that libssl is fully using the EVP API, we need a way to specify that
we want a quick check instead of a full check. Therefore we introduce
EVP_PKEY_param_check_quick() and use it.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14146)
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Fixes #14153
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14154)
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Using ERR_LIB_* causes the error output to say 'reason(n)' instead of
the name of the sub-library in question.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14152)
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The low level SRP implementation has been deprecated with no replacement.
Therefore the libssl level APIs need to be similarly deprecated.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14132)
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The OTC decided that all low level APIs should be deprecated. This extends
to SRP, even though at the current time there is no "EVP" interface to it.
This could be added in a future release.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14132)
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This field has not been used since #3858 was merged in 2017 when we
moved to a table-based lookup for certificate type properties instead of
an index-based one.
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13991)
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The existing names such as EVP_PKEY_param_fromdata_settable were a bit
confusing since the 'param' referred to key params not OSSL_PARAM. To simplify
the interface a 'selection' parameter will be passed instead. The
changes are:
(1) EVP_PKEY_fromdata_init() replaces both EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_init() and EVP_PKEY_param_fromdata_init().
(2) EVP_PKEY_fromdata() has an additional selection parameter.
(3) EVP_PKEY_fromdata_settable() replaces EVP_PKEY_key_fromdata_settable() and EVP_PKEY_param_fromdata_settable().
EVP_PKEY_fromdata_settable() also uses a selection parameter.
Fixes #12989
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14076)
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We should no longer be relying on compile time checks in libssl for
the availability of crypto algorithms. The availability of crypto
algorithms should be determined at runtime based on what providers have
been loaded.
Fixes #13616
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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We may have compiled in sigalg values that we can't support at runtime.
Make sure we only use sigalgs that are actually enabled.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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By recognising the nist group names directly we can avoid having to call
EC_curve_nist2nid in libssl, which is not available in a no-ec build.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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With 3.0 we need to know whether algs are available at run time not
at compile time. Actually the code as written is sufficient to do this,
so we can simply remove the guards.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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In 1.1.1 and below we would check for the availability of certain
algorithms based on compile time guards. However with 3.0 this is no
longer sufficient. Some algorithms that are unavailable at compile time
may become available later if 3rd party providers are loaded. Similarly,
algorithms that exist in our built-in providers at compile time may not
be available at run time if those providers are not loaded.
Fixes #13184
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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The supported groups code was checking the OPENSSL_NO_EC and
OPENSSL_NO_DH guards in order to work, and the list of default groups was
based on those guards. However we now need it to work even in a no-ec
and no-dh build, because new groups might be added from providers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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The default supported groups code was disabled in the event of a build
with no-ec and no-dh. However now that providers can add there own
groups (which might not fit into either of these categories), this is
no longer appropriate.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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This removes man unnecessary OPENSSL_NO_DH guards from libssl. Now that
libssl is entirely using the EVP APIs and implementations can be plugged
in via providers it is no longer needed to disable DH at compile time in
libssl. Instead it should detect at runtime whether DH is available from
the loaded providers.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13916)
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We had a couple of stray references to OpenSSL1.2 in libssl. We just
reword the comments to remove those references without changing any
behaviour.
The first one in t1_lib.c is a technical non-compliance in the TLSv1.3
spec where, under some circumstances, we offer DSA sigalgs even in a
ClientHello that eventually negotiates TLSv1.3. We explicitly chose to
accept this behaviour in 1.1.1 and we're not planning to change it for
3.0.
The second one in s3_lib.c is regarnding the behaviour of
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(). Technically you shouldn't be able to call
this from a server - but we allow it and just ignore it rather than
raising an error. The TODO suggest we consider raising an error instead.
However, with 3.0 we are trying to minimise breaking changes so I suggest
not making this change now.
Fixes #13161
Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14037)
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Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
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The client-side cert verification callback function may not only return
as usual for success or 0 for failure, but also -1,
typically on failure verifying the server certificate.
This makes the handshake suspend and return control to the calling application
with SSL_ERROR_WANT_RETRY_VERIFY.
The app can for instance fetch further certificates or cert status information
needed for the verification.
Calling SSL_connect() again resumes the connection attempt
by retrying the server certificate verification step.
This process may even be repeated if need be.
The core implementation of the feature is in ssl/statem/statem_clnt.c,
splitting tls_process_server_certificate() into a preparation step
that just copies the certificates received from the server to s->session->peer_chain
(rather than having them in a local variable at first) and returns to the state machine,
and a post-processing step in tls_post_process_server_certificate() that can be repeated:
Try verifying the current contents of s->session->peer_chain basically as before,
but give the verification callback function the chance to pause connecting and
make the TLS state machine later call tls_post_process_server_certificate() again.
Otherwise processing continues as usual.
The documentation of the new feature is added to SSL_CTX_set_cert_verify_callback.pod
and SSL_want.pod.
This adds two tests:
* A generic test in test/helpers/handshake.c
on the usability of the new server cert verification retry feature.
It is triggered via test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf.in (while the bulky auto-
generated changes to test/ssl-tests/03-custom_verify.cnf can be basically ignored).
* A test in test/sslapitest.c that demonstrates the effectiveness of the approach
for augmenting the cert chain provided by the server in between SSL_connect() calls.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13906)
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Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13139)
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libssl at the moment downgrades an EVP_PKEY to an EC_KEY object in order
to get the conv form and field type. Instead we provide EVP_PKEY level
functions to do this.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13139)
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Co-author: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
Co-author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13139)
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Whenever we set a private key in libssl, we first found the certificate
that matched the key algorithm. Then we copied the key parameters from the
private key into the public key for the certficate before finally checking
that the private key matched the public key in the certificate. This makes
no sense! Part of checking the private key is to make sure that the
parameters match. It seems that this code has been present since SSLeay.
Perhaps at some point it made sense to do this - but it doesn't any more.
We remove that piece of code altogether. The previous code also had the
undocumented side effect of removing the certificate if the key didn't
match. This makes sense if you've just overwritten the parameters in the
certificate with bad values - but doesn't seem to otherwise. I've also
removed that error logic.
Due to issue #13893, the public key associated with the certificate is
always a legacy key. EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters will downgrade the "from"
key to legacy if the target is legacy, so this means that in libssl all
private keys were always downgraded to legacy when they are first set
in the SSL/SSL_CTX. Removing the EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters code has the
added benefit of removing that downgrade.
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13899)
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Linux kernel is going to support ChaCha20-Poly1305 in TLS offload.
Add support for this cipher.
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13475)
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