diff options
author | Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com> | 2011-03-23 16:42:57 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de> | 2011-03-23 22:48:13 +0100 |
commit | 4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df (patch) | |
tree | 730a88b218c6540feda268aa6df5d9ef349abc5a | |
parent | sound/oss: remove offset from load_patch callbacks (diff) | |
download | linux-4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df.tar.xz linux-4d00135a680727f6c3be78f8befaac009030e4df.zip |
sound/oss/opl3: validate voice and channel indexes
User-controllable indexes for voice and channel values may cause reading
and writing beyond the bounds of their respective arrays, leading to
potentially exploitable memory corruption. Validate these indexes.
Signed-off-by: Dan Rosenberg <drosenberg@vsecurity.com>
Cc: stable@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai <tiwai@suse.de>
-rw-r--r-- | sound/oss/opl3.c | 15 |
1 files changed, 13 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/sound/oss/opl3.c b/sound/oss/opl3.c index cbf957424d5c..407cd677950b 100644 --- a/sound/oss/opl3.c +++ b/sound/oss/opl3.c @@ -845,6 +845,10 @@ static int opl3_load_patch(int dev, int format, const char __user *addr, static void opl3_panning(int dev, int voice, int value) { + + if (voice < 0 || voice >= devc->nr_voice) + return; + devc->voc[voice].panning = value; } @@ -1062,8 +1066,15 @@ static int opl3_alloc_voice(int dev, int chn, int note, struct voice_alloc_info static void opl3_setup_voice(int dev, int voice, int chn) { - struct channel_info *info = - &synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn]; + struct channel_info *info; + + if (voice < 0 || voice >= devc->nr_voice) + return; + + if (chn < 0 || chn > 15) + return; + + info = &synth_devs[dev]->chn_info[chn]; opl3_set_instr(dev, voice, info->pgm_num); |