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authorJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>2021-01-29 00:56:21 +0100
committerJarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>2021-02-16 09:40:28 +0100
commit8c657a0590de585b1115847c17b34a58025f2f4b (patch)
tree2ab5fb0d0bb465e620b4b023080899efaab928eb /security/keys
parentKEYS: trusted: Fix migratable=1 failing (diff)
downloadlinux-8c657a0590de585b1115847c17b34a58025f2f4b.tar.xz
linux-8c657a0590de585b1115847c17b34a58025f2f4b.zip
KEYS: trusted: Reserve TPM for seal and unseal operations
When TPM 2.0 trusted keys code was moved to the trusted keys subsystem, the operations were unwrapped from tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), which are used to take temporarily the ownership of the TPM chip. The ownership is only taken inside tpm_send(), but this is not sufficient, as in the key load TPM2_CC_LOAD, TPM2_CC_UNSEAL and TPM2_FLUSH_CONTEXT need to be done as a one single atom. Take the TPM chip ownership before sending anything with tpm_try_get_ops() and tpm_put_ops(), and use tpm_transmit_cmd() to send TPM commands instead of tpm_send(), reverting back to the old behaviour. Fixes: 2e19e10131a0 ("KEYS: trusted: Move TPM2 trusted keys code") Reported-by: "James E.J. Bottomley" <James.Bottomley@HansenPartnership.com> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Cc: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com> Cc: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Cc: Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Acked-by Sumit Garg <sumit.garg@linaro.org> Tested-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com> Signed-off-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
Diffstat (limited to 'security/keys')
-rw-r--r--security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c22
1 files changed, 18 insertions, 4 deletions
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
index 08ec7f48f01d..e2a0ed5d02f0 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm2.c
@@ -83,6 +83,12 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm_buf_init(&buf, TPM2_ST_SESSIONS, TPM2_CC_CREATE);
+ if (rc) {
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
tpm_buf_append_u32(&buf, options->keyhandle);
tpm2_buf_append_auth(&buf, TPM2_RS_PW,
NULL /* nonce */, 0,
@@ -130,7 +136,7 @@ int tpm2_seal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "sealing data");
if (rc)
goto out;
@@ -157,6 +163,7 @@ out:
rc = -EPERM;
}
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
return rc;
}
@@ -211,7 +218,7 @@ static int tpm2_load_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
goto out;
}
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 4, "loading blob");
if (!rc)
*blob_handle = be32_to_cpup(
(__be32 *) &buf.data[TPM_HEADER_SIZE]);
@@ -260,7 +267,7 @@ static int tpm2_unseal_cmd(struct tpm_chip *chip,
options->blobauth /* hmac */,
TPM_DIGEST_SIZE);
- rc = tpm_send(chip, buf.data, tpm_buf_length(&buf));
+ rc = tpm_transmit_cmd(chip, &buf, 6, "unsealing");
if (rc > 0)
rc = -EPERM;
@@ -304,12 +311,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal_trusted(struct tpm_chip *chip,
u32 blob_handle;
int rc;
- rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ rc = tpm_try_get_ops(chip);
if (rc)
return rc;
+ rc = tpm2_load_cmd(chip, payload, options, &blob_handle);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+
rc = tpm2_unseal_cmd(chip, payload, options, blob_handle);
tpm2_flush_context(chip, blob_handle);
+out:
+ tpm_put_ops(chip);
+
return rc;
}