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* tpm2-util: show loaded libraries in 'systemd-analyze has-tpm2'Yu Watanabe2024-09-301-7/+14
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | After 3b16e9f41983f697bc38c40bb8e7119c1bb4f7c8, even the libraries are documented in the man page, it is useful to mention which libraries are checked in the command output. Of course, the dependencies are kind of implementation detail, and may be changed in the future version, but that's especially why I think showing the library deps in the output is useful. systemd-analyze is a debugging tool, and already shows many internal states. I think there is nothing to prevent from showing the deps. Prompted by #34477.
* tpm2-util: update commentYu Watanabe2024-09-191-2/+2
| | | | | | has-tpm2 command is moved to systemd-analyze. Follow-up for 58e359604ffdca12bb4d2c5807b96e070611c0f6.
* tpm2-util: do not load tpm2 libraries when not interested in the existence ↵Yu Watanabe2024-09-191-1/+4
| | | | | | | | of the libraries For example, 'bootctl status' only interested in if the efi has TPM2 support and a TPM2 driver is loaded. Hence, not necessary to load libtss2.
* tpm2-util: introduce tpm2_is_fully_supported()Yu Watanabe2024-09-191-0/+3
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* analyze: move "has-tpm2" from systemd-creds to systemd-analyzeLennart Poettering2024-09-121-0/+2
| | | | | | The verb s not really specific to credential management, it was always a bit misplaced. Hence move it to systemd-analyze, where we already have some general TPM related verbs such as "srk" and "pcrs"
* cryptenroll/cryptsetup: allow combined signed TPM2 PCR policy + pcrlock policyLennart Poettering2024-09-061-4/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | So far you had to pick: 1. Use a signed PCR TPM2 policy to lock your disk to (i.e. UKI vendor blesses your setup via signature) or 2. Use a pcrlock policy (i.e. local system blesses your setup via dynamic local policy stored in NV index) It was not possible combine these two, because TPM2 access policies do not allow the combination of PolicyAuthorize (used to implement #1 above) and PolicyAuthorizeNV (used to implement #2) in a single policy, unless one is "further upstream" (and can simply remove the other from the policy freely). This is quite limiting of course, since we actually do want to enforce on each TPM object that both the OS vendor policy and the local policy must be fulfilled, without the chance for the vendor or the local system to disable the other. This patch addresses this: instead of trying to find a way to come up with some adventurous scheme to combine both policy into one TPM2 policy, we simply shard the symmetric LUKS decryption key: one half we protect via the signed PCR policy, and the other we protect via the pcrlock policy. Only if both halves can be acquired the disk can be decrypted. This means: 1. we simply double the unlock key in length in case both policies shall be used. 2. We store two resulting TPM policy hashes in the LUKS token JSON, one for each policy 3. We store two sealed TPM policy key blobs in the LUKS token JSON, for both halves of the LUKS unlock key. This patch keeps the "sharding" logic relatively generic (i.e. the low level logic is actually fine with more than 2 shards), because I figure sooner or later we might have to encode more shards, for example if we add further TPM2-based access policies, for example when combining FIDO2 with TPM2, or implementing TOTP for this.
* various: move ptr indicator to return valueZbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek2024-06-191-5/+5
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* various: move const ptr indicator to return valueZbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek2024-06-191-7/+7
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* libsystemd: turn json.[ch] into a public APILennart Poettering2024-06-121-11/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This is preparation for making our Varlink API a public API. Since our Varlink API is built on top of our JSON API we need to make that public first (it's a nice API, but JSON APIs there are already enough, this is purely about the Varlink angle). I made most of the json.h APIs public, and just placed them in sd-json.h. Sometimes I wasn't so sure however, since the underlying data structures would have to be made public too. If in doubt I didn#t risk it, and moved the relevant API to src/libsystemd/sd-json/json-util.h instead (without any sd_* symbol prefixes). This is mostly a giant search/replace patch.
* tpm2-util: tighten rules on the nvindex handle range we allocate fromLennart Poettering2024-06-111-0/+11
| | | | | | | | | | | | Let's follow the conventions set by "Registry of Reserved TPM 2.0 Handles and Localities" and only allocate nvindex currently not assigned to any vendor. For details see: https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/registry/ Section 2.2
* tpm2-util: add generic wrapper tpm2_context_new_or_warn() that wrpas ↵Lennart Poettering2024-04-221-0/+1
| | | | | | | | | | tpm2_context_new and logs about errors We so far just print a short log message that is not very useful, let's add some recognizable error codes, and output better log messages if we can't get TPM stuff to work. Fixes: #31925
* tpm2-util: now that we don't use PolicyAuthValue anymore, let's not set an ↵Lennart Poettering2024-04-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | | authValue anymore for the policy nvindex We have now switched from PolicyAuthValue to PolicySigned to control access to the policy nvindex to. This means there's no point in setting an authValue on the nvindex anymore, hence drop this.
* pcrlock: switch access policy for nvindex to store policy in from ↵Lennart Poettering2024-04-181-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | PolicyAuthValue to PolicySigned (with an HMAC-SHA256 key) So far the nvindex to store the pcrlock policy in was protected via a PolicyAuthValue policy (i.e. with a simple PIN set on the nvindex). That's a bad idea however, as it means an attacker can simply remove and re-create the nvindex and the "name" of the nvindex does not change, thus defeating the logic. (This is because the authValue is *not* part of the "name" of an nvindex!). Fix this by switching from PolicyAuthValue to PolicySigned with an HMAC-SHA256 key. Behaviour is very similar: however, the PIN is now part of of the access policy hash, which *is* part of the "name" of an nvindex. Thus, if an attacker removes and recreates the nvindex it has to provide the same PIN again or the "name" of the nvindex will change. Mission accomplished. I'd like to thank Chris Coulson for finding this issue (and helping me address it). Thank you!
* tpm2-util: rename tpm2_get_pin_auth() → tpm2_auth_value_from_pin()Lennart Poettering2024-04-181-1/+1
| | | | | | | Just some renaming. I found the old name a bit confusing since it sounds as if this would get the pin from somewhere, but it really doesn't. It just converts a PIN into an auth_value, and I think saying so explicitly makes things easier to grok.
* tpm2: export tpm2_get_name()Lennart Poettering2024-04-181-0/+1
| | | | We later want to use this from pcrlock.c, hence export it.
* pcrlock: when unlocking try to pick up pcrlock policy from system credentialsLennart Poettering2024-01-221-2/+4
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* tpm2-util: more iovec'ificationLennart Poettering2024-01-051-5/+5
| | | | | | | Let's move more code to using struct iovec for passing around binary chunks of data. No real changes in behaviour, just refactoring.
* Merge pull request #29955 from poettering/repart-seal-keyLuca Boccassi2023-11-101-2/+2
|\ | | | | repart: add --tpm2-seal-key= support, matching the recently added support cryptenroll has
| * tpm2-util: move loading of TPM2B_PUBLIC from disk into tpm2-util.cLennart Poettering2023-11-091-2/+2
| | | | | | | | | | | | No change in behaviour, let's just move this over so that we can reuse this in repart later (and don't have to export the ugly `sym_` function pointer for it)
* | tpm2-setup: also save the SRK to the file system in TPM2_PUBLIC formatLennart Poettering2023-11-091-0/+1
|/ | | | | | We already save it in PEM format, also store it TPM2_PUBLIC format next to it. This is useful for usage with systemd-cryptenroll's --tpm2-device-key= switch.
* cryptenroll: add support for calculated TPM2 enrollmentDan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | Instead of enrolling the local TPM to a luks volume, use the public key from a TPM to enroll it into the luks volume. This is useful when enrolling a TPM that is not currently accessible, for example if the TPM is located on a different system.
* tpm2: update test-tpm2 for tpm2_calculate_seal()Dan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+2
| | | | Add testing for tpm2_calculate_seal().
* tpm2: add tpm2_calculate_seal() and helper functionsDan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+7
| | | | Add functions to calculate a sealed secret object.
* tpm2: add tpm2_sym_alg_*_string() and tpm2_sym_mode_*_string()Dan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+6
| | | | | Add functions to convert between alg id and string name for symmetric algorithms and symmetric encryption modes.
* tpm2: add test to verify srk templatesDan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+2
| | | | | Verify the tpm2_get_srk_template() and tpm2_get_best_srk_template() functions work as expected.
* tpm2: allow using tpm2_get_srk_template() without tpmDan Streetman2023-11-071-0/+2
| | | | | | | | The SRK templates are defined by specification, so move the check for TPM support to the tpm2_get_best_srk_template() function, and allow anyone to get the ECC and RSA templates. Also add test to verify the SRK templates are correct.
* pcrlock: add new pcrlock toolLennart Poettering2023-11-031-3/+59
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* tpm2-util: add common array for TPM2 hash algorithmsLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+4
| | | | | This is useful to enumerate all hash algorithms we want to predict measurements for.
* tpm2-util: make various marshalling/unmarshalling calls static, as we only ↵Lennart Poettering2023-11-031-4/+0
| | | | | | | | use them internally in tpm2-util.c Note, some of these were just added in this same PR. We only exported them initially to make sure gcc doesn't complained about unused local symbols.
* tpm2-util: add generic helpers for sealing/unsealing dataLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+3
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | These helpers tpm2_seal_data()/tpm2_unseal_data() are useful for sealing/unsealing data without any further semantics around them. This is different from the existing tpm2_seal()/tpm2_unseal() which seal with a specific policy and serialize in a specific way, as we use it for disk encryption. These new helpers are more generic, they do not serialize in a specific way or imply policy, they are just the core of the sealing/unsealing. (We should look into porting tpm2_seal()/tpm2_unseal() onto these new helpers, but this isn#t trivial, since the classic serialization we use uses a merged marshalling of private/public key, which we'd have to change in one way or another)
* tpm2-util: add helper for creating/removing/updating NV index with stored policyLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+4
| | | | | | | This is the primary core of what pcrlock is supposed to do eventually: maintain a TPM2 policy hash inside an NV index which we then can reference via a PolicyAuthorizeNV expression to lock other objects against it.
* tpm2-util: add calls for calculating/submitting PolicyAuthorizeNV + PolicyOR ↵Lennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+5
| | | | TPM2 policies
* tpm2-util: add helper that calculates name of NV indexLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+2
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* tpm2-util: add helper for setting TPM2B_AUTH in binaryLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+2
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* tpm2-util: add helpers for marshalling NV index public areasLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+2
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* tpm2-util: add helpers for marshalling public/private keysLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+4
| | | | | | | Note: we export these new symbols for now. A later commit in this PR will make them static again. The only reason they are exported here is to make sure gcc doesn't complain about unused static symbols, and I really wanted to commit them in a separate commit.
* tpm2-util: export a couple of functions we'd like to use for pcrlockLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+12
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* tpm2-util: add helper for returning path to EFI event log blobLennart Poettering2023-11-031-0/+1
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* tpm2-util: make tpm2_read_public() static, as we use it only internally in ↵Lennart Poettering2023-10-231-2/+0
| | | | tpm2-util.c
* tpm2-util: make tpm2_marshal_blob()/tpm2_unmarshal_blob() staticLennart Poettering2023-10-231-3/+0
| | | | | | | These are not used outside of tpm2-util.[ch], and the way they merge public/private key pair into one blob is kinda specific to our implementation, hence better should be hidden away, and not used for new code anyway.
* tpm2-util: rename tpm2_calculate_name() → tpm2_calculate_pubkey_name()Lennart Poettering2023-10-211-1/+1
| | | | | | We'll soon have a function for determining the name of an NV index, hence let's rename the existing function for the same of a public key to make clear it's about public keys only.
* test: add tests for systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-seal-key-handleDan Streetman2023-10-101-0/+8
| | | | | | | | | In TEST-70-TPM2, test systemd-cryptenroll --tpm2-seal-key-handle using the default (0) as well as the SRK handle (0x81000001), and test using a non-SRK handle index after creating and persisting a primary key. In test/test-tpm2, test tpm2_seal() and tpm2_unseal() using default (0), the SRK handle, and a transient handle.
* cryptenroll: allow specifying handle index of key to use for sealingDan Streetman2023-10-101-1/+1
| | | | This defaults to the SRK index.
* tpm2: cache TPM's supported ECC curvesDan Streetman2023-10-031-0/+3
| | | | | This brings the tpm2_supports_ecc_curve() api in line with the other tpm2_supports_*() functions, of returning a boolean.
* tpm2: change tpm2_unseal() to accept Tpm2Context instead of device stringDan Streetman2023-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | This matches the change to tpm2_seal(), which now accepts a Tpm2Context instead of a device string. This also allows using the same TPM context for sealing and unsealing, which will be required by (future) test code when sealing/unsealing using a transient key.
* tpm2: downgrade most log functions from error to debugDan Streetman2023-10-031-1/+1
| | | | | | | | | | Because most TPM2 functions here are 'library-like' functions, they should be at debug level, not error level. The only functions not reduced to logging at debug are tpm2_list_devices(), since it is expected to print output, and the tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_*() functions, since the system-wide parse_*_argument() functions generally log at error level.
* tpm2-setup: add new early boot tool for initializing the SRKLennart Poettering2023-09-291-0/+4
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | This adds an explicit service for initializing the TPM2 SRK. This is implicitly also done by systemd-cryptsetup, hence strictly speaking redundant, but doing this early has the benefit that we can parallelize this in a nicer way. This also write a copy of the SRK public key in PEM format to /run/ + /var/lib/, thus pinning the disk image to the TPM. Making the SRK public key is also useful for allowing easy offline encryption for a specific TPM. Sooner or later we should probably grow what this service does, the above is just the first step. For example, the service should probably offer the ability to reset the TPM (clear the owner hierarchy?) on a factory reset, if such a policy is needed. And we might want to install some default AK (?). Fixes: #27986 Also see: #22637
* tpm2: add tpm2_index_to_handle() and tpm2_index_from_handle()Dan Streetman2023-09-291-0/+5
| | | | | | | | | Adjust the tpm2_esys_handle_from_tpm_handle() function into better-named tpm2_index_to_handle(), which operates like tpm2_get_srk() but allows using any handle index. Also add matching tpm2_index_from_handle(). Also change the references to 'location' in tpm2_persist_handle() to more appropriate 'handle index'.
* tpm2: add tpm2_marshal_blob() and tpm2_unmarshal_blob()Dan Streetman2023-09-291-0/+3
| | | | Add functions to marshal and unmarshal our 'blob' object.
* tpm2: whenever we measure, also write a tpm log recordLennart Poettering2023-08-301-1/+15
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | Previously we only logged our measurements to the journal. This is not a great solution though, since regular logs are subject to rotation, which is something we really cannot have for measurements (as it means we can never reproduce the PCR values from the data). Hence, let's maintain an explicit log. Ideally, we'd just use the TCG Canonical Event Log format 1:1 (https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/canonical-event-log-format/). However it's not a perfect fit fo us, for various reasons. But let's follow it (in its JSON incantation) as closely at it makes sense, so that it can easily be converted to the full format by programs consuming it. Code comments explain where we deviate from the TCG CEL-JSON, and what to do about it when reading the data.
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