diff options
author | Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com> | 2023-12-05 11:50:18 +0100 |
---|---|---|
committer | Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de> | 2024-01-31 22:03:04 +0100 |
commit | 5105e7687ad3dffde77f6e4393b5530e83d672dc (patch) | |
tree | bc3f17dae2474cf5e4b411b6e249e2c52ceef121 /arch/x86/mm | |
parent | x86/fred: Let ret_from_fork_asm() jmp to asm_fred_exit_user when FRED is enabled (diff) | |
download | linux-5105e7687ad3dffde77f6e4393b5530e83d672dc.tar.xz linux-5105e7687ad3dffde77f6e4393b5530e83d672dc.zip |
x86/fred: Fixup fault on ERETU by jumping to fred_entrypoint_user
If the stack frame contains an invalid user context (e.g. due to invalid SS,
a non-canonical RIP, etc.) the ERETU instruction will trap (#SS or #GP).
From a Linux point of view, this really should be considered a user space
failure, so use the standard fault fixup mechanism to intercept the fault,
fix up the exception frame, and redirect execution to fred_entrypoint_user.
The end result is that it appears just as if the hardware had taken the
exception immediately after completing the transition to user space.
Suggested-by: H. Peter Anvin (Intel) <hpa@zytor.com>
Signed-off-by: Xin Li <xin3.li@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov (AMD) <bp@alien8.de>
Tested-by: Shan Kang <shan.kang@intel.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20231205105030.8698-30-xin3.li@intel.com
Diffstat (limited to 'arch/x86/mm')
-rw-r--r-- | arch/x86/mm/extable.c | 78 |
1 files changed, 78 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c index 271dcb2deabc..b522933bfa56 100644 --- a/arch/x86/mm/extable.c +++ b/arch/x86/mm/extable.c @@ -6,6 +6,7 @@ #include <xen/xen.h> #include <asm/fpu/api.h> +#include <asm/fred.h> #include <asm/sev.h> #include <asm/traps.h> #include <asm/kdebug.h> @@ -223,6 +224,79 @@ static bool ex_handler_ucopy_len(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, return ex_handler_uaccess(fixup, regs, trapnr, fault_address); } +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED +static bool ex_handler_eretu(const struct exception_table_entry *fixup, + struct pt_regs *regs, unsigned long error_code) +{ + struct pt_regs *uregs = (struct pt_regs *)(regs->sp - offsetof(struct pt_regs, orig_ax)); + unsigned short ss = uregs->ss; + unsigned short cs = uregs->cs; + + /* + * Move the NMI bit from the invalid stack frame, which caused ERETU + * to fault, to the fault handler's stack frame, thus to unblock NMI + * with the fault handler's ERETS instruction ASAP if NMI is blocked. + */ + regs->fred_ss.nmi = uregs->fred_ss.nmi; + + /* + * Sync event information to uregs, i.e., the ERETU return frame, but + * is it safe to write to the ERETU return frame which is just above + * current event stack frame? + * + * The RSP used by FRED to push a stack frame is not the value in %rsp, + * it is calculated from %rsp with the following 2 steps: + * 1) RSP = %rsp - (IA32_FRED_CONFIG & 0x1c0) // Reserve N*64 bytes + * 2) RSP = RSP & ~0x3f // Align to a 64-byte cache line + * when an event delivery doesn't trigger a stack level change. + * + * Here is an example with N*64 (N=1) bytes reserved: + * + * 64-byte cache line ==> ______________ + * |___Reserved___| + * |__Event_data__| + * |_____SS_______| + * |_____RSP______| + * |_____FLAGS____| + * |_____CS_______| + * |_____IP_______| + * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__| <== ERETU return frame + * |______________| + * |______________| + * |______________| + * |______________| + * |______________| + * |______________| + * |______________| + * 64-byte cache line ==> |______________| <== RSP after step 1) and 2) + * |___Reserved___| + * |__Event_data__| + * |_____SS_______| + * |_____RSP______| + * |_____FLAGS____| + * |_____CS_______| + * |_____IP_______| + * 64-byte cache line ==> |__Error_code__| <== ERETS return frame + * + * Thus a new FRED stack frame will always be pushed below a previous + * FRED stack frame ((N*64) bytes may be reserved between), and it is + * safe to write to a previous FRED stack frame as they never overlap. + */ + fred_info(uregs)->edata = fred_event_data(regs); + uregs->ssx = regs->ssx; + uregs->fred_ss.ss = ss; + /* The NMI bit was moved away above */ + uregs->fred_ss.nmi = 0; + uregs->csx = regs->csx; + uregs->fred_cs.sl = 0; + uregs->fred_cs.wfe = 0; + uregs->cs = cs; + uregs->orig_ax = error_code; + + return ex_handler_default(fixup, regs); +} +#endif + int ex_get_fixup_type(unsigned long ip) { const struct exception_table_entry *e = search_exception_tables(ip); @@ -300,6 +374,10 @@ int fixup_exception(struct pt_regs *regs, int trapnr, unsigned long error_code, return ex_handler_ucopy_len(e, regs, trapnr, fault_addr, reg, imm); case EX_TYPE_ZEROPAD: return ex_handler_zeropad(e, regs, fault_addr); +#ifdef CONFIG_X86_FRED + case EX_TYPE_ERETU: + return ex_handler_eretu(e, regs, error_code); +#endif } BUG(); } |