| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15656)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
verify RSA-PSS
This is an upstream fix for #13931
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13968)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13719)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: David von Oheimb <david.von.oheimb@siemens.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12947)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Viktor Dukhovni <viktor@openssl.org>
GH: #10786
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Create a PSS certificate with parameter restrictions
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9553)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7767)
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5689)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5470)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Around 138 distinct errors found and fixed; thanks!
Reviewed-by: Kurt Roeckx <kurt@roeckx.be>
Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3459)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Remove some incorrect copyright references.
Move copyright to standard place
Add OpenSSL copyright where missing.
Remove copyrighted file that we don't use any more
Remove Itanium assembler for RC4 and MD5 (assembler versions of old and
weak algorithms for an old chip)
Standardize apps/rehash copyright comment; approved by Timo
Put dual-copyright notice on mkcert
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3691)
|
| |
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/3585)
|
| |
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/2667)
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
subject alternate names.
Add nameConstraints tests incluing DNS, IP and email tests both in
subject alt name extension and subject name.
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
| |
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This extends 'req' to take more than one DN component, and to take
them as full DN components and not just CN values. All other commands
are changed to pass "CN = $cn" instead of just a CN value.
This adds 'genpc', which differs from the other 'gen*' commands by not
calling 'req', and expect the result from 'req' to come through stdin.
Finally, test/certs/setup.sh gets the commands needed to generate a
few proxy certificates.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This is really a security bugfix, not enhancement any more.
Everyone knows critical extensions.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A new X509_VERIFY_PARAM_set_auth_level() function sets the
authentication security level. For verification of SSL peers, this
is automatically set from the SSL security level. Otherwise, for
now, the authentication security level remains at (effectively) 0
by default.
The new "-auth_level" verify(1) option is available in all the
command-line tools that support the standard verify(1) options.
New verify(1) tests added to check enforcement of chain signature
and public key security levels. Also added new tests of enforcement
of the verify_depth limit.
Updated documentation.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Previously, it was sufficient to have certSign in keyUsage when the
basicConstraints extension was missing. That is still accepted in
a trust anchor, but is no longer accepted in an intermediate CA.
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
As documented both SSL_get0_dane_authority() and SSL_get0_dane_tlsa()
are expected to return a negative match depth and nothing else when
verification fails. However, this only happened when verification
failed during chain construction. Errors in verification of the
constructed chain did not have the intended effect on these functions.
This commit updates the functions to check for verify_result ==
X509_V_OK, and no longer erases any accumulated match information
when chain construction fails. Sophisticated developers can, with
care, use SSL_set_verify_result(ssl, X509_V_OK) to "peek" at TLSA
info even when verification fail. They must of course first check
and save the real error, and restore the original error as quickly
as possible. Hiding by default seems to be the safer interface.
Introduced X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH code to signal failure to find
matching TLSA records. Previously reported via X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED.
This also changes the "-brief" output from s_client to include
verification results and TLSA match information.
Mentioned session resumption in code example in SSL_CTX_dane_enable(3).
Also mentioned that depths returned are relative to the verified chain
which is now available via SSL_get0_verified_chain(3).
Added a few more test-cases to danetest, that exercise the new
code.
Resolved thread safety issue in use of static buffer in
X509_verify_cert_error_string().
Fixed long-stating issue in apps/s_cb.c which always sets verify_error
to either X509_V_OK or "chain to long", code elsewhere (e.g.
s_time.c), seems to expect the actual error. [ The new chain
construction code is expected to correctly generate "chain
too long" errors, so at some point we need to drop the
work-arounds, once SSL_set_verify_depth() is also fixed to
propagate the depth to X509_STORE_CTX reliably. ]
Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
When auxiliary data contains only reject entries, continue to trust
self-signed objects just as when no auxiliary data is present.
This makes it possible to reject specific uses without changing
what's accepted (and thus overring the underlying EKU).
Added new supported certs and doubled test count from 38 to 76.
Reviewed-by: Dr. Stephen Henson <steve@openssl.org>
|
|
|
Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org>
|
