Merge branch 'i2c/for-current-fixed' into i2c/for-5.8

1 files changed, 29 insertions, 12 deletions

diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
index 04c6630cc18f..fa1d8245b925 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c
@@ -1255,8 +1255,7 @@ static void __mark_reg_unknown(const struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	reg->type = SCALAR_VALUE;
 	reg->var_off = tnum_unknown;
 	reg->frameno = 0;
-	reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->allow_ptr_leaks ?
-		       true : false;
+	reg->precise = env->subprog_cnt > 1 || !env->allow_ptr_leaks;
 	__mark_reg_unbounded(reg);
 }
 
@@ -2119,6 +2118,15 @@ static bool register_is_const(struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 	return reg->type == SCALAR_VALUE && tnum_is_const(reg->var_off);
 }
 
+static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
+			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
+{
+	if (allow_ptr_leaks)
+		return false;
+
+	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
+}
+
 static void save_register_state(struct bpf_func_state *state,
 				int spi, struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
 {
@@ -2309,6 +2317,16 @@ static int check_stack_read(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 			 * which resets stack/reg liveness for state transitions
 			 */
 			state->regs[value_regno].live |= REG_LIVE_WRITTEN;
+		} else if (__is_pointer_value(env->allow_ptr_leaks, reg)) {
+			/* If value_regno==-1, the caller is asking us whether
+			 * it is acceptable to use this value as a SCALAR_VALUE
+			 * (e.g. for XADD).
+			 * We must not allow unprivileged callers to do that
+			 * with spilled pointers.
+			 */
+			verbose(env, "leaking pointer from stack off %d\n",
+				off);
+			return -EACCES;
 		}
 		mark_reg_read(env, reg, reg->parent, REG_LIVE_READ64);
 	} else {
@@ -2674,15 +2692,6 @@ static int check_sock_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx,
 	return -EACCES;
 }
 
-static bool __is_pointer_value(bool allow_ptr_leaks,
-			       const struct bpf_reg_state *reg)
-{
-	if (allow_ptr_leaks)
-		return false;
-
-	return reg->type != SCALAR_VALUE;
-}
-
 static struct bpf_reg_state *reg_state(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno)
 {
 	return cur_regs(env) + regno;
@@ -3090,7 +3099,7 @@ static int check_ptr_to_btf_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,
 	if (ret < 0)
 		return ret;
 
-	if (atype == BPF_READ) {
+	if (atype == BPF_READ && value_regno >= 0) {
 		if (ret == SCALAR_VALUE) {
 			mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno);
 			return 0;
@@ -10488,6 +10497,7 @@ static int check_attach_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env)
 				return -EINVAL;
 			}
 			env->ops = bpf_verifier_ops[tgt_prog->type];
+			prog->expected_attach_type = tgt_prog->expected_attach_type;
 		}
 		if (!tgt_prog->jited) {
 			verbose(env, "Can attach to only JITed progs\n");
@@ -10832,6 +10842,13 @@ err_release_maps:
 		 * them now. Otherwise free_used_maps() will release them.
 		 */
 		release_maps(env);
+
+	/* extension progs temporarily inherit the attach_type of their targets
+	   for verification purposes, so set it back to zero before returning
+	 */
+	if (env->prog->type == BPF_PROG_TYPE_EXT)
+		env->prog->expected_attach_type = 0;
+
 	*prog = env->prog;
 err_unlock:
 	if (!is_priv)