/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */ #pragma once #include #include "bitfield.h" #include "io-util.h" #include "sd-json.h" #include "macro.h" #include "openssl-util.h" #include "ordered-set.h" #include "sha256.h" #include "tpm2-pcr.h" typedef enum TPM2Flags { TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PIN = 1 << 0, TPM2_FLAGS_USE_PCRLOCK = 1 << 1, } TPM2Flags; /* As per https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/wp-content/uploads/TCG_PCClient_PFP_r1p05_v23_pub.pdf a * TPM2 on a Client PC must have at least 24 PCRs. This hardcodes our expectation of 24. */ #define TPM2_PCRS_MAX 24U #define TPM2_PCRS_MASK ((UINT32_C(1) << TPM2_PCRS_MAX) - 1) /* The SRK handle is defined in the Provisioning Guidance document (see above) in the table "Reserved Handles * for TPM Provisioning Fundamental Elements". The SRK is useful because it is "shared", meaning it has no * authValue nor authPolicy set, and thus may be used by anyone on the system to generate derived keys or * seal secrets. This is useful if the TPM has an auth (password) set for the 'owner hierarchy', which would * prevent users from generating primary transient keys, unless they knew the owner hierarchy auth. See * the Provisioning Guidance document for more details. */ #define TPM2_SRK_HANDLE UINT32_C(0x81000001) /* The TPM specification limits sealed data to MAX_SYM_DATA. Unfortunately, tpm2-tss incorrectly * defines this value as 256; the TPM specification Part 2 ("Structures") section * "TPMU_SENSITIVE_CREATE" states "For interoperability, MAX_SYM_DATA should be 128." */ #define TPM2_MAX_SEALED_DATA UINT16_C(128) static inline bool TPM2_PCR_INDEX_VALID(unsigned pcr) { return pcr < TPM2_PCRS_MAX; } static inline bool TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(uint32_t pcr_mask) { return pcr_mask <= TPM2_PCRS_MASK; } #define FOREACH_PCR_IN_MASK(pcr, mask) BIT_FOREACH(pcr, mask) #define TPM2_N_HASH_ALGORITHMS 4U #if HAVE_TPM2 #include #include #include int dlopen_tpm2(void); typedef struct { unsigned n_ref; void *tcti_dl; TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *tcti_context; ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context; /* Some selected cached capabilities of the TPM */ TPMS_ALG_PROPERTY *capability_algorithms; size_t n_capability_algorithms; TPMA_CC *capability_commands; size_t n_capability_commands; TPM2_ECC_CURVE *capability_ecc_curves; size_t n_capability_ecc_curves; TPML_PCR_SELECTION capability_pcrs; } Tpm2Context; int tpm2_context_new(const char *device, Tpm2Context **ret_context); int tpm2_context_new_or_warn(const char *device, Tpm2Context **ret_context); Tpm2Context *tpm2_context_ref(Tpm2Context *context); Tpm2Context *tpm2_context_unref(Tpm2Context *context); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(Tpm2Context*, tpm2_context_unref); typedef struct { Tpm2Context *tpm2_context; ESYS_TR esys_handle; bool flush; } Tpm2Handle; #define _tpm2_handle(c, h) { .tpm2_context = (c), .esys_handle = (h), } static const Tpm2Handle TPM2_HANDLE_NONE = _tpm2_handle(NULL, ESYS_TR_NONE); void Esys_Freep(void *p); int tpm2_handle_new(Tpm2Context *context, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); Tpm2Handle *tpm2_handle_free(Tpm2Handle *handle); DEFINE_TRIVIAL_CLEANUP_FUNC(Tpm2Handle*, tpm2_handle_free); typedef struct { unsigned index; TPMI_ALG_HASH hash; TPM2B_DIGEST value; } Tpm2PCRValue; #define TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(i, h, v) \ (Tpm2PCRValue) { \ .index = (i), \ .hash = (h), \ .value = ((TPM2B_DIGEST) v), \ } bool tpm2_pcr_value_valid(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value); bool tpm2_pcr_values_has_any_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); bool tpm2_pcr_values_has_all_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); int tpm2_pcr_value_from_string(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue *ret_pcr_value); char* tpm2_pcr_value_to_string(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value); bool tpm2_pcr_values_valid(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); void tpm2_sort_pcr_values(Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); int tpm2_pcr_values_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values); int tpm2_pcr_values_to_mask(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t *ret_mask); int tpm2_pcr_values_from_string(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values); char* tpm2_pcr_values_to_string(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); int tpm2_pcr_values_hash_count(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, size_t *ret_count); int tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_pcr_values(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *ret_selection, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_values, size_t *ret_n_values); int tpm2_make_encryption_session(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *primary, const Tpm2Handle *bind_key, Tpm2Handle **ret_session); int tpm2_create_primary(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *template, const TPM2B_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_create(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPMT_PUBLIC *template, const TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE **ret_private); int tpm2_create_loaded(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPMT_PUBLIC *template, const TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE *sensitive, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE **ret_private, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_load(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *parent, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *private, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_marshal_public(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); int tpm2_marshal_nv_public(const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *nv_public, void **ret, size_t *ret_size); int tpm2_unmarshal_nv_public(const void *data, size_t size, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *ret_nv_public); int tpm2_marshal_blob(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_PRIVATE *private, const TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *seed, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size); int tpm2_unmarshal_blob(const void *blob, size_t blob_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret_public, TPM2B_PRIVATE *ret_private, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET *ret_seed); int tpm2_get_name(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name); bool tpm2_supports_alg(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_ALG_ID alg); bool tpm2_supports_command(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_CC command); bool tpm2_supports_ecc_curve(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_ECC_CURVE ecc_curve); bool tpm2_test_parms(Tpm2Context *c, TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg, const TPMU_PUBLIC_PARMS *parms); int tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH **ret_banks); int tpm2_get_good_pcr_banks_strv(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, char ***ret); int tpm2_get_best_pcr_bank(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t pcr_mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH *ret); const char* tpm2_userspace_log_path(void); const char* tpm2_firmware_log_path(void); typedef enum Tpm2UserspaceEventType { TPM2_EVENT_PHASE, TPM2_EVENT_FILESYSTEM, TPM2_EVENT_VOLUME_KEY, TPM2_EVENT_MACHINE_ID, _TPM2_USERSPACE_EVENT_TYPE_MAX, _TPM2_USERSPACE_EVENT_TYPE_INVALID = -EINVAL, } Tpm2UserspaceEventType; const char* tpm2_userspace_event_type_to_string(Tpm2UserspaceEventType type) _const_; Tpm2UserspaceEventType tpm2_userspace_event_type_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; int tpm2_extend_bytes(Tpm2Context *c, char **banks, unsigned pcr_index, const void *data, size_t data_size, const void *secret, size_t secret_size, Tpm2UserspaceEventType event, const char *description); uint32_t tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_to_mask(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *ret); bool tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_has_mask(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_add_mask(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_sub_mask(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_add(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_sub(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b); void tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_move(TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *a, TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *b); char* tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_to_string(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s); size_t tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_weight(const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s); #define tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_is_empty(s) (tpm2_tpms_pcr_selection_weight(s) == 0) uint32_t tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_to_mask(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_mask(uint32_t mask, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *ret); bool tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_has_mask(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add_mask(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub_mask(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, uint32_t mask); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add_tpms_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub_tpms_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const TPMS_PCR_SELECTION *s); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_add(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *b); void tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_sub(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *a, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *b); char* tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_to_string(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l); size_t tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_weight(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l); #define tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_is_empty(l) (tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_weight(l) == 0) int tpm2_digest_many(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const struct iovec data[], size_t count, bool extend); static inline int tpm2_digest_buffer(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const void *data, size_t len, bool extend) { return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, &IOVEC_MAKE((void*) data, len), 1, extend); } int tpm2_digest_many_digests(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const TPM2B_DIGEST data[], size_t count, bool extend); static inline int tpm2_digest_rehash(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest) { return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, NULL, 0, true); } static inline int tpm2_digest_init(TPMI_ALG_HASH alg, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest) { return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, NULL, 0, false); } void tpm2_log_debug_tpml_pcr_selection(const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *l, const char *msg); void tpm2_log_debug_pcr_value(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_value, const char *msg); void tpm2_log_debug_buffer(const void *buffer, size_t size, const char *msg); void tpm2_log_debug_digest(const TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const char *msg); void tpm2_log_debug_name(const TPM2B_NAME *name, const char *msg); typedef struct Tpm2PCRPredictionResult { TPM2B_DIGEST hash[TPM2_N_HASH_ALGORITHMS]; /* a hash for each potential algorithm */ } Tpm2PCRPredictionResult; TPM2B_DIGEST *tpm2_pcr_prediction_result_get_hash(Tpm2PCRPredictionResult *result, uint16_t alg); /* A structure encapsulating a full set of PCR predictions with alternatives. This can be converted into a * series of PolicyOR + PolicyPCR items for the TPM. */ typedef struct Tpm2PCRPrediction { uint32_t pcrs; /* A mask of pcrs included */ OrderedSet* results[TPM2_PCRS_MAX]; /* set of Tpm2PCRPredictionResult objects, one for each PCR */ } Tpm2PCRPrediction; void tpm2_pcr_prediction_done(Tpm2PCRPrediction *p); extern const struct hash_ops tpm2_pcr_prediction_result_hash_ops; bool tpm2_pcr_prediction_equal(Tpm2PCRPrediction *a, Tpm2PCRPrediction *b, uint16_t algorithm); int tpm2_pcr_prediction_to_json(const Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, sd_json_variant **ret); int tpm2_pcr_prediction_from_json(Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, sd_json_variant *aj); /* As structure encapsulating all metadata stored for a pcrlock policy on disk */ typedef struct Tpm2PCRLockPolicy { /* The below is the fixed metadata encoding information about the NV index we store the * PolicyAuthorizeNV policy in, as well as a pinned SRK, and the encrypted PIN to use for writing to * the NV Index. */ uint16_t algorithm; uint32_t nv_index; struct iovec nv_handle; struct iovec nv_public; struct iovec srk_handle; struct iovec pin_public; struct iovec pin_private; /* The below contains the current prediction whose resulting policy is stored in the NV * index. Once in JSON and once in parsed form. When the policy is updated the fields below are * changed, the fields above remain fixed. */ sd_json_variant *prediction_json; Tpm2PCRPrediction prediction; } Tpm2PCRLockPolicy; void tpm2_pcrlock_policy_done(Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *data); int tpm2_pcrlock_policy_from_json(sd_json_variant *v, Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *ret_policy); int tpm2_pcrlock_search_file(const char *path, FILE **ret_file, char **ret_path); int tpm2_pcrlock_policy_load(const char *path, Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *ret_policy); int tpm2_pcrlock_policy_from_credentials(const struct iovec *srk, const struct iovec *nv, Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *ret); int tpm2_index_to_handle(Tpm2Context *c, TPM2_HANDLE index, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_index_from_handle(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, TPM2_HANDLE *ret_index); int tpm2_pcr_read(Tpm2Context *c, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_selection, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values); int tpm2_pcr_read_missing_values(Tpm2Context *c, Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values); int tpm2_auth_value_from_pin(TPMI_ALG_HASH hash, const char *pin, TPM2B_AUTH *ret_auth); int tpm2_set_auth(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, const char *pin); int tpm2_set_auth_binary(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, const TPM2B_AUTH *auth); int tpm2_make_policy_session(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *primary, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, Tpm2Handle **ret_session); int tpm2_policy_auth_value(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest); int tpm2_policy_authorize_nv(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest); int tpm2_policy_pcr(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_selection, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest); int tpm2_policy_or(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_DIGEST *branches, size_t n_branches, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest); int tpm2_policy_super_pcr(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm); int tpm2_policy_signed_hmac_sha256(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const Tpm2Handle *hmac_key_handle, const struct iovec *hmac_key, TPM2B_DIGEST **ret_policy_digest); int tpm2_calculate_pubkey_name(const TPMT_PUBLIC *public, TPM2B_NAME *ret_name); int tpm2_calculate_nv_index_name(const TPMS_NV_PUBLIC *nvpublic, TPM2B_NAME *ret_name); int tpm2_calculate_policy_auth_value(TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_policy_authorize(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy_ref, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_policy_authorize_nv(const TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *public, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_policy_pcr(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_policy_or(const TPM2B_DIGEST *branches, size_t n_branches, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_policy_super_pcr(Tpm2PCRPrediction *prediction, uint16_t algorithm, TPM2B_DIGEST *pcr_policy); int tpm2_calculate_policy_signed(TPM2B_DIGEST *digest, const TPM2B_NAME *name); int tpm2_calculate_serialize(TPM2_HANDLE handle, const TPM2B_NAME *name, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret_serialized, size_t *ret_serialized_size); int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, bool use_pin, const Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *policy, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest); int tpm2_calculate_seal(TPM2_HANDLE parent_handle, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *parent_public, const TPMA_OBJECT *attributes, const struct iovec *secret, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, struct iovec *ret_secret, struct iovec *ret_blob, struct iovec *ret_serialized_parent); int tpm2_get_srk_template(TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg, TPMT_PUBLIC *ret_template); int tpm2_get_best_srk_template(Tpm2Context *c, TPMT_PUBLIC *ret_template); int tpm2_get_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_get_or_create_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const TPM2B_DIGEST policy_hash[], size_t n_policy, const char *pin, struct iovec *ret_secret, struct iovec **ret_blobs, size_t *ret_n_blobs, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, struct iovec *ret_srk); int tpm2_unseal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const struct iovec *pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, sd_json_variant *signature, const char *pin, const Tpm2PCRLockPolicy *pcrlock_policy, uint16_t primary_alg, const struct iovec blobs[], size_t n_blobs, const struct iovec policy_hash[], size_t n_policy_hash, const struct iovec *srk, struct iovec *ret_secret); #if HAVE_OPENSSL int tpm2_tpm2b_public_to_openssl_pkey(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, EVP_PKEY **ret); int tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_openssl_pkey(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret); #endif int tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(const void *pem, size_t pem_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret); int tpm2_tpm2b_public_to_fingerprint(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, void **ret_fingerprint, size_t *ret_fingerprint_size); int tpm2_define_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2_HANDLE requested_nv_index, const TPM2B_DIGEST *write_policy, TPM2_HANDLE *ret_nv_index, Tpm2Handle **ret_nv_handle, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC *ret_nv_public); int tpm2_write_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *policy_session, TPM2_HANDLE nv_index, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy_digest); int tpm2_undefine_policy_nv_index(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2_HANDLE nv_index, const Tpm2Handle *nv_handle); int tpm2_seal_data(Tpm2Context *c, const struct iovec *data, const Tpm2Handle *primary_handle, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, struct iovec *ret_public, struct iovec *ret_private); int tpm2_unseal_data(Tpm2Context *c, const struct iovec *public, const struct iovec *private, const Tpm2Handle *primary_handle, const Tpm2Handle *policy_session, const Tpm2Handle *encryption_session, struct iovec *ret_data); int tpm2_serialize(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, void **ret_serialized, size_t *ret_serialized_size); int tpm2_deserialize(Tpm2Context *c, const void *serialized, size_t serialized_size, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle); int tpm2_load_public_key_file(const char *path, TPM2B_PUBLIC *ret); int tpm2_hmac_key_from_pin(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, const TPM2B_AUTH *pin, Tpm2Handle **ret); /* The tpm2-tss library has many structs that are simply a combination of an array (or object) and * size. These macros allow easily initializing or assigning instances of such structs from an existing * buffer/object and size, while also checking the size for safety with the struct buffer/object size. If the * provided buffer/object is NULL, the resulting struct's buffer/object will be 0s. If the provided size is * larger than the struct's buffer/object size, this results in assertion failure; to check the size, use one * of the TPM2B_*_CHECK_SIZE() macros. */ #define TPM2B_AUTH_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_AUTH, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_DATA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_DATA, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET, secret, size) #define TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_NAME_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_NAME, name, size) #define TPM2B_PRIVATE_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PRIVATE, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_MAKE(b, s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(b, s, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA, buffer, size) #define TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field) \ _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, UNIQ, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field) #define _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_MAKE(buf, size, uniq, struct_type, buffer_field, size_field) \ ({ \ typeof(buf) UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq) = (buf); \ typeof(size) UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) = (size); \ struct_type UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq) = { .size_field = UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq), }; \ assert(sizeof(UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq).buffer_field) >= (size_t) UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq)); \ if (UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq)) \ memcpy_safe(UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq).buffer_field, UNIQ_T(BUF, uniq), UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq)); \ UNIQ_T(STRUCT, uniq); \ }) /* Check if the size will fit in the TPM2B struct buffer. Returns 0 if the size will fit, otherwise this logs * a debug message and returns < 0. */ #define TPM2B_AUTH_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_AUTH, buffer) #define TPM2B_DATA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_DATA, buffer) #define TPM2B_DIGEST_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer) #define TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_ECC_PARAMETER, buffer) #define TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_ENCRYPTED_SECRET, buffer) #define TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER, buffer) #define TPM2B_NAME_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_NAME, name) #define TPM2B_PRIVATE_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PRIVATE, buffer) #define TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PRIVATE_KEY_RSA, buffer) #define TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_PUBLIC_KEY_RSA, buffer) #define TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA_CHECK_SIZE(s) TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(s, TPM2B_SENSITIVE_DATA, buffer) #define TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, struct_type, buffer_field) \ _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, UNIQ, struct_type, buffer_field) #define _TPM2B_BUF_SIZE_STRUCT_CHECK_SIZE(size, uniq, struct_type, buffer_field) \ ({ \ size_t UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) = (size_t) (size); \ size_t UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq) = sizeof_field(struct_type, buffer_field); \ UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq) < UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq) ? \ log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), \ "Size %zu larger than " #struct_type " buffer size %zu.", \ UNIQ_T(SIZE, uniq), UNIQ_T(BUFSIZE, uniq)) : \ 0; \ }) #else /* HAVE_TPM2 */ typedef struct {} Tpm2Context; typedef struct {} Tpm2Handle; typedef struct {} Tpm2PCRValue; #define TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(i, h, v) (Tpm2PCRValue) {} static inline int tpm2_pcrlock_search_file(const char *path, FILE **ret_file, char **ret_path) { return -ENOENT; } #endif /* HAVE_TPM2 */ int tpm2_list_devices(void); int tpm2_find_device_auto(char **ret); int tpm2_make_pcr_json_array(uint32_t pcr_mask, sd_json_variant **ret); int tpm2_parse_pcr_json_array(sd_json_variant *v, uint32_t *ret); int tpm2_make_luks2_json(int keyslot, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const struct iovec *pubkey, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, uint16_t primary_alg, const struct iovec blobs[], size_t n_blobs, const struct iovec policy_hash[], size_t n_policy_hash, const struct iovec *salt, const struct iovec *srk, const struct iovec *pcrlock_nv, TPM2Flags flags, sd_json_variant **ret); int tpm2_parse_luks2_json(sd_json_variant *v, int *ret_keyslot, uint32_t *ret_hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, struct iovec *ret_pubkey, uint32_t *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, struct iovec **ret_blobs, size_t *ret_n_blobs, struct iovec **ret_policy_hash, size_t *ret_n_policy_hash, struct iovec *ret_salt, struct iovec *ret_srk, struct iovec *pcrlock_nv, TPM2Flags *ret_flags); /* Default to PCR 7 only */ #define TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT UINT32_C(7) #define TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT) /* We want the helpers below to work also if TPM2 libs are not available, hence define these four defines if * they are missing. */ #ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA1 #define TPM2_ALG_SHA1 0x4 #endif #ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA256 #define TPM2_ALG_SHA256 0xB #endif #ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA384 #define TPM2_ALG_SHA384 0xC #endif #ifndef TPM2_ALG_SHA512 #define TPM2_ALG_SHA512 0xD #endif #ifndef TPM2_ALG_ECC #define TPM2_ALG_ECC 0x23 #endif #ifndef TPM2_ALG_RSA #define TPM2_ALG_RSA 0x1 #endif int tpm2_hash_alg_to_size(uint16_t alg); const char* tpm2_hash_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_; int tpm2_hash_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_; const char* tpm2_asym_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_; int tpm2_asym_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_; const char* tpm2_sym_alg_to_string(uint16_t alg) _const_; int tpm2_sym_alg_from_string(const char *alg) _pure_; const char* tpm2_sym_mode_to_string(uint16_t mode) _const_; int tpm2_sym_mode_from_string(const char *mode) _pure_; char* tpm2_pcr_mask_to_string(uint32_t mask); extern const uint16_t tpm2_hash_algorithms[]; typedef struct { uint32_t search_pcr_mask; const char *device; const char *signature_path; const char *pcrlock_path; } systemd_tpm2_plugin_params; typedef enum Tpm2Support { /* NOTE! The systemd-creds tool returns these flags 1:1 as exit status. Hence these flags are pretty * much ABI! Hence, be extra careful when changing/extending these definitions. */ TPM2_SUPPORT_NONE = 0, /* no support */ TPM2_SUPPORT_FIRMWARE = 1 << 0, /* firmware reports TPM2 was used */ TPM2_SUPPORT_DRIVER = 1 << 1, /* the kernel has a driver loaded for it */ TPM2_SUPPORT_SYSTEM = 1 << 2, /* we support it ourselves */ TPM2_SUPPORT_SUBSYSTEM = 1 << 3, /* the kernel has the tpm subsystem enabled */ TPM2_SUPPORT_LIBRARIES = 1 << 4, /* we can dlopen the tpm2 libraries */ TPM2_SUPPORT_FULL = TPM2_SUPPORT_FIRMWARE|TPM2_SUPPORT_DRIVER|TPM2_SUPPORT_SYSTEM|TPM2_SUPPORT_SUBSYSTEM|TPM2_SUPPORT_LIBRARIES, } Tpm2Support; Tpm2Support tpm2_support(void); int verb_has_tpm2_generic(bool quiet); int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values); int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(const char *arg, Tpm2PCRValue **ret_pcr_values, size_t *ret_n_pcr_values); int tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(const char *arg, uint32_t *mask); int tpm2_load_pcr_signature(const char *path, sd_json_variant **ret); int tpm2_load_pcr_public_key(const char *path, void **ret_pubkey, size_t *ret_pubkey_size); int tpm2_util_pbkdf2_hmac_sha256(const void *pass, size_t passlen, const void *salt, size_t saltlen, uint8_t res[static SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE]); enum { /* Additional defines for the PCR index naming enum from "fundamental/tpm2-pcr.h" */ _TPM2_PCR_INDEX_MAX_DEFINED = TPM2_PCRS_MAX, _TPM2_PCR_INDEX_INVALID = -EINVAL, }; int tpm2_pcr_index_from_string(const char *s) _pure_; const char* tpm2_pcr_index_to_string(int pcr) _const_; /* The first and last NV index handle that is not registered to any company, as per TCG's "Registry of * Reserved TPM 2.0 Handles and Localities", section 2.2.2. */ #define TPM2_NV_INDEX_UNASSIGNED_FIRST UINT32_C(0x01800000) #define TPM2_NV_INDEX_UNASSIGNED_LAST UINT32_C(0x01BFFFFF) #if HAVE_TPM2 /* Verify that the above is indeed a subset of the general NV Index range */ assert_cc(TPM2_NV_INDEX_UNASSIGNED_FIRST >= TPM2_NV_INDEX_FIRST); assert_cc(TPM2_NV_INDEX_UNASSIGNED_LAST <= TPM2_NV_INDEX_LAST); #endif