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authorMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>2012-10-05 14:36:26 +0200
committerMauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com>2012-10-05 14:36:26 +0200
commitbd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71 (patch)
treecdee4371121a355d627a655c4eef5c0047b0462a /security
parent[media] v4l2-ioctl.c: fix overlay support (diff)
parentem28xx: regression fix: use DRX-K sync firmware requests on em28xx (diff)
downloadlinux-bd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71.tar.xz
linux-bd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71.zip
Merge branch 'staging/for_v3.7' into v4l_for_linus
* staging/for_v3.7: (2891 commits) em28xx: regression fix: use DRX-K sync firmware requests on em28xx drxk: allow loading firmware synchrousnously em28xx: Make all em28xx extensions to be initialized asynchronously [media] tda18271: properly report read errors in tda18271_get_id [media] tda18271: delay IR & RF calibration until init() if delay_cal is set [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda827x maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda8290 maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as cxusb maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as lg2160 maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as lgdt3305 maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as mxl111sf maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as mxl5007t maintainer [media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda18271 maintainer [media] s5p-tv: Report only multi-plane capabilities in vidioc_querycap [media] s5p-mfc: Fix misplaced return statement in s5p_mfc_suspend() [media] exynos-gsc: Add missing static storage class specifiers [media] exynos-gsc: Remove <linux/version.h> header file inclusion [media] s5p-fimc: Fix incorrect condition in fimc_lite_reqbufs() [media] s5p-tv: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference error [media] s5k6aa: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference ... Conflicts: drivers/media/platform/s5p-fimc/fimc-capture.c drivers/media/platform/s5p-fimc/fimc-lite.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/avc.c2
-rw-r--r--security/selinux/include/xfrm.h1
-rw-r--r--security/yama/yama_lsm.c43
3 files changed, 41 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c
index 68d82daed257..4d3fab47e643 100644
--- a/security/selinux/avc.c
+++ b/security/selinux/avc.c
@@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void)
{
struct avc_node *node;
- node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC);
if (!node)
goto out;
diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
index c220f314709c..65f67cb0aefb 100644
--- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
+++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall);
static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void)
{
atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid);
+ rt_genid_bump(&init_net);
}
#else
static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void)
diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
index 83554ee8a587..0cc99a3ea42d 100644
--- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
+++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c
@@ -279,12 +279,46 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child,
}
if (rc) {
- char name[sizeof(current->comm)];
printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
"ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
- child->pid,
- get_task_comm(name, current),
- current->pid);
+ child->pid, current->comm, current->pid);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls
+ * @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error.
+ */
+static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should
+ * only tighten restrictions further.
+ */
+ rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+
+ /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */
+ switch (ptrace_scope) {
+ case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY:
+ if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH:
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (rc) {
+ printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE
+ "ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n",
+ current->pid, parent->comm, parent->pid);
}
return rc;
@@ -294,6 +328,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = {
.name = "yama",
.ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check,
+ .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme,
.task_prctl = yama_task_prctl,
.task_free = yama_task_free,
};