/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #include #include #include #include #include #include #include #if WANT_LINUX_FS_H #include #endif #include "alloc-util.h" #include "base-filesystem.h" #include "chase-symlinks.h" #include "dev-setup.h" #include "devnum-util.h" #include "env-util.h" #include "escape.h" #include "extension-release.h" #include "fd-util.h" #include "format-util.h" #include "glyph-util.h" #include "label.h" #include "list.h" #include "loop-util.h" #include "loopback-setup.h" #include "missing_syscall.h" #include "mkdir-label.h" #include "mount-util.h" #include "mountpoint-util.h" #include "namespace-util.h" #include "namespace.h" #include "nsflags.h" #include "nulstr-util.h" #include "os-util.h" #include "path-util.h" #include "selinux-util.h" #include "socket-util.h" #include "sort-util.h" #include "stat-util.h" #include "string-table.h" #include "string-util.h" #include "strv.h" #include "tmpfile-util.h" #include "umask-util.h" #include "user-util.h" #define DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS (MS_NOSUID|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOEXEC) typedef enum MountMode { /* This is ordered by priority! */ INACCESSIBLE, OVERLAY_MOUNT, MOUNT_IMAGES, BIND_MOUNT, BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, PRIVATE_TMP, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY, PRIVATE_DEV, BIND_DEV, EMPTY_DIR, SYSFS, PROCFS, READONLY, READWRITE, NOEXEC, EXEC, TMPFS, RUN, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, /* Bind-mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */ EXTENSION_IMAGES, /* Mounted outside the root directory, and used by subsequent mounts */ MQUEUEFS, READWRITE_IMPLICIT, /* Should have the lowest priority. */ _MOUNT_MODE_MAX, } MountMode; typedef struct MountEntry { const char *path_const; /* Memory allocated on stack or static */ MountMode mode:5; bool ignore:1; /* Ignore if path does not exist? */ bool has_prefix:1; /* Already is prefixed by the root dir? */ bool read_only:1; /* Shall this mount point be read-only? */ bool nosuid:1; /* Shall set MS_NOSUID on the mount itself */ bool noexec:1; /* Shall set MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */ bool exec:1; /* Shall clear MS_NOEXEC on the mount itself */ bool applied:1; /* Already applied */ char *path_malloc; /* Use this instead of 'path_const' if we had to allocate memory */ const char *unprefixed_path_const; /* If the path was amended with a prefix, these will save the original */ char *unprefixed_path_malloc; const char *source_const; /* The source path, for bind mounts or images */ char *source_malloc; const char *options_const;/* Mount options for tmpfs */ char *options_malloc; unsigned long flags; /* Mount flags used by EMPTY_DIR and TMPFS. Do not include MS_RDONLY here, but please use read_only. */ unsigned n_followed; LIST_HEAD(MountOptions, image_options); } MountEntry; /* If MountAPIVFS= is used, let's mount /sys, /proc, /dev and /run into the it, but only as a fallback if the user hasn't mounted * something there already. These mounts are hence overridden by any other explicitly configured mounts. */ static const MountEntry apivfs_table[] = { { "/proc", PROCFS, false }, { "/dev", BIND_DEV, false }, { "/sys", SYSFS, false }, { "/run", RUN, false, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_RUN, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, }; /* ProtectKernelTunables= option and the related filesystem APIs */ static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table[] = { { "/proc/acpi", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/apm", READONLY, true }, /* Obsolete API, there's no point in permitting access to this, ever */ { "/proc/asound", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/bus", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/fs", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/irq", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/kallsyms", INACCESSIBLE, true }, { "/proc/kcore", INACCESSIBLE, true }, { "/proc/latency_stats", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/mtrr", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/scsi", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/sys", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/sysrq-trigger", READONLY, true }, { "/proc/timer_stats", READONLY, true }, }; static const MountEntry protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table[] = { { "/sys", READONLY, false }, { "/sys/fs/bpf", READONLY, true }, { "/sys/fs/cgroup", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* READONLY is set by ProtectControlGroups= option */ { "/sys/fs/selinux", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, { "/sys/kernel/debug", READONLY, true }, { "/sys/kernel/tracing", READONLY, true }, }; /* ProtectKernelModules= option */ static const MountEntry protect_kernel_modules_table[] = { #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR { "/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, #endif { "/usr/lib/modules", INACCESSIBLE, true }, }; /* ProtectKernelLogs= option */ static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_proc_table[] = { { "/proc/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, }; static const MountEntry protect_kernel_logs_dev_table[] = { { "/dev/kmsg", INACCESSIBLE, true }, }; /* * ProtectHome=read-only table, protect $HOME and $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR and rest of * system should be protected by ProtectSystem= */ static const MountEntry protect_home_read_only_table[] = { { "/home", READONLY, true }, { "/run/user", READONLY, true }, { "/root", READONLY, true }, }; /* ProtectHome=tmpfs table */ static const MountEntry protect_home_tmpfs_table[] = { { "/home", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, { "/run/user", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, { "/root", TMPFS, true, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0700" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME }, }; /* ProtectHome=yes table */ static const MountEntry protect_home_yes_table[] = { { "/home", INACCESSIBLE, true }, { "/run/user", INACCESSIBLE, true }, { "/root", INACCESSIBLE, true }, }; /* ProtectSystem=yes table */ static const MountEntry protect_system_yes_table[] = { { "/usr", READONLY, false }, { "/boot", READONLY, true }, { "/efi", READONLY, true }, #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR { "/lib", READONLY, true }, { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, { "/bin", READONLY, true }, # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, # endif #endif }; /* ProtectSystem=full includes ProtectSystem=yes */ static const MountEntry protect_system_full_table[] = { { "/usr", READONLY, false }, { "/boot", READONLY, true }, { "/efi", READONLY, true }, { "/etc", READONLY, false }, #if HAVE_SPLIT_USR { "/lib", READONLY, true }, { "/lib64", READONLY, true }, { "/bin", READONLY, true }, # if HAVE_SPLIT_BIN { "/sbin", READONLY, true }, # endif #endif }; /* * ProtectSystem=strict table. In this strict mode, we mount everything * read-only, except for /proc, /dev, /sys which are the kernel API VFS, * which are left writable, but PrivateDevices= + ProtectKernelTunables= * protect those, and these options should be fully orthogonal. * (And of course /home and friends are also left writable, as ProtectHome= * shall manage those, orthogonally). */ static const MountEntry protect_system_strict_table[] = { { "/", READONLY, false }, { "/proc", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ { "/sys", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* ProtectKernelTunables= */ { "/dev", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, false }, /* PrivateDevices= */ { "/home", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ { "/run/user", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ { "/root", READWRITE_IMPLICIT, true }, /* ProtectHome= */ }; static const char * const mount_mode_table[_MOUNT_MODE_MAX] = { [INACCESSIBLE] = "inaccessible", [OVERLAY_MOUNT] = "overlay", [BIND_MOUNT] = "bind", [BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE] = "rbind", [PRIVATE_TMP] = "private-tmp", [PRIVATE_DEV] = "private-dev", [BIND_DEV] = "bind-dev", [EMPTY_DIR] = "empty", [SYSFS] = "sysfs", [PROCFS] = "procfs", [READONLY] = "read-only", [READWRITE] = "read-write", [TMPFS] = "tmpfs", [MOUNT_IMAGES] = "mount-images", [READWRITE_IMPLICIT] = "rw-implicit", [EXEC] = "exec", [NOEXEC] = "noexec", [MQUEUEFS] = "mqueuefs", }; DEFINE_PRIVATE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_TO_STRING(mount_mode, MountMode); static const char *mount_entry_path(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); /* Returns the path of this bind mount. If the malloc()-allocated ->path_buffer field is set we return that, * otherwise the stack/static ->path field is returned. */ return p->path_malloc ?: p->path_const; } static const char *mount_entry_unprefixed_path(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); /* Returns the unprefixed path (ie: before prefix_where_needed() ran), if any */ return p->unprefixed_path_malloc ?: p->unprefixed_path_const ?: mount_entry_path(p); } static void mount_entry_consume_prefix(MountEntry *p, char *new_path) { assert(p); assert(p->path_malloc || p->path_const); assert(new_path); /* Saves current path in unprefixed_ variable, and takes over new_path */ free_and_replace(p->unprefixed_path_malloc, p->path_malloc); /* If we didn't have a path on the heap, then it's a static one */ if (!p->unprefixed_path_malloc) p->unprefixed_path_const = p->path_const; p->path_malloc = new_path; p->has_prefix = true; } static bool mount_entry_read_only(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); return p->read_only || IN_SET(p->mode, READONLY, INACCESSIBLE, PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY); } static bool mount_entry_noexec(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); return p->noexec || IN_SET(p->mode, NOEXEC, INACCESSIBLE, SYSFS, PROCFS); } static bool mount_entry_exec(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); return p->exec || p->mode == EXEC; } static const char *mount_entry_source(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); return p->source_malloc ?: p->source_const; } static const char *mount_entry_options(const MountEntry *p) { assert(p); return p->options_malloc ?: p->options_const; } static void mount_entry_done(MountEntry *p) { assert(p); p->path_malloc = mfree(p->path_malloc); p->unprefixed_path_malloc = mfree(p->unprefixed_path_malloc); p->source_malloc = mfree(p->source_malloc); p->options_malloc = mfree(p->options_malloc); p->image_options = mount_options_free_all(p->image_options); } static int append_access_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv, MountMode mode, bool forcibly_require_prefix) { assert(p); /* Adds a list of user-supplied READWRITE/READWRITE_IMPLICIT/READONLY/INACCESSIBLE entries */ STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { bool ignore = false, needs_prefix = false; const char *e = *i; /* Look for any prefixes */ if (startswith(e, "-")) { e++; ignore = true; } if (startswith(e, "+")) { e++; needs_prefix = true; } if (!path_is_absolute(e)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Path is not absolute: %s", e); *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = e, .mode = mode, .ignore = ignore, .has_prefix = !needs_prefix && !forcibly_require_prefix, }; } return 0; } static int append_empty_dir_mounts(MountEntry **p, char **strv) { assert(p); /* Adds tmpfs mounts to provide readable but empty directories. This is primarily used to implement the * "/private/" boundary directories for DynamicUser=1. */ STRV_FOREACH(i, strv) { *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = *i, .mode = EMPTY_DIR, .ignore = false, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, }; } return 0; } static int append_bind_mounts(MountEntry **p, const BindMount *binds, size_t n) { assert(p); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { const BindMount *b = binds + i; *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = b->destination, .mode = b->recursive ? BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE : BIND_MOUNT, .read_only = b->read_only, .nosuid = b->nosuid, .source_const = b->source, .ignore = b->ignore_enoent, }; } return 0; } static int append_mount_images(MountEntry **p, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n) { assert(p); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { const MountImage *m = mount_images + i; *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = m->destination, .mode = MOUNT_IMAGES, .source_const = m->source, .image_options = m->mount_options, .ignore = m->ignore_enoent, }; } return 0; } static int append_extensions( MountEntry **p, const char *root, const char *extension_dir, char **hierarchies, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n, char **extension_directories) { _cleanup_strv_free_ char **overlays = NULL; int r; if (n == 0 && strv_isempty(extension_directories)) return 0; assert(p); assert(extension_dir); /* Prepare a list of overlays, that will have as each element a string suitable for being * passed as a lowerdir= parameter, so start with the hierarchy on the root. * The overlays vector will have the same number of elements and will correspond to the * hierarchies vector, so they can be iterated upon together. */ STRV_FOREACH(hierarchy, hierarchies) { _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL; prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, *hierarchy); if (!prefixed_hierarchy) return -ENOMEM; r = strv_consume(&overlays, TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy)); if (r < 0) return r; } /* First, prepare a mount for each image, but these won't be visible to the unit, instead * they will be mounted in our propagate directory, and used as a source for the overlay. */ for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL; const MountImage *m = mount_images + i; r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, i); if (r < 0) return -ENOMEM; for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) { _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL; prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]); if (!prefixed_hierarchy) return -ENOMEM; escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:"); if (!escaped) return -ENOMEM; /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */ lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]); if (!lowerdir) return -ENOMEM; free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir); } *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point), .image_options = m->mount_options, .ignore = m->ignore_enoent, .source_const = m->source, .mode = EXTENSION_IMAGES, .has_prefix = true, }; } /* Secondly, extend the lowerdir= parameters with each ExtensionDirectory. * Bind mount them in the same location as the ExtensionImages, so that we * can check that they are valid trees (extension-release.d). */ STRV_FOREACH(extension_directory, extension_directories) { _cleanup_free_ char *mount_point = NULL, *source = NULL; const char *e = *extension_directory; bool ignore_enoent = false; /* Pick up the counter where the ExtensionImages left it. */ r = asprintf(&mount_point, "%s/%zu", extension_dir, n++); if (r < 0) return -ENOMEM; /* Look for any prefixes */ if (startswith(e, "-")) { e++; ignore_enoent = true; } /* Ignore this for now */ if (startswith(e, "+")) e++; source = strdup(e); if (!source) return -ENOMEM; for (size_t j = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[j]; ++j) { _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL, *escaped = NULL, *lowerdir = NULL; prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(mount_point, hierarchies[j]); if (!prefixed_hierarchy) return -ENOMEM; escaped = shell_escape(prefixed_hierarchy, ",:"); if (!escaped) return -ENOMEM; /* Note that lowerdir= parameters are in 'reverse' order, so the * top-most directory in the overlay comes first in the list. */ lowerdir = strjoin(escaped, ":", overlays[j]); if (!lowerdir) return -ENOMEM; free_and_replace(overlays[j], lowerdir); } *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(mount_point), .source_const = TAKE_PTR(source), .mode = EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, .ignore = ignore_enoent, .has_prefix = true, .read_only = true, }; } /* Then, for each hierarchy, prepare an overlay with the list of lowerdir= strings * set up earlier. */ for (size_t i = 0; hierarchies && hierarchies[i]; ++i) { _cleanup_free_ char *prefixed_hierarchy = NULL; prefixed_hierarchy = path_join(root, hierarchies[i]); if (!prefixed_hierarchy) return -ENOMEM; *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_malloc = TAKE_PTR(prefixed_hierarchy), .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(overlays[i]), .mode = OVERLAY_MOUNT, .has_prefix = true, .ignore = true, /* If the source image doesn't set the ignore bit it will fail earlier. */ }; } return 0; } static int append_tmpfs_mounts(MountEntry **p, const TemporaryFileSystem *tmpfs, size_t n) { assert(p); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { const TemporaryFileSystem *t = tmpfs + i; _cleanup_free_ char *o = NULL, *str = NULL; unsigned long flags; bool ro = false; int r; if (!path_is_absolute(t->path)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Path is not absolute: %s", t->path); str = strjoin("mode=0755" NESTED_TMPFS_LIMITS ",", t->options); if (!str) return -ENOMEM; r = mount_option_mangle(str, MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME, &flags, &o); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse mount option '%s': %m", str); ro = flags & MS_RDONLY; if (ro) flags ^= MS_RDONLY; *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = t->path, .mode = TMPFS, .read_only = ro, .options_malloc = TAKE_PTR(o), .flags = flags, }; } return 0; } static int append_static_mounts(MountEntry **p, const MountEntry *mounts, size_t n, bool ignore_protect) { assert(p); assert(mounts); /* Adds a list of static pre-defined entries */ for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) *((*p)++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = mount_entry_path(mounts+i), .mode = mounts[i].mode, .ignore = mounts[i].ignore || ignore_protect, }; return 0; } static int append_protect_home(MountEntry **p, ProtectHome protect_home, bool ignore_protect) { assert(p); switch (protect_home) { case PROTECT_HOME_NO: return 0; case PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_read_only_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table), ignore_protect); case PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_tmpfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table), ignore_protect); case PROTECT_HOME_YES: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_home_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table), ignore_protect); default: assert_not_reached(); } } static int append_protect_system(MountEntry **p, ProtectSystem protect_system, bool ignore_protect) { assert(p); switch (protect_system) { case PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO: return 0; case PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_strict_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table), ignore_protect); case PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_yes_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table), ignore_protect); case PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL: return append_static_mounts(p, protect_system_full_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table), ignore_protect); default: assert_not_reached(); } } static int mount_path_compare(const MountEntry *a, const MountEntry *b) { int d; /* ExtensionImages/Directories will be used by other mounts as a base, so sort them first * regardless of the prefix - they are set up in the propagate directory anyway */ d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES, b->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES); if (d != 0) return d; d = -CMP(a->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES, b->mode == EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES); if (d != 0) return d; /* If the paths are not equal, then order prefixes first */ d = path_compare(mount_entry_path(a), mount_entry_path(b)); if (d != 0) return d; /* If the paths are equal, check the mode */ return CMP((int) a->mode, (int) b->mode); } static int prefix_where_needed(MountEntry *m, size_t n, const char *root_directory) { /* Prefixes all paths in the bind mount table with the root directory if the entry needs that. */ assert(m || n == 0); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { char *s; if (m[i].has_prefix) continue; s = path_join(root_directory, mount_entry_path(m+i)); if (!s) return -ENOMEM; mount_entry_consume_prefix(&m[i], s); } return 0; } static void drop_duplicates(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { MountEntry *f, *t, *previous; assert(m); assert(n); /* Drops duplicate entries. Expects that the array is properly ordered already. */ for (f = m, t = m, previous = NULL; f < m + *n; f++) { /* The first one wins (which is the one with the more restrictive mode), see mount_path_compare() * above. Note that we only drop duplicates that haven't been mounted yet. */ if (previous && path_equal(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(previous)) && !f->applied && !previous->applied) { log_debug("%s (%s) is duplicate.", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode)); /* Propagate the flags to the remaining entry */ previous->read_only = previous->read_only || mount_entry_read_only(f); previous->noexec = previous->noexec || mount_entry_noexec(f); previous->exec = previous->exec || mount_entry_exec(f); mount_entry_done(f); continue; } *t = *f; previous = t; t++; } *n = t - m; } static void drop_inaccessible(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { MountEntry *f, *t; const char *clear = NULL; assert(m); assert(n); /* Drops all entries obstructed by another entry further up the tree. Expects that the array is properly * ordered already. */ for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { /* If we found a path set for INACCESSIBLE earlier, and this entry has it as prefix we should drop * it, as inaccessible paths really should drop the entire subtree. */ if (clear && path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), clear)) { log_debug("%s is masked by %s.", mount_entry_path(f), clear); mount_entry_done(f); continue; } clear = f->mode == INACCESSIBLE ? mount_entry_path(f) : NULL; *t = *f; t++; } *n = t - m; } static void drop_nop(MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { MountEntry *f, *t; assert(m); assert(n); /* Drops all entries which have an immediate parent that has the same type, as they are redundant. Assumes the * list is ordered by prefixes. */ for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { /* Only suppress such subtrees for READONLY, READWRITE and READWRITE_IMPLICIT entries */ if (IN_SET(f->mode, READONLY, READWRITE, READWRITE_IMPLICIT)) { MountEntry *found = NULL; /* Now let's find the first parent of the entry we are looking at. */ for (MountEntry *p = PTR_SUB1(t, m); p; p = PTR_SUB1(p, m)) if (path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), mount_entry_path(p))) { found = p; break; } /* We found it, let's see if it's the same mode, if so, we can drop this entry */ if (found && found->mode == f->mode) { log_debug("%s (%s) is made redundant by %s (%s)", mount_entry_path(f), mount_mode_to_string(f->mode), mount_entry_path(found), mount_mode_to_string(found->mode)); mount_entry_done(f); continue; } } *t = *f; t++; } *n = t - m; } static void drop_outside_root(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, size_t *n) { MountEntry *f, *t; assert(m); assert(n); /* Nothing to do */ if (!root_directory) return; /* Drops all mounts that are outside of the root directory. */ for (f = m, t = m; f < m + *n; f++) { /* ExtensionImages/Directories bases are opened in /run/systemd/unit-extensions on the host */ if (!IN_SET(f->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) && !path_startswith(mount_entry_path(f), root_directory)) { log_debug("%s is outside of root directory.", mount_entry_path(f)); mount_entry_done(f); continue; } *t = *f; t++; } *n = t - m; } static int clone_device_node( const char *d, const char *temporary_mount, bool *make_devnode) { _cleanup_free_ char *sl = NULL; const char *dn, *bn, *t; struct stat st; int r; if (stat(d, &st) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT) { log_debug_errno(errno, "Device node '%s' to clone does not exist, ignoring.", d); return -ENXIO; } return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to stat() device node '%s' to clone, ignoring: %m", d); } if (!S_ISBLK(st.st_mode) && !S_ISCHR(st.st_mode)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Device node '%s' to clone is not a device node, ignoring.", d); dn = strjoina(temporary_mount, d); /* First, try to create device node properly */ if (*make_devnode) { mac_selinux_create_file_prepare(d, st.st_mode); r = mknod(dn, st.st_mode, st.st_rdev); mac_selinux_create_file_clear(); if (r >= 0) goto add_symlink; if (errno != EPERM) return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod failed for %s: %m", d); /* This didn't work, let's not try this again for the next iterations. */ *make_devnode = false; } /* We're about to fall back to bind-mounting the device node. So create a dummy bind-mount target. * Do not prepare device-node SELinux label (see issue 13762) */ r = mknod(dn, S_IFREG, 0); if (r < 0 && errno != EEXIST) return log_debug_errno(errno, "mknod() fallback failed for '%s': %m", d); /* Fallback to bind-mounting: The assumption here is that all used device nodes carry standard * properties. Specifically, the devices nodes we bind-mount should either be owned by root:root or * root:tty (e.g. /dev/tty, /dev/ptmx) and should not carry ACLs. */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, d, dn, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; add_symlink: bn = path_startswith(d, "/dev/"); if (!bn) return 0; /* Create symlinks like /dev/char/1:9 → ../urandom */ if (asprintf(&sl, "%s/dev/%s/" DEVNUM_FORMAT_STR, temporary_mount, S_ISCHR(st.st_mode) ? "char" : "block", DEVNUM_FORMAT_VAL(st.st_rdev)) < 0) return log_oom(); (void) mkdir_parents(sl, 0755); t = strjoina("../", bn); if (symlink(t, sl) < 0) log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to symlink '%s' to '%s', ignoring: %m", t, sl); return 0; } static int mount_private_dev(MountEntry *m) { static const char devnodes[] = "/dev/null\0" "/dev/zero\0" "/dev/full\0" "/dev/random\0" "/dev/urandom\0" "/dev/tty\0"; char temporary_mount[] = "/tmp/namespace-dev-XXXXXX"; const char *dev = NULL, *devpts = NULL, *devshm = NULL, *devhugepages = NULL, *devmqueue = NULL, *devlog = NULL, *devptmx = NULL; bool can_mknod = true; int r; assert(m); if (!mkdtemp(temporary_mount)) return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create temporary directory '%s': %m", temporary_mount); dev = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev"); (void) mkdir(dev, 0755); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", dev, "tmpfs", DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_PRIVATE_DEV); if (r < 0) goto fail; r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, dev, "/dev", 0); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as /dev: %m", dev); goto fail; } devpts = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/pts"); (void) mkdir(devpts, 0755); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/pts", devpts, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); if (r < 0) goto fail; /* /dev/ptmx can either be a device node or a symlink to /dev/pts/ptmx. * When /dev/ptmx a device node, /dev/pts/ptmx has 000 permissions making it inaccessible. * Thus, in that case make a clone. * In nspawn and other containers it will be a symlink, in that case make it a symlink. */ r = is_symlink("/dev/ptmx"); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect whether /dev/ptmx is a symlink or not: %m"); goto fail; } else if (r > 0) { devptmx = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/ptmx"); if (symlink("pts/ptmx", devptmx) < 0) { r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to pts/ptmx: %m", devptmx); goto fail; } } else { r = clone_device_node("/dev/ptmx", temporary_mount, &can_mknod); if (r < 0) goto fail; } devshm = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/shm"); (void) mkdir(devshm, 0755); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/shm", devshm, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); if (r < 0) goto fail; devmqueue = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/mqueue"); (void) mkdir(devmqueue, 0755); (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/mqueue", devmqueue, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); devhugepages = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/hugepages"); (void) mkdir(devhugepages, 0755); (void) mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev/hugepages", devhugepages, NULL, MS_BIND, NULL); devlog = strjoina(temporary_mount, "/dev/log"); if (symlink("/run/systemd/journal/dev-log", devlog) < 0) log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to create a symlink '%s' to /run/systemd/journal/dev-log, ignoring: %m", devlog); NULSTR_FOREACH(d, devnodes) { r = clone_device_node(d, temporary_mount, &can_mknod); /* ENXIO means the *source* is not a device file, skip creation in that case */ if (r < 0 && r != -ENXIO) goto fail; } r = dev_setup(temporary_mount, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up basic device tree at '%s', ignoring: %m", temporary_mount); /* Create the /dev directory if missing. It is more likely to be missing when the service is started * with RootDirectory. This is consistent with mount units creating the mount points when missing. */ (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); /* Unmount everything in old /dev */ r = umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); if (r < 0) log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to unmount directories below '%s', ignoring: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_MOVE, NULL); if (r < 0) goto fail; (void) rmdir(dev); (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); return 0; fail: if (devpts) (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devpts, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); if (devshm) (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devshm, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); if (devhugepages) (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devhugepages, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); if (devmqueue) (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, devmqueue, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); (void) umount_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, dev, UMOUNT_NOFOLLOW); (void) rmdir(dev); (void) rmdir(temporary_mount); return r; } static int mount_bind_dev(const MountEntry *m) { int r; assert(m); /* Implements the little brother of mount_private_dev(): simply bind mounts the host's /dev into the * service's /dev. This is only used when RootDirectory= is set. */ (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /dev is already mounted: %m"); if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /dev is already a mount point */ return 0; r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/dev", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; return 1; } static int mount_sysfs(const MountEntry *m) { int r; assert(m); (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /sys is already mounted: %m"); if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /sys is already a mount point */ return 0; /* Bind mount the host's version so that we get all child mounts of it, too. */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/sys", mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; return 1; } static bool mount_option_supported(const char *fstype, const char *key, const char *value) { _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; int r; /* This function assumes support by default. Only if the fsconfig() call fails with -EINVAL/-EOPNOTSUPP * will it report that the option/value is not supported. */ fd = fsopen(fstype, FSOPEN_CLOEXEC); if (fd < 0) { if (errno != ENOSYS) log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to open superblock context for '%s': %m", fstype); return true; /* If fsopen() fails for whatever reason, assume the value is supported. */ } r = fsconfig(fd, FSCONFIG_SET_STRING, key, value, 0); if (r < 0 && !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP, ENOSYS)) log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to set '%s=%s' on '%s' superblock context: %m", key, value, fstype); return r >= 0 || !IN_SET(errno, EINVAL, EOPNOTSUPP); } static int mount_procfs(const MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { _cleanup_free_ char *opts = NULL; const char *entry_path; int r, n; assert(m); assert(ns_info); if (ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL) { /* Starting with kernel 5.8 procfs' hidepid= logic is truly per-instance (previously it * pretended to be per-instance but actually was per-namespace), hence let's make use of it * if requested. To make sure this logic succeeds only on kernels where hidepid= is * per-instance, we'll exclusively use the textual value for hidepid=, since support was * added in the same commit: if it's supported it is thus also per-instance. */ const char *hpv = ns_info->protect_proc == PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT ? "off" : protect_proc_to_string(ns_info->protect_proc); /* hidepid= support was added in 5.8, so we can use fsconfig()/fsopen() (which were added in * 5.2) to check if hidepid= is supported. This avoids a noisy dmesg log by the kernel when * trying to use hidepid= on systems where it isn't supported. The same applies for subset=. * fsopen()/fsconfig() was also backported on some distros which allows us to detect * hidepid=/subset= support in even more scenarios. */ if (mount_option_supported("proc", "hidepid", hpv)) { opts = strjoin("hidepid=", hpv); if (!opts) return -ENOMEM; } if (ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID && mount_option_supported("proc", "subset", "pid")) if (!strextend_with_separator(&opts, ",", "subset=pid")) return -ENOMEM; } entry_path = mount_entry_path(m); (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755); /* Mount a new instance, so that we get the one that matches our user namespace, if we are running in * one. i.e we don't reuse existing mounts here under any condition, we want a new instance owned by * our user namespace and with our hidepid= settings applied. Hence, let's get rid of everything * mounted on /proc/ first. */ n = umount_recursive(entry_path, 0); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, opts); if (r == -EINVAL && opts) /* If this failed with EINVAL then this likely means the textual hidepid= stuff is * not supported by the kernel, and thus the per-instance hidepid= neither, which * means we really don't want to use it, since it would affect our host's /proc * mount. Hence let's gracefully fallback to a classic, unrestricted version. */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "proc", entry_path, "proc", MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC|MS_NODEV, NULL); if (r == -EPERM) { /* When we do not have enough privileges to mount /proc, fallback to use existing /proc. */ if (n > 0) /* /proc or some of sub-mounts are umounted in the above. Refuse incomplete tree. * Propagate the original error code returned by mount() in the above. */ return -EPERM; r = path_is_mount_point(entry_path, NULL, 0); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /proc is already mounted: %m"); if (r == 0) { /* We lack permissions to mount a new instance of /proc, and it is not already * mounted. But we can access the host's, so as a final fallback bind-mount it to * the destination, as most likely we are inside a user manager in an unprivileged * user namespace. */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/proc", entry_path, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) return -EPERM; } } else if (r < 0) return r; return 1; } static int mount_tmpfs(const MountEntry *m) { const char *entry_path, *inner_path; int r; assert(m); entry_path = mount_entry_path(m); inner_path = mount_entry_unprefixed_path(m); /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there is anything. Then, overmount with our new * tmpfs */ (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755); (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "tmpfs", entry_path, "tmpfs", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)); if (r < 0) return r; r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, entry_path, inner_path, 0); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to fix label of '%s' as '%s': %m", entry_path, inner_path); return 1; } static int mount_run(const MountEntry *m) { int r; assert(m); r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), NULL, 0); if (r < 0 && r != -ENOENT) return log_debug_errno(r, "Unable to determine whether /run is already mounted: %m"); if (r > 0) /* make this a NOP if /run is already a mount point */ return 0; return mount_tmpfs(m); } static int mount_mqueuefs(const MountEntry *m) { int r; const char *entry_path; assert(m); entry_path = mount_entry_path(m); (void) mkdir_p_label(entry_path, 0755); (void) umount_recursive(entry_path, 0); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "mqueue", entry_path, "mqueue", m->flags, mount_entry_options(m)); if (r < 0) return r; return 0; } static int mount_image(const MountEntry *m, const char *root_directory) { _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL, *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL; int r; assert(m); if (m->mode == EXTENSION_IMAGES) { r = parse_os_release( empty_to_root(root_directory), "ID", &host_os_release_id, "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id, "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory)); if (isempty(host_os_release_id)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory)); } r = verity_dissect_and_mount( /* src_fd= */ -1, mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m), m->image_options, host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id, host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r == -ESTALE && host_os_release_id) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s, extension-release metadata does not match the lower layer's: ID=%s%s%s%s%s", mount_entry_source(m), host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id ? " VERSION_ID=" : "", strempty(host_os_release_version_id), host_os_release_sysext_level ? " SYSEXT_LEVEL=" : "", strempty(host_os_release_sysext_level)); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount image %s on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m), mount_entry_path(m)); return 1; } static int mount_overlay(const MountEntry *m) { const char *options; int r; assert(m); options = strjoina("lowerdir=", mount_entry_options(m)); (void) mkdir_p_label(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "overlay", mount_entry_path(m), "overlay", MS_RDONLY, options); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return r; return 1; } static int follow_symlink( const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m) { _cleanup_free_ char *target = NULL; int r; /* Let's chase symlinks, but only one step at a time. That's because depending where the symlink points we * might need to change the order in which we mount stuff. Hence: let's normalize piecemeal, and do one step at * a time by specifying CHASE_STEP. This function returns 0 if we resolved one step, and > 0 if we reached the * end and already have a fully normalized name. */ r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, CHASE_STEP|CHASE_NONEXISTENT, &target, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to chase symlinks '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m)); if (r > 0) /* Reached the end, nothing more to resolve */ return 1; if (m->n_followed >= CHASE_SYMLINKS_MAX) /* put a boundary on things */ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), "Symlink loop on '%s'.", mount_entry_path(m)); log_debug("Followed mount entry path symlink %s %s %s.", mount_entry_path(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), target); mount_entry_consume_prefix(m, TAKE_PTR(target)); m->n_followed ++; return 0; } static int apply_one_mount( const char *root_directory, MountEntry *m, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { _cleanup_free_ char *inaccessible = NULL; bool rbind = true, make = false; const char *what; int r; assert(m); assert(ns_info); log_debug("Applying namespace mount on %s", mount_entry_path(m)); switch (m->mode) { case INACCESSIBLE: { _cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL; const char *runtime_dir; struct stat target; /* First, get rid of everything that is below if there * is anything... Then, overmount it with an * inaccessible path. */ (void) umount_recursive(mount_entry_path(m), 0); if (lstat(mount_entry_path(m), &target) < 0) { if (errno == ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; return log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to lstat() %s to determine what to mount over it: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); } if (geteuid() == 0) runtime_dir = "/run"; else { if (asprintf(&tmp, "/run/user/" UID_FMT, geteuid()) < 0) return -ENOMEM; runtime_dir = tmp; } r = mode_to_inaccessible_node(runtime_dir, target.st_mode, &inaccessible); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ELOOP), "File type not supported for inaccessible mounts. Note that symlinks are not allowed"); what = inaccessible; break; } case READONLY: case READWRITE: case READWRITE_IMPLICIT: case EXEC: case NOEXEC: r = path_is_mount_point(mount_entry_path(m), root_directory, 0); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to determine whether %s is already a mount point: %m", mount_entry_path(m)); if (r > 0) /* Nothing to do here, it is already a mount. We just later toggle the MS_RDONLY * and MS_NOEXEC bits for the mount point if needed. */ return 0; /* This isn't a mount point yet, let's make it one. */ what = mount_entry_path(m); break; case EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES: { _cleanup_free_ char *host_os_release_id = NULL, *host_os_release_version_id = NULL, *host_os_release_sysext_level = NULL, *extension_name = NULL; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **extension_release = NULL; r = path_extract_filename(mount_entry_source(m), &extension_name); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to extract extension name from %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m)); r = parse_os_release( empty_to_root(root_directory), "ID", &host_os_release_id, "VERSION_ID", &host_os_release_version_id, "SYSEXT_LEVEL", &host_os_release_sysext_level, NULL); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to acquire 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory)); if (isempty(host_os_release_id)) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "'ID' field not found or empty in 'os-release' data of OS tree '%s': %m", empty_to_root(root_directory)); r = load_extension_release_pairs(mount_entry_source(m), extension_name, /* relax_extension_release_check= */ false, &extension_release); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to parse directory %s extension-release metadata: %m", extension_name); r = extension_release_validate( extension_name, host_os_release_id, host_os_release_version_id, host_os_release_sysext_level, /* host_sysext_scope */ NULL, /* Leave empty, we need to accept both system and portable */ extension_release); if (r == 0) return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ESTALE), "Directory %s extension-release metadata does not match the root's", extension_name); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to compare directory %s extension-release metadata with the root's os-release: %m", extension_name); _fallthrough_; } case BIND_MOUNT: rbind = false; _fallthrough_; case BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE: { _cleanup_free_ char *chased = NULL; /* Since mount() will always follow symlinks we chase the symlinks on our own first. Note * that bind mount source paths are always relative to the host root, hence we pass NULL as * root directory to chase_symlinks() here. */ r = chase_symlinks(mount_entry_source(m), NULL, CHASE_TRAIL_SLASH, &chased, NULL); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) { log_debug_errno(r, "Path %s does not exist, ignoring.", mount_entry_source(m)); return 0; } if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to follow symlinks on %s: %m", mount_entry_source(m)); log_debug("Followed source symlinks %s %s %s.", mount_entry_source(m), special_glyph(SPECIAL_GLYPH_ARROW_RIGHT), chased); free_and_replace(m->source_malloc, chased); what = mount_entry_source(m); make = true; break; } case EMPTY_DIR: case TMPFS: return mount_tmpfs(m); case PRIVATE_TMP: case PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY: what = mount_entry_source(m); make = true; break; case PRIVATE_DEV: return mount_private_dev(m); case BIND_DEV: return mount_bind_dev(m); case SYSFS: return mount_sysfs(m); case PROCFS: return mount_procfs(m, ns_info); case RUN: return mount_run(m); case MQUEUEFS: return mount_mqueuefs(m); case MOUNT_IMAGES: return mount_image(m, NULL); case EXTENSION_IMAGES: return mount_image(m, root_directory); case OVERLAY_MOUNT: return mount_overlay(m); default: assert_not_reached(); } assert(what); r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL); if (r < 0) { bool try_again = false; if (r == -ENOENT && make) { int q; /* Hmm, either the source or the destination are missing. Let's see if we can create the destination, then try again. */ (void) mkdir_parents(mount_entry_path(m), 0755); q = make_mount_point_inode_from_path(what, mount_entry_path(m), 0755); if (q < 0 && q != -EEXIST) log_error_errno(q, "Failed to create destination mount point node '%s': %m", mount_entry_path(m)); else try_again = true; } if (try_again) r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, what, mount_entry_path(m), NULL, MS_BIND|(rbind ? MS_REC : 0), NULL); if (r < 0) return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to mount %s to %s: %m", what, mount_entry_path(m)); } log_debug("Successfully mounted %s to %s", what, mount_entry_path(m)); return 0; } static int make_read_only(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0; bool submounts; int r; assert(m); assert(proc_self_mountinfo); if (mount_entry_read_only(m) || m->mode == PRIVATE_DEV) { new_flags |= MS_RDONLY; flags_mask |= MS_RDONLY; } if (m->nosuid) { new_flags |= MS_NOSUID; flags_mask |= MS_NOSUID; } if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */ return 0; /* We generally apply these changes recursively, except for /dev, and the cases we know there's * nothing further down. Set /dev readonly, but not submounts like /dev/shm. Also, we only set the * per-mount read-only flag. We can't set it on the superblock, if we are inside a user namespace * and running Linux <= 4.17. */ submounts = mount_entry_read_only(m) && !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); if (submounts) r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); else r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo); /* Note that we only turn on the MS_RDONLY flag here, we never turn it off. Something that was marked * read-only already stays this way. This improves compatibility with container managers, where we * won't attempt to undo read-only mounts already applied. */ if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m), submounts ? " and its submounts" : ""); return 0; } static int make_noexec(const MountEntry *m, char **deny_list, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { unsigned long new_flags = 0, flags_mask = 0; bool submounts; int r; assert(m); assert(proc_self_mountinfo); if (mount_entry_noexec(m)) { new_flags |= MS_NOEXEC; flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC; } else if (mount_entry_exec(m)) { new_flags &= ~MS_NOEXEC; flags_mask |= MS_NOEXEC; } if (flags_mask == 0) /* No Change? */ return 0; submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); if (submounts) r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); else r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), new_flags, flags_mask, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m), submounts ? " and its submounts" : ""); return 0; } static int make_nosuid(const MountEntry *m, FILE *proc_self_mountinfo) { bool submounts; int r; assert(m); assert(proc_self_mountinfo); submounts = !IN_SET(m->mode, EMPTY_DIR, TMPFS); if (submounts) r = bind_remount_recursive_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, NULL, proc_self_mountinfo); else r = bind_remount_one_with_mountinfo(mount_entry_path(m), MS_NOSUID, MS_NOSUID, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r == -ENOENT && m->ignore) return 0; if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to re-mount '%s'%s: %m", mount_entry_path(m), submounts ? " and its submounts" : ""); return 0; } static bool namespace_info_mount_apivfs(const NamespaceInfo *ns_info) { assert(ns_info); /* * ProtectControlGroups= and ProtectKernelTunables= imply MountAPIVFS=, * since to protect the API VFS mounts, they need to be around in the * first place... */ return ns_info->mount_apivfs || ns_info->protect_control_groups || ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables || ns_info->protect_proc != PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT || ns_info->proc_subset != PROC_SUBSET_ALL; } static size_t namespace_calculate_mounts( const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, char** read_write_paths, char** read_only_paths, char** inaccessible_paths, char** exec_paths, char** no_exec_paths, char** empty_directories, size_t n_bind_mounts, size_t n_temporary_filesystems, size_t n_mount_images, size_t n_extension_images, size_t n_extension_directories, size_t n_hierarchies, const char* tmp_dir, const char* var_tmp_dir, const char *creds_path, const char* log_namespace, bool setup_propagate, const char* notify_socket) { size_t protect_home_cnt; size_t protect_system_cnt = (ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_strict_table) : ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL) ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_full_table) : ((ns_info->protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES) ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_system_yes_table) : 0))); protect_home_cnt = (ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_YES ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_yes_table) : ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY) ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_read_only_table) : ((ns_info->protect_home == PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS) ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_home_tmpfs_table) : 0))); return !!tmp_dir + !!var_tmp_dir + strv_length(read_write_paths) + strv_length(read_only_paths) + strv_length(inaccessible_paths) + strv_length(exec_paths) + strv_length(no_exec_paths) + strv_length(empty_directories) + n_bind_mounts + n_mount_images + (n_extension_images > 0 || n_extension_directories > 0 ? /* Mount each image and directory plus an overlay per hierarchy */ n_hierarchies + n_extension_images + n_extension_directories: 0) + n_temporary_filesystems + ns_info->private_dev + (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table) : 0) + (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table) : 0) + (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs ? ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table) + ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table) : 0) + (ns_info->protect_control_groups ? 1 : 0) + protect_home_cnt + protect_system_cnt + (ns_info->protect_hostname ? 2 : 0) + (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info) ? ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table) : 0) + (creds_path ? 2 : 1) + !!log_namespace + setup_propagate + /* /run/systemd/incoming */ !!notify_socket + ns_info->private_ipc; /* /dev/mqueue */ } /* Walk all mount entries and dropping any unused mounts. This affects all * mounts: * - that are implicitly protected by a path that has been rendered inaccessible * - whose immediate parent requests the same protection mode as the mount itself * - that are outside of the relevant root directory * - which are duplicates */ static void drop_unused_mounts(const char *root_directory, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts) { assert(root_directory); assert(n_mounts); assert(mounts || *n_mounts == 0); typesafe_qsort(mounts, *n_mounts, mount_path_compare); drop_duplicates(mounts, n_mounts); drop_outside_root(root_directory, mounts, n_mounts); drop_inaccessible(mounts, n_mounts); drop_nop(mounts, n_mounts); } static int create_symlinks_from_tuples(const char *root, char **strv_symlinks) { int r; STRV_FOREACH_PAIR(src, dst, strv_symlinks) { _cleanup_free_ char *src_abs = NULL, *dst_abs = NULL; src_abs = path_join(root, *src); dst_abs = path_join(root, *dst); if (!src_abs || !dst_abs) return -ENOMEM; r = mkdir_parents_label(dst_abs, 0755); if (r < 0) return r; r = symlink_idempotent(src_abs, dst_abs, true); if (r < 0) return r; } return 0; } static int apply_mounts( const char *root, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, MountEntry *mounts, size_t *n_mounts, char **exec_dir_symlinks, char **error_path) { _cleanup_fclose_ FILE *proc_self_mountinfo = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char **deny_list = NULL; int r; if (n_mounts == 0) /* Shortcut: nothing to do */ return 0; assert(root); assert(mounts); assert(n_mounts); /* Open /proc/self/mountinfo now as it may become unavailable if we mount anything on top of * /proc. For example, this is the case with the option: 'InaccessiblePaths=/proc'. */ proc_self_mountinfo = fopen("/proc/self/mountinfo", "re"); if (!proc_self_mountinfo) { r = -errno; if (error_path) *error_path = strdup("/proc/self/mountinfo"); return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to open /proc/self/mountinfo: %m"); } /* First round, establish all mounts we need */ for (;;) { bool again = false; for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) { if (m->applied) continue; /* ExtensionImages/Directories are first opened in the propagate directory, not in the root_directory */ r = follow_symlink(!IN_SET(m->mode, EXTENSION_IMAGES, EXTENSION_DIRECTORIES) ? root : NULL, m); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); return r; } if (r == 0) { /* We hit a symlinked mount point. The entry got rewritten and might * point to a very different place now. Let's normalize the changed * list, and start from the beginning. After all to mount the entry * at the new location we might need some other mounts first */ again = true; break; } r = apply_one_mount(root, m, ns_info); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); return r; } m->applied = true; } if (!again) break; drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, n_mounts); } /* Now that all filesystems have been set up, but before the * read-only switches are flipped, create the exec dirs symlinks. * Note that when /var/lib is not empty/tmpfs, these symlinks will already * exist, which means this will be a no-op. */ r = create_symlinks_from_tuples(root, exec_dir_symlinks); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to set up ExecDirectories symlinks inside mount namespace: %m"); /* Create a deny list we can pass to bind_mount_recursive() */ deny_list = new(char*, (*n_mounts)+1); if (!deny_list) return -ENOMEM; for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++) deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL; /* Second round, flip the ro bits if necessary. */ for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) { r = make_read_only(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); return r; } } /* Third round, flip the noexec bits with a simplified deny list. */ for (size_t j = 0; j < *n_mounts; j++) if (IN_SET((mounts+j)->mode, EXEC, NOEXEC)) deny_list[j] = (char*) mount_entry_path(mounts+j); deny_list[*n_mounts] = NULL; for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) { r = make_noexec(m, deny_list, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); return r; } } /* Fourth round, flip the nosuid bits without a deny list. */ if (ns_info->mount_nosuid) for (MountEntry *m = mounts; m < mounts + *n_mounts; ++m) { r = make_nosuid(m, proc_self_mountinfo); if (r < 0) { if (error_path && mount_entry_path(m)) *error_path = strdup(mount_entry_path(m)); return r; } } return 1; } static bool root_read_only( char **read_only_paths, ProtectSystem protect_system) { /* Determine whether the root directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. */ if (protect_system == PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT) return true; if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/")) return true; return false; } static bool home_read_only( char** read_only_paths, char** inaccessible_paths, char** empty_directories, const BindMount *bind_mounts, size_t n_bind_mounts, const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, size_t n_temporary_filesystems, ProtectHome protect_home) { /* Determine whether the /home directory is going to be read-only given the configured settings. Yes, * this is a bit sloppy, since we don't bother checking for cases where / is affected by multiple * settings. */ if (protect_home != PROTECT_HOME_NO) return true; if (prefixed_path_strv_contains(read_only_paths, "/home") || prefixed_path_strv_contains(inaccessible_paths, "/home") || prefixed_path_strv_contains(empty_directories, "/home")) return true; for (size_t i = 0; i < n_temporary_filesystems; i++) if (path_equal(temporary_filesystems[i].path, "/home")) return true; /* If /home is overmounted with some dir from the host it's not writable. */ for (size_t i = 0; i < n_bind_mounts; i++) if (path_equal(bind_mounts[i].destination, "/home")) return true; return false; } static int verity_settings_prepare( VeritySettings *verity, const char *root_image, const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_size, const char *root_hash_path, const void *root_hash_sig, size_t root_hash_sig_size, const char *root_hash_sig_path, const char *verity_data_path) { int r; assert(verity); if (root_hash) { void *d; d = memdup(root_hash, root_hash_size); if (!d) return -ENOMEM; free_and_replace(verity->root_hash, d); verity->root_hash_size = root_hash_size; verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; } if (root_hash_sig) { void *d; d = memdup(root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size); if (!d) return -ENOMEM; free_and_replace(verity->root_hash_sig, d); verity->root_hash_sig_size = root_hash_sig_size; verity->designator = PARTITION_ROOT; } if (verity_data_path) { r = free_and_strdup(&verity->data_path, verity_data_path); if (r < 0) return r; } r = verity_settings_load( verity, root_image, root_hash_path, root_hash_sig_path); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to load root hash: %m"); return 0; } int setup_namespace( const char* root_directory, const char* root_image, const MountOptions *root_image_options, const NamespaceInfo *ns_info, char** read_write_paths, char** read_only_paths, char** inaccessible_paths, char** exec_paths, char** no_exec_paths, char** empty_directories, char** exec_dir_symlinks, const BindMount *bind_mounts, size_t n_bind_mounts, const TemporaryFileSystem *temporary_filesystems, size_t n_temporary_filesystems, const MountImage *mount_images, size_t n_mount_images, const char* tmp_dir, const char* var_tmp_dir, const char *creds_path, const char *log_namespace, unsigned long mount_flags, const void *root_hash, size_t root_hash_size, const char *root_hash_path, const void *root_hash_sig, size_t root_hash_sig_size, const char *root_hash_sig_path, const char *verity_data_path, const MountImage *extension_images, size_t n_extension_images, char **extension_directories, const char *propagate_dir, const char *incoming_dir, const char *extension_dir, const char *notify_socket, char **error_path) { _cleanup_(loop_device_unrefp) LoopDevice *loop_device = NULL; _cleanup_(dissected_image_unrefp) DissectedImage *dissected_image = NULL; _cleanup_(verity_settings_done) VeritySettings verity = VERITY_SETTINGS_DEFAULT; _cleanup_strv_free_ char **hierarchies = NULL; MountEntry *m = NULL, *mounts = NULL; bool require_prefix = false, setup_propagate = false; const char *root; DissectImageFlags dissect_image_flags = DISSECT_IMAGE_GENERIC_ROOT | DISSECT_IMAGE_REQUIRE_ROOT | DISSECT_IMAGE_DISCARD_ON_LOOP | DISSECT_IMAGE_RELAX_VAR_CHECK | DISSECT_IMAGE_FSCK | DISSECT_IMAGE_USR_NO_ROOT | DISSECT_IMAGE_GROWFS | DISSECT_IMAGE_ADD_PARTITION_DEVICES | DISSECT_IMAGE_PIN_PARTITION_DEVICES; size_t n_mounts; int r; assert(ns_info); /* Make sure that all mknod(), mkdir() calls we do are unaffected by the umask, and the access modes * we configure take effect */ BLOCK_WITH_UMASK(0000); if (!isempty(propagate_dir) && !isempty(incoming_dir)) setup_propagate = true; if (mount_flags == 0) mount_flags = MS_SHARED; if (root_image) { /* Make the whole image read-only if we can determine that we only access it in a read-only fashion. */ if (root_read_only(read_only_paths, ns_info->protect_system) && home_read_only(read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, empty_directories, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems, ns_info->protect_home) && strv_isempty(read_write_paths)) dissect_image_flags |= DISSECT_IMAGE_READ_ONLY; r = verity_settings_prepare( &verity, root_image, root_hash, root_hash_size, root_hash_path, root_hash_sig, root_hash_sig_size, root_hash_sig_path, verity_data_path); if (r < 0) return r; SET_FLAG(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE, verity.data_path); r = loop_device_make_by_path( root_image, FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_DEVICE_READ_ONLY) ? O_RDONLY : -1 /* < 0 means writable if possible, read-only as fallback */, /* sector_size= */ UINT32_MAX, FLAGS_SET(dissect_image_flags, DISSECT_IMAGE_NO_PARTITION_TABLE) ? 0 : LO_FLAGS_PARTSCAN, LOCK_SH, &loop_device); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to create loop device for root image: %m"); r = dissect_loop_device( loop_device, &verity, root_image_options, dissect_image_flags, &dissected_image); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to dissect image: %m"); r = dissected_image_load_verity_sig_partition( dissected_image, loop_device->fd, &verity); if (r < 0) return r; r = dissected_image_decrypt( dissected_image, NULL, &verity, dissect_image_flags); if (r < 0) return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to decrypt dissected image: %m"); } if (root_directory) root = root_directory; else { /* /run/systemd should have been created by PID 1 early on already, but in some cases, like * when running tests (test-execute), it might not have been created yet so let's make sure * we create it if it doesn't already exist. */ (void) mkdir_p_label("/run/systemd", 0755); /* Always create the mount namespace in a temporary directory, instead of operating directly * in the root. The temporary directory prevents any mounts from being potentially obscured * my other mounts we already applied. We use the same mount point for all images, which is * safe, since they all live in their own namespaces after all, and hence won't see each * other. */ root = "/run/systemd/unit-root"; (void) mkdir_label(root, 0700); require_prefix = true; } if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) { r = parse_env_extension_hierarchies(&hierarchies); if (r < 0) return r; } n_mounts = namespace_calculate_mounts( ns_info, read_write_paths, read_only_paths, inaccessible_paths, exec_paths, no_exec_paths, empty_directories, n_bind_mounts, n_temporary_filesystems, n_mount_images, n_extension_images, strv_length(extension_directories), strv_length(hierarchies), tmp_dir, var_tmp_dir, creds_path, log_namespace, setup_propagate, notify_socket); if (n_mounts > 0) { m = mounts = new0(MountEntry, n_mounts); if (!mounts) return -ENOMEM; r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_write_paths, READWRITE, require_prefix); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_access_mounts(&m, read_only_paths, READONLY, require_prefix); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_access_mounts(&m, inaccessible_paths, INACCESSIBLE, require_prefix); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_access_mounts(&m, exec_paths, EXEC, require_prefix); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_access_mounts(&m, no_exec_paths, NOEXEC, require_prefix); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_empty_dir_mounts(&m, empty_directories); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_bind_mounts(&m, bind_mounts, n_bind_mounts); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_tmpfs_mounts(&m, temporary_filesystems, n_temporary_filesystems); if (r < 0) goto finish; if (tmp_dir) { bool ro = streq(tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/tmp", .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, .source_const = tmp_dir, }; } if (var_tmp_dir) { bool ro = streq(var_tmp_dir, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/var/tmp", .mode = ro ? PRIVATE_TMP_READONLY : PRIVATE_TMP, .source_const = var_tmp_dir, }; } r = append_mount_images(&m, mount_images, n_mount_images); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_extensions(&m, root, extension_dir, hierarchies, extension_images, n_extension_images, extension_directories); if (r < 0) goto finish; if (ns_info->private_dev) *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/dev", .mode = PRIVATE_DEV, .flags = DEV_MOUNT_OPTIONS, }; /* In case /proc is successfully mounted with pid tree subset only (ProcSubset=pid), the protective mounts to non-pid /proc paths would fail. But the pid only option may have failed gracefully, so let's try the mounts but it's not fatal if they don't succeed. */ bool ignore_protect_proc = ns_info->ignore_protect_paths || ns_info->proc_subset == PROC_SUBSET_PID; if (ns_info->protect_kernel_tunables) { r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_proc_table), ignore_protect_proc); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_tunables_sys_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); if (r < 0) goto finish; } if (ns_info->protect_kernel_modules) { r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_modules_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_modules_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); if (r < 0) goto finish; } if (ns_info->protect_kernel_logs) { r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_logs_proc_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_proc_table), ignore_protect_proc); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_static_mounts(&m, protect_kernel_logs_dev_table, ELEMENTSOF(protect_kernel_logs_dev_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); if (r < 0) goto finish; } if (ns_info->protect_control_groups) *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/sys/fs/cgroup", .mode = READONLY, }; r = append_protect_home(&m, ns_info->protect_home, ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = append_protect_system(&m, ns_info->protect_system, false); if (r < 0) goto finish; if (namespace_info_mount_apivfs(ns_info)) { r = append_static_mounts(&m, apivfs_table, ELEMENTSOF(apivfs_table), ns_info->ignore_protect_paths); if (r < 0) goto finish; } /* Note, if proc is mounted with subset=pid then neither of the * two paths will exist, i.e. they are implicitly protected by * the mount option. */ if (ns_info->protect_hostname) { *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/hostname", .mode = READONLY, .ignore = ignore_protect_proc, }; *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/proc/sys/kernel/domainname", .mode = READONLY, .ignore = ignore_protect_proc, }; } if (ns_info->private_ipc) *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/dev/mqueue", .mode = MQUEUEFS, .flags = MS_NOSUID | MS_NODEV | MS_NOEXEC | MS_RELATIME, }; if (creds_path) { /* If our service has a credentials store configured, then bind that one in, but hide * everything else. */ *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/run/credentials", .mode = TMPFS, .read_only = true, .options_const = "mode=0755" TMPFS_LIMITS_EMPTY_OR_ALMOST, .flags = MS_NODEV|MS_STRICTATIME|MS_NOSUID|MS_NOEXEC, }; *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = creds_path, .mode = BIND_MOUNT, .read_only = true, .source_const = creds_path, }; } else { /* If our service has no credentials store configured, then make the whole * credentials tree inaccessible wholesale. */ *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/run/credentials", .mode = INACCESSIBLE, .ignore = true, }; } if (log_namespace) { _cleanup_free_ char *q = NULL; q = strjoin("/run/systemd/journal.", log_namespace); if (!q) { r = -ENOMEM; goto finish; } *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = "/run/systemd/journal", .mode = BIND_MOUNT_RECURSIVE, .read_only = true, .source_malloc = TAKE_PTR(q), }; } /* Will be used to add bind mounts at runtime */ if (setup_propagate) *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .source_const = propagate_dir, .path_const = incoming_dir, .mode = BIND_MOUNT, .read_only = true, }; if (notify_socket) *(m++) = (MountEntry) { .path_const = notify_socket, .source_const = notify_socket, .mode = BIND_MOUNT, .read_only = true, }; assert(mounts + n_mounts == m); /* Prepend the root directory where that's necessary */ r = prefix_where_needed(mounts, n_mounts, root); if (r < 0) goto finish; drop_unused_mounts(root, mounts, &n_mounts); } /* All above is just preparation, figuring out what to do. Let's now actually start doing something. */ if (unshare(CLONE_NEWNS) < 0) { r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to unshare the mount namespace: %m"); if (IN_SET(r, -EACCES, -EPERM, -EOPNOTSUPP, -ENOSYS)) /* If the kernel doesn't support namespaces, or when there's a MAC or seccomp filter * in place that doesn't allow us to create namespaces (or a missing cap), then * propagate a recognizable error back, which the caller can use to detect this case * (and only this) and optionally continue without namespacing applied. */ r = -ENOANO; goto finish; } /* Create the source directory to allow runtime propagation of mounts */ if (setup_propagate) (void) mkdir_p(propagate_dir, 0600); if (n_extension_images > 0 || !strv_isempty(extension_directories)) /* ExtensionImages/Directories mountpoint directories will be created while parsing the * mounts to create, so have the parent ready */ (void) mkdir_p(extension_dir, 0600); /* Remount / as SLAVE so that nothing now mounted in the namespace * shows up in the parent */ if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, MS_SLAVE|MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' as SLAVE: %m"); goto finish; } if (root_image) { /* A root image is specified, mount it to the right place */ r = dissected_image_mount(dissected_image, root, UID_INVALID, UID_INVALID, dissect_image_flags); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root image: %m"); goto finish; } /* Now release the block device lock, so that udevd is free to call BLKRRPART on the device * if it likes. */ r = loop_device_flock(loop_device, LOCK_UN); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to release lock on loopback block device: %m"); goto finish; } r = dissected_image_relinquish(dissected_image); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to relinquish dissected image: %m"); goto finish; } } else if (root_directory) { /* A root directory is specified. Turn its directory into bind mount, if it isn't one yet. */ r = path_is_mount_point(root, NULL, AT_SYMLINK_FOLLOW); if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to detect that %s is a mount point or not: %m", root); goto finish; } if (r == 0) { r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) goto finish; } } else { /* Let's mount the main root directory to the root directory to use */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, "/", root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) goto finish; } /* Try to set up the new root directory before mounting anything else there. */ if (root_image || root_directory) (void) base_filesystem_create(root, UID_INVALID, GID_INVALID); /* Now make the magic happen */ r = apply_mounts(root, ns_info, mounts, &n_mounts, exec_dir_symlinks, error_path); if (r < 0) goto finish; /* MS_MOVE does not work on MS_SHARED so the remount MS_SHARED will be done later */ r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0); if (r == -EINVAL && root_directory) { /* If we are using root_directory and we don't have privileges (ie: user manager in a user * namespace) and the root_directory is already a mount point in the parent namespace, * MS_MOVE will fail as we don't have permission to change it (with EINVAL rather than * EPERM). Attempt to bind-mount it over itself (like we do above if it's not already a * mount point) and try again. */ r = mount_nofollow_verbose(LOG_DEBUG, root, root, NULL, MS_BIND|MS_REC, NULL); if (r < 0) goto finish; r = mount_switch_root(root, /* mount_propagation_flag = */ 0); } if (r < 0) { log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to mount root with MS_MOVE: %m"); goto finish; } /* Remount / as the desired mode. Note that this will not * reestablish propagation from our side to the host, since * what's disconnected is disconnected. */ if (mount(NULL, "/", NULL, mount_flags | MS_REC, NULL) < 0) { r = log_debug_errno(errno, "Failed to remount '/' with desired mount flags: %m"); goto finish; } /* bind_mount_in_namespace() will MS_MOVE into that directory, and that's only * supported for non-shared mounts. This needs to happen after remounting / or it will fail. */ if (setup_propagate) { r = mount(NULL, incoming_dir, NULL, MS_SLAVE, NULL); if (r < 0) { log_error_errno(r, "Failed to remount %s with MS_SLAVE: %m", incoming_dir); goto finish; } } r = 0; finish: if (n_mounts > 0) for (m = mounts; m < mounts + n_mounts; m++) mount_entry_done(m); free(mounts); return r; } void bind_mount_free_many(BindMount *b, size_t n) { assert(b || n == 0); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(b[i].source); free(b[i].destination); } free(b); } int bind_mount_add(BindMount **b, size_t *n, const BindMount *item) { _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; BindMount *c; assert(b); assert(n); assert(item); s = strdup(item->source); if (!s) return -ENOMEM; d = strdup(item->destination); if (!d) return -ENOMEM; c = reallocarray(*b, *n + 1, sizeof(BindMount)); if (!c) return -ENOMEM; *b = c; c[(*n) ++] = (BindMount) { .source = TAKE_PTR(s), .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), .read_only = item->read_only, .nosuid = item->nosuid, .recursive = item->recursive, .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, }; return 0; } MountImage* mount_image_free_many(MountImage *m, size_t *n) { assert(n); assert(m || *n == 0); for (size_t i = 0; i < *n; i++) { free(m[i].source); free(m[i].destination); mount_options_free_all(m[i].mount_options); } free(m); *n = 0; return NULL; } int mount_image_add(MountImage **m, size_t *n, const MountImage *item) { _cleanup_free_ char *s = NULL, *d = NULL; _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *options = NULL; MountImage *c; assert(m); assert(n); assert(item); s = strdup(item->source); if (!s) return -ENOMEM; if (item->destination) { d = strdup(item->destination); if (!d) return -ENOMEM; } LIST_FOREACH(mount_options, i, item->mount_options) { _cleanup_(mount_options_free_allp) MountOptions *o = NULL; o = new(MountOptions, 1); if (!o) return -ENOMEM; *o = (MountOptions) { .partition_designator = i->partition_designator, .options = strdup(i->options), }; if (!o->options) return -ENOMEM; LIST_APPEND(mount_options, options, TAKE_PTR(o)); } c = reallocarray(*m, *n + 1, sizeof(MountImage)); if (!c) return -ENOMEM; *m = c; c[(*n) ++] = (MountImage) { .source = TAKE_PTR(s), .destination = TAKE_PTR(d), .mount_options = TAKE_PTR(options), .ignore_enoent = item->ignore_enoent, .type = item->type, }; return 0; } void temporary_filesystem_free_many(TemporaryFileSystem *t, size_t n) { assert(t || n == 0); for (size_t i = 0; i < n; i++) { free(t[i].path); free(t[i].options); } free(t); } int temporary_filesystem_add( TemporaryFileSystem **t, size_t *n, const char *path, const char *options) { _cleanup_free_ char *p = NULL, *o = NULL; TemporaryFileSystem *c; assert(t); assert(n); assert(path); p = strdup(path); if (!p) return -ENOMEM; if (!isempty(options)) { o = strdup(options); if (!o) return -ENOMEM; } c = reallocarray(*t, *n + 1, sizeof(TemporaryFileSystem)); if (!c) return -ENOMEM; *t = c; c[(*n) ++] = (TemporaryFileSystem) { .path = TAKE_PTR(p), .options = TAKE_PTR(o), }; return 0; } static int make_tmp_prefix(const char *prefix) { _cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL; _cleanup_close_ int fd = -EBADF; int r; /* Don't do anything unless we know the dir is actually missing */ r = access(prefix, F_OK); if (r >= 0) return 0; if (errno != ENOENT) return -errno; WITH_UMASK(000) r = mkdir_parents(prefix, 0755); if (r < 0) return r; r = tempfn_random(prefix, NULL, &t); if (r < 0) return r; /* umask will corrupt this access mode, but that doesn't matter, we need to call chmod() anyway for * the suid bit, below. */ fd = open_mkdir_at(AT_FDCWD, t, O_EXCL|O_CLOEXEC, 0777); if (fd < 0) return fd; r = RET_NERRNO(fchmod(fd, 01777)); if (r < 0) { (void) rmdir(t); return r; } r = RET_NERRNO(rename(t, prefix)); if (r < 0) { (void) rmdir(t); return r == -EEXIST ? 0 : r; /* it's fine if someone else created the dir by now */ } return 0; } static int setup_one_tmp_dir(const char *id, const char *prefix, char **path, char **tmp_path) { _cleanup_free_ char *x = NULL; _cleanup_free_ char *y = NULL; sd_id128_t boot_id; bool rw = true; int r; assert(id); assert(prefix); assert(path); /* We include the boot id in the directory so that after a * reboot we can easily identify obsolete directories. */ r = sd_id128_get_boot(&boot_id); if (r < 0) return r; x = strjoin(prefix, "/systemd-private-", SD_ID128_TO_STRING(boot_id), "-", id, "-XXXXXX"); if (!x) return -ENOMEM; r = make_tmp_prefix(prefix); if (r < 0) return r; WITH_UMASK(0077) if (!mkdtemp(x)) { if (errno == EROFS || ERRNO_IS_DISK_SPACE(errno)) rw = false; else return -errno; } if (rw) { y = strjoin(x, "/tmp"); if (!y) return -ENOMEM; WITH_UMASK(0000) if (mkdir(y, 0777 | S_ISVTX) < 0) return -errno; r = label_fix_full(AT_FDCWD, y, prefix, 0); if (r < 0) return r; if (tmp_path) *tmp_path = TAKE_PTR(y); } else { /* Trouble: we failed to create the directory. Instead of failing, let's simulate /tmp being * read-only. This way the service will get the EROFS result as if it was writing to the real * file system. */ WITH_UMASK(0000) r = mkdir_p(RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY, 0500); if (r < 0) return r; r = free_and_strdup(&x, RUN_SYSTEMD_EMPTY); if (r < 0) return r; } *path = TAKE_PTR(x); return 0; } int setup_tmp_dirs(const char *id, char **tmp_dir, char **var_tmp_dir) { _cleanup_(namespace_cleanup_tmpdirp) char *a = NULL; _cleanup_(rmdir_and_freep) char *a_tmp = NULL; char *b; int r; assert(id); assert(tmp_dir); assert(var_tmp_dir); r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/tmp", &a, &a_tmp); if (r < 0) return r; r = setup_one_tmp_dir(id, "/var/tmp", &b, NULL); if (r < 0) return r; a_tmp = mfree(a_tmp); /* avoid rmdir */ *tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(a); *var_tmp_dir = TAKE_PTR(b); return 0; } int setup_shareable_ns(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], unsigned long nsflag) { _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF; int r, q; const char *ns_name, *ns_path; assert(ns_storage_socket); assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); ns_name = namespace_single_flag_to_string(nsflag); assert(ns_name); /* We use the passed socketpair as a storage buffer for our * namespace reference fd. Whatever process runs this first * shall create a new namespace, all others should just join * it. To serialize that we use a file lock on the socket * pair. * * It's a bit crazy, but hey, works great! */ if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) return -errno; ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); if (ns == -EAGAIN) { /* Nothing stored yet, so let's create a new namespace. */ if (unshare(nsflag) < 0) { r = -errno; goto fail; } (void) loopback_setup(); ns_path = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", ns_name); ns = open(ns_path, O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY); if (ns < 0) { r = -errno; goto fail; } r = 1; } else if (ns < 0) { r = ns; goto fail; } else { /* Yay, found something, so let's join the namespace */ if (setns(ns, nsflag) < 0) { r = -errno; goto fail; } r = 0; } q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT); if (q < 0) { r = q; goto fail; } fail: (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); return r; } int open_shareable_ns_path(const int ns_storage_socket[static 2], const char *path, unsigned long nsflag) { _cleanup_close_ int ns = -EBADF; int q, r; assert(ns_storage_socket); assert(ns_storage_socket[0] >= 0); assert(ns_storage_socket[1] >= 0); assert(path); /* If the storage socket doesn't contain a ns fd yet, open one via the file system and store it in * it. This is supposed to be called ahead of time, i.e. before setup_shareable_ns() which will * allocate a new anonymous ns if needed. */ if (lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_LOCK, 0) < 0) return -errno; ns = receive_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[0], MSG_DONTWAIT); if (ns == -EAGAIN) { /* Nothing stored yet. Open the file from the file system. */ ns = open(path, O_RDONLY|O_NOCTTY|O_CLOEXEC); if (ns < 0) { r = -errno; goto fail; } r = fd_is_ns(ns, nsflag); if (r == 0) { /* Not a ns of our type? Refuse early. */ r = -EINVAL; goto fail; } if (r < 0 && r != -EUCLEAN) /* EUCLEAN: we don't know */ goto fail; r = 1; } else if (ns < 0) { r = ns; goto fail; } else r = 0; /* Already allocated */ q = send_one_fd(ns_storage_socket[1], ns, MSG_DONTWAIT); if (q < 0) { r = q; goto fail; } fail: (void) lockf(ns_storage_socket[0], F_ULOCK, 0); return r; } bool ns_type_supported(NamespaceType type) { const char *t, *ns_proc; t = namespace_type_to_string(type); if (!t) /* Don't know how to translate this? Then it's not supported */ return false; ns_proc = strjoina("/proc/self/ns/", t); return access(ns_proc, F_OK) == 0; } static const char *const protect_home_table[_PROTECT_HOME_MAX] = { [PROTECT_HOME_NO] = "no", [PROTECT_HOME_YES] = "yes", [PROTECT_HOME_READ_ONLY] = "read-only", [PROTECT_HOME_TMPFS] = "tmpfs", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_home, ProtectHome, PROTECT_HOME_YES); static const char *const protect_system_table[_PROTECT_SYSTEM_MAX] = { [PROTECT_SYSTEM_NO] = "no", [PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES] = "yes", [PROTECT_SYSTEM_FULL] = "full", [PROTECT_SYSTEM_STRICT] = "strict", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP_WITH_BOOLEAN(protect_system, ProtectSystem, PROTECT_SYSTEM_YES); static const char* const namespace_type_table[] = { [NAMESPACE_MOUNT] = "mnt", [NAMESPACE_CGROUP] = "cgroup", [NAMESPACE_UTS] = "uts", [NAMESPACE_IPC] = "ipc", [NAMESPACE_USER] = "user", [NAMESPACE_PID] = "pid", [NAMESPACE_NET] = "net", [NAMESPACE_TIME] = "time", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(namespace_type, NamespaceType); static const char* const protect_proc_table[_PROTECT_PROC_MAX] = { [PROTECT_PROC_DEFAULT] = "default", [PROTECT_PROC_NOACCESS] = "noaccess", [PROTECT_PROC_INVISIBLE] = "invisible", [PROTECT_PROC_PTRACEABLE] = "ptraceable", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(protect_proc, ProtectProc); static const char* const proc_subset_table[_PROC_SUBSET_MAX] = { [PROC_SUBSET_ALL] = "all", [PROC_SUBSET_PID] = "pid", }; DEFINE_STRING_TABLE_LOOKUP(proc_subset, ProcSubset);