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* Check if an object (a message, detached sign, public key, or whatever)
is signed by definite user, i.e. define user
(userid, or any other unique identification) on command line.
--> NO: Use a script and --status-fd
* Change the internal represention of keyid into a struct which
can also hold the localid and extend the localid to hold information
of the subkey number because two subkeys may have the same keyid.
* signature verification is done duplicated on import: in import.c and
then in trustdb.c too. Maybe we can use a flag to skip the actual
verification process (this should work if we use the same keyblock,
but I'm not sure how to accomplish that). Another way is to allow
the import of bogus data and let trustdb mark these keys as invalid;
I see an advantage in this that it may help to prevent a DoS on a
keyserver by sending him a lot of bogus signatures which he has
to check - Needs further investigation.
* Add a way to override the current cipher/md implementations
by others (using extensions)
* Not GnuPG replated: What about option completion in bash?
Can "--dump-options" be used for this or should we place the
options in a special ELF segment?
* Split key support (n-out-of-m)
* Check Berkeley DB - it is in glibc - any licensing problems?
* add an option to re-create a public key from a secret key; we
can do this in trustdb.c:verify_own_keys.
(special tool?)
* rewrite --list-packets or put it into another tool.
* We need a maintainence pass over the trustdb which flags
signatures as expired if the key used to make the signature has
expired. Maybe it is a good idea to store the exiration time
in the key record of the trustdb.
* write a tool to extract selected keys from a file.
* Change the buffering to a mbuf like scheme? Need it for PSST anyway;
see Michael's proposal.
* Work on the library
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