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* Rename the field 'provctx and data' to 'algctx' inside some objects containingShane Lontis2021-05-241-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | pointers to provider size algorithm contexts. Fixes #14284 The gettable_ctx_params methods were confusingly passing a 'provctx' and a provider context which are completely different objects. Some objects such as EVP_KDF used 'data' while others such as EVP_MD used 'provctx'. For libcrypto this 'ctx' is an opaque ptr returned when a providers algorithm implementation creates an internal context using a new_ctx() method. Hence the new name 'algctx'. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/15275)
* Fix naming for EVP_RAND_CTX_gettable functions.Pauli2021-04-171-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Change: EVP_RAND_gettable_ctx_params -> EVP_RAND_CTX_gettable_params EVP_RAND_settable_ctx_params -> EVP_RAND_CTX_settable_params Which brings them in line with the other similar functions for other algorithm types. Fixes #14880 Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14893)
* test: update tests to allow for params argument for the instantiate call on ↵Pauli2021-02-281-3/+3
| | | | | | | EVP_RAND_CTXs Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/14310)
* test: make the DRBG test work without RAND_METHOD support.Pauli2021-02-231-0/+4
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13652)
* RAND_METHOD deprecation: testsPauli2021-02-231-0/+3
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13652)
* Update copyright yearRichard Levitte2021-01-281-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13999)
* Remove unused DRBG tests.Pauli2021-01-151-1/+0
| | | | | | | | The DRBG known answer tests are performed by evp_test and the old vectors are not used. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/13867)
* prov/drbg: cleanup some RAND_DRBG leftoversDr. Matthias St. Pierre2020-09-141-6/+0
| | | | | | | These are leftovers from the RAND_DRBG removal (#12509). Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12866)
* NonStop port updates for 3.0.0.Randall S. Becker2020-09-121-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | HPE NonStop Port Changes for 3.0.0 Includes unthreaded, PUT, and SPT for OSS. The port changes include wrapping where necessary for FLOSS and appropriate configuration changes to support that. Two tests are excluded as being inappropriate for the platform. The changes are: * Added /usr/local/include to nonstop-nsx_spt_floss to load floss.h * Added SPT Floss variant for NonStop * Wrapped FLOSS definitions in OPENSSL_TANDEM_FLOSS to allow selective enablement. * SPT build configuration for NonStop * Skip tests not relevant for NonStop * PUT configuration changes required for NonStop platforms * Configurations/50-nonstop.conf: updates for TNS/X platform. * FLOSS instrumentation for HPE NonStop TNS/X and TNS/E platforms. * Configurations/50-nonstop.conf: modifications for non-PUT TNS/E platform b * Fix use of DELAY in ssltestlib.c for HPNS. * Fixed commit merge issues and added floss to http_server.c CLA: Permission is granted by the author to the OpenSSL team to use these modifications. Fixes #5087. Signed-off-by: Randall S. Becker <rsbecker@nexbridge.com> Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12800)
* Add CMS AuthEnvelopedData with AES-GCM supportJakub Zelenka2020-09-081-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | Add the AuthEnvelopedData as defined in RFC 5083 with AES-GCM parameter as defined in RFC 5084. Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8024)
* test/drbgtest: improve the reseed after fork testDr. Matthias St. Pierre2020-09-051-35/+310
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Issue #12377 demonstrated that it is not sufficient to verify that after a fork a reseeding is triggered in the child. This commit enhances the test by collecting the output of the public and private drbg for the parent and all children and checking for duplicates. In case of duplicates, it prints an error message and displays a sorted output. The analysis of #12377 (see [1]) showed that due to an error in the resetting of the AES-CTR (issue #12405, fixed by #12413), it could happen that only the first n bytes (n=1,...15) of the children's random output were identical. This test is optimized to detect this issue by only comparing the first byte of the sampled data (i.e., the first 'column' of the output). The number of samples is chosen high enough to keep the chance of false positives low. The test is executed sixteen times, each time advancing the internal counter by requesting a single extra byte of random data. Another, more general test splits the entire sampled random data into two-byte chunks and counts their collisions. If a certain threshold is exceeded, it reports an error. [1] https://github.com/openssl/openssl/issues/12377#issuecomment-656207334 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12407)
* Fix memory leak in drbgtestShane Lontis2020-08-101-9/+2
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12613)
* drbgtest: avoid a memory leakPauli2020-08-071-0/+7
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509)
* rand_drbg: remove RAND_DRBG.Pauli2020-08-071-742/+108
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | The RAND_DRBG API did not fit well into the new provider concept as implemented by EVP_RAND and EVP_RAND_CTX. The main reason is that the RAND_DRBG API is a mixture of 'front end' and 'back end' API calls and some of its API calls are rather low-level. This holds in particular for the callback mechanism (RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) and the RAND_DRBG type changing mechanism (RAND_DRBG_set()). Adding a compatibility layer to continue supporting the RAND_DRBG API as a legacy API for a regular deprecation period turned out to come at the price of complicating the new provider API unnecessarily. Since the RAND_DRBG API exists only since version 1.1.1, it was decided by the OMC to drop it entirely. Other related changes: Use RNG instead of DRBG in EVP_RAND documentation. The documentation was using DRBG in places where it should have been RNG or CSRNG. Move the RAND_DRBG(7) documentation to EVP_RAND(7). Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12509)
* test/drbgtest.c: set the correct counter to trigger reseedingDr. Matthias St. Pierre2020-07-231-2/+9
| | | | | | | | | | It's the generate counter (drbg->reseed_gen_counter), not the reseed counter which needs to be raised above the reseed_interval. This mix-up was partially caused by some recent renamings of DRBG members variables, but that will be dealt with in a separate commit. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11195)
* test/drbgtest.c: Remove error check for large generate requestsDr. Matthias St. Pierre2020-07-231-6/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | The behaviour of RAND_DRBG_generate() has changed. Previously, it would fail for requests larger than max_request, now it automatically splits large input into chunks (which was previously done only by RAND_DRBG_bytes() before calling RAND_DRBG_generate()). So this test has not only become obsolete, the fact that it succeeded unexpectedly also caused a buffer overflow that terminated the test. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11195)
* Fix DRBG reseed counter condition.Vitezslav Cizek2020-07-231-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | The reseed counter condition was broken since a93ba40, where the initial value was wrongly changed from one to zero. Commit 8bf3665 fixed the initialization, but also adjusted the check, so the problem remained. This change restores original (OpenSSL-fips-2_0-stable) behavior. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11195)
* test/drbgtest.c: Fix error check testVitezslav Cizek2020-07-231-18/+22
| | | | | | | | | | | The condition in test_error_checks() was inverted, so it succeeded as long as error_check() failed. Incidently, error_check() contained several bugs that assured it always failed, thus giving overall drbg test success. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11195)
* DRBG: rename the DRBG taxonomy.Pauli2020-07-141-120/+124
| | | | | | | | | The existing wording didn't capture the reality of the default setup, this new nomenclature attempts to improve the situation. Reviewed-by: Mark J. Cox <mark@awe.com> Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/12366)
* update drbgtest to the provider modelPauli2020-06-241-339/+199
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11682)
* Rename FIPS_MODE to FIPS_MODULERichard Levitte2020-04-281-5/+5
| | | | | | | | | | This macro is used to determine if certain pieces of code should become part of the FIPS module or not. The old name was confusing. Fixes #11538 Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11539)
* Update copyright yearMatt Caswell2020-04-231-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/11616)
* tests/drbgtest: use new RAND_DRBG callback_data API instead of ex_dataDr. Matthias St. Pierre2020-02-071-15/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | It took me a little while to realize why the test_rand_drbg_reseed test kept crashing after replacing the RAND_DRBG_{gs}et_ex_data() calls by RAND_DRBG_{gs}et_callback_data(). The reason was that the ex_data API prohibits modifying the callbacks or callback data of chained DRBGs and returned an error which was ignored by the `test_rand_drbg_reseed` test, for good reasons. The `test_rand_drbg_reseed` test is special in this respect, because it needs to install callbacks for all DRBGs, in order to intercept and count the reseeding events. Since the drbgtest module has access to the internal structures of the DRBG anyway, the problem could be solved by accessing the members directly. I added a warning comment in hook_drbg(). [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Shane Lontis <shane.lontis@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10950)
* Document "get/set-app-data" macros.Rich Salz2019-10-231-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | Documenting the macros removes 14 undocumented items. Merged three separate manpages into one. Rename the DRBG CRYPTO_EX define into RAND_DRBG, but keep the old one for API compatibility. Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org> Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10216)
* Reorganize local header filesDr. Matthias St. Pierre2019-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | Apart from public and internal header files, there is a third type called local header files, which are located next to source files in the source directory. Currently, they have different suffixes like '*_lcl.h', '*_local.h', or '*_int.h' This commit changes the different suffixes to '*_local.h' uniformly. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
* Reorganize private crypto header filesDr. Matthias St. Pierre2019-09-281-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Currently, there are two different directories which contain internal header files of libcrypto which are meant to be shared internally: While header files in 'include/internal' are intended to be shared between libcrypto and libssl, the files in 'crypto/include/internal' are intended to be shared inside libcrypto only. To make things complicated, the include search path is set up in such a way that the directive #include "internal/file.h" could refer to a file in either of these two directoroes. This makes it necessary in some cases to add a '_int.h' suffix to some files to resolve this ambiguity: #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "internal/file_int.h" # located in 'crypto/include/internal' This commit moves the private crypto headers from 'crypto/include/internal' to 'include/crypto' As a result, the include directives become unambiguous #include "internal/file.h" # located in 'include/internal' #include "crypto/file.h" # located in 'include/crypto' hence the superfluous '_int.h' suffixes can be stripped. The files 'store_int.h' and 'store.h' need to be treated specially; they are joined into a single file. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9333)
* drbg: ensure fork-safety without using a pthread_atfork handlerDr. Matthias St. Pierre2019-09-111-0/+45
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | When the new OpenSSL CSPRNG was introduced in version 1.1.1, it was announced in the release notes that it would be fork-safe, which the old CSPRNG hadn't been. The fork-safety was implemented using a fork count, which was incremented by a pthread_atfork handler. Initially, this handler was enabled by default. Unfortunately, the default behaviour had to be changed for other reasons in commit b5319bdbd095, so the new OpenSSL CSPRNG failed to keep its promise. This commit restores the fork-safety using a different approach. It replaces the fork count by a fork id, which coincides with the process id on UNIX-like operating systems and is zero on other operating systems. It is used to detect when an automatic reseed after a fork is necessary. To prevent a future regression, it also adds a test to verify that the child reseeds after fork. CVE-2019-1549 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9832)
* Fix TyposAntoine Cœur2019-07-021-1/+1
| | | | | | | | CLA: trivial Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9288)
* Make the RAND code available from inside the FIPS moduleMatt Caswell2019-06-281-2/+2
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9035)
* Make the rand_crng code OPENSSL_CTX awareMatt Caswell2019-06-071-8/+7
| | | | | | | This is in preparation for moving this code inside the FIPS module. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/9039)
* Ignore entropy from RAND_add()/RAND_seed() in FIPS modeDr. Matthias St. Pierre2019-05-101-0/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | The functions RAND_add() and RAND_seed() provide a legacy API which enables the application to seed the CSPRNG. But NIST SP-800-90A clearly mandates that entropy *shall not* be provided by the consuming application, neither for instantiation, nor for reseeding. The provided random data will be mixed into the DRBG state as additional data only, and no entropy will accounted for it. Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8722)
* Squashed commit of the following:Pauli2019-04-301-2/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Digest stored entropy for CRNG test. Via the FIPS lab, NIST confirmed: The CMVP had a chance to discuss this inquiry and we agree that hashing the NDRNG block does meet the spirit and letter of AS09.42. However, the CMVP did have a few questions: what hash algorithm would be used in this application? Is it approved? Is it CAVs tested? SHA256 is being used here and it will be both approved and CAVs tested. This means that no raw entropy needs to be kept between RNG seedings, preventing a potential attack vector aganst the randomness source and the DRBG chains. It also means the block of secure memory allocated for this purpose is no longer required. Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8790)
* Add prediction resistance capability to the DRBG reseeding process.Pauli2019-04-121-0/+78
| | | | | | | | | | | Refer to NIST SP 800-90C section 5.4 "Prediction Resistance.l" This requires the seed sources to be approved as entropy sources, after which they should be considered live sources as per section 5.3.2 "Live Entropy Source Availability." Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8647)
* Reseeding without derivation function is not supported in FIPS mode.Pauli2019-04-111-2/+7
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8648)
* Add the FIPS related continuous random number generator (CRNG) testing.Pauli2019-03-291-4/+150
| | | | | | | | | | | | Refer to FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests for details. The check is fairly simplistic, being for the entropy sources to not feed the DRBG the same block of seed material twice in a row. Only the first DRBG in a chain is subject to this check, latter DRBGs are assumed to be safely seeded via the earlier DRBGs. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8599)
* Address a bug in the DRBG tests where the reseeding wasn't properlyPauli2019-02-081-3/+3
| | | | | | | | | reinstantiating the DRBG. Bug reported by Doug Gibbons. Reviewed-by: Paul Yang <yang.yang@baishancloud.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8184)
* test/drbgtest.c: call OPENSSL_thread_stop() explicitlyRichard Levitte2019-02-071-0/+10
| | | | | | | | | | | | The manual says this in its notes: ... and therefore applications using static linking should also call OPENSSL_thread_stop() on each thread. ... Fixes #8171 Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/8173)
* Following the license change, modify the boilerplates in test/Richard Levitte2018-12-061-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7767)
* Test: link drbgtest statically against libcryptoDr. Matthias St. Pierre2018-11-081-40/+0
| | | | | | | and remove duplicate rand_drbg_seedlen() implementation again. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7462)
* Fix a race condition in drbgtest.cBernd Edlinger2018-11-051-10/+24
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7531)
* Fix error handling in drbgtest.cBernd Edlinger2018-11-051-14/+19
| | | | | | Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7517)
* RAND_add()/RAND_seed(): fix failure on short input or low entropyDr. Matthias St. Pierre2018-10-261-40/+84
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Commit 5b4cb385c18a (#7382) introduced a bug which had the effect that RAND_add()/RAND_seed() failed for buffer sizes less than 32 bytes. The reason was that now the added random data was used exlusively as entropy source for reseeding. When the random input was too short or contained not enough entropy, the DRBG failed without querying the available entropy sources. This commit makes drbg_add() act smarter: it checks the entropy requirements explicitely. If the random input fails this check, it won't be added as entropy input, but only as additional data. More precisely, the behaviour depends on whether an os entropy source was configured (which is the default on most os): - If an os entropy source is avaible then we declare the buffer content as additional data by setting randomness to zero and trigger a regular reseeding. - If no os entropy source is available, a reseeding will fail inevitably. So drbg_add() uses a trick to mix the buffer contents into the DRBG state without forcing a reseeding: it generates a dummy random byte, using the buffer content as additional data. Related-to: #7449 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7456)
* DRBG: fix reseeding via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() with large inputDr. Matthias St. Pierre2018-10-161-1/+0
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | In pull request #4328 the seeding of the DRBG via RAND_add()/RAND_seed() was implemented by buffering the data in a random pool where it is picked up later by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback. This buffer was limited to the size of 4096 bytes. When a larger input was added via RAND_add() or RAND_seed() to the DRBG, the reseeding failed, but the error returned by the DRBG was ignored by the two calling functions, which both don't return an error code. As a consequence, the data provided by the application was effectively ignored. This commit fixes the problem by a more efficient implementation which does not copy the data in memory and by raising the buffer the size limit to INT32_MAX (2 gigabytes). This is less than the NIST limit of 2^35 bits but it was chosen intentionally to avoid platform dependent problems like integer sizes and/or signed/unsigned conversion. Additionally, the DRBG is now less permissive on errors: In addition to pushing a message to the openssl error stack, it enters the error state, which forces a reinstantiation on next call. Thanks go to Dr. Falko Strenzke for reporting this issue to the openssl-security mailing list. After internal discussion the issue has been categorized as not being security relevant, because the DRBG reseeds automatically and is fully functional even without additional randomness provided by the application. Fixes #7381 Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7382)
* Fix the drbgtest with randomized orderingMatt Caswell2018-10-031-1/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | In drbgtest, test_set_defaults changes the default DRBGs. This works fine when tests are run in the normal order. However if OPENSSL_TEST_RAND_ORDER is defined then it may fail (dependent on the ordering). This environment variable is defined for one of the Travis tests, so this issue was causing intermittent travis test failures. [extended tests] Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7338)
* Added DRBG_HMAC & DRBG_HASH + Added defaults for setting DRBG for ↵Shane Lontis2018-09-271-23/+141
| | | | | | | | master/public/private + renamed generate_counter back to reseed_counter + generated new cavs data tests Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/6779)
* Use void in all function definitions that do not take any argumentsKurt Roeckx2018-05-111-1/+1
| | | | | Reviewed-by: Rich Salz <rsalz@openssl.org> GH: #6208
* DRBG: fix coverity issuesDr. Matthias St. Pierre2018-04-171-3/+13
| | | | | | | | | | | | - drbg_lib.c: Silence coverity warning: the comment preceding the RAND_DRBG_instantiate() call explicitely states that the error is ignored and explains the reason why. - drbgtest: Add checks for the return values of RAND_bytes() and RAND_priv_bytes() to run_multi_thread_test(). Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5976)
* Make sure we use a nonce when a nonce is requiredKurt Roeckx2018-04-011-0/+63
| | | | | | | | If a nonce is required and the get_nonce callback is NULL, request 50% more entropy following NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1. Reviewed-by: Dr. Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> GH: #5503
* Fix: drbgtest fails when tests are executed in random orderDr. Matthias St. Pierre2018-03-191-1/+16
| | | | | | | | | | | | [extended tests] The test_rand_reseed assumed that the global DRBGs were not used previously. This assumption is false when the tests are executed in random order (OPENSSL_TEST_RAND_ORDER). So we uninstantiate them first and add a test for the first instantiation. Reviewed-by: Richard Levitte <levitte@openssl.org> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5680)
* Add a multithread rand testKurt Roeckx2018-03-191-0/+89
| | | | | | | Reviewed-by: Tim Hudson <tjh@openssl.org> Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <paul.dale@oracle.com> Reviewed-by: Matthias St. Pierre <Matthias.St.Pierre@ncp-e.com> (Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/5547)
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