/* ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c */ /* Copyright (C) 1995-1998 Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com) * All rights reserved. * * This package is an SSL implementation written * by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com). * The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL. * * This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as * the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions * apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA, * lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation * included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms * except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * * Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in * the code are not to be removed. * If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution * as the author of the parts of the library used. * This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or * in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the * documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution. * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this software * must display the following acknowledgement: * "This product includes cryptographic software written by * Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)" * The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library * being used are not cryptographic related :-). * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from * the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement: * "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND * ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE * ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL * DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS * OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT * LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY * OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGE. * * The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or * derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be * copied and put under another distribution licence * [including the GNU Public Licence.] */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright (c) 1998-2007 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved. * * Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without * modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions * are met: * * 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer. * * 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in * the documentation and/or other materials provided with the * distribution. * * 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this * software must display the following acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to * endorse or promote products derived from this software without * prior written permission. For written permission, please contact * openssl-core@openssl.org. * * 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL" * nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written * permission of the OpenSSL Project. * * 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following * acknowledgment: * "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project * for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.openssl.org/)" * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY * EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE * IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR * PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR * ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, * SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT * NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; * LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) * HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, * STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) * ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED * OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE. * ==================================================================== * * This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young * (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim * Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com). * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED. * * Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by * SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project. * * The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license provided above. * * ECC cipher suite support in OpenSSL originally written by * Vipul Gupta and Sumit Gupta of Sun Microsystems Laboratories. * */ /* ==================================================================== * Copyright 2005 Nokia. All rights reserved. * * The portions of the attached software ("Contribution") is developed by * Nokia Corporation and is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source * license. * * The Contribution, originally written by Mika Kousa and Pasi Eronen of * Nokia Corporation, consists of the "PSK" (Pre-Shared Key) ciphersuites * support (see RFC 4279) to OpenSSL. * * No patent licenses or other rights except those expressly stated in * the OpenSSL open source license shall be deemed granted or received * expressly, by implication, estoppel, or otherwise. * * No assurances are provided by Nokia that the Contribution does not * infringe the patent or other intellectual property rights of any third * party or that the license provides you with all the necessary rights * to make use of the Contribution. * * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND. IN * ADDITION TO THE DISCLAIMERS INCLUDED IN THE LICENSE, NOKIA * SPECIFICALLY DISCLAIMS ANY LIABILITY FOR CLAIMS BROUGHT BY YOU OR ANY * OTHER ENTITY BASED ON INFRINGEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS OR * OTHERWISE. */ #include #include "../ssl_locl.h" #include "statem_locl.h" #include "internal/constant_time_locl.h" #include #include #include #include #include #include #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH # include #endif #include #include static STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format, int *al); /* * server_read_transition() encapsulates the logic for the allowed handshake * state transitions when the server is reading messages from the client. The * message type that the client has sent is provided in |mt|. The current state * is in |s->statem.hand_state|. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success (transition allowed) * 0: Error (transition not allowed) */ int ossl_statem_server_read_transition(SSL *s, int mt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: /* * If we get a CKE message after a ServerDone then either * 1) We didn't request a Certificate * OR * 2) If we did request one then * a) We allow no Certificate to be returned * AND * b) We are running SSL3 (in TLS1.0+ the client must return a 0 * list if we requested a certificate) */ if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE && (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request || (!((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) && (s->version == SSL3_VERSION)))) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } else if (s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: /* * We should only process a CertificateVerify message if we have * received a Certificate from the client. If so then |s->session->peer| * will be non NULL. In some instances a CertificateVerify message is * not required even if the peer has sent a Certificate (e.g. such as in * the case of static DH). In that case |st->no_cert_verify| should be * set. */ if (s->session->peer == NULL || st->no_cert_verify) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { /* * For the ECDH ciphersuites when the client sends its ECDH * pub key in a certificate, the CertificateVerify message is * not sent. Also for GOST ciphersuites when the client uses * its key from the certificate for key exchange. */ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } } else { if (mt == SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY; return 1; } } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG if (s->s3->next_proto_neg_seen) { if (mt == SSL3_MT_NEXT_PROTO) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO; return 1; } } else { #endif if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG } #endif break; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: if (mt == SSL3_MT_FINISHED) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED; return 1; } break; #endif case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (mt == SSL3_MT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE; return 1; } break; default: break; } /* No valid transition found */ return 0; } /* * Should we send a ServerKeyExchange message? * * Valid return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int send_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { unsigned long alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; /* * only send a ServerKeyExchange if DH or fortezza but we have a * sign only certificate PSK: may send PSK identity hints For * ECC ciphersuites, we send a serverKeyExchange message only if * the cipher suite is either ECDH-anon or ECDHE. In other cases, * the server certificate contains the server's public key for * key exchange. */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE|SSL_kECDHE) /* * PSK: send ServerKeyExchange if PSK identity hint if * provided */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* Only send SKE if we have identity hint for plain PSK */ || ((alg_k & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) && s->cert->psk_identity_hint) /* For other PSK always send SKE */ || (alg_k & (SSL_PSK & (SSL_kDHEPSK | SSL_kECDHEPSK))) #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP /* SRP: send ServerKeyExchange */ || (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) #endif ) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * Should we send a CertificateRequest message? * * Valid return values are: * 1: Yes * 0: No */ static int send_certificate_request(SSL *s) { if ( /* don't request cert unless asked for it: */ s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER /* * if SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE is set, don't request cert * during re-negotiation: */ && ((s->session->peer == NULL) || !(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_CLIENT_ONCE)) /* * never request cert in anonymous ciphersuites (see * section "Certificate request" in SSL 3 drafts and in * RFC 2246): */ && (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aNULL) /* * ... except when the application insists on * verification (against the specs, but s3_clnt.c accepts * this for SSL 3) */ || (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) /* don't request certificate for SRP auth */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aSRP) /* * With normal PSK Certificates and Certificate Requests * are omitted */ && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & SSL_aPSK)) { return 1; } return 0; } /* * server_write_transition() works out what handshake state to move to next * when the server is writing messages to be sent to the client. */ WRITE_TRAN ossl_statem_server_write_transition(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_BEFORE: /* Just go straight to trying to read from the client */; return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_OK: /* We must be trying to renegotiate */ st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->d1->cookie_verified && (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE)) st->hand_state = DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (s->hit) { if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; else st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; } else { /* Check if it is anon DH or anon ECDH, */ /* normal PSK or SRP */ if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL | SSL_aSRP | SSL_aPSK))) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT; } else if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; } else if (send_certificate_request(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; } } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: if (s->tlsext_status_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: if (send_server_key_exchange(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: if (send_certificate_request(s)) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } /* Fall through */ case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; } else if (s->tlsext_ticket_expected) { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET; } else { st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; } return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: st->hand_state = TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED; return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (s->hit) { return WRITE_TRAN_FINISHED; } st->hand_state = TLS_ST_OK; ossl_statem_set_in_init(s, 0); return WRITE_TRAN_CONTINUE; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ return WRITE_TRAN_ERROR; } } /* * Perform any pre work that needs to be done prior to sending a message from * the server to the client. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_pre_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: s->shutdown = 0; if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { dtls1_clear_record_buffer(s); /* We don't buffer this message so don't use the timer */ st->use_timer = 0; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * Messages we write from now on should be bufferred and * retransmitted if necessary, so we need to use the timer now */ st->use_timer = 1; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s))) return dtls_wait_for_dry(s); #endif return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer */ st->use_timer = 0; } break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: s->session->cipher = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher; if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->setup_key_block(s)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* * We're into the last flight. We don't retransmit the last flight * unless we need to, so we don't use the timer. This might have * already been set to 0 if we sent a NewSessionTicket message, * but we'll set it again here in case we didn't. */ st->use_timer = 0; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; case TLS_ST_OK: return tls_finish_handshake(s, wst); default: /* No pre work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Perform any work that needs to be done after sending a message from the * server to the client. */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_work(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; s->init_num = 0; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); break; case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; /* HelloVerifyRequest resets Finished MAC */ if (s->version != DTLS1_BAD_VER) ssl3_init_finished_mac(s); /* * The next message should be another ClientHello which we need to * treat like it was the first packet */ s->first_packet = 1; break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no * SCTP used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } #endif break; case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && !s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif if (!s->method->ssl3_enc->change_cipher_state(s, SSL3_CHANGE_CIPHER_SERVER_WRITE)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) dtls1_reset_seq_numbers(s, SSL3_CC_WRITE); break; case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; break; case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: if (statem_flush(s) != 1) return WORK_MORE_A; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && s->hit) { /* * Change to new shared key of SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if * no SCTP used. */ BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_NEXT_AUTH_KEY, 0, NULL); } #endif break; default: /* No post work to be done */ break; } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } /* * Construct a message to be sent from the server to the client. * * Valid return values are: * 1: Success * 0: Error */ int ossl_statem_server_construct_message(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case DTLS_ST_SW_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST: return dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_HELLO_REQ: return tls_construct_hello_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_HELLO: return tls_construct_server_hello(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT: return tls_construct_server_certificate(s); case TLS_ST_SW_KEY_EXCH: return tls_construct_server_key_exchange(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_REQ: return tls_construct_certificate_request(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SRVR_DONE: return tls_construct_server_done(s); case TLS_ST_SW_SESSION_TICKET: return tls_construct_new_session_ticket(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CERT_STATUS: return tls_construct_cert_status(s); case TLS_ST_SW_CHANGE: if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) return dtls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); else return tls_construct_change_cipher_spec(s); case TLS_ST_SW_FINISHED: return tls_construct_finished(s, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label, s->method-> ssl3_enc->server_finished_label_len); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } #define CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH 2048 #define NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH 514 /* * Returns the maximum allowed length for the current message that we are * reading. Excludes the message header. */ unsigned long ossl_statem_server_max_message_size(SSL *s) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return s->max_cert_list; case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return CLIENT_KEY_EXCH_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return NEXT_PROTO_MAX_LENGTH; #endif case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: return CCS_MAX_LENGTH; case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return FINISHED_MAX_LENGTH; default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return 0; } /* * Process a message that the server has received from the client. */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN ossl_statem_server_process_message(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_process_client_hello(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_CERT: return tls_process_client_certificate(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_process_client_key_exchange(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: return tls_process_cert_verify(s, pkt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG case TLS_ST_SR_NEXT_PROTO: return tls_process_next_proto(s, pkt); #endif case TLS_ST_SR_CHANGE: return tls_process_change_cipher_spec(s, pkt); case TLS_ST_SR_FINISHED: return tls_process_finished(s, pkt); default: /* Shouldn't happen */ break; } return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } /* * Perform any further processing required following the receipt of a message * from the client */ WORK_STATE ossl_statem_server_post_process_message(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { OSSL_STATEM *st = &s->statem; switch(st->hand_state) { case TLS_ST_SR_CLNT_HELLO: return tls_post_process_client_hello(s, wst); case TLS_ST_SR_KEY_EXCH: return tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(s, wst); case TLS_ST_SR_CERT_VRFY: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if ( /* Is this SCTP? */ BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) /* Are we renegotiating? */ && s->renegotiate && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); return WORK_MORE_A; } else { ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); } #endif return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; default: break; } /* Shouldn't happen */ return WORK_ERROR; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP static int ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(SSL *s, int *al) { int ret = SSL_ERROR_NONE; *al = SSL_AD_UNRECOGNIZED_NAME; if ((s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_kSRP) && (s->srp_ctx.TLS_ext_srp_username_callback != NULL)) { if (s->srp_ctx.login == NULL) { /* * RFC 5054 says SHOULD reject, we do so if There is no srp * login name */ ret = SSL3_AL_FATAL; *al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; } else { ret = SSL_srp_server_param_with_username(s, al); } } return ret; } #endif int tls_construct_hello_request(SSL *s) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_HELLO_REQUEST, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } unsigned int dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *cookie, unsigned char cookie_len) { unsigned int msg_len; unsigned char *p; p = buf; /* Always use DTLS 1.0 version: see RFC 6347 */ *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION >> 8; *(p++) = DTLS1_VERSION & 0xFF; *(p++) = (unsigned char)cookie_len; memcpy(p, cookie, cookie_len); p += cookie_len; msg_len = p - buf; return msg_len; } int dtls_construct_hello_verify_request(SSL *s) { unsigned int len; unsigned char *buf; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; if (s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb == NULL || s->ctx->app_gen_cookie_cb(s, s->d1->cookie, &(s->d1->cookie_len)) == 0 || s->d1->cookie_len > 255) { SSLerr(SSL_F_DTLS_CONSTRUCT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, SSL_R_COOKIE_GEN_CALLBACK_FAILURE); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } len = dtls_raw_hello_verify_request(&buf[DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH], s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len); dtls1_set_message_header(s, buf, DTLS1_MT_HELLO_VERIFY_REQUEST, len, 0, len); len += DTLS1_HM_HEADER_LENGTH; /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = len; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_hello(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; unsigned int j, complen = 0; unsigned long id; const SSL_CIPHER *c; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP SSL_COMP *comp = NULL; #endif STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ciphers = NULL; int protverr; /* |cookie| will only be initialized for DTLS. */ PACKET session_id, cipher_suites, compression, extensions, cookie; int is_v2_record; is_v2_record = RECORD_LAYER_is_sslv2_record(&s->rlayer); PACKET_null_init(&cookie); /* First lets get s->client_version set correctly */ if (is_v2_record) { unsigned int version; unsigned int mt; /*- * An SSLv3/TLSv1 backwards-compatible CLIENT-HELLO in an SSLv2 * header is sent directly on the wire, not wrapped as a TLS * record. Our record layer just processes the message length and passes * the rest right through. Its format is: * Byte Content * 0-1 msg_length - decoded by the record layer * 2 msg_type - s->init_msg points here * 3-4 version * 5-6 cipher_spec_length * 7-8 session_id_length * 9-10 challenge_length * ... ... */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &mt) || mt != SSL2_MT_CLIENT_HELLO) { /* * Should never happen. We should have tested this in the record * layer in order to have determined that this is a SSLv2 record * in the first place */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &version)) { /* No protocol version supplied! */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } if (version == 0x0002) { /* This is real SSLv2. We don't support it. */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } else if ((version & 0xff00) == (SSL3_VERSION_MAJOR << 8)) { /* SSLv3/TLS */ s->client_version = version; } else { /* No idea what protocol this is */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PROTOCOL); goto err; } } else { /* * use version from inside client hello, not from record header (may * differ: see RFC 2246, Appendix E, second paragraph) */ if(!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, (unsigned int *)&s->client_version)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_TOO_SHORT); goto f_err; } } /* * Do SSL/TLS version negotiation if applicable. For DTLS we just check * versions are potentially compatible. Version negotiation comes later. */ if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); } else if (s->method->version != DTLS_ANY_VERSION && DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->client_version, s->version)) { protverr = SSL_R_VERSION_TOO_LOW; } else { protverr = 0; } if (protverr) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); if ((!s->enc_write_ctx && !s->write_hash)) { /* * similar to ssl3_get_record, send alert using remote version * number */ s->version = s->client_version; } al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } /* Parse the message and load client random. */ if (is_v2_record) { /* * Handle an SSLv2 backwards compatible ClientHello * Note, this is only for SSLv3+ using the backward compatible format. * Real SSLv2 is not supported, and is rejected above. */ unsigned int cipher_len, session_id_len, challenge_len; PACKET challenge; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &cipher_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &challenge_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (session_id_len > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &cipher_suites, cipher_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &session_id, session_id_len) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &challenge, challenge_len) /* No extensions. */ || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_RECORD_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } /* Load the client random */ challenge_len = challenge_len > SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE ? SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE : challenge_len; memset(s->s3->client_random, 0, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(&challenge, s->s3->client_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE - challenge_len, challenge_len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } PACKET_null_init(&compression); PACKET_null_init(&extensions); } else { /* Regular ClientHello. */ if (!PACKET_copy_bytes(pkt, s->s3->client_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &session_id)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (PACKET_remaining(&session_id) > SSL_MAX_SSL_SESSION_ID_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &cookie)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* * If we require cookies and this ClientHello doesn't contain one, * just return since we do not want to allocate any memory yet. * So check cookie length... */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (PACKET_remaining(&cookie) == 0) return 1; } } if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &cipher_suites) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &compression)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* Could be empty. */ extensions = *pkt; } s->hit = 0; /* * We don't allow resumption in a backwards compatible ClientHello. * TODO(openssl-team): in TLS1.1+, session_id MUST be empty. * * Versions before 0.9.7 always allow clients to resume sessions in * renegotiation. 0.9.7 and later allow this by default, but optionally * ignore resumption requests with flag * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION (it's a new flag rather * than a change to default behavior so that applications relying on * this for security won't even compile against older library versions). * 1.0.1 and later also have a function SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated() to * request renegotiation but not a new session (s->new_session remains * unset): for servers, this essentially just means that the * SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION setting will be * ignored. */ if (is_v2_record || (s->new_session && (s->options & SSL_OP_NO_SESSION_RESUMPTION_ON_RENEGOTIATION))) { if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } else { i = ssl_get_prev_session(s, &extensions, &session_id); /* * Only resume if the session's version matches the negotiated * version. * RFC 5246 does not provide much useful advice on resumption * with a different protocol version. It doesn't forbid it but * the sanity of such behaviour would be questionable. * In practice, clients do not accept a version mismatch and * will abort the handshake with an error. */ if (i == 1 && s->version == s->session->ssl_version) { /* previous session */ s->hit = 1; } else if (i == -1) { goto err; } else { /* i == 0 */ if (!ssl_get_new_session(s, 1)) goto err; } } if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { /* Empty cookie was already handled above by returning early. */ if (SSL_get_options(s) & SSL_OP_COOKIE_EXCHANGE) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb != NULL) { if (s->ctx->app_verify_cookie_cb(s, PACKET_data(&cookie), PACKET_remaining(&cookie)) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; /* else cookie verification succeeded */ } /* default verification */ } else if (!PACKET_equal(&cookie, s->d1->cookie, s->d1->cookie_len)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_COOKIE_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } s->d1->cookie_verified = 1; } if (s->method->version == DTLS_ANY_VERSION) { protverr = ssl_choose_server_version(s); if (protverr != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, protverr); s->version = s->client_version; al = SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION; goto f_err; } s->session->ssl_version = s->version; } } if (ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(s, &cipher_suites, &(ciphers), is_v2_record, &al) == NULL) { goto f_err; } /* If it is a hit, check that the cipher is in the list */ if (s->hit) { j = 0; id = s->session->cipher->id; #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client sent %d ciphers\n", sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers)); #endif for (i = 0; i < sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers); i++) { c = sk_SSL_CIPHER_value(ciphers, i); #ifdef CIPHER_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "client [%2d of %2d]:%s\n", i, sk_SSL_CIPHER_num(ciphers), SSL_CIPHER_get_name(c)); #endif if (c->id == id) { j = 1; break; } } if (j == 0) { /* * we need to have the cipher in the cipher list if we are asked * to reuse it */ al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_CIPHER_MISSING); goto f_err; } } complen = PACKET_remaining(&compression); for (j = 0; j < complen; j++) { if (PACKET_data(&compression)[j] == 0) break; } if (j >= complen) { /* no compress */ al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_COMPRESSION_SPECIFIED); goto f_err; } /* TLS extensions */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (!ssl_parse_clienthello_tlsext(s, &extensions)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_PARSE_TLSEXT); goto err; } } /* * Check if we want to use external pre-shared secret for this handshake * for not reused session only. We need to generate server_random before * calling tls_session_secret_cb in order to allow SessionTicket * processing to use it in key derivation. */ { unsigned char *pos; pos = s->s3->server_random; if (ssl_fill_hello_random(s, 1, pos, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0) { goto f_err; } } if (!s->hit && s->version >= TLS1_VERSION && s->tls_session_secret_cb) { const SSL_CIPHER *pref_cipher = NULL; s->session->master_key_length = sizeof(s->session->master_key); if (s->tls_session_secret_cb(s, s->session->master_key, &s->session->master_key_length, ciphers, &pref_cipher, s->tls_session_secret_cb_arg)) { s->hit = 1; s->session->ciphers = ciphers; s->session->verify_result = X509_V_OK; ciphers = NULL; /* check if some cipher was preferred by call back */ pref_cipher = pref_cipher ? pref_cipher : ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s-> session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers (s)); if (pref_cipher == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->session->cipher = pref_cipher; sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list); s->cipher_list = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->cipher_list_by_id); s->cipher_list_by_id = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(s->session->ciphers); } } /* * Worst case, we will use the NULL compression, but if we have other * options, we will now look for them. We have complen-1 compression * algorithms from the client, starting at q. */ s->s3->tmp.new_compression = NULL; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_COMP /* This only happens if we have a cache hit */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { int m, comp_id = s->session->compress_meth; unsigned int k; /* Perform sanity checks on resumed compression algorithm */ /* Can't disable compression */ if (!ssl_allow_compression(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed compression method */ for (m = 0; m < sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); if (comp_id == comp->id) { s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; break; } } if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INVALID_COMPRESSION_ALGORITHM); goto f_err; } /* Look for resumed method in compression list */ for (k = 0; k < complen; k++) { if (PACKET_data(&compression)[k] == comp_id) break; } if (k >= complen) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_REQUIRED_COMPRESSSION_ALGORITHM_MISSING); goto f_err; } } else if (s->hit) comp = NULL; else if (ssl_allow_compression(s) && s->ctx->comp_methods) { /* See if we have a match */ int m, nn, v, done = 0; unsigned int o; nn = sk_SSL_COMP_num(s->ctx->comp_methods); for (m = 0; m < nn; m++) { comp = sk_SSL_COMP_value(s->ctx->comp_methods, m); v = comp->id; for (o = 0; o < complen; o++) { if (v == PACKET_data(&compression)[o]) { done = 1; break; } } if (done) break; } if (done) s->s3->tmp.new_compression = comp; else comp = NULL; } #else /* * If compression is disabled we'd better not try to resume a session * using compression. */ if (s->session->compress_meth != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_INCONSISTENT_COMPRESSION); goto f_err; } #endif /* * Given s->session->ciphers and SSL_get_ciphers, we must pick a cipher */ if (!s->hit) { #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP s->session->compress_meth = 0; #else s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id; #endif sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(s->session->ciphers); s->session->ciphers = ciphers; if (ciphers == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ciphers = NULL; if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto err; } } sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { int al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; const SSL_CIPHER *cipher; if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { if (!s->hit) { /* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */ if (s->cert->cert_cb) { int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg); if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR); goto f_err; } if (rv < 0) { s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_A; } s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING; } cipher = ssl3_choose_cipher(s, s->session->ciphers, SSL_get_ciphers(s)); if (cipher == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_NO_SHARED_CIPHER); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = cipher; /* check whether we should disable session resumption */ if (s->not_resumable_session_cb != NULL) s->session->not_resumable = s->not_resumable_session_cb(s, ((cipher->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kECDHE)) != 0)); if (s->session->not_resumable) /* do not send a session ticket */ s->tlsext_ticket_expected = 0; } else { /* Session-id reuse */ s->s3->tmp.new_cipher = s->session->cipher; } if (!(s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER)) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } /*- * we now have the following setup. * client_random * cipher_list - our prefered list of ciphers * ciphers - the clients prefered list of ciphers * compression - basically ignored right now * ssl version is set - sslv3 * s->session - The ssl session has been setup. * s->hit - session reuse flag * s->s3->tmp.new_cipher- the new cipher to use. */ /* Handles TLS extensions that we couldn't check earlier */ if (s->version >= SSL3_VERSION) { if (ssl_check_clienthello_tlsext_late(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } wst = WORK_MORE_B; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) { int ret; if ((ret = ssl_check_srp_ext_ClientHello(s, &al)) < 0) { /* * callback indicates further work to be done */ s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP; return WORK_MORE_B; } if (ret != SSL_ERROR_NONE) { /* * This is not really an error but the only means to for * a client to detect whether srp is supported. */ if (al != TLS1_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY) SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO, SSL_R_CLIENTHELLO_TLSEXT); goto f_err; } } #endif s->renegotiate = 2; return WORK_FINISHED_STOP; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } int tls_construct_server_hello(SSL *s) { unsigned char *buf; unsigned char *p, *d; int i, sl; int al = 0; unsigned long l; buf = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* Do the message type and length last */ d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); *(p++) = s->version >> 8; *(p++) = s->version & 0xff; /* * Random stuff. Filling of the server_random takes place in * tls_process_client_hello() */ memcpy(p, s->s3->server_random, SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE); p += SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE; /*- * There are several cases for the session ID to send * back in the server hello: * - For session reuse from the session cache, * we send back the old session ID. * - If stateless session reuse (using a session ticket) * is successful, we send back the client's "session ID" * (which doesn't actually identify the session). * - If it is a new session, we send back the new * session ID. * - However, if we want the new session to be single-use, * we send back a 0-length session ID. * s->hit is non-zero in either case of session reuse, * so the following won't overwrite an ID that we're supposed * to send back. */ if (s->session->not_resumable || (!(s->ctx->session_cache_mode & SSL_SESS_CACHE_SERVER) && !s->hit)) s->session->session_id_length = 0; sl = s->session->session_id_length; if (sl > (int)sizeof(s->session->session_id)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } *(p++) = sl; memcpy(p, s->session->session_id, sl); p += sl; /* put the cipher */ i = ssl3_put_cipher_by_char(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, p); p += i; /* put the compression method */ #ifdef OPENSSL_NO_COMP *(p++) = 0; #else if (s->s3->tmp.new_compression == NULL) *(p++) = 0; else *(p++) = s->s3->tmp.new_compression->id; #endif if (ssl_prepare_serverhello_tlsext(s) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, SSL_R_SERVERHELLO_TLSEXT); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if ((p = ssl_add_serverhello_tlsext(s, p, buf + SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH, &al)) == NULL) { ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } /* do the header */ l = (p - d); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO, l)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_HELLO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_server_done(SSL *s) { if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_DONE, 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_DONE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if (!s->s3->tmp.cert_request) { if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); } } return 1; } int tls_construct_server_key_exchange(SSL *s) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY *pkdh = NULL; #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC unsigned char *encodedPoint = NULL; int encodedlen = 0; int curve_id = 0; #endif EVP_PKEY *pkey; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; unsigned char *p, *d; int al, i; unsigned long type; int n; BIGNUM *r[4]; int nr[4], kn; BUF_MEM *buf; EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (md_ctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } type = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; buf = s->init_buf; r[0] = r[1] = r[2] = r[3] = NULL; n = 0; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { /* * reserve size for record length and PSK identity hint */ n += 2; if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) n += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); } /* Plain PSK or RSAPSK nothing to do */ if (type & (SSL_kPSK | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_PSK */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (type & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { CERT *cert = s->cert; EVP_PKEY *pkdhp = NULL; DH *dh; if (s->cert->dh_tmp_auto) { DH *dhp = ssl_get_auto_dh(s); pkdh = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (pkdh == NULL || dhp == NULL) { DH_free(dhp); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_assign_DH(pkdh, dhp); pkdhp = pkdh; } else { pkdhp = cert->dh_tmp; } if ((pkdhp == NULL) && (s->cert->dh_tmp_cb != NULL)) { DH *dhp = s->cert->dh_tmp_cb(s, 0, 1024); pkdh = ssl_dh_to_pkey(dhp); if (pkdh == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } pkdhp = pkdh; } if (pkdhp == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (!ssl_security(s, SSL_SECOP_TMP_DH, EVP_PKEY_security_bits(pkdhp), 0, pkdhp)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_KEY_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(pkdhp, NID_undef); if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } dh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(s->s3->tmp.pkey); EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); pkdh = NULL; r[0] = dh->p; r[1] = dh->g; r[2] = dh->pub_key; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { int nid; if (s->s3->tmp.pkey != NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } /* Get NID of appropriate shared curve */ nid = tls1_shared_curve(s, -2); curve_id = tls1_ec_nid2curve_id(nid); if (curve_id == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_ELLIPTIC_CURVE); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.pkey = ssl_generate_pkey(NULL, nid); /* Generate a new key for this curve */ if (s->s3->tmp.pkey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto f_err; } /* Encode the public key. */ encodedlen = EC_KEY_key2buf(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->s3->tmp.pkey), POINT_CONVERSION_UNCOMPRESSED, &encodedPoint, NULL); if (encodedlen == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } /* * We only support named (not generic) curves in ECDH ephemeral key * exchanges. In this situation, we need four additional bytes to * encode the entire ServerECDHParams structure. */ n += 4 + encodedlen; /* * We'll generate the serverKeyExchange message explicitly so we * can set these to NULLs */ r[0] = NULL; r[1] = NULL; r[2] = NULL; r[3] = NULL; } else #endif /* !OPENSSL_NO_EC */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (type & SSL_kSRP) { if ((s->srp_ctx.N == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.g == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.s == NULL) || (s->srp_ctx.B == NULL)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_SRP_PARAM); goto err; } r[0] = s->srp_ctx.N; r[1] = s->srp_ctx.g; r[2] = s->srp_ctx.s; r[3] = s->srp_ctx.B; } else #endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_KEY_EXCHANGE_TYPE); goto f_err; } for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { nr[i] = BN_num_bytes(r[i]); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) n += 1 + nr[i]; else #endif n += 2 + nr[i]; } if (!(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth & (SSL_aNULL|SSL_aSRP)) && !(s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey & SSL_PSK)) { if ((pkey = ssl_get_sign_pkey(s, s->s3->tmp.new_cipher, &md)) == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } kn = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); } else { pkey = NULL; kn = 0; } if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean(buf, n + SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + kn)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_BUF); goto err; } d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK if (type & SSL_PSK) { /* copy PSK identity hint */ if (s->cert->psk_identity_hint) { s2n(strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint), p); strncpy((char *)p, s->cert->psk_identity_hint, strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint)); p += strlen(s->cert->psk_identity_hint); } else { s2n(0, p); } } #endif for (i = 0; i < 4 && r[i] != NULL; i++) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if ((i == 2) && (type & SSL_kSRP)) { *p = nr[i]; p++; } else #endif s2n(nr[i], p); BN_bn2bin(r[i], p); p += nr[i]; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (type & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { /* * XXX: For now, we only support named (not generic) curves. In * this situation, the serverKeyExchange message has: [1 byte * CurveType], [2 byte CurveName] [1 byte length of encoded * point], followed by the actual encoded point itself */ *p = NAMED_CURVE_TYPE; p += 1; *p = 0; p += 1; *p = curve_id; p += 1; *p = encodedlen; p += 1; memcpy(p, encodedPoint, encodedlen); OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); encodedPoint = NULL; p += encodedlen; } #endif /* not anonymous */ if (pkey != NULL) { /* * n is the length of the params, they start at &(d[4]) and p * points to the space at the end. */ if (md) { /* send signature algorithm */ if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { if (!tls12_get_sigandhash(p, pkey, md)) { /* Should never happen */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } p += 2; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using hash %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (EVP_SignInit_ex(md_ctx, md, NULL) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->client_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, &(s->s3->server_random[0]), SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE) <= 0 || EVP_SignUpdate(md_ctx, d, n) <= 0 || EVP_SignFinal(md_ctx, &(p[2]), (unsigned int *)&i, pkey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_LIB_EVP); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } s2n(i, p); n += i + 2; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) n += 2; } else { /* Is this error check actually needed? */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_PKEY_TYPE); goto f_err; } } if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, n)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); return 1; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); err: #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH EVP_PKEY_free(pkdh); #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC OPENSSL_free(encodedPoint); #endif EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_construct_certificate_request(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p, *d; int i, j, nl, off, n; STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *sk = NULL; X509_NAME *name; BUF_MEM *buf; buf = s->init_buf; d = p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* get the list of acceptable cert types */ p++; n = ssl3_get_req_cert_type(s, p); d[0] = n; p += n; n++; if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { const unsigned char *psigs; unsigned char *etmp = p; nl = tls12_get_psigalgs(s, &psigs); /* Skip over length for now */ p += 2; nl = tls12_copy_sigalgs(s, p, psigs, nl); /* Now fill in length */ s2n(nl, etmp); p += nl; n += nl + 2; } off = n; p += 2; n += 2; sk = SSL_get_client_CA_list(s); nl = 0; if (sk != NULL) { for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(sk); i++) { name = sk_X509_NAME_value(sk, i); j = i2d_X509_NAME(name, NULL); if (!BUF_MEM_grow_clean (buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + n + j + 2)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_BUF_LIB); goto err; } p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + n; s2n(j, p); i2d_X509_NAME(name, &p); n += 2 + j; nl += 2 + j; } } /* else no CA names */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + off; s2n(nl, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, n)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CERTIFICATE_REQUEST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } s->s3->tmp.cert_request = 1; return 1; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int al; unsigned int i; unsigned long alg_k; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA RSA *rsa = NULL; #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY *ckey = NULL; #endif PACKET enc_premaster; unsigned char *data, *rsa_decrypt = NULL; alg_k = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_mkey; #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK /* For PSK parse and retrieve identity, obtain PSK key */ if (alg_k & SSL_PSK) { unsigned char psk[PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN]; size_t psklen; PACKET psk_identity; if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &psk_identity)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (PACKET_remaining(&psk_identity) > PSK_MAX_IDENTITY_LEN) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG); goto f_err; } if (s->psk_server_callback == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_NO_SERVER_CB); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_strndup(&psk_identity, &s->session->psk_identity)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } psklen = s->psk_server_callback(s, s->session->psk_identity, psk, sizeof(psk)); if (psklen > PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } else if (psklen == 0) { /* * PSK related to the given identity not found */ SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_PSK_IDENTITY_NOT_FOUND); al = SSL_AD_UNKNOWN_PSK_IDENTITY; goto f_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->s3->tmp.psk); s->s3->tmp.psk = OPENSSL_memdup(psk, psklen); OPENSSL_cleanse(psk, psklen); if (s->s3->tmp.psk == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } s->s3->tmp.psklen = psklen; } if (alg_k & SSL_kPSK) { /* Identity extracted earlier: should be nothing left */ if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } /* PSK handled by ssl_generate_master_secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, NULL, 0, 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA if (alg_k & (SSL_kRSA | SSL_kRSAPSK)) { unsigned char rand_premaster_secret[SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH]; int decrypt_len; unsigned char decrypt_good, version_good; size_t j; /* FIX THIS UP EAY EAY EAY EAY */ rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_RSA_ENC].privatekey); if (rsa == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_RSA_CERTIFICATE); goto f_err; } /* SSLv3 and pre-standard DTLS omit the length bytes. */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION || s->version == DTLS1_BAD_VER) { enc_premaster = *pkt; } else { if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_2(pkt, &enc_premaster) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } } /* * We want to be sure that the plaintext buffer size makes it safe to * iterate over the entire size of a premaster secret * (SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH). Reject overly short RSA keys because * their ciphertext cannot accommodate a premaster secret anyway. */ if (RSA_size(rsa) < SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL); goto f_err; } rsa_decrypt = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(rsa)); if (rsa_decrypt == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } /* * We must not leak whether a decryption failure occurs because of * Bleichenbacher's attack on PKCS #1 v1.5 RSA padding (see RFC 2246, * section 7.4.7.1). The code follows that advice of the TLS RFC and * generates a random premaster secret for the case that the decrypt * fails. See https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-7.4.7.1 */ if (RAND_bytes(rand_premaster_secret, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret)) <= 0) { goto err; } decrypt_len = RSA_private_decrypt(PACKET_remaining(&enc_premaster), PACKET_data(&enc_premaster), rsa_decrypt, rsa, RSA_PKCS1_PADDING); ERR_clear_error(); /* * decrypt_len should be SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH. decrypt_good will * be 0xff if so and zero otherwise. */ decrypt_good = constant_time_eq_int_8(decrypt_len, SSL_MAX_MASTER_KEY_LENGTH); /* * If the version in the decrypted pre-master secret is correct then * version_good will be 0xff, otherwise it'll be zero. The * Klima-Pokorny-Rosa extension of Bleichenbacher's attack * (http://eprint.iacr.org/2003/052/) exploits the version number * check as a "bad version oracle". Thus version checks are done in * constant time and are treated like any other decryption error. */ version_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->client_version >> 8)); version_good &= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1], (unsigned)(s->client_version & 0xff)); /* * The premaster secret must contain the same version number as the * ClientHello to detect version rollback attacks (strangely, the * protocol does not offer such protection for DH ciphersuites). * However, buggy clients exist that send the negotiated protocol * version instead if the server does not support the requested * protocol version. If SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG is set, tolerate such * clients. */ if (s->options & SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG) { unsigned char workaround_good; workaround_good = constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[0], (unsigned)(s->version >> 8)); workaround_good &= constant_time_eq_8(rsa_decrypt[1], (unsigned)(s->version & 0xff)); version_good |= workaround_good; } /* * Both decryption and version must be good for decrypt_good to * remain non-zero (0xff). */ decrypt_good &= version_good; /* * Now copy rand_premaster_secret over from p using * decrypt_good_mask. If decryption failed, then p does not * contain valid plaintext, however, a check above guarantees * it is still sufficiently large to read from. */ for (j = 0; j < sizeof(rand_premaster_secret); j++) { rsa_decrypt[j] = constant_time_select_8(decrypt_good, rsa_decrypt[j], rand_premaster_secret[j]); } if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, rsa_decrypt, sizeof(rand_premaster_secret), 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); rsa_decrypt = NULL; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DH if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; DH *cdh; if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i)) { if (alg_k & (SSL_kDHE | SSL_kDHEPSK)) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto f_err; } i = 0; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) != i) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DH_PUBLIC_VALUE_LENGTH_IS_WRONG); goto err; } skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; if (skey == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_DH_KEY); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { /* We already checked we have enough data */ al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } cdh = EVP_PKEY_get0_DH(ckey); cdh->pub_key = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL); if (cdh->pub_key == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); ckey = NULL; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHE | SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe | SSL_kECDHEPSK)) { EVP_PKEY *skey = NULL; /* Let's get server private key and group information */ if (alg_k & (SSL_kECDHr | SSL_kECDHe)) { /* use the certificate */ skey = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey; } else { /* * use the ephermeral values we saved when generating the * ServerKeyExchange msg. */ skey = s->s3->tmp.pkey; } if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0L) { /* We don't support ECDH client auth */ al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_MISSING_TMP_ECDH_KEY); goto f_err; } else { /* * Get client's public key from encoded point in the * ClientKeyExchange message. */ /* Get encoded point length */ if (!PACKET_get_1(pkt, &i)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } ckey = EVP_PKEY_new(); if (ckey == NULL || EVP_PKEY_copy_parameters(ckey, skey) <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); goto err; } if (EC_KEY_oct2key(EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(ckey), data, i, NULL) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_EC_LIB); goto err; } } if (ssl_derive(s, skey, ckey) == 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); ckey = NULL; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; } else #endif #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP if (alg_k & SSL_kSRP) { if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &i) || !PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, i)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_A_LENGTH); goto f_err; } if ((s->srp_ctx.A = BN_bin2bn(data, i, NULL)) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_BN_LIB); goto err; } if (BN_ucmp(s->srp_ctx.A, s->srp_ctx.N) >= 0 || BN_is_zero(s->srp_ctx.A)) { al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_BAD_SRP_PARAMETERS); goto f_err; } OPENSSL_free(s->session->srp_username); s->session->srp_username = OPENSSL_strdup(s->srp_ctx.login); if (s->session->srp_username == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto err; } if (!srp_generate_server_master_secret(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } } else #endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SRP */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (alg_k & SSL_kGOST) { EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkey_ctx; EVP_PKEY *client_pub_pkey = NULL, *pk = NULL; unsigned char premaster_secret[32], *start; size_t outlen = 32, inlen; unsigned long alg_a; int Ttag, Tclass; long Tlen; long sess_key_len; /* Get our certificate private key */ alg_a = s->s3->tmp.new_cipher->algorithm_auth; if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST12) { /* * New GOST ciphersuites have SSL_aGOST01 bit too */ pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512].privatekey; if (pk == NULL) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256].privatekey; } if (pk == NULL) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; } } else if (alg_a & SSL_aGOST01) { pk = s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_GOST01].privatekey; } pkey_ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pk, NULL); if (pkey_ctx == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkey_ctx) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto f_err; } /* * If client certificate is present and is of the same type, maybe * use it for key exchange. Don't mind errors from * EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer, because it is completely valid to use a * client certificate for authorization only. */ client_pub_pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(s->session->peer); if (client_pub_pkey) { if (EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(pkey_ctx, client_pub_pkey) <= 0) ERR_clear_error(); } /* Decrypt session key */ sess_key_len = PACKET_remaining(pkt); if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, sess_key_len)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto gerr; } if (ASN1_get_object ((const unsigned char **)&data, &Tlen, &Ttag, &Tclass, sess_key_len) != V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED || Ttag != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE || Tclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } start = data; inlen = Tlen; if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt (pkey_ctx, premaster_secret, &outlen, start, inlen) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED); goto gerr; } /* Generate master secret */ if (!ssl_generate_master_secret(s, premaster_secret, sizeof(premaster_secret), 0)) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto gerr; } /* Check if pubkey from client certificate was used */ if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl (pkey_ctx, -1, -1, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY, 2, NULL) > 0) s->statem.no_cert_verify = 1; EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; gerr: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkey_ctx); goto f_err; } else #endif { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER_TYPE); goto f_err; } return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_RSA) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || defined(OPENSSL_NO_SRP) err: #endif #if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC) || !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DH) EVP_PKEY_free(ckey); #endif OPENSSL_free(rsa_decrypt); #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK OPENSSL_clear_free(s->s3->tmp.psk, s->s3->tmp.psklen); s->s3->tmp.psk = NULL; #endif ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_key_exchange(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst) { #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCTP if (wst == WORK_MORE_A) { if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) { unsigned char sctpauthkey[64]; char labelbuffer[sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)]; /* * Add new shared key for SCTP-Auth, will be ignored if no SCTP * used. */ memcpy(labelbuffer, DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL, sizeof(DTLS1_SCTP_AUTH_LABEL)); if (SSL_export_keying_material(s, sctpauthkey, sizeof(sctpauthkey), labelbuffer, sizeof(labelbuffer), NULL, 0, 0) <= 0) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR;; } BIO_ctrl(SSL_get_wbio(s), BIO_CTRL_DGRAM_SCTP_ADD_AUTH_KEY, sizeof(sctpauthkey), sctpauthkey); } wst = WORK_MORE_B; } if ((wst == WORK_MORE_B) /* Is this SCTP? */ && BIO_dgram_is_sctp(SSL_get_wbio(s)) /* Are we renegotiating? */ && s->renegotiate /* Are we going to skip the CertificateVerify? */ && (s->session->peer == NULL || s->statem.no_cert_verify) && BIO_dgram_sctp_msg_waiting(SSL_get_rbio(s))) { s->s3->in_read_app_data = 2; s->rwstate = SSL_READING; BIO_clear_retry_flags(SSL_get_rbio(s)); BIO_set_retry_read(SSL_get_rbio(s)); ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 1); return WORK_MORE_B; } else { ossl_statem_set_sctp_read_sock(s, 0); } #endif if (s->statem.no_cert_verify) { /* No certificate verify so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } else { if (!s->session->peer) { /* No peer certificate so we no longer need the handshake_buffer */ BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } if (!s->s3->handshake_buffer) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_KEY_EXCHANGE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } /* * For sigalgs freeze the handshake buffer. If we support * extms we've done this already so this is a no-op */ if (!ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 1)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return WORK_ERROR; } } return WORK_FINISHED_CONTINUE; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; unsigned char *sig, *data; int al, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; int type = 0, j; unsigned int len; X509 *peer; const EVP_MD *md = NULL; long hdatalen = 0; void *hdata; EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (mctx == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } peer = s->session->peer; pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(peer); type = X509_certificate_type(peer, pkey); if (!(type & EVP_PKT_SIGN)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_SIGNATURE_FOR_NON_SIGNING_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; goto f_err; } /* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */ /* * If key is GOST and n is exactly 64, it is bare signature without * length field (CryptoPro implementations at least till CSP 4.0) */ #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST if (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 64 && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == NID_id_GostR3410_2001) { len = 64; } else #endif { if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s)) { int rv; if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &sig, 2)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } rv = tls12_check_peer_sigalg(&md, s, sig, pkey); if (rv == -1) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } else if (rv == 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif } else { /* Use default digest for this key type */ int idx = ssl_cert_type(NULL, pkey); if (idx >= 0) md = s->s3->tmp.md[idx]; if (md == NULL) { al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } } if (!PACKET_get_net_2(pkt, &len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } } j = EVP_PKEY_size(pkey); if (((int)len > j) || ((int)PACKET_remaining(pkt) > j) || (PACKET_remaining(pkt) == 0)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_SIZE); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_bytes(pkt, &data, len)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; goto f_err; } hdatalen = BIO_get_mem_data(s->s3->handshake_buffer, &hdata); if (hdatalen <= 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifdef SSL_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "Using client verify alg %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md)); #endif if (!EVP_VerifyInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) || !EVP_VerifyUpdate(mctx, hdata, hdatalen)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_GOST { int pktype = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey); if (pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2001 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_256 || pktype == NID_id_GostR3410_2012_512) BUF_reverse(data, NULL, len); } #endif if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION && !EVP_MD_CTX_ctrl(mctx, EVP_CTRL_SSL3_MASTER_SECRET, s->session->master_key_length, s->session->master_key)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, ERR_R_EVP_LIB); al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto f_err; } if (EVP_VerifyFinal(mctx, data, len, pkey) <= 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECRYPT_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY, SSL_R_BAD_SIGNATURE); goto f_err; } ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_PROCESSING; if (0) { f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); } BIO_free(s->s3->handshake_buffer); s->s3->handshake_buffer = NULL; EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx); return ret; } MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_client_certificate(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { int i, al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, ret = MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; X509 *x = NULL; unsigned long l, llen; const unsigned char *certstart; unsigned char *certbytes; STACK_OF(X509) *sk = NULL; PACKET spkt; if ((sk = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } if (!PACKET_get_net_3(pkt, &llen) || !PACKET_get_sub_packet(pkt, &spkt, llen) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) != 0) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } while (PACKET_remaining(&spkt) > 0) { if (!PACKET_get_net_3(&spkt, &l) || !PACKET_get_bytes(&spkt, &certbytes, l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } certstart = certbytes; x = d2i_X509(NULL, (const unsigned char **)&certbytes, l); if (x == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_ASN1_LIB); goto f_err; } if (certbytes != (certstart + l)) { al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERT_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto f_err; } if (!sk_X509_push(sk, x)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); goto f_err; } x = NULL; } if (sk_X509_num(sk) <= 0) { /* TLS does not mind 0 certs returned */ if (s->version == SSL3_VERSION) { al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_NO_CERTIFICATES_RETURNED); goto f_err; } /* Fail for TLS only if we required a certificate */ else if ((s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_PEER) && (s->verify_mode & SSL_VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_PEER_DID_NOT_RETURN_A_CERTIFICATE); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } /* No client certificate so digest cached records */ if (s->s3->handshake_buffer && !ssl3_digest_cached_records(s, 0)) { goto f_err; } } else { EVP_PKEY *pkey; i = ssl_verify_cert_chain(s, sk); if (i <= 0) { al = ssl_verify_alarm_type(s->verify_result); SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_CERTIFICATE_VERIFY_FAILED); goto f_err; } if (i > 1) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, i); al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto f_err; } pkey = X509_get0_pubkey(sk_X509_value(sk, 0)); if (pkey == NULL) { al = SSL3_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CLIENT_CERTIFICATE, SSL_R_UNKNOWN_CERTIFICATE_TYPE); goto f_err; } } X509_free(s->session->peer); s->session->peer = sk_X509_shift(sk); s->session->verify_result = s->verify_result; sk_X509_pop_free(s->session->peer_chain, X509_free); s->session->peer_chain = sk; /* * Inconsistency alert: cert_chain does *not* include the peer's own * certificate, while we do include it in s3_clnt.c */ sk = NULL; ret = MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; goto done; f_err: ssl3_send_alert(s, SSL3_AL_FATAL, al); ossl_statem_set_error(s); done: X509_free(x); sk_X509_pop_free(sk, X509_free); return ret; } int tls_construct_server_certificate(SSL *s) { CERT_PKEY *cpk; cpk = ssl_get_server_send_pkey(s); if (cpk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } if (!ssl3_output_cert_chain(s, cpk)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_SERVER_CERTIFICATE, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } return 1; } int tls_construct_new_session_ticket(SSL *s) { unsigned char *senc = NULL; EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx; HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL; unsigned char *p, *macstart; const unsigned char *const_p; int len, slen_full, slen; SSL_SESSION *sess; unsigned int hlen; SSL_CTX *tctx = s->initial_ctx; unsigned char iv[EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH]; unsigned char key_name[16]; /* get session encoding length */ slen_full = i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, NULL); /* * Some length values are 16 bits, so forget it if session is too * long */ if (slen_full == 0 || slen_full > 0xFF00) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } senc = OPENSSL_malloc(slen_full); if (senc == NULL) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); hctx = HMAC_CTX_new(); p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(s->session, &p)) goto err; /* * create a fresh copy (not shared with other threads) to clean up */ const_p = senc; sess = d2i_SSL_SESSION(NULL, &const_p, slen_full); if (sess == NULL) goto err; sess->session_id_length = 0; /* ID is irrelevant for the ticket */ slen = i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, NULL); if (slen == 0 || slen > slen_full) { /* shouldn't ever happen */ SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } p = senc; if (!i2d_SSL_SESSION(sess, &p)) { SSL_SESSION_free(sess); goto err; } SSL_SESSION_free(sess); /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows handshake_header_length + * 4 (ticket lifetime hint) + 2 (ticket length) + * 16 (key name) + max_iv_len (iv length) + * session_length + max_enc_block_size (max encrypted session * length) + max_md_size (HMAC). */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, SSL_HM_HEADER_LENGTH(s) + 22 + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE + slen)) goto err; p = ssl_handshake_start(s); /* * Initialize HMAC and cipher contexts. If callback present it does * all the work otherwise use generated values from parent ctx. */ if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb) { if (tctx->tlsext_ticket_key_cb(s, key_name, iv, ctx, hctx, 1) < 0) goto err; } else { if (RAND_bytes(iv, 16) <= 0) goto err; if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_cbc(), NULL, tctx->tlsext_tick_aes_key, iv)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->tlsext_tick_hmac_key, 16, EVP_sha256(), NULL)) goto err; memcpy(key_name, tctx->tlsext_tick_key_name, 16); } /* * Ticket lifetime hint (advisory only): We leave this unspecified * for resumed session (for simplicity), and guess that tickets for * new sessions will live as long as their sessions. */ l2n(s->hit ? 0 : s->session->timeout, p); /* Skip ticket length for now */ p += 2; /* Output key name */ macstart = p; memcpy(p, key_name, 16); p += 16; /* output IV */ memcpy(p, iv, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx)); p += EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx); /* Encrypt session data */ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, p, &len, senc, slen)) goto err; p += len; if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, p, &len)) goto err; p += len; if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, macstart, p - macstart)) goto err; if (!HMAC_Final(hctx, p, &hlen)) goto err; EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); ctx = NULL; hctx = NULL; p += hlen; /* Now write out lengths: p points to end of data written */ /* Total length */ len = p - ssl_handshake_start(s); /* Skip ticket lifetime hint */ p = ssl_handshake_start(s) + 4; s2n(len - 6, p); if (!ssl_set_handshake_header(s, SSL3_MT_NEWSESSION_TICKET, len)) goto err; OPENSSL_free(senc); return 1; err: OPENSSL_free(senc); EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx); HMAC_CTX_free(hctx); ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } int tls_construct_cert_status(SSL *s) { unsigned char *p; /*- * Grow buffer if need be: the length calculation is as * follows 1 (message type) + 3 (message length) + * 1 (ocsp response type) + 3 (ocsp response length) * + (ocsp response) */ if (!BUF_MEM_grow(s->init_buf, 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen)) { ossl_statem_set_error(s); return 0; } p = (unsigned char *)s->init_buf->data; /* do the header */ *(p++) = SSL3_MT_CERTIFICATE_STATUS; /* message length */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen + 4, p); /* status type */ *(p++) = s->tlsext_status_type; /* length of OCSP response */ l2n3(s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen, p); /* actual response */ memcpy(p, s->tlsext_ocsp_resp, s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen); /* number of bytes to write */ s->init_num = 8 + s->tlsext_ocsp_resplen; s->init_off = 0; return 1; } #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_NEXTPROTONEG /* * tls_process_next_proto reads a Next Protocol Negotiation handshake message. * It sets the next_proto member in s if found */ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_next_proto(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt) { PACKET next_proto, padding; size_t next_proto_len; /*- * The payload looks like: * uint8 proto_len; * uint8 proto[proto_len]; * uint8 padding_len; * uint8 padding[padding_len]; */ if (!PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &next_proto) || !PACKET_get_length_prefixed_1(pkt, &padding) || PACKET_remaining(pkt) > 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_NEXT_PROTO, SSL_R_LENGTH_MISMATCH); goto err; } if (!PACKET_memdup(&next_proto, &s->next_proto_negotiated, &next_proto_len)) { s->next_proto_negotiated_len = 0; goto err; } s->next_proto_negotiated_len = (unsigned char)next_proto_len; return MSG_PROCESS_CONTINUE_READING; err: ossl_statem_set_error(s); return MSG_PROCESS_ERROR; } #endif #define SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN 3 STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_bytes_to_cipher_list(SSL *s, PACKET *cipher_suites, STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **skp, int sslv2format, int *al ) { const SSL_CIPHER *c; STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *sk; int n; /* 3 = SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN > TLS_CIPHER_LEN = 2. */ unsigned char cipher[SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN]; s->s3->send_connection_binding = 0; n = sslv2format ? SSLV2_CIPHER_LEN : TLS_CIPHER_LEN; if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) == 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_NO_CIPHERS_SPECIFIED); *al = SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER; return NULL; } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) % n != 0) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_ERROR_IN_RECEIVED_CIPHER_LIST); *al = SSL_AD_DECODE_ERROR; return NULL; } if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) { sk = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null(); /* change perhaps later */ if(sk == NULL) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; return NULL; } } else { sk = *skp; sk_SSL_CIPHER_zero(sk); } if (!PACKET_memdup(cipher_suites, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_raw, &s->s3->tmp.ciphers_rawlen)) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } while (PACKET_copy_bytes(cipher_suites, cipher, n)) { /* * SSLv3 ciphers wrapped in an SSLv2-compatible ClientHello have the * first byte set to zero, while true SSLv2 ciphers have a non-zero * first byte. We don't support any true SSLv2 ciphers, so skip them. */ if (sslv2format && cipher[0] != '\0') continue; /* Check for TLS_EMPTY_RENEGOTIATION_INFO_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* SCSV fatal if renegotiating */ if (s->renegotiate) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_SCSV_RECEIVED_WHEN_RENEGOTIATING); *al = SSL_AD_HANDSHAKE_FAILURE; goto err; } s->s3->send_connection_binding = 1; #ifdef OPENSSL_RI_DEBUG fprintf(stderr, "SCSV received by server\n"); #endif continue; } /* Check for TLS_FALLBACK_SCSV */ if ((cipher[n - 2] == ((SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV >> 8) & 0xff)) && (cipher[n - 1] == (SSL3_CK_FALLBACK_SCSV & 0xff))) { /* * The SCSV indicates that the client previously tried a higher * version. Fail if the current version is an unexpected * downgrade. */ if (!ssl_check_version_downgrade(s)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK); *al = SSL_AD_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK; goto err; } continue; } /* For SSLv2-compat, ignore leading 0-byte. */ c = ssl_get_cipher_by_char(s, sslv2format ? &cipher[1] : cipher); if (c != NULL) { if (!sk_SSL_CIPHER_push(sk, c)) { SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; goto err; } } } if (PACKET_remaining(cipher_suites) > 0) { *al = SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR; SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_BYTES_TO_CIPHER_LIST, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR); goto err; } if (skp != NULL) *skp = sk; return (sk); err: if ((skp == NULL) || (*skp == NULL)) sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(sk); return NULL; }