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|
/*
* Copyright 2016-2023 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* HMAC low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/proverr.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/packet.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
#include "prov/providercommon.h"
#include "prov/implementations.h"
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
#include "prov/securitycheck.h"
#include "internal/e_os.h"
#include "internal/params.h"
#define HKDF_MAXBUF 2048
#define HKDF_MAXINFO (32*1024)
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_dupctx_fn kdf_hkdf_dup;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_3_derive;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_FUNC_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_3_get_ctx_params;
static int HKDF(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
static int HKDF_Extract(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
/* Settable context parameters that are common across HKDF and the TLS KDF */
#define HKDF_COMMON_SETTABLES \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0), \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0)
/* Gettable context parameters that are common across HKDF and the TLS KDF */
#define HKDF_COMMON_GETTABLES \
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), \
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0)
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
int mode;
PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
unsigned char *key;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char *prefix;
size_t prefix_len;
unsigned char *label;
size_t label_len;
unsigned char *data;
size_t data_len;
unsigned char *info;
size_t info_len;
OSSL_FIPS_IND_DECLARE
} KDF_HKDF;
static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running())
return NULL;
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) != NULL) {
ctx->provctx = provctx;
OSSL_FIPS_IND_INIT(ctx)
}
return ctx;
}
static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
if (ctx != NULL) {
kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
}
static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
void *provctx = ctx->provctx;
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
#else
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
#endif
OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
ctx->provctx = provctx;
}
static void *kdf_hkdf_dup(void *vctx)
{
const KDF_HKDF *src = (const KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
KDF_HKDF *dest;
dest = kdf_hkdf_new(src->provctx);
if (dest != NULL) {
if (!ossl_prov_memdup(src->salt, src->salt_len, &dest->salt,
&dest->salt_len)
|| !ossl_prov_memdup(src->key, src->key_len,
&dest->key , &dest->key_len)
|| !ossl_prov_memdup(src->prefix, src->prefix_len,
&dest->prefix, &dest->prefix_len)
|| !ossl_prov_memdup(src->label, src->label_len,
&dest->label, &dest->label_len)
|| !ossl_prov_memdup(src->data, src->data_len,
&dest->data, &dest->data_len)
|| !ossl_prov_memdup(src->info, src->info_len,
&dest->info, &dest->info_len)
|| !ossl_prov_digest_copy(&dest->digest, &src->digest))
goto err;
dest->mode = src->mode;
OSSL_FIPS_IND_COPY(dest, src)
}
return dest;
err:
kdf_hkdf_free(dest);
return NULL;
}
static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
int sz;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
return SIZE_MAX;
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
sz = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
return sz;
}
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
static int fips_hkdf_key_check_passed(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
int key_approved = ossl_kdf_check_key_size(ctx->key_len);
if (!key_approved) {
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0,
libctx, "HKDF", "Key size",
ossl_fips_config_hkdf_key_check)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
const EVP_MD *md;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->key == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (keylen == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
switch (ctx->mode) {
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
default:
return HKDF(libctx, md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
return HKDF_Extract(libctx, md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
ctx->key, ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
return HKDF_Expand(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
}
}
static int hkdf_common_set_ctx_params(KDF_HKDF *ctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
int n;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if (OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST) != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
return 0;
md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if ((EVP_MD_get_flags(md) & EVP_MD_FLAG_XOF) != 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XOF_DIGESTS_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
} else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
} else if (OPENSSL_strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
} else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
ctx->mode = n;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
ctx->key = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
&ctx->key_len))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
ctx->salt = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
&ctx->salt_len))
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK))
return 0;
if (!hkdf_common_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
if (ossl_param_get1_concat_octet_string(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO,
&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len,
HKDF_MAXINFO) == 0)
return 0;
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY) != NULL)
if (!fips_hkdf_key_check_passed(ctx))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
HKDF_COMMON_SETTABLES,
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int hkdf_common_get_ctx_params(KDF_HKDF *ctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL) {
size_t sz = kdf_hkdf_size(ctx);
if (sz == 0)
return 0;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sz))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
if (ctx->info == NULL || ctx->info_len == 0)
p->return_size = 0;
else if (!OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string(p, ctx->info, ctx->info_len))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if (!hkdf_common_get_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, params))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
HKDF_COMMON_GETTABLES,
OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM()
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
OSSL_DISPATCH_END
};
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
* Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
*
* From the paper:
* The scheme HKDF is specified as:
* HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
*
* where:
* SKM is source key material
* XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
* CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
* L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
* k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
* t = ceil(L/k)
* the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
*
* From RFC 5869:
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*/
static int HKDF(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int ret, sz;
size_t prk_len;
sz = EVP_MD_get_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
prk_len = (size_t)sz;
/* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
if (!HKDF_Extract(libctx, evp_md,
salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
return 0;
/* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
return ret;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
*
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
*
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
* if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
* IKM input keying material
*
* Output:
* PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
*
* The output PRK is calculated as follows:
*
* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
*/
static int HKDF_Extract(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx, const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
{
int sz = EVP_MD_get_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
return
EVP_Q_mac(libctx, "HMAC", NULL, EVP_MD_get0_name(evp_md), NULL, salt,
salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, EVP_MD_get_size(evp_md), NULL)
!= NULL;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
*
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
*
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
* (usually, the output from the extract step)
* info optional context and application specific information
* (can be a zero-length string)
* L length of output keying material in octets
* (<= 255*HashLen)
*
* Output:
* OKM output keying material (of L octets)
*
* The output OKM is calculated as follows:
*
* N = ceil(L/HashLen)
* T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
* OKM = first L octets of T
*
* where:
* T(0) = empty string (zero length)
* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
* T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
* T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
* ...
*
* (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
* single octet.)
*/
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
int ret = 0, sz;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
sz = EVP_MD_get_size(evp_md);
if (sz <= 0)
return 0;
dig_len = (size_t)sz;
/* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
n = okm_len / dig_len;
if (okm_len % dig_len)
n++;
if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
return 0;
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
size_t copy_len;
const unsigned char ctr = i;
/* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
if (i > 1) {
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
goto err;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
goto err;
copy_len = (dig_len > okm_len - done_len) ?
okm_len - done_len :
dig_len;
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
done_len += copy_len;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
/*
* TLS uses slight variations of the above and for FIPS validation purposes,
* they need to be present here.
* Refer to RFC 8446 section 7 for specific details.
*/
/*
* Given a |secret|; a |label| of length |labellen|; and |data| of length
* |datalen| (e.g. typically a hash of the handshake messages), derive a new
* secret |outlen| bytes long and store it in the location pointed to be |out|.
* The |data| value may be zero length. Returns 1 on success and 0 on failure.
*/
static int prov_tls13_hkdf_expand(const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *prefix, size_t prefixlen,
const unsigned char *label, size_t labellen,
const unsigned char *data, size_t datalen,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
size_t hkdflabellen;
unsigned char hkdflabel[HKDF_MAXBUF];
WPACKET pkt;
/*
* 2 bytes for length of derived secret + 1 byte for length of combined
* prefix and label + bytes for the label itself + 1 byte length of hash
* + bytes for the hash itself. We've got the maximum the KDF can handle
* which should always be sufficient.
*/
if (!WPACKET_init_static_len(&pkt, hkdflabel, sizeof(hkdflabel), 0)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(&pkt, outlen)
|| !WPACKET_start_sub_packet_u8(&pkt)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, prefix, prefixlen)
|| !WPACKET_memcpy(&pkt, label, labellen)
|| !WPACKET_close(&pkt)
|| !WPACKET_sub_memcpy_u8(&pkt, data, (data == NULL) ? 0 : datalen)
|| !WPACKET_get_total_written(&pkt, &hkdflabellen)
|| !WPACKET_finish(&pkt)) {
WPACKET_cleanup(&pkt);
return 0;
}
return HKDF_Expand(md, key, keylen, hkdflabel, hkdflabellen,
out, outlen);
}
static int prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx,
const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *prevsecret,
size_t prevsecretlen,
const unsigned char *insecret,
size_t insecretlen,
const unsigned char *prefix,
size_t prefixlen,
const unsigned char *label,
size_t labellen,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
size_t mdlen;
int ret;
unsigned char preextractsec[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/* Always filled with zeros */
static const unsigned char default_zeros[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
ret = EVP_MD_get_size(md);
/* Ensure cast to size_t is safe */
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
mdlen = (size_t)ret;
if (insecret == NULL) {
insecret = default_zeros;
insecretlen = mdlen;
}
if (prevsecret == NULL) {
prevsecret = default_zeros;
prevsecretlen = mdlen;
} else {
EVP_MD_CTX *mctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
/* The pre-extract derive step uses a hash of no messages */
if (mctx == NULL
|| EVP_DigestInit_ex(mctx, md, NULL) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestFinal_ex(mctx, hash, NULL) <= 0) {
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return 0;
}
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
/* Generate the pre-extract secret */
if (!prov_tls13_hkdf_expand(md, prevsecret, mdlen,
prefix, prefixlen, label, labellen,
hash, mdlen, preextractsec, mdlen))
return 0;
prevsecret = preextractsec;
prevsecretlen = mdlen;
}
ret = HKDF_Extract(libctx, md, prevsecret, prevsecretlen,
insecret, insecretlen, out, outlen);
if (prevsecret == preextractsec)
OPENSSL_cleanse(preextractsec, mdlen);
return ret;
}
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
static int fips_tls1_3_digest_check_passed(KDF_HKDF *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
/*
* Perform digest check
*
* According to RFC 8446 appendix B.4, the valid hash functions are
* specified in FIPS 180-4. However, it only lists SHA2-256 and SHA2-384 in
* the table. ACVP also only lists the same set of hash functions.
*/
int digest_unapproved = !EVP_MD_is_a(md, SN_sha256)
&& !EVP_MD_is_a(md, SN_sha384);
if (digest_unapproved) {
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0,
libctx, "TLS13 KDF", "Digest",
ossl_fips_config_tls13_kdf_digest_check)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Calculate the correct length of the secret key.
*
* RFC 8446:
* If a given secret is not available, then the 0-value consisting of a
* string of Hash.length bytes set to zeros is used.
*/
static size_t fips_tls1_3_key_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
size_t key_size = 0;
if (ctx->key != NULL)
key_size = ctx->key_len;
else if (md != NULL)
key_size = EVP_MD_size(md);
return key_size;
}
static int fips_tls1_3_key_check_passed(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
OSSL_LIB_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx);
int key_approved = ossl_kdf_check_key_size(fips_tls1_3_key_size(ctx));
if (!key_approved) {
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_ON_UNAPPROVED(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE1,
libctx, "TLS13 KDF", "Key size",
ossl_fips_config_tls13_kdf_key_check)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
#endif
static int kdf_tls1_3_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
const EVP_MD *md;
if (!ossl_prov_is_running() || !kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
switch (ctx->mode) {
default:
return 0;
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
return prov_tls13_hkdf_generate_secret(PROV_LIBCTX_OF(ctx->provctx),
md,
ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
ctx->prefix, ctx->prefix_len,
ctx->label, ctx->label_len,
key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
return prov_tls13_hkdf_expand(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
ctx->prefix, ctx->prefix_len,
ctx->label, ctx->label_len,
ctx->data, ctx->data_len,
key, keylen);
}
}
static int kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE0, params,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_DIGEST_CHECK))
return 0;
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_SET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE1, params,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK))
return 0;
if (!hkdf_common_set_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
if (ctx->mode == EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
ctx->prefix = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->prefix, 0,
&ctx->prefix_len))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->label);
ctx->label = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->label, 0,
&ctx->label_len))
return 0;
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->data, ctx->data_len);
ctx->data = NULL;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA)) != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->data, 0,
&ctx->data_len))
return 0;
#ifdef FIPS_MODULE
if (OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_ALG_PARAM_DIGEST) != NULL) {
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (!fips_tls1_3_digest_check_passed(ctx, md))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
if (!fips_tls1_3_key_check_passed(ctx))
return 0;
#endif
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
HKDF_COMMON_SETTABLES,
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PREFIX, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_LABEL, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DATA, NULL, 0),
OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_DIGEST_CHECK)
OSSL_FIPS_IND_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAM(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_FIPS_KEY_CHECK)
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int kdf_tls1_3_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
if (params == NULL)
return 1;
if (!hkdf_common_get_ctx_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
if (!OSSL_FIPS_IND_GET_CTX_PARAM(ctx, params))
return 0;
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_3_gettable_ctx_params(ossl_unused void *ctx,
ossl_unused void *provctx)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
HKDF_COMMON_GETTABLES,
OSSL_FIPS_IND_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAM()
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH ossl_kdf_tls1_3_kdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DUPCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_dup },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_3_get_ctx_params },
OSSL_DISPATCH_END
};
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