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|
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: LGPL-2.1-or-later */
#include <fcntl.h>
#include "ask-password-api.h"
#include "escape.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
#include "format-table.h"
#include "io-util.h"
#include "memory-util.h"
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
#include "openssl-util.h"
#endif
#include "pkcs11-util.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-util.h"
#include "strv.h"
bool pkcs11_uri_valid(const char *uri) {
const char *p;
/* A very superficial checker for RFC7512 PKCS#11 URI syntax */
if (isempty(uri))
return false;
p = startswith(uri, "pkcs11:");
if (!p)
return false;
if (isempty(p))
return false;
if (!in_charset(p, ALPHANUMERICAL ".~/-_?;&%="))
return false;
return true;
}
#if HAVE_P11KIT
int uri_from_string(const char *p, P11KitUri **ret) {
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *uri = NULL;
assert(p);
assert(ret);
uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
if (!uri)
return -ENOMEM;
if (p11_kit_uri_parse(p, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, uri) != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
return -EINVAL;
*ret = TAKE_PTR(uri);
return 0;
}
P11KitUri *uri_from_module_info(const CK_INFO *info) {
P11KitUri *uri;
assert(info);
uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
if (!uri)
return NULL;
*p11_kit_uri_get_module_info(uri) = *info;
return uri;
}
P11KitUri *uri_from_slot_info(const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info) {
P11KitUri *uri;
assert(slot_info);
uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
if (!uri)
return NULL;
*p11_kit_uri_get_slot_info(uri) = *slot_info;
return uri;
}
P11KitUri *uri_from_token_info(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
P11KitUri *uri;
assert(token_info);
uri = p11_kit_uri_new();
if (!uri)
return NULL;
*p11_kit_uri_get_token_info(uri) = *token_info;
return uri;
}
CK_RV pkcs11_get_slot_list_malloc(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SLOT_ID **ret_slotids,
CK_ULONG *ret_n_slotids) {
CK_RV rv;
assert(m);
assert(ret_slotids);
assert(ret_n_slotids);
for (unsigned tries = 0; tries < 16; tries++) {
_cleanup_free_ CK_SLOT_ID *slotids = NULL;
CK_ULONG n_slotids = 0;
rv = m->C_GetSlotList(0, NULL, &n_slotids);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return rv;
if (n_slotids == 0) {
*ret_slotids = NULL;
*ret_n_slotids = 0;
return CKR_OK;
}
slotids = new(CK_SLOT_ID, n_slotids);
if (!slotids)
return CKR_HOST_MEMORY;
rv = m->C_GetSlotList(0, slotids, &n_slotids);
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
*ret_slotids = TAKE_PTR(slotids);
*ret_n_slotids = n_slotids;
return CKR_OK;
}
if (rv != CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL)
return rv;
/* Hu? Maybe somebody plugged something in and things changed? Let's try again */
}
return CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
}
char *pkcs11_token_label(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
char *t;
/* The label is not NUL terminated and likely padded with spaces, let's make a copy here, so that we
* can strip that. */
t = strndup((char*) token_info->label, sizeof(token_info->label));
if (!t)
return NULL;
strstrip(t);
return t;
}
char *pkcs11_token_manufacturer_id(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
char *t;
t = strndup((char*) token_info->manufacturerID, sizeof(token_info->manufacturerID));
if (!t)
return NULL;
strstrip(t);
return t;
}
char *pkcs11_token_model(const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info) {
char *t;
t = strndup((char*) token_info->model, sizeof(token_info->model));
if (!t)
return NULL;
strstrip(t);
return t;
}
int pkcs11_token_login(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
const char *friendly_name,
const char *icon_name,
const char *key_name,
const char *credential_name,
usec_t until,
bool headless,
char **ret_used_pin) {
_cleanup_free_ char *token_uri_string = NULL, *token_uri_escaped = NULL, *id = NULL, *token_label = NULL;
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *token_uri = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO updated_token_info;
int uri_result, r;
CK_RV rv;
assert(m);
assert(token_info);
token_label = pkcs11_token_label(token_info);
if (!token_label)
return log_oom();
token_uri = uri_from_token_info(token_info);
if (!token_uri)
return log_oom();
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &token_uri_string);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_PROTECTED_AUTHENTICATION_PATH)) {
rv = m->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, NULL, 0);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to log into security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
log_info("Successfully logged into security token '%s' via protected authentication path.", token_label);
if (ret_used_pin)
*ret_used_pin = NULL;
return 0;
}
if (!FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_LOGIN_REQUIRED)) {
log_info("No login into security token '%s' required.", token_label);
if (ret_used_pin)
*ret_used_pin = NULL;
return 0;
}
token_uri_escaped = cescape(token_uri_string);
if (!token_uri_escaped)
return log_oom();
id = strjoin("pkcs11:", token_uri_escaped);
if (!id)
return log_oom();
for (unsigned tries = 0; tries < 3; tries++) {
_cleanup_strv_free_erase_ char **passwords = NULL;
char **i, *e;
e = getenv("PIN");
if (e) {
passwords = strv_new(e);
if (!passwords)
return log_oom();
string_erase(e);
if (unsetenv("PIN") < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to unset $PIN: %m");
} else if (headless)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOPKG), "PIN querying disabled via 'headless' option. Use the 'PIN' environment variable.");
else {
_cleanup_free_ char *text = NULL;
if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_USER_PIN_FINAL_TRY))
r = asprintf(&text,
"Please enter correct PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s (final try):",
token_label, friendly_name);
else if (FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_USER_PIN_COUNT_LOW))
r = asprintf(&text,
"PIN has been entered incorrectly previously, please enter correct PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s:",
token_label, friendly_name);
else if (tries == 0)
r = asprintf(&text,
"Please enter PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s:",
token_label, friendly_name);
else
r = asprintf(&text,
"Please enter PIN for security token '%s' in order to unlock %s (try #%u):",
token_label, friendly_name, tries+1);
if (r < 0)
return log_oom();
/* We never cache PINs, simply because it's fatal if we use wrong PINs, since usually there are only 3 tries */
r = ask_password_auto(text, icon_name, id, key_name, credential_name, until, 0, &passwords);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to query PIN for security token '%s': %m", token_label);
}
STRV_FOREACH(i, passwords) {
rv = m->C_Login(session, CKU_USER, (CK_UTF8CHAR*) *i, strlen(*i));
if (rv == CKR_OK) {
if (ret_used_pin) {
char *c;
c = strdup(*i);
if (!c)
return log_oom();
*ret_used_pin = c;
}
log_info("Successfully logged into security token '%s'.", token_label);
return 0;
}
if (rv == CKR_PIN_LOCKED)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM),
"PIN has been locked, please reset PIN of security token '%s'.", token_label);
if (!IN_SET(rv, CKR_PIN_INCORRECT, CKR_PIN_LEN_RANGE))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to log into security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
/* Referesh the token info, so that we can prompt knowing the new flags if they changed. */
rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slotid, &updated_token_info);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to acquire updated security token information for slot %lu: %s",
slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
token_info = &updated_token_info;
log_notice("PIN for token '%s' is incorrect, please try again.", token_label);
}
}
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EPERM), "Too many attempts to log into token '%s'.", token_label);
}
int pkcs11_token_find_x509_certificate(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
P11KitUri *search_uri,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *ret_object) {
bool found_class = false, found_certificate_type = false;
_cleanup_free_ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes_buffer = NULL;
CK_ULONG n_attributes, a, n_objects;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objects[2];
CK_RV rv, rv2;
assert(m);
assert(search_uri);
assert(ret_object);
attributes = p11_kit_uri_get_attributes(search_uri, &n_attributes);
for (a = 0; a < n_attributes; a++) {
/* We use the URI's included match attributes, but make them more strict. This allows users
* to specify a token URL instead of an object URL and the right thing should happen if
* there's only one suitable key on the token. */
switch (attributes[a].type) {
case CKA_CLASS: {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS c;
if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(c))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CLASS attribute size.");
memcpy(&c, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(c));
if (c != CKO_CERTIFICATE)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an X.509 certificate, refusing.");
found_class = true;
break;
}
case CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE: {
CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE t;
if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(t))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE attribute size.");
memcpy(&t, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(t));
if (t != CKC_X_509)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an X.509 certificate, refusing.");
found_certificate_type = true;
break;
}}
}
if (!found_class || !found_certificate_type) {
/* Hmm, let's slightly extend the attribute list we search for */
attributes_buffer = new(CK_ATTRIBUTE, n_attributes + !found_class + !found_certificate_type);
if (!attributes_buffer)
return log_oom();
memcpy(attributes_buffer, attributes, sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE) * n_attributes);
if (!found_class) {
static const CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_CERTIFICATE;
attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
.type = CKA_CLASS,
.pValue = (CK_OBJECT_CLASS*) &class,
.ulValueLen = sizeof(class),
};
}
if (!found_certificate_type) {
static const CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE type = CKC_X_509;
attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
.type = CKA_CERTIFICATE_TYPE,
.pValue = (CK_CERTIFICATE_TYPE*) &type,
.ulValueLen = sizeof(type),
};
}
attributes = attributes_buffer;
}
rv = m->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attributes, n_attributes);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to initialize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
rv = m->C_FindObjects(session, objects, ELEMENTSOF(objects), &n_objects);
rv2 = m->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to find objects: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
if (rv2 != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to finalize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
if (n_objects == 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
"Failed to find selected X509 certificate on token.");
if (n_objects > 1)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ),
"Configured URI matches multiple certificates, refusing.");
*ret_object = objects[0];
return 0;
}
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
int pkcs11_token_read_x509_certificate(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object,
X509 **ret_cert) {
_cleanup_free_ void *buffer = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *t = NULL;
CK_ATTRIBUTE attribute = {
.type = CKA_VALUE
};
CK_RV rv;
_cleanup_(X509_freep) X509 *x509 = NULL;
X509_NAME *name = NULL;
const unsigned char *p;
rv = m->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, &attribute, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to read X.509 certificate size off token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
buffer = malloc(attribute.ulValueLen);
if (!buffer)
return log_oom();
attribute.pValue = buffer;
rv = m->C_GetAttributeValue(session, object, &attribute, 1);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to read X.509 certificate data off token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
p = attribute.pValue;
x509 = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, attribute.ulValueLen);
if (!x509)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Failed parse X.509 certificate.");
name = X509_get_subject_name(x509);
if (!name)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EBADMSG), "Failed to acquire X.509 subject name.");
t = X509_NAME_oneline(name, NULL, 0);
if (!t)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to format X.509 subject name as string.");
log_debug("Using X.509 certificate issued for '%s'.", t);
*ret_cert = TAKE_PTR(x509);
return 0;
}
#endif
int pkcs11_token_find_private_key(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
P11KitUri *search_uri,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE *ret_object) {
bool found_decrypt = false, found_class = false, found_key_type = false;
_cleanup_free_ CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes_buffer = NULL;
CK_ULONG n_attributes, a, n_objects;
CK_ATTRIBUTE *attributes = NULL;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE objects[2];
CK_RV rv, rv2;
assert(m);
assert(search_uri);
assert(ret_object);
attributes = p11_kit_uri_get_attributes(search_uri, &n_attributes);
for (a = 0; a < n_attributes; a++) {
/* We use the URI's included match attributes, but make them more strict. This allows users
* to specify a token URL instead of an object URL and the right thing should happen if
* there's only one suitable key on the token. */
switch (attributes[a].type) {
case CKA_CLASS: {
CK_OBJECT_CLASS c;
if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(c))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_CLASS attribute size.");
memcpy(&c, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(c));
if (c != CKO_PRIVATE_KEY)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Selected PKCS#11 object is not a private key, refusing.");
found_class = true;
break;
}
case CKA_DECRYPT: {
CK_BBOOL b;
if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(b))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_DECRYPT attribute size.");
memcpy(&b, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(b));
if (!b)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Selected PKCS#11 object is not suitable for decryption, refusing.");
found_decrypt = true;
break;
}
case CKA_KEY_TYPE: {
CK_KEY_TYPE t;
if (attributes[a].ulValueLen != sizeof(t))
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Invalid PKCS#11 CKA_KEY_TYPE attribute size.");
memcpy(&t, attributes[a].pValue, sizeof(t));
if (t != CKK_RSA)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Selected PKCS#11 object is not an RSA key, refusing.");
found_key_type = true;
break;
}}
}
if (!found_decrypt || !found_class || !found_key_type) {
/* Hmm, let's slightly extend the attribute list we search for */
attributes_buffer = new(CK_ATTRIBUTE, n_attributes + !found_decrypt + !found_class + !found_key_type);
if (!attributes_buffer)
return log_oom();
memcpy(attributes_buffer, attributes, sizeof(CK_ATTRIBUTE) * n_attributes);
if (!found_decrypt) {
static const CK_BBOOL yes = true;
attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
.type = CKA_DECRYPT,
.pValue = (CK_BBOOL*) &yes,
.ulValueLen = sizeof(yes),
};
}
if (!found_class) {
static const CK_OBJECT_CLASS class = CKO_PRIVATE_KEY;
attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
.type = CKA_CLASS,
.pValue = (CK_OBJECT_CLASS*) &class,
.ulValueLen = sizeof(class),
};
}
if (!found_key_type) {
static const CK_KEY_TYPE type = CKK_RSA;
attributes_buffer[n_attributes++] = (CK_ATTRIBUTE) {
.type = CKA_KEY_TYPE,
.pValue = (CK_KEY_TYPE*) &type,
.ulValueLen = sizeof(type),
};
}
attributes = attributes_buffer;
}
rv = m->C_FindObjectsInit(session, attributes, n_attributes);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to initialize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
rv = m->C_FindObjects(session, objects, ELEMENTSOF(objects), &n_objects);
rv2 = m->C_FindObjectsFinal(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to find objects: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
if (rv2 != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to finalize object find call: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
if (n_objects == 0)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
"Failed to find selected private key suitable for decryption on token.");
if (n_objects > 1)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ),
"Configured private key URI matches multiple keys, refusing.");
*ret_object = objects[0];
return 0;
}
int pkcs11_token_decrypt_data(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object,
const void *encrypted_data,
size_t encrypted_data_size,
void **ret_decrypted_data,
size_t *ret_decrypted_data_size) {
static const CK_MECHANISM mechanism = {
.mechanism = CKM_RSA_PKCS
};
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) CK_BYTE *dbuffer = NULL;
CK_ULONG dbuffer_size = 0;
CK_RV rv;
assert(m);
assert(encrypted_data);
assert(encrypted_data_size > 0);
assert(ret_decrypted_data);
assert(ret_decrypted_data_size);
rv = m->C_DecryptInit(session, (CK_MECHANISM*) &mechanism, object);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to initialize decryption on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
dbuffer_size = encrypted_data_size; /* Start with something reasonable */
dbuffer = malloc(dbuffer_size);
if (!dbuffer)
return log_oom();
rv = m->C_Decrypt(session, (CK_BYTE*) encrypted_data, encrypted_data_size, dbuffer, &dbuffer_size);
if (rv == CKR_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
erase_and_free(dbuffer);
dbuffer = malloc(dbuffer_size);
if (!dbuffer)
return log_oom();
rv = m->C_Decrypt(session, (CK_BYTE*) encrypted_data, encrypted_data_size, dbuffer, &dbuffer_size);
}
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to decrypt key on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
log_info("Successfully decrypted key with security token.");
*ret_decrypted_data = TAKE_PTR(dbuffer);
*ret_decrypted_data_size = dbuffer_size;
return 0;
}
int pkcs11_token_acquire_rng(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session) {
_cleanup_free_ void *buffer = NULL;
size_t rps;
CK_RV rv;
int r;
assert(m);
/* While we are at it, let's read some RNG data from the PKCS#11 token and pass it to the kernel
* random pool. This should be cheap if we are talking to the device already. Note that we don't
* credit any entropy, since we don't know about the quality of the pkcs#11 token's RNG. Why bother
* at all? There are two sides to the argument whether to generate private keys on tokens or on the
* host. By crediting some data from the token RNG to the host's pool we at least can say that any
* key generated from it is at least as good as both sources individually. */
rps = random_pool_size();
buffer = malloc(rps);
if (!buffer)
return log_oom();
rv = m->C_GenerateRandom(session, buffer, rps);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"Failed to generate RNG data on security token: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
r = random_write_entropy(-1, buffer, rps, false);
if (r < 0)
return log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to write PKCS#11 acquired random data to /dev/urandom: %m");
log_debug("Successfully written %zu bytes random data acquired via PKCS#11 to kernel random pool.", rps);
return 0;
}
static int token_process(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info,
const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
P11KitUri *search_uri,
pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_free_ char *token_label = NULL;
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session;
CK_RV rv;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(slot_info);
assert(token_info);
token_label = pkcs11_token_label(token_info);
if (!token_label)
return log_oom();
rv = m->C_OpenSession(slotid, CKF_SERIAL_SESSION, NULL, NULL, &session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO),
"Failed to create session for security token '%s': %s", token_label, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
if (callback)
r = callback(m, session, slotid, slot_info, token_info, search_uri, userdata);
else
r = 1; /* if not callback was specified, just say we found what we were looking for */
rv = m->C_CloseSession(session);
if (rv != CKR_OK)
log_warning("Failed to close session on PKCS#11 token, ignoring: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
return r;
}
static int slot_process(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SLOT_ID slotid,
P11KitUri *search_uri,
pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri* slot_uri = NULL, *token_uri = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ char *token_uri_string = NULL;
CK_TOKEN_INFO token_info;
CK_SLOT_INFO slot_info;
int uri_result;
CK_RV rv;
assert(m);
/* We return -EAGAIN for all failures we can attribute to a specific slot in some way, so that the
* caller might try other slots before giving up. */
rv = m->C_GetSlotInfo(slotid, &slot_info);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to acquire slot info for slot %lu, ignoring slot: %s", slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
return -EAGAIN;
}
slot_uri = uri_from_slot_info(&slot_info);
if (!slot_uri)
return log_oom();
if (DEBUG_LOGGING) {
_cleanup_free_ char *slot_uri_string = NULL;
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(slot_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &slot_uri_string);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to format slot URI, ignoring slot: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
return -EAGAIN;
}
log_debug("Found slot with URI %s", slot_uri_string);
}
rv = m->C_GetTokenInfo(slotid, &token_info);
if (rv == CKR_TOKEN_NOT_PRESENT) {
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Token not present in slot, ignoring.");
} else if (rv != CKR_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to acquire token info for slot %lu, ignoring slot: %s", slotid, p11_kit_strerror(rv));
return -EAGAIN;
}
token_uri = uri_from_token_info(&token_info);
if (!token_uri)
return log_oom();
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &token_uri_string);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (search_uri && !p11_kit_uri_match_token_info(search_uri, &token_info))
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"Found non-matching token with URI %s.",
token_uri_string);
log_debug("Found matching token with URI %s.", token_uri_string);
return token_process(
m,
slotid,
&slot_info,
&token_info,
search_uri,
callback,
userdata);
}
static int module_process(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
P11KitUri *search_uri,
pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_free_ char *name = NULL, *module_uri_string = NULL;
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri* module_uri = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ CK_SLOT_ID *slotids = NULL;
CK_ULONG n_slotids = 0;
int uri_result;
CK_INFO info;
size_t k;
CK_RV rv;
int r;
assert(m);
/* We ignore most errors from modules here, in order to skip over faulty modules: one faulty module
* should not have the effect that we don't try the others anymore. We indicate such per-module
* failures with -EAGAIN, which let's the caller try the next module. */
name = p11_kit_module_get_name(m);
if (!name)
return log_oom();
log_debug("Trying PKCS#11 module %s.", name);
rv = m->C_GetInfo(&info);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to get info on PKCS#11 module, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
return -EAGAIN;
}
module_uri = uri_from_module_info(&info);
if (!module_uri)
return log_oom();
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(module_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &module_uri_string);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to format module URI, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
return -EAGAIN;
}
log_debug("Found module with URI %s", module_uri_string);
rv = pkcs11_get_slot_list_malloc(m, &slotids, &n_slotids);
if (rv != CKR_OK) {
log_warning("Failed to get slot list, ignoring module: %s", p11_kit_strerror(rv));
return -EAGAIN;
}
if (n_slotids == 0)
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN),
"This module has no slots? Ignoring module.");
for (k = 0; k < n_slotids; k++) {
r = slot_process(
m,
slotids[k],
search_uri,
callback,
userdata);
if (r != -EAGAIN)
return r;
}
return -EAGAIN;
}
int pkcs11_find_token(
const char *pkcs11_uri,
pkcs11_find_token_callback_t callback,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(p11_kit_modules_finalize_and_releasep) CK_FUNCTION_LIST **modules = NULL;
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *search_uri = NULL;
int r;
/* Execute the specified callback for each matching token found. If nothing is found returns
* -EAGAIN. Logs about all errors, except for EAGAIN, which the caller has to log about. */
if (pkcs11_uri) {
r = uri_from_string(pkcs11_uri, &search_uri);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to parse PKCS#11 URI '%s': %m", pkcs11_uri);
}
modules = p11_kit_modules_load_and_initialize(0);
if (!modules)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Failed to initialize pkcs11 modules");
for (CK_FUNCTION_LIST **i = modules; *i; i++) {
r = module_process(
*i,
search_uri,
callback,
userdata);
if (r != -EAGAIN)
return r;
}
return -EAGAIN;
}
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
struct pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data {
char *pin_used;
X509 *cert;
const char *askpw_friendly_name, *askpw_icon_name;
};
static void pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data_release(struct pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data *data) {
erase_and_free(data->pin_used);
X509_free(data->cert);
}
static int pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SLOT_ID slot_id,
const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info,
const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
P11KitUri *uri,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_used = NULL;
struct pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data *data = userdata;
CK_OBJECT_HANDLE object;
int r;
assert(m);
assert(slot_info);
assert(token_info);
assert(uri);
assert(data);
/* Called for every token matching our URI */
r = pkcs11_token_login(m, session, slot_id, token_info, data->askpw_friendly_name, data->askpw_icon_name, "pkcs11-pin", "pkcs11-pin", UINT64_MAX, false, &pin_used);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = pkcs11_token_find_x509_certificate(m, session, uri, &object);
if (r < 0)
return r;
r = pkcs11_token_read_x509_certificate(m, session, object, &data->cert);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's read some random data off the token and write it to the kernel pool before we generate our
* random key from it. This way we can claim the quality of the RNG is at least as good as the
* kernel's and the token's pool */
(void) pkcs11_token_acquire_rng(m, session);
data->pin_used = TAKE_PTR(pin_used);
return 1;
}
int pkcs11_acquire_certificate(
const char *uri,
const char *askpw_friendly_name,
const char *askpw_icon_name,
X509 **ret_cert,
char **ret_pin_used) {
_cleanup_(pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data_release) struct pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback_data data = {
.askpw_friendly_name = askpw_friendly_name,
.askpw_icon_name = askpw_icon_name,
};
int r;
assert(uri);
assert(ret_cert);
r = pkcs11_find_token(uri, pkcs11_acquire_certificate_callback, &data);
if (r == -EAGAIN) /* pkcs11_find_token() doesn't log about this error, but all others */
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENXIO),
"Specified PKCS#11 token with URI '%s' not found.",
uri);
if (r < 0)
return r;
*ret_cert = TAKE_PTR(data.cert);
if (ret_pin_used)
*ret_pin_used = TAKE_PTR(data.pin_used);
return 0;
}
#endif
static int list_callback(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SLOT_ID slot_id,
const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info,
const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
P11KitUri *uri,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_free_ char *token_uri_string = NULL, *token_label = NULL, *token_manufacturer_id = NULL, *token_model = NULL;
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *token_uri = NULL;
Table *t = userdata;
int uri_result, r;
assert(slot_info);
assert(token_info);
/* We only care about hardware devices here with a token inserted. Let's filter everything else
* out. (Note that the user can explicitly specify non-hardware tokens if they like, but during
* enumeration we'll filter those, since software tokens are typically the system certificate store
* and such, and it's typically not what people want to bind their home directories to.) */
if (!FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_HW_SLOT|CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
return -EAGAIN;
token_label = pkcs11_token_label(token_info);
if (!token_label)
return log_oom();
token_manufacturer_id = pkcs11_token_manufacturer_id(token_info);
if (!token_manufacturer_id)
return log_oom();
token_model = pkcs11_token_model(token_info);
if (!token_model)
return log_oom();
token_uri = uri_from_token_info(token_info);
if (!token_uri)
return log_oom();
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, &token_uri_string);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
r = table_add_many(
t,
TABLE_STRING, token_uri_string,
TABLE_STRING, token_label,
TABLE_STRING, token_manufacturer_id,
TABLE_STRING, token_model);
if (r < 0)
return table_log_add_error(r);
return -EAGAIN; /* keep scanning */
}
#endif
int pkcs11_list_tokens(void) {
#if HAVE_P11KIT
_cleanup_(table_unrefp) Table *t = NULL;
int r;
t = table_new("uri", "label", "manufacturer", "model");
if (!t)
return log_oom();
r = pkcs11_find_token(NULL, list_callback, t);
if (r < 0 && r != -EAGAIN)
return r;
if (table_get_rows(t) <= 1) {
log_info("No suitable PKCS#11 tokens found.");
return 0;
}
r = table_print(t, stdout);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to show device table: %m");
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"PKCS#11 tokens not supported on this build.");
#endif
}
#if HAVE_P11KIT
static int auto_callback(
CK_FUNCTION_LIST *m,
CK_SESSION_HANDLE session,
CK_SLOT_ID slot_id,
const CK_SLOT_INFO *slot_info,
const CK_TOKEN_INFO *token_info,
P11KitUri *uri,
void *userdata) {
_cleanup_(p11_kit_uri_freep) P11KitUri *token_uri = NULL;
char **t = userdata;
int uri_result;
assert(slot_info);
assert(token_info);
if (!FLAGS_SET(token_info->flags, CKF_HW_SLOT|CKF_TOKEN_PRESENT))
return -EAGAIN;
if (*t)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTUNIQ),
"More than one suitable PKCS#11 token found.");
token_uri = uri_from_token_info(token_info);
if (!token_uri)
return log_oom();
uri_result = p11_kit_uri_format(token_uri, P11_KIT_URI_FOR_ANY, t);
if (uri_result != P11_KIT_URI_OK)
return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EAGAIN), "Failed to format slot URI: %s", p11_kit_uri_message(uri_result));
return 0;
}
#endif
int pkcs11_find_token_auto(char **ret) {
#if HAVE_P11KIT
int r;
r = pkcs11_find_token(NULL, auto_callback, ret);
if (r == -EAGAIN)
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODEV), "No suitable PKCS#11 tokens found.");
if (r < 0)
return r;
return 0;
#else
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"PKCS#11 tokens not supported on this build.");
#endif
}
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