/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include "efivars.h" #include "memory-util-fundamental.h" #include "proto/rng.h" #include "random-seed.h" #include "secure-boot.h" #include "sha256-fundamental.h" #include "util.h" #define RANDOM_MAX_SIZE_MIN (32U) #define RANDOM_MAX_SIZE_MAX (32U*1024U) struct linux_efi_random_seed { uint32_t size; uint8_t seed[]; }; #define LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE_GUID \ { 0x1ce1e5bc, 0x7ceb, 0x42f2, { 0x81, 0xe5, 0x8a, 0xad, 0xf1, 0x80, 0xf5, 0x7b } } /* SHA256 gives us 256/8=32 bytes */ #define HASH_VALUE_SIZE 32 /* Linux's RNG is 256 bits, so let's provide this much */ #define DESIRED_SEED_SIZE 32 /* Some basic domain separation in case somebody uses this data elsewhere */ #define HASH_LABEL "systemd-boot random seed label v1" static EFI_STATUS acquire_rng(void *ret, size_t size) { EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL *rng; EFI_STATUS err; assert(ret); /* Try to acquire the specified number of bytes from the UEFI RNG */ err = BS->LocateProtocol(MAKE_GUID_PTR(EFI_RNG_PROTOCOL), NULL, (void **) &rng); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return err; if (!rng) return EFI_UNSUPPORTED; err = rng->GetRNG(rng, NULL, size, ret); /* On some systems the RNG might not be ready during early boot, handle gracefully and don't log. */ if (err == EFI_NOT_READY) return err; if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_warning_status(err, "Failed to acquire RNG data, proceeding without: %m"); return EFI_SUCCESS; } static EFI_STATUS acquire_system_token(void **ret, size_t *ret_size) { _cleanup_free_ char *data = NULL; EFI_STATUS err; size_t size; assert(ret); assert(ret_size); err = efivar_get_raw(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LOADER), u"LoaderSystemToken", (void**) &data, &size); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) { if (err != EFI_NOT_FOUND) log_error_status(err, "Failed to read LoaderSystemToken EFI variable: %m"); return err; } if (size <= 0) return log_error_status(EFI_NOT_FOUND, "System token too short, ignoring."); *ret = TAKE_PTR(data); *ret_size = size; return EFI_SUCCESS; } static void validate_sha256(void) { #ifdef EFI_DEBUG /* Let's validate our SHA256 implementation. We stole it from glibc, and converted it to UEFI * style. We better check whether it does the right stuff. We use the simpler test vectors from the * SHA spec. Note that we strip this out in optimization builds. */ static const struct { const char *string; uint8_t hash[HASH_VALUE_SIZE]; } array[] = { { "abc", { 0xba, 0x78, 0x16, 0xbf, 0x8f, 0x01, 0xcf, 0xea, 0x41, 0x41, 0x40, 0xde, 0x5d, 0xae, 0x22, 0x23, 0xb0, 0x03, 0x61, 0xa3, 0x96, 0x17, 0x7a, 0x9c, 0xb4, 0x10, 0xff, 0x61, 0xf2, 0x00, 0x15, 0xad }}, { "", { 0xe3, 0xb0, 0xc4, 0x42, 0x98, 0xfc, 0x1c, 0x14, 0x9a, 0xfb, 0xf4, 0xc8, 0x99, 0x6f, 0xb9, 0x24, 0x27, 0xae, 0x41, 0xe4, 0x64, 0x9b, 0x93, 0x4c, 0xa4, 0x95, 0x99, 0x1b, 0x78, 0x52, 0xb8, 0x55 }}, { "abcdbcdecdefdefgefghfghighijhijkijkljklmklmnlmnomnopnopq", { 0x24, 0x8d, 0x6a, 0x61, 0xd2, 0x06, 0x38, 0xb8, 0xe5, 0xc0, 0x26, 0x93, 0x0c, 0x3e, 0x60, 0x39, 0xa3, 0x3c, 0xe4, 0x59, 0x64, 0xff, 0x21, 0x67, 0xf6, 0xec, 0xed, 0xd4, 0x19, 0xdb, 0x06, 0xc1 }}, { "abcdefghbcdefghicdefghijdefghijkefghijklfghijklmghijklmnhijklmnoijklmnopjklmnopqklmnopqrlmnopqrsmnopqrstnopqrstu", { 0xcf, 0x5b, 0x16, 0xa7, 0x78, 0xaf, 0x83, 0x80, 0x03, 0x6c, 0xe5, 0x9e, 0x7b, 0x04, 0x92, 0x37, 0x0b, 0x24, 0x9b, 0x11, 0xe8, 0xf0, 0x7a, 0x51, 0xaf, 0xac, 0x45, 0x03, 0x7a, 0xfe, 0xe9, 0xd1 }}, }; FOREACH_ELEMENT(i, array) assert(memcmp(SHA256_DIRECT(i->string, strlen8(i->string)), i->hash, HASH_VALUE_SIZE) == 0); #endif } EFI_STATUS process_random_seed(EFI_FILE *root_dir) { uint8_t random_bytes[DESIRED_SEED_SIZE], hash_key[HASH_VALUE_SIZE]; _cleanup_free_ struct linux_efi_random_seed *new_seed_table = NULL; struct linux_efi_random_seed *previous_seed_table = NULL; _cleanup_free_ void *seed = NULL, *system_token = NULL; _cleanup_(file_closep) EFI_FILE *handle = NULL; _cleanup_free_ EFI_FILE_INFO *info = NULL; struct sha256_ctx hash; uint64_t uefi_monotonic_counter = 0; size_t size, rsize, wsize; bool seeded_by_efi = false; EFI_STATUS err; EFI_TIME now; CLEANUP_ERASE(random_bytes); CLEANUP_ERASE(hash_key); CLEANUP_ERASE(hash); assert(root_dir); assert_cc(DESIRED_SEED_SIZE == HASH_VALUE_SIZE); validate_sha256(); /* hash = LABEL || sizeof(input1) || input1 || ... || sizeof(inputN) || inputN */ sha256_init_ctx(&hash); /* Some basic domain separation in case somebody uses this data elsewhere */ sha256_process_bytes(HASH_LABEL, sizeof(HASH_LABEL) - 1, &hash); previous_seed_table = find_configuration_table(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE)); if (!previous_seed_table) { size = 0; sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); } else { size = previous_seed_table->size; seeded_by_efi = size >= DESIRED_SEED_SIZE; sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(previous_seed_table->seed, size, &hash); /* Zero and free the previous seed table only at the end after we've managed to install a new * one, so that in case this function fails or aborts, Linux still receives whatever the * previous bootloader chain set. So, the next line of this block is not an explicit_bzero() * call. */ } /* Request some random data from the UEFI RNG. We don't need this to work safely, but it's a good * idea to use it because it helps us for cases where users mistakenly include a random seed in * golden master images that are replicated many times. */ err = acquire_rng(random_bytes, sizeof(random_bytes)); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) { size = 0; /* If we can't get any randomness from EFI itself, then we'll only be relying on what's in * ESP. But ESP is mutable, so if secure boot is enabled, we probably shouldn't trust that * alone, in which case we bail out early. */ if (!seeded_by_efi && secure_boot_enabled()) return EFI_NOT_FOUND; } else { seeded_by_efi = true; size = sizeof(random_bytes); } sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(random_bytes, size, &hash); /* Get some system specific seed that the installer might have placed in an EFI variable. We include * it in our hash. This is protection against golden master image sloppiness, and it remains on the * system, even when disk images are duplicated or swapped out. */ size = 0; err = acquire_system_token(&system_token, &size); if ((err != EFI_SUCCESS || size < DESIRED_SEED_SIZE) && !seeded_by_efi) return err; sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); if (system_token) { sha256_process_bytes(system_token, size, &hash); explicit_bzero_safe(system_token, size); } err = root_dir->Open( root_dir, &handle, (char16_t *) u"\\loader\\random-seed", EFI_FILE_MODE_READ | EFI_FILE_MODE_WRITE, 0); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) { if (err != EFI_NOT_FOUND && err != EFI_WRITE_PROTECTED) log_error_status(err, "Failed to open random seed file: %m"); return err; } err = get_file_info(handle, &info, NULL); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to get file info for random seed: %m"); size = info->FileSize; if (size < RANDOM_MAX_SIZE_MIN) return log_error("Random seed file is too short."); if (size > RANDOM_MAX_SIZE_MAX) return log_error("Random seed file is too large."); seed = xmalloc(size); rsize = size; err = handle->Read(handle, &rsize, seed); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to read random seed file: %m"); if (rsize != size) { explicit_bzero_safe(seed, rsize); return log_error_status(EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, "Short read on random seed file."); } sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(seed, size, &hash); explicit_bzero_safe(seed, size); err = handle->SetPosition(handle, 0); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to seek to beginning of random seed file: %m"); /* Let's also include the UEFI monotonic counter (which is supposedly increasing on every single * boot) in the hash, so that even if the changes to the ESP for some reason should not be * persistent, the random seed we generate will still be different on every single boot. */ err = BS->GetNextMonotonicCount(&uefi_monotonic_counter); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS && !seeded_by_efi) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to acquire UEFI monotonic counter: %m"); size = sizeof(uefi_monotonic_counter); sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(&uefi_monotonic_counter, size, &hash); err = RT->GetTime(&now, NULL); size = err == EFI_SUCCESS ? sizeof(now) : 0; /* Known to be flaky, so don't bark on error. */ sha256_process_bytes(&size, sizeof(size), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(&now, size, &hash); /* hash_key = HASH(hash) */ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash, hash_key); /* hash = hash_key || 0 */ sha256_init_ctx(&hash); sha256_process_bytes(hash_key, sizeof(hash_key), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(&(const uint8_t){ 0 }, sizeof(uint8_t), &hash); /* random_bytes = HASH(hash) */ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash, random_bytes); size = sizeof(random_bytes); /* If the file size is too large, zero out the remaining bytes on disk. */ if (size < info->FileSize) { err = handle->SetPosition(handle, size); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to seek to offset of random seed file: %m"); wsize = info->FileSize - size; err = handle->Write(handle, &wsize, seed /* All zeros now */); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to write random seed file: %m"); if (wsize != info->FileSize - size) return log_error_status(EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, "Short write on random seed file."); err = handle->Flush(handle); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to flush random seed file: %m"); err = handle->SetPosition(handle, 0); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to seek to beginning of random seed file: %m"); /* We could truncate the file here with something like: * * info->FileSize = size; * err = handle->SetInfo(handle, &GenericFileInfo, info->Size, info); * if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) * return log_error_status(err, "Failed to truncate random seed file: %u"); * * But this is considered slightly risky, because EFI filesystem drivers are a little bit * flimsy. So instead we rely on userspace eventually truncating this when it writes a new * seed. For now the best we do is zero it. */ } /* Update the random seed on disk before we use it */ wsize = size; err = handle->Write(handle, &wsize, random_bytes); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to write random seed file: %m"); if (wsize != size) return log_error_status(EFI_PROTOCOL_ERROR, "Short write on random seed file."); err = handle->Flush(handle); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to flush random seed file: %m"); err = BS->AllocatePool(EfiACPIReclaimMemory, offsetof(struct linux_efi_random_seed, seed) + DESIRED_SEED_SIZE, (void **) &new_seed_table); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to allocate EFI table for random seed: %m"); new_seed_table->size = DESIRED_SEED_SIZE; /* hash = hash_key || 1 */ sha256_init_ctx(&hash); sha256_process_bytes(hash_key, sizeof(hash_key), &hash); sha256_process_bytes(&(const uint8_t){ 1 }, sizeof(uint8_t), &hash); /* new_seed_table->seed = HASH(hash) */ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash, new_seed_table->seed); err = BS->InstallConfigurationTable(MAKE_GUID_PTR(LINUX_EFI_RANDOM_SEED_TABLE), new_seed_table); if (err != EFI_SUCCESS) return log_error_status(err, "Failed to install EFI table for random seed: %m"); TAKE_PTR(new_seed_table); if (previous_seed_table) { /* Now that we've succeeded in installing the new table, we can safely nuke the old one. */ explicit_bzero_safe(previous_seed_table->seed, previous_seed_table->size); explicit_bzero_safe(previous_seed_table, sizeof(*previous_seed_table)); free(previous_seed_table); } return EFI_SUCCESS; }