/* * Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved. * * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include "internal/evp_int.h" #include "evp_locl.h" /* MAC PKEY context structure */ typedef struct { EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx; /* * We know of two MAC types: * * 1. those who take a secret in raw form, i.e. raw data as a * ASN1_OCTET_STRING embedded in a EVP_PKEY. So far, that's * all of them but CMAC. * 2. those who take a secret with associated cipher in very generic * form, i.e. a complete EVP_MAC_CTX embedded in a PKEY. So far, * only CMAC does this. * * (one might wonder why the second form isn't used for all) */ #define MAC_TYPE_RAW 1 /* HMAC like MAC type (all but CMAC so far) */ #define MAC_TYPE_MAC 2 /* CMAC like MAC type (only CMAC known so far) */ int type; /* The following is only used for MAC_TYPE_RAW implementations */ struct { const EVP_MD *md; /* temp storage of MD */ ASN1_OCTET_STRING ktmp; /* temp storage for key */ } raw_data; } MAC_PKEY_CTX; static void pkey_mac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); static int pkey_mac_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx; /* We're being smart and using the same base NIDs for PKEY and for MAC */ int nid = ctx->pmeth->pkey_id; EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, OBJ_nid2sn(nid), NULL); if ((hctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*hctx))) == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_MAC_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } hctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac); if (hctx->ctx == NULL) { OPENSSL_free(hctx); return 0; } if (nid == EVP_PKEY_CMAC) { hctx->type = MAC_TYPE_MAC; } else { hctx->type = MAC_TYPE_RAW; hctx->raw_data.ktmp.type = V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING; } pkey_mac_cleanup(ctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, hctx); ctx->keygen_info_count = 0; return 1; } static int pkey_mac_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, const EVP_PKEY_CTX *src) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *sctx, *dctx; sctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(src); if (sctx->ctx->data == NULL) return 0; dctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dctx)); if (dctx == NULL) { EVPerr(EVP_F_PKEY_MAC_COPY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(dst, dctx); dst->keygen_info_count = 0; dctx->ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(sctx->ctx); if (dctx->ctx == NULL) goto err; /* * Normally, nothing special would be done with the MAC method. In * this particular case, though, the MAC method was fetched internally * by pkey_mac_init() above or by EVP_PKEY_new_CMAC_key() and passed * via the EVP_MAC_CTX, so it is effectively like every new EVP_MAC_CTX * fetches the MAC method anew in this case. Therefore, its reference * count must be adjusted here. */ if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(dctx->ctx))) goto err; dctx->type = sctx->type; switch (dctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: dctx->raw_data.md = sctx->raw_data.md; if (ASN1_STRING_get0_data(&sctx->raw_data.ktmp) != NULL && !ASN1_STRING_copy(&dctx->raw_data.ktmp, &sctx->raw_data.ktmp)) goto err; break; case MAC_TYPE_MAC: /* Nothing more to do */ break; default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } return 1; err: pkey_mac_cleanup(dst); return 0; } static void pkey_mac_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { /* * For the exact same reasons the MAC reference count is incremented * in pkey_mac_copy() above, it must be explicitly freed here. */ MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = ctx == NULL ? NULL : EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); if (hctx != NULL) { EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx); switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: OPENSSL_clear_free(hctx->raw_data.ktmp.data, hctx->raw_data.ktmp.length); break; } EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx); EVP_MAC_free(mac); OPENSSL_free(hctx); EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_data(ctx, NULL); } } static int pkey_mac_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); int nid = ctx->pmeth->pkey_id; switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *hkey = NULL; if (!hctx->raw_data.ktmp.data) return 0; hkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(&hctx->raw_data.ktmp); if (!hkey) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, nid, hkey); } break; case MAC_TYPE_MAC: { EVP_MAC_CTX *cmkey = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(hctx->ctx); if (cmkey == NULL) return 0; if (!EVP_MAC_up_ref(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx))) return 0; EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, nid, cmkey); } break; default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } return 1; } static int int_update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)); if (!EVP_MAC_update(hctx->ctx, data, count)) return 0; return 1; } static int pkey_mac_signctx_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key = NULL; int rv = 1; /* * For MACs with the EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM flag set and that * gets the key passed as an ASN.1 OCTET STRING, we set the key here, * as this may be only time it's set during a DigestSign. * * MACs that pass around the key in form of EVP_MAC_CTX are setting * the key through other mechanisms. (this is only CMAC for now) */ int set_key = hctx->type == MAC_TYPE_RAW && (ctx->pmeth->flags & EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM) != 0; if (set_key) { if (!EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx), OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_PKEY_id(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx))))) return 0; key = EVP_PKEY_get0(EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx)); if (key == NULL) return 0; } EVP_MD_CTX_set_flags(mctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT); EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn(mctx, int_update); /* Some MACs don't support this control... that's fine */ { OSSL_PARAM params[3]; size_t params_n = 0; int flags = EVP_MD_CTX_test_flags(mctx, ~EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NO_INIT); /* TODO(3.0) "flags" isn't quite right, i.e. a quick hack for now */ params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_FLAGS, &flags); if (set_key) params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, key->data, key->length); params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); rv = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params); } return rv; } static int pkey_mac_signctx(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, EVP_MD_CTX *mctx) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); return EVP_MAC_final(hctx->ctx, sig, siglen, EVP_MAC_size(hctx->ctx)); } static int pkey_mac_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); switch (type) { case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CIPHER: switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: return -2; /* The raw types don't support ciphers */ case MAC_TYPE_MAC: { OSSL_PARAM params[3]; size_t params_n = 0; char *ciphname = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_CIPHER_nid(p2)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE char *engineid = (char *)ENGINE_get_id(ctx->engine); params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("engine", engineid, 0); #endif params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CIPHER, ciphname, 0); params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params) || !EVP_MAC_init(hctx->ctx)) return 0; } break; default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD: switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: hctx->raw_data.md = p2; break; case MAC_TYPE_MAC: { EVP_MAC_CTX *new_mac_ctx; if (ctx->pkey == NULL) return 0; new_mac_ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup((EVP_MAC_CTX *)ctx->pkey ->pkey.ptr); if (new_mac_ctx == NULL) return 0; EVP_MAC_CTX_free(hctx->ctx); hctx->ctx = new_mac_ctx; } break; default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_DIGEST_SIZE: { OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END }; size_t size = (size_t)p1; size_t verify = 0; /* * We verify that the length is actually set by getting back * the same parameter and checking that it matches what we * tried to set. * TODO(3.0) when we have a more direct mechanism to check if * a parameter was used, we must refactor this to use that. */ params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &size); if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params)) return 0; params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE, &verify); if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_get_params(hctx->ctx, params)) return 0; /* * Since EVP_MAC_CTX_{get,set}_params() returned successfully, * we can only assume that the size was ignored, i.e. this * control is unsupported. */ if (verify != size) return -2; } break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SET_MAC_KEY: switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: if ((!p2 && p1 > 0) || (p1 < -1)) return 0; if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(&hctx->raw_data.ktmp, p2, p1)) return 0; break; case MAC_TYPE_MAC: { OSSL_PARAM params[2]; size_t params_n = 0; params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, p2, p1); params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params); } break; default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } break; case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT: switch (hctx->type) { case MAC_TYPE_RAW: /* Ensure that we have attached the implementation */ if (!EVP_MAC_init(hctx->ctx)) return 0; { ASN1_OCTET_STRING *key = (ASN1_OCTET_STRING *)ctx->pkey->pkey.ptr; OSSL_PARAM params[4]; size_t params_n = 0; char *mdname = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(EVP_MD_nid(hctx->raw_data.md)); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE char *engineid = ctx->engine == NULL ? NULL : (char *)ENGINE_get_id(ctx->engine); if (engineid != NULL) params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string("engine", engineid, 0); #endif params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST, mdname, 0); params[params_n++] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, key->data, key->length); params[params_n] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); return EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params); } break; case MAC_TYPE_MAC: return -2; /* The mac types don't support ciphers */ default: /* This should be dead code */ return 0; } break; default: return -2; } return 1; } static int pkey_mac_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type, const char *value) { MAC_PKEY_CTX *hctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_data(ctx); const EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(hctx->ctx); OSSL_PARAM params[2]; int ok = 0; /* * Translation of some control names that are equivalent to a single * parameter name. * * "md" and "digest" are the same thing, we use the single "digest" * * "digestsize" was a setting control in siphash, but naming wise, * it's really the same as "size". */ if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0) type = OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST; else if (strcmp(type, "digestsize") == 0) type = OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE; if (!OSSL_PARAM_allocate_from_text(¶ms[0], EVP_MAC_CTX_settable_params(mac), type, value, strlen(value) + 1)) return 0; params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); ok = EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(hctx->ctx, params); OPENSSL_free(params[0].data); return ok; } static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD cmac_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_CMAC, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM, pkey_mac_init, pkey_mac_copy, pkey_mac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_signctx_init, pkey_mac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_ctrl, pkey_mac_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *cmac_pkey_method(void) { return &cmac_pkey_meth; } static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD hmac_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_HMAC, 0, pkey_mac_init, pkey_mac_copy, pkey_mac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_signctx_init, pkey_mac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_ctrl, pkey_mac_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *hmac_pkey_method(void) { return &hmac_pkey_meth; } static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD siphash_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_SIPHASH, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM, pkey_mac_init, pkey_mac_copy, pkey_mac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_signctx_init, pkey_mac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_ctrl, pkey_mac_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *siphash_pkey_method(void) { return &siphash_pkey_meth; } static const EVP_PKEY_METHOD poly1305_pkey_meth = { EVP_PKEY_POLY1305, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM, pkey_mac_init, pkey_mac_copy, pkey_mac_cleanup, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_keygen, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_signctx_init, pkey_mac_signctx, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, pkey_mac_ctrl, pkey_mac_ctrl_str }; const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *poly1305_pkey_method(void) { return &poly1305_pkey_meth; }