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author | Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> | 2018-01-21 16:24:43 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org> | 2018-01-21 16:30:53 +0100 |
commit | 3f4ca85cb0cf58006417f4f7faafaa9a1f1bdf22 (patch) | |
tree | d77273b89c38dda139c8e204c6d60673e46a5e36 /g10/mainproc.c | |
parent | gpg: Add stub function for encrypting AEAD. (diff) | |
download | gnupg2-3f4ca85cb0cf58006417f4f7faafaa9a1f1bdf22.tar.xz gnupg2-3f4ca85cb0cf58006417f4f7faafaa9a1f1bdf22.zip |
gpg: First take on PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD.
* common/openpgpdefs.h (PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD): New const.
* g10/dek.h (DEK): Increase size of use_aead to 4 bits.
* g10/filter.h (cipher_filter_context_t): Add new fields for AEAD.
* g10/packet.h (PKT_encrypted): Add fields aead_algo, cipher_algo, and
chunkbyte.
* g10/build-packet.c (do_encrypted_aead): New.
(build_packet): Call it.
* g10/parse-packet.c (dump_sig_subpkt): Handle SIGSUBPKT_PREF_AEAD.
(parse_one_sig_subpkt, can_handle_critical): Ditto.
(parse_encrypted): Clear new PKT_ENCRYPTED fields.
(parse_encrypted_aead): New.
(parse): Call it.
* g10/gpg.c (main): Take care of --rfc4880bis option when checking
compliance.
* g10/cipher-aead.c: Replace the stub by real code.
* g10/decrypt-data.c (decode_filter_ctx_t): Add fields for use with
AEAD.
(aead_set_nonce): New.
(aead_set_ad): New.
(decrypt_data): Support AEAD.
(aead_underflow): New.
(aead_decode_filter): New.
* g10/encrypt.c (use_aead): Make that new fucntion work.
(encrypt_simple): Use default_aead_algo() instead of EAX.
* g10/mainproc.c (proc_encrypted): Support AEAD.
(do_proc_packets): Support PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD.
--
This code has seen only a very few manual tests. Encrypting always
uses a 64k chunks and decryption has not been tested with larger
chunks. Those small chunks make debugging much faster.
Tests can be done using:
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase abc \
--force-aead --aead-algo ocb --s2k-mode 0 --cipher AES \
-v -z 0 --status-fd 2 -c <INFILE >OUTFILE
and
gpg --rfc4880bis --pinentry-mode=loopback --passphrase=abc \
--status-fd 2 -v -d <INFILE >OUTFILE
Signed-off-by: Werner Koch <wk@gnupg.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'g10/mainproc.c')
-rw-r--r-- | g10/mainproc.c | 23 |
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/g10/mainproc.c b/g10/mainproc.c index b712e6048..92da98242 100644 --- a/g10/mainproc.c +++ b/g10/mainproc.c @@ -648,6 +648,7 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) else if (!result && !opt.ignore_mdc_error && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method + && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo && openpgp_cipher_get_algo_blklen (c->dek->algo) != 8 && c->dek->algo != CIPHER_ALGO_TWOFISH) { @@ -662,17 +663,25 @@ proc_encrypted (CTX c, PACKET *pkt) write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_FAILED); } else if (!result || (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE + && !pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo && opt.ignore_mdc_error)) { + /* All is fine or for an MDC message the MDC failed but the + * --ignore-mdc-error option is active. For compatibility + * reasons we issue GOODMDC also for AEAD messages. */ write_status (STATUS_DECRYPTION_OKAY); if (opt.verbose > 1) log_info(_("decryption okay\n")); - if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result) + + if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->aead_algo) + write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC); + else if (pkt->pkt.encrypted->mdc_method && !result) write_status (STATUS_GOODMDC); else if (!opt.no_mdc_warn) log_info (_("WARNING: message was not integrity protected\n")); } - else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE) + else if (gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_BAD_SIGNATURE + || gpg_err_code (result) == GPG_ERR_TRUNCATED) { glo_ctrl.lasterr = result; log_error (_("WARNING: encrypted message has been manipulated!\n")); @@ -1391,7 +1400,8 @@ do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a) case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD:proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; default: newpkt = 0; break; } @@ -1407,6 +1417,7 @@ do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a) case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: case PKT_ENCRYPTED: case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: write_status_text( STATUS_UNEXPECTED, "0" ); rc = GPG_ERR_UNEXPECTED; goto leave; @@ -1434,7 +1445,8 @@ do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a) case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break; @@ -1461,7 +1473,8 @@ do_proc_packets (ctrl_t ctrl, CTX c, iobuf_t a) case PKT_PUBKEY_ENC: proc_pubkey_enc (ctrl, c, pkt); break; case PKT_SYMKEY_ENC: proc_symkey_enc (c, pkt); break; case PKT_ENCRYPTED: - case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_MDC: + case PKT_ENCRYPTED_AEAD: proc_encrypted (c, pkt); break; case PKT_PLAINTEXT: proc_plaintext (c, pkt); break; case PKT_COMPRESSED: rc = proc_compressed (c, pkt); break; case PKT_ONEPASS_SIG: newpkt = add_onepass_sig (c, pkt); break; |