| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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As previously announced, execute order 66:
https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2022-September/048352.html
The meson options split-usr, rootlibdir and rootprefix become no-ops
that print a warning if they are set to anything other than the
default values. We can remove them in a future release.
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We don't need two (and half) templating systems anymore, yay!
I'm keeping the changes minimal, to make the diff manageable. Some enhancements
due to a better templating system might be possible in the future.
For handling of '## ' — see the next commit.
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Add `ProtectClock=yes` to systemd units. Since it implies certain
`DeviceAllow=` rules, make sure that the units have `DeviceAllow=` rules so
they are still able to access other devices. Exclude timesyncd and timedated.
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We set ProtectKernelLogs=yes on all long running services except for
udevd, since it accesses /dev/kmsg, and journald, since it calls syslog
and accesses /dev/kmsg.
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As discussed on systemd-devel [1], in Fedora we get lots of abrt reports
about the watchdog firing [2], but 100% of them seem to be caused by resource
starvation in the machine, and never actual deadlocks in the services being
monitored. Killing the services not only does not improve anything, but it
makes the resource starvation worse, because the service needs cycles to restart,
and coredump processing is also fairly expensive. This adds a configuration option
to allow the value to be changed. If the setting is not set, there is no change.
My plan is to set it to some ridiculusly high value, maybe 1h, to catch cases
where a service is actually hanging.
[1] https://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2019-October/043618.html
[2] https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1300212
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Previously, setting this option by default was problematic due to
SELinux (as this would also prohibit the transition from PID1's label to
the service's label). However, this restriction has since been lifted,
hence let's start making use of this universally in our services.
On SELinux system this change should be synchronized with a policy
update that ensures that NNP-ful transitions from init_t to service
labels is permitted.
An while we are at it: sort the settings in the unit files this touches.
This might increase the size of the change in this case, but hopefully
should result in stabler patches later on.
Fixes: #1219
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journal
This updates the unit files of all our serviecs that deal with journal
stuff to use a higher RLIMIT_NOFILE soft limit by default. The new value
is the same as used for the new HIGH_RLIMIT_NOFILE we just added.
With this we ensure all code that access the journal has higher
RLIMIT_NOFILE. The code that runs as daemon via the unit files, the code
that is run from the user's command line via C code internal to the
relevant tools. In some cases this means we'll redundantly bump the
limits as there are tools run both from the command line and as service.
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Let's lock things down. Also, using it is the only way how to properly
test this to the fullest extent.
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Let's step up the protection a notch
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Basically, we turn it on for most long-running services, with the
exception of machined (whose child processes need to join containers
here and there), and importd (which sandboxes tar in a CLONE_NEWNET
namespace). machined is left unrestricted, and importd is restricted to
use only "net"
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Let's make this an excercise in dogfooding: let's turn on more security
features for all our long-running services.
Specifically:
- Turn on RestrictRealtime=yes for all of them
- Turn on ProtectKernelTunables=yes and ProtectControlGroups=yes for most of
them
- Turn on RestrictAddressFamilies= for all of them, but different sets of
address families for each
Also, always order settings in the unit files, that the various sandboxing
features are close together.
Add a couple of missing, older settings for a numbre of unit files.
Note that this change turns off AF_INET/AF_INET6 from udevd, thus effectively
turning of networking from udev rule commands. Since this might break stuff
(that is already broken I'd argue) this is documented in NEWS.
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Apparently, disk IO issues are more frequent than we hope, and 1min
waiting for disk IO happens, so let's increase the watchdog timeout a
bit, for all our services.
See #1353 for an example where this triggers.
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This reverts commit 6a716208b346b742053cfd01e76f76fb27c4ea47.
Apparently this doesn't work.
http://lists.freedesktop.org/archives/systemd-devel/2015-February/028212.html
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No setuid programs are expected to be executed, so add
SecureBits=noroot noroot-locked
to unit files.
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