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author | Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> | 2012-10-05 14:36:26 +0200 |
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committer | Mauro Carvalho Chehab <mchehab@redhat.com> | 2012-10-05 14:36:26 +0200 |
commit | bd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71 (patch) | |
tree | cdee4371121a355d627a655c4eef5c0047b0462a /security | |
parent | [media] v4l2-ioctl.c: fix overlay support (diff) | |
parent | em28xx: regression fix: use DRX-K sync firmware requests on em28xx (diff) | |
download | linux-bd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71.tar.xz linux-bd0d10498826ed150da5e4c45baf8b9c7088fb71.zip |
Merge branch 'staging/for_v3.7' into v4l_for_linus
* staging/for_v3.7: (2891 commits)
em28xx: regression fix: use DRX-K sync firmware requests on em28xx
drxk: allow loading firmware synchrousnously
em28xx: Make all em28xx extensions to be initialized asynchronously
[media] tda18271: properly report read errors in tda18271_get_id
[media] tda18271: delay IR & RF calibration until init() if delay_cal is set
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda827x maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda8290 maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as cxusb maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as lg2160 maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as lgdt3305 maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as mxl111sf maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as mxl5007t maintainer
[media] MAINTAINERS: add Michael Krufky as tda18271 maintainer
[media] s5p-tv: Report only multi-plane capabilities in vidioc_querycap
[media] s5p-mfc: Fix misplaced return statement in s5p_mfc_suspend()
[media] exynos-gsc: Add missing static storage class specifiers
[media] exynos-gsc: Remove <linux/version.h> header file inclusion
[media] s5p-fimc: Fix incorrect condition in fimc_lite_reqbufs()
[media] s5p-tv: Fix potential NULL pointer dereference error
[media] s5k6aa: Fix possible NULL pointer dereference
...
Conflicts:
drivers/media/platform/s5p-fimc/fimc-capture.c
drivers/media/platform/s5p-fimc/fimc-lite.c
Diffstat (limited to 'security')
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/avc.c | 2 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/selinux/include/xfrm.h | 1 | ||||
-rw-r--r-- | security/yama/yama_lsm.c | 43 |
3 files changed, 41 insertions, 5 deletions
diff --git a/security/selinux/avc.c b/security/selinux/avc.c index 68d82daed257..4d3fab47e643 100644 --- a/security/selinux/avc.c +++ b/security/selinux/avc.c @@ -274,7 +274,7 @@ static struct avc_node *avc_alloc_node(void) { struct avc_node *node; - node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC); + node = kmem_cache_zalloc(avc_node_cachep, GFP_ATOMIC|__GFP_NOMEMALLOC); if (!node) goto out; diff --git a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h index c220f314709c..65f67cb0aefb 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/xfrm.h @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ int selinux_xfrm_decode_session(struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *sid, int ckall); static inline void selinux_xfrm_notify_policyload(void) { atomic_inc(&flow_cache_genid); + rt_genid_bump(&init_net); } #else static inline int selinux_xfrm_enabled(void) diff --git a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c index 83554ee8a587..0cc99a3ea42d 100644 --- a/security/yama/yama_lsm.c +++ b/security/yama/yama_lsm.c @@ -279,12 +279,46 @@ static int yama_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, } if (rc) { - char name[sizeof(current->comm)]; printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE "ptrace of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", - child->pid, - get_task_comm(name, current), - current->pid); + child->pid, current->comm, current->pid); + } + + return rc; +} + +/** + * yama_ptrace_traceme - validate PTRACE_TRACEME calls + * @parent: task that will become the ptracer of the current task + * + * Returns 0 if following the ptrace is allowed, -ve on error. + */ +static int yama_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent) +{ + int rc; + + /* If standard caps disallows it, so does Yama. We should + * only tighten restrictions further. + */ + rc = cap_ptrace_traceme(parent); + if (rc) + return rc; + + /* Only disallow PTRACE_TRACEME on more aggressive settings. */ + switch (ptrace_scope) { + case YAMA_SCOPE_CAPABILITY: + if (!ns_capable(task_user_ns(parent), CAP_SYS_PTRACE)) + rc = -EPERM; + break; + case YAMA_SCOPE_NO_ATTACH: + rc = -EPERM; + break; + } + + if (rc) { + printk_ratelimited(KERN_NOTICE + "ptraceme of pid %d was attempted by: %s (pid %d)\n", + current->pid, parent->comm, parent->pid); } return rc; @@ -294,6 +328,7 @@ static struct security_operations yama_ops = { .name = "yama", .ptrace_access_check = yama_ptrace_access_check, + .ptrace_traceme = yama_ptrace_traceme, .task_prctl = yama_task_prctl, .task_free = yama_task_free, }; |