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authorLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-09 21:57:46 +0100
committerLinus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>2024-01-09 21:57:46 +0100
commit063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac (patch)
tree9910f131597a3f5c2060c988f5bd65484cfe365b /security/selinux
parentMerge tag 'selinux-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/... (diff)
parentlsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook (diff)
downloadlinux-063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac.tar.xz
linux-063a7ce32ddc2c4f2404b0dfd29e60e3dbcdffac.zip
Merge tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm
Pull security module updates from Paul Moore: - Add three new syscalls: lsm_list_modules(), lsm_get_self_attr(), and lsm_set_self_attr(). The first syscall simply lists the LSMs enabled, while the second and third get and set the current process' LSM attributes. Yes, these syscalls may provide similar functionality to what can be found under /proc or /sys, but they were designed to support multiple, simultaneaous (stacked) LSMs from the start as opposed to the current /proc based solutions which were created at a time when only one LSM was allowed to be active at a given time. We have spent considerable time discussing ways to extend the existing /proc interfaces to support multiple, simultaneaous LSMs and even our best ideas have been far too ugly to support as a kernel API; after +20 years in the kernel, I felt the LSM layer had established itself enough to justify a handful of syscalls. Support amongst the individual LSM developers has been nearly unanimous, with a single objection coming from Tetsuo (TOMOYO) as he is worried that the LSM_ID_XXX token concept will make it more difficult for out-of-tree LSMs to survive. Several members of the LSM community have demonstrated the ability for out-of-tree LSMs to continue to exist by picking high/unused LSM_ID values as well as pointing out that many kernel APIs rely on integer identifiers, e.g. syscalls (!), but unfortunately Tetsuo's objections remain. My personal opinion is that while I have no interest in penalizing out-of-tree LSMs, I'm not going to penalize in-tree development to support out-of-tree development, and I view this as a necessary step forward to support the push for expanded LSM stacking and reduce our reliance on /proc and /sys which has occassionally been problematic for some container users. Finally, we have included the linux-api folks on (all?) recent revisions of the patchset and addressed all of their concerns. - Add a new security_file_ioctl_compat() LSM hook to handle the 32-bit ioctls on 64-bit systems problem. This patch includes support for all of the existing LSMs which provide ioctl hooks, although it turns out only SELinux actually cares about the individual ioctls. It is worth noting that while Casey (Smack) and Tetsuo (TOMOYO) did not give explicit ACKs to this patch, they did both indicate they are okay with the changes. - Fix a potential memory leak in the CALIPSO code when IPv6 is disabled at boot. While it's good that we are fixing this, I doubt this is something users are seeing in the wild as you need to both disable IPv6 and then attempt to configure IPv6 labeled networking via NetLabel/CALIPSO; that just doesn't make much sense. Normally this would go through netdev, but Jakub asked me to take this patch and of all the trees I maintain, the LSM tree seemed like the best fit. - Update the LSM MAINTAINERS entry with additional information about our process docs, patchwork, bug reporting, etc. I also noticed that the Lockdown LSM is missing a dedicated MAINTAINERS entry so I've added that to the pull request. I've been working with one of the major Lockdown authors/contributors to see if they are willing to step up and assume a Lockdown maintainer role; hopefully that will happen soon, but in the meantime I'll continue to look after it. - Add a handful of mailmap entries for Serge Hallyn and myself. * tag 'lsm-pr-20240105' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/pcmoore/lsm: (27 commits) lsm: new security_file_ioctl_compat() hook lsm: Add a __counted_by() annotation to lsm_ctx.ctx calipso: fix memory leak in netlbl_calipso_add_pass() selftests: remove the LSM_ID_IMA check in lsm/lsm_list_modules_test MAINTAINERS: add an entry for the lockdown LSM MAINTAINERS: update the LSM entry mailmap: add entries for Serge Hallyn's dead accounts mailmap: update/replace my old email addresses lsm: mark the lsm_id variables are marked as static lsm: convert security_setselfattr() to use memdup_user() lsm: align based on pointer length in lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: consolidate buffer size handling into lsm_fill_user_ctx() lsm: correct error codes in security_getselfattr() lsm: cleanup the size counters in security_getselfattr() lsm: don't yet account for IMA in LSM_CONFIG_COUNT calculation lsm: drop LSM_ID_IMA LSM: selftests for Linux Security Module syscalls SELinux: Add selfattr hooks AppArmor: Add selfattr hooks Smack: implement setselfattr and getselfattr hooks ...
Diffstat (limited to 'security/selinux')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/hooks.c173
1 files changed, 145 insertions, 28 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index c96836da3802..5e5fd5be6d93 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -92,6 +92,7 @@
#include <linux/fsnotify.h>
#include <linux/fanotify.h>
#include <linux/io_uring.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/lsm.h>
#include "avc.h"
#include "objsec.h"
@@ -3738,6 +3739,33 @@ static int selinux_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
return error;
}
+static int selinux_file_ioctl_compat(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ /*
+ * If we are in a 64-bit kernel running 32-bit userspace, we need to
+ * make sure we don't compare 32-bit flags to 64-bit flags.
+ */
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case FS_IOC32_GETFLAGS:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_GETFLAGS;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_SETFLAGS:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_SETFLAGS;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_GETVERSION:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_GETVERSION;
+ break;
+ case FS_IOC32_SETVERSION:
+ cmd = FS_IOC_SETVERSION;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return selinux_file_ioctl(file, cmd, arg);
+}
+
static int default_noexec __ro_after_init;
static int file_map_prot_check(struct file *file, unsigned long prot, int shared)
@@ -6313,8 +6341,8 @@ static void selinux_d_instantiate(struct dentry *dentry, struct inode *inode)
inode_doinit_with_dentry(inode, dentry);
}
-static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
- const char *name, char **value)
+static int selinux_lsm_getattr(unsigned int attr, struct task_struct *p,
+ char **value)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
u32 sid;
@@ -6331,20 +6359,27 @@ static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
goto bad;
}
- if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ switch (attr) {
+ case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
sid = __tsec->sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "prev"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_PREV:
sid = __tsec->osid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
sid = __tsec->exec_sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
sid = __tsec->create_sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
sid = __tsec->keycreate_sid;
- else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
sid = __tsec->sockcreate_sid;
- else {
- error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
goto bad;
}
rcu_read_unlock();
@@ -6362,7 +6397,7 @@ bad:
return error;
}
-static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+static int selinux_lsm_setattr(u64 attr, void *value, size_t size)
{
struct task_security_struct *tsec;
struct cred *new;
@@ -6373,23 +6408,31 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
/*
* Basic control over ability to set these attributes at all.
*/
- if (!strcmp(name, "exec"))
+ switch (attr) {
+ case LSM_ATTR_EXEC:
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETEXEC, NULL);
- else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE:
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETFSCREATE, NULL);
- else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE:
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETKEYCREATE, NULL);
- else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE:
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETSOCKCREATE, NULL);
- else if (!strcmp(name, "current"))
+ break;
+ case LSM_ATTR_CURRENT:
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, mysid, SECCLASS_PROCESS,
PROCESS__SETCURRENT, NULL);
- else
- error = -EINVAL;
+ break;
+ default:
+ error = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ break;
+ }
if (error)
return error;
@@ -6401,13 +6444,14 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
}
error = security_context_to_sid(value, size,
&sid, GFP_KERNEL);
- if (error == -EINVAL && !strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+ if (error == -EINVAL && attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
if (!has_cap_mac_admin(true)) {
struct audit_buffer *ab;
size_t audit_size;
- /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end, otherwise the
- * context contains a nul and we should audit that */
+ /* We strip a nul only if it is at the end,
+ * otherwise the context contains a nul and
+ * we should audit that */
if (str[size - 1] == '\0')
audit_size = size - 1;
else
@@ -6418,7 +6462,8 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
if (!ab)
return error;
audit_log_format(ab, "op=fscreate invalid_context=");
- audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value, audit_size);
+ audit_log_n_untrustedstring(ab, value,
+ audit_size);
audit_log_end(ab);
return error;
@@ -6441,11 +6486,11 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
checks and may_create for the file creation checks. The
operation will then fail if the context is not permitted. */
tsec = selinux_cred(new);
- if (!strcmp(name, "exec")) {
+ if (attr == LSM_ATTR_EXEC) {
tsec->exec_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "fscreate")) {
+ } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_FSCREATE) {
tsec->create_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "keycreate")) {
+ } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_KEYCREATE) {
if (sid) {
error = avc_has_perm(mysid, sid,
SECCLASS_KEY, KEY__CREATE, NULL);
@@ -6453,9 +6498,9 @@ static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
goto abort_change;
}
tsec->keycreate_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "sockcreate")) {
+ } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_SOCKCREATE) {
tsec->sockcreate_sid = sid;
- } else if (!strcmp(name, "current")) {
+ } else if (attr == LSM_ATTR_CURRENT) {
error = -EINVAL;
if (sid == 0)
goto abort_change;
@@ -6496,6 +6541,69 @@ abort_change:
return error;
}
+/**
+ * selinux_getselfattr - Get SELinux current task attributes
+ * @attr: the requested attribute
+ * @ctx: buffer to receive the result
+ * @size: buffer size (input), buffer size used (output)
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Fill the passed user space @ctx with the details of the requested
+ * attribute.
+ *
+ * Returns the number of attributes on success, an error code otherwise.
+ * There will only ever be one attribute.
+ */
+static int selinux_getselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx __user *ctx,
+ size_t *size, u32 flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *val;
+ int val_len;
+
+ val_len = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, current, &val);
+ if (val_len < 0)
+ return val_len;
+ rc = lsm_fill_user_ctx(ctx, size, val, val_len, LSM_ID_SELINUX, 0);
+ kfree(val);
+ return (!rc ? 1 : rc);
+}
+
+static int selinux_setselfattr(unsigned int attr, struct lsm_ctx *ctx,
+ size_t size, u32 flags)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, ctx->ctx, ctx->ctx_len);
+ if (rc > 0)
+ return 0;
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static int selinux_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p,
+ const char *name, char **value)
+{
+ unsigned int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (attr) {
+ rc = selinux_lsm_getattr(attr, p, value);
+ if (rc != -EOPNOTSUPP)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
+static int selinux_setprocattr(const char *name, void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ int attr = lsm_name_to_attr(name);
+
+ if (attr)
+ return selinux_lsm_setattr(attr, value, size);
+ return -EINVAL;
+}
+
static int selinux_ismaclabel(const char *name)
{
return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SELINUX_SUFFIX) == 0);
@@ -6978,6 +7086,11 @@ static int selinux_uring_cmd(struct io_uring_cmd *ioucmd)
}
#endif /* CONFIG_IO_URING */
+static const struct lsm_id selinux_lsmid = {
+ .name = "selinux",
+ .id = LSM_ID_SELINUX,
+};
+
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: When adding new hooks, please be careful to keep this order:
* 1. any hooks that don't belong to (2.) or (3.) below,
@@ -7064,6 +7177,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, selinux_file_permission),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, selinux_file_alloc_security),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, selinux_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl_compat, selinux_file_ioctl_compat),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, selinux_mmap_file),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, selinux_mmap_addr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_mprotect, selinux_file_mprotect),
@@ -7119,6 +7233,8 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, selinux_d_instantiate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getselfattr, selinux_getselfattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setselfattr, selinux_setselfattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, selinux_getprocattr),
LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, selinux_setprocattr),
@@ -7298,7 +7414,8 @@ static __init int selinux_init(void)
hashtab_cache_init();
- security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks), "selinux");
+ security_add_hooks(selinux_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(selinux_hooks),
+ &selinux_lsmid);
if (avc_add_callback(selinux_netcache_avc_callback, AVC_CALLBACK_RESET))
panic("SELinux: Unable to register AVC netcache callback\n");