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authorWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2014-05-07 13:16:32 +0200
committerWerner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>2014-05-07 13:27:43 +0200
commit8fee6c1ce6d116fe7909dbe1184d95bc91305484 (patch)
treee803fc492044c704a55b32700c491627f5f93f89 /agent/cvt-openpgp.c
parentkbx: Add experimental support for EDDSA. (diff)
downloadgnupg2-8fee6c1ce6d116fe7909dbe1184d95bc91305484.tar.xz
gnupg2-8fee6c1ce6d116fe7909dbe1184d95bc91305484.zip
gpg: Finish experimental support for Ed25519.
* agent/cvt-openpgp.c (try_do_unprotect_arg_s): Add field "curve". (get_keygrip): Add and use arg CURVE. (convert_secret_key): Ditto. (convert_transfer_key): Ditto. (get_npkey_nskey): New. (prepare_unprotect): Replace gcrypt functions by get_npkey_nskey. Allow opaque MPIs. (do_unprotect): Use CURVE instead of parameters. (convert_from_openpgp_main): Ditto. (convert_to_openpgp): Simplify. * g10/import.c (one_mpi_from_pkey): Remove. (transfer_secret_keys): Rewrite to use the curve instead of the parameters. * g10/parse-packet.c (parse_key): Mark protected MPIs with USER1 flag. * common/openpgp-oid.c (openpgp_curve_to_oid): Allow the use of "NIST P-256" et al. * g10/keygen.c (ask_curve): Add arg ALGO. (generate_keypair): Rewrite the ECC key logic. * tests/openpgp/ecc.test: Provide the "ecc" passphrase.
Diffstat (limited to 'agent/cvt-openpgp.c')
-rw-r--r--agent/cvt-openpgp.c184
1 files changed, 100 insertions, 84 deletions
diff --git a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
index ef34463d8..28f0380e4 100644
--- a/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
+++ b/agent/cvt-openpgp.c
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
int is_v4;
int is_protected;
int pubkey_algo;
+ const char *curve;
int protect_algo;
char *iv;
int ivlen;
@@ -54,7 +55,8 @@ struct try_do_unprotect_arg_s
/* Compute the keygrip from the public key and store it at GRIP. */
static gpg_error_t
-get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip)
+get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, const char *curve, gcry_mpi_t *pkey,
+ unsigned char *grip)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t s_pkey = NULL;
@@ -80,9 +82,8 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip)
case GCRY_PK_ECC:
err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_pkey, NULL,
- "(public-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)))",
- pkey[0], pkey[1], pkey[2], pkey[3], pkey[4],
- pkey[5]);
+ "(public-key(ecc(curve %s)(q%m)))",
+ curve, pkey[0]);
break;
default:
@@ -102,7 +103,8 @@ get_keygrip (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *pkey, unsigned char *grip)
parameters into our s-expression based format. Note that
PUBKEY_ALGO has an gcrypt algorithm number. */
static gpg_error_t
-convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
+convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
+ const char *curve)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
@@ -135,11 +137,12 @@ convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
break;
case GCRY_PK_ECC:
- err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_skey, NULL,
- "(private-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)"
- "(d%m)))",
- skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4],
- skey[5], skey[6]);
+ if (!curve)
+ err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
+ else
+ err = gcry_sexp_build (&s_skey, NULL,
+ "(private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)(d%m)))",
+ curve, skey[0], skey[1]);
break;
default:
@@ -160,7 +163,7 @@ convert_secret_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey)
mode. Note that PUBKEY_ALGO has an gcrypt algorithm number. */
static gpg_error_t
convert_transfer_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
- gcry_sexp_t transfer_key)
+ const char *curve, gcry_sexp_t transfer_key)
{
gpg_error_t err;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
@@ -197,9 +200,9 @@ convert_transfer_key (gcry_sexp_t *r_key, int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey,
case GCRY_PK_ECC:
err = gcry_sexp_build
(&s_skey, NULL,
- "(protected-private-key(ecc(p%m)(a%m)(b%m)(g%m)(n%m)(q%m)"
+ "(protected-private-key(ecc(curve%s)(q%m)"
"(protected openpgp-native%S)))",
- skey[0], skey[1], skey[2], skey[3], skey[4], skey[5], transfer_key);
+ curve, skey[0], transfer_key);
break;
default:
@@ -254,6 +257,22 @@ checksum (const unsigned char *p, unsigned int n)
}
+/* Return the number of expected key parameters. */
+static void
+get_npkey_nskey (int pubkey_algo, size_t *npkey, size_t *nskey)
+{
+ switch (pubkey_algo)
+ {
+ case GCRY_PK_RSA: *npkey = 2; *nskey = 6; break;
+ case GCRY_PK_ELG: *npkey = 3; *nskey = 4; break;
+ case GCRY_PK_ELG_E: *npkey = 3; *nskey = 4; break;
+ case GCRY_PK_DSA: *npkey = 4; *nskey = 5; break;
+ case GCRY_PK_ECC: *npkey = 1; *nskey = 2; break;
+ default: *npkey = 0; *nskey = 0; break;
+ }
+}
+
+
/* Helper for do_unprotect. PUBKEY_ALOGO is the gcrypt algo number.
On success R_NPKEY and R_NSKEY receive the number or parameters for
the algorithm PUBKEY_ALGO and R_SKEYLEN the used length of
@@ -264,7 +283,6 @@ prepare_unprotect (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
unsigned int *r_npkey, unsigned int *r_nskey,
unsigned int *r_skeylen)
{
- gpg_error_t err;
size_t npkey, nskey, skeylen;
int i;
@@ -293,12 +311,8 @@ prepare_unprotect (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
/* Get properties of the public key algorithm and do some
consistency checks. Note that we need at least NPKEY+1 elements
in the SKEY array. */
- if ( (err = gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NPKEY,
- NULL, &npkey))
- || (err = gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY,
- NULL, &nskey)))
- return err;
- if (!npkey || npkey >= nskey)
+ get_npkey_nskey (pubkey_algo, &npkey, &nskey);
+ if (!npkey || !nskey || npkey >= nskey)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_INTERNAL);
if (skeylen <= npkey)
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_MISSING_VALUE);
@@ -309,7 +323,7 @@ prepare_unprotect (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
encrypted. */
for (i=0; i < npkey; i++)
{
- if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
+ if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
}
@@ -329,7 +343,7 @@ prepare_unprotect (int pubkey_algo, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
static int
do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
int pkt_version, int pubkey_algo, int is_protected,
- gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
+ const char *curve, gcry_mpi_t *skey, size_t skeysize,
int protect_algo, void *protect_iv, size_t protect_ivlen,
int s2k_mode, int s2k_algo, byte *s2k_salt, u32 s2k_count,
u16 desired_csum, gcry_sexp_t *r_key)
@@ -353,23 +367,26 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
merely verify the checksum. */
if (!is_protected)
{
- unsigned char *buffer;
-
actual_csum = 0;
for (i=npkey; i < nskey; i++)
{
- if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE))
+ if (!skey[i] || gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
return gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
- err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, NULL, 0, &nbytes, skey[i]);
- if (!err)
+ if (gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[i], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1))
+ {
+ unsigned int nbits;
+ const unsigned char *buffer;
+ buffer = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (skey[i], &nbits);
+ nbytes = (nbits+7)/8;
+ actual_csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
+ }
+ else
{
- buffer = (gcry_is_secure (skey[i])?
- xtrymalloc_secure (nbytes) : xtrymalloc (nbytes));
- if (!buffer)
- return gpg_error_from_syserror ();
- err = gcry_mpi_print (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, buffer, nbytes,
- NULL, skey[i]);
+ unsigned char *buffer;
+
+ err = gcry_mpi_aprint (GCRYMPI_FMT_PGP, &buffer, &nbytes,
+ skey[i]);
if (!err)
actual_csum += checksum (buffer, nbytes);
xfree (buffer);
@@ -428,7 +445,8 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
{
int ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
- unsigned char *p, *data;
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ unsigned char *data;
u16 csum_pgp7 = 0;
if (!gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[npkey], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE ))
@@ -527,7 +545,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
for (i = npkey; i < nskey; i++)
{
- unsigned char *p;
+ const unsigned char *p;
size_t ndata;
unsigned int ndatabits;
@@ -580,7 +598,7 @@ do_unprotect (const char *passphrase,
if (nskey != skeylen)
err = gpg_error (GPG_ERR_BAD_SECKEY);
else
- err = convert_secret_key (r_key, pubkey_algo, skey);
+ err = convert_secret_key (r_key, pubkey_algo, skey, curve);
if (err)
return err;
@@ -608,6 +626,7 @@ try_do_unprotect_cb (struct pin_entry_info_s *pi)
err = do_unprotect (pi->pin,
arg->is_v4? 4:3,
arg->pubkey_algo, arg->is_protected,
+ arg->curve,
arg->skey, arg->skeysize,
arg->protect_algo, arg->iv, arg->ivlen,
arg->s2k_mode, arg->s2k_algo,
@@ -651,6 +670,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
u32 s2k_count = 0;
size_t npkey, nskey;
gcry_mpi_t skey[10]; /* We support up to 9 parameters. */
+ char *curve = NULL;
u16 desired_csum;
int skeyidx = 0;
gcry_sexp_t s_skey = NULL;
@@ -695,8 +715,6 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
if (!string)
goto bad_seckey;
protect_algo = gcry_cipher_map_name (string);
- if (!protect_algo && !!strcmp (string, "IDEA"))
- protect_algo = GCRY_CIPHER_IDEA;
xfree (string);
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, 3, &valuelen);
@@ -739,11 +757,21 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
pubkey_algo = gcry_pk_map_name (string);
xfree (string);
- if (gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NPKEY, NULL, &npkey)
- || gcry_pk_algo_info (pubkey_algo, GCRYCTL_GET_ALGO_NSKEY, NULL, &nskey)
- || !npkey || npkey >= nskey)
+ get_npkey_nskey (pubkey_algo, &npkey, &nskey);
+ if (!npkey || !nskey || npkey >= nskey)
goto bad_seckey;
+ if (npkey == 1) /* This is ECC */
+ {
+ gcry_sexp_release (list);
+ list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "curve", 0);
+ if (!list)
+ goto bad_seckey;
+ curve = gcry_sexp_nth_string (list, 1);
+ if (!curve)
+ goto bad_seckey;
+ }
+
gcry_sexp_release (list);
list = gcry_sexp_find_token (top_list, "skey", 0);
if (!list)
@@ -770,15 +798,15 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
value = gcry_sexp_nth_data (list, ++idx, &valuelen);
if (!value || !valuelen)
goto bad_seckey;
- if (is_enc)
+ if (is_enc || curve)
{
- void *p = xtrymalloc (valuelen);
- if (!p)
- goto outofmem;
- memcpy (p, value, valuelen);
- skey[skeyidx] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque (NULL, p, valuelen*8);
+ /* Encrypted parameters and ECC parameters need or can be
+ stored as opaque. */
+ skey[skeyidx] = gcry_mpi_set_opaque_copy (NULL, value, valuelen*8);
if (!skey[skeyidx])
goto outofmem;
+ if (is_enc)
+ gcry_mpi_set_flag (skey[skeyidx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1);
}
else
{
@@ -807,33 +835,24 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
gcry_sexp_release (list); list = NULL;
gcry_sexp_release (top_list); top_list = NULL;
- /* log_debug ("XXX is_v4=%d\n", is_v4); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX pubkey_algo=%d\n", pubkey_algo); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX is_protected=%d\n", is_protected); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX protect_algo=%d\n", protect_algo); */
- /* log_printhex ("XXX iv", iv, ivlen); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX ivlen=%d\n", ivlen); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX s2k_mode=%d\n", s2k_mode); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX s2k_algo=%d\n", s2k_algo); */
- /* log_printhex ("XXX s2k_salt", s2k_salt, sizeof s2k_salt); */
- /* log_debug ("XXX s2k_count=%lu\n", (unsigned long)s2k_count); */
- /* for (idx=0; skey[idx]; idx++) */
- /* { */
- /* int is_enc = gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_OPAQUE); */
- /* log_info ("XXX skey[%d]%s:", idx, is_enc? " (enc)":""); */
- /* if (is_enc) */
- /* { */
- /* void *p; */
- /* unsigned int nbits; */
- /* p = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (skey[idx], &nbits); */
- /* log_printhex (NULL, p, (nbits+7)/8); */
- /* } */
- /* else */
- /* gcry_mpi_dump (skey[idx]); */
- /* log_printf ("\n"); */
- /* } */
-
- err = get_keygrip (pubkey_algo, skey, grip);
+#if 0
+ log_debug ("XXX is_v4=%d\n", is_v4);
+ log_debug ("XXX pubkey_algo=%d\n", pubkey_algo);
+ log_debug ("XXX is_protected=%d\n", is_protected);
+ log_debug ("XXX protect_algo=%d\n", protect_algo);
+ log_printhex ("XXX iv", iv, ivlen);
+ log_debug ("XXX ivlen=%d\n", ivlen);
+ log_debug ("XXX s2k_mode=%d\n", s2k_mode);
+ log_debug ("XXX s2k_algo=%d\n", s2k_algo);
+ log_printhex ("XXX s2k_salt", s2k_salt, sizeof s2k_salt);
+ log_debug ("XXX s2k_count=%lu\n", (unsigned long)s2k_count);
+ log_debug ("XXX curve='%s'\n", curve);
+ for (idx=0; skey[idx]; idx++)
+ gcry_log_debugmpi (gcry_mpi_get_flag (skey[idx], GCRYMPI_FLAG_USER1)
+ ? "skey(e)" : "skey(_)", skey[idx]);
+#endif /*0*/
+
+ err = get_keygrip (pubkey_algo, curve, skey, grip);
if (err)
goto leave;
@@ -850,7 +869,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
if (err)
goto leave;
- err = convert_transfer_key (&s_skey, pubkey_algo, skey, s_pgp);
+ err = convert_transfer_key (&s_skey, pubkey_algo, skey, curve, s_pgp);
if (err)
goto leave;
}
@@ -871,6 +890,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
pi_arg.is_v4 = is_v4;
pi_arg.is_protected = is_protected;
pi_arg.pubkey_algo = pubkey_algo;
+ pi_arg.curve = curve;
pi_arg.protect_algo = protect_algo;
pi_arg.iv = iv;
pi_arg.ivlen = ivlen;
@@ -929,6 +949,7 @@ convert_from_openpgp_main (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_pgp,
err = make_canon_sexp_pad (s_skey, 1, r_key, NULL);
leave:
+ xfree (curve);
gcry_sexp_release (s_skey);
gcry_sexp_release (list);
gcry_sexp_release (top_list);
@@ -1223,11 +1244,9 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
{
char countbuf[35];
membuf_t mbuf;
- void *format_args_buf_ptr[1];
- int format_args_buf_int[1];
void *format_args[10+2];
- unsigned int n;
- gcry_sexp_t tmpkey, tmpsexp = NULL;
+ gcry_sexp_t tmpkey;
+ gcry_sexp_t tmpsexp = NULL;
snprintf (countbuf, sizeof countbuf, "%lu", s2k_count);
@@ -1238,11 +1257,8 @@ convert_to_openpgp (ctrl_t ctrl, gcry_sexp_t s_key, const char *passphrase,
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " _ %m");
format_args[j++] = array + i;
}
- put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %b");
- format_args_buf_ptr[0] = gcry_mpi_get_opaque (array[npkey], &n);
- format_args_buf_int[0] = (n+7)/8;
- format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_int;
- format_args[j++] = format_args_buf_ptr;
+ put_membuf_str (&mbuf, " e %m");
+ format_args[j++] = array + npkey;
put_membuf_str (&mbuf, ")\n");
put_membuf (&mbuf, "", 1);