- djm@cvs.openbsd.org 2014/01/29 06:18:35

     [Makefile.in auth.h auth2-jpake.c auth2.c jpake.c jpake.h monitor.c]
     [monitor.h monitor_wrap.c monitor_wrap.h readconf.c readconf.h]
     [schnorr.c schnorr.h servconf.c servconf.h ssh2.h sshconnect2.c]
     remove experimental, never-enabled JPAKE code; ok markus@

1 files changed, 0 insertions, 563 deletions

diff --git a/auth2-jpake.c b/auth2-jpake.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 78a6b8817..000000000
--- a/auth2-jpake.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,563 +0,0 @@
-/* $OpenBSD: auth2-jpake.c,v 1.6 2013/05/17 00:13:13 djm Exp $ */
-/*
- * Copyright (c) 2008 Damien Miller.  All rights reserved.
- *
- * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
- * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
- * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
- *
- * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
- * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
- * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
- * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
- * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
- * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
- * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
- */
-
-/*
- * Server side of zero-knowledge password auth using J-PAKE protocol
- * as described in:
- *
- * F. Hao, P. Ryan, "Password Authenticated Key Exchange by Juggling",
- * 16th Workshop on Security Protocols, Cambridge, April 2008
- *
- * http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/Research/contributions/hao-ryan-2008.pdf
- */
-
-#ifdef JPAKE
-
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/param.h>
-
-#include <pwd.h>
-#include <stdio.h>
-#include <string.h>
-#include <login_cap.h>
-
-#include <openssl/bn.h>
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-
-#include "xmalloc.h"
-#include "ssh2.h"
-#include "key.h"
-#include "hostfile.h"
-#include "auth.h"
-#include "buffer.h"
-#include "packet.h"
-#include "dispatch.h"
-#include "log.h"
-#include "servconf.h"
-#include "auth-options.h"
-#include "canohost.h"
-#ifdef GSSAPI
-#include "ssh-gss.h"
-#endif
-#include "monitor_wrap.h"
-
-#include "schnorr.h"
-#include "jpake.h"
-
-/*
- * XXX options->permit_empty_passwd (at the moment, they will be refused
- * anyway because they will mismatch on fake salt.
- */
-
-/* Dispatch handlers */
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-static void input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int, u_int32_t, void *);
-
-static int auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *);
-
-/* import */
-extern ServerOptions options;
-extern u_char *session_id2;
-extern u_int session_id2_len;
-
-/*
- * Attempt J-PAKE authentication.
- */
-static int
-userauth_jpake(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	debug("jpake-01@openssh.com requested");
-
-	if (authctxt->user != NULL) {
-		if (authctxt->jpake_ctx == NULL)
-			authctxt->jpake_ctx = jpake_new();
-		if (options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication)
-			authenticated = auth2_jpake_start(authctxt);
-	}
-
-	return authenticated;
-}
-
-Authmethod method_jpake = {
-	"jpake-01@openssh.com",
-	userauth_jpake,
-	&options.zero_knowledge_password_authentication
-};
-
-/* Clear context and callbacks */
-void
-auth2_jpake_stop(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	/* unregister callbacks */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
-	if (authctxt->jpake_ctx != NULL) {
-		jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-		authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-	}
-}
-
-/* Returns 1 if 'c' is a valid crypt(3) salt character, 0 otherwise */
-static int
-valid_crypt_salt(int c)
-{
-	if (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z')
-		return 1;
-	if (c >= 'a' && c <= 'z')
-		return 1;
-	if (c >= '.' && c <= '9')
-		return 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/*
- * Derive fake salt as H(username || first_private_host_key)
- * This provides relatively stable fake salts for non-existent
- * users and avoids the jpake method becoming an account validity
- * oracle.
- */
-static void
-derive_rawsalt(const char *username, u_char *rawsalt, u_int len)
-{
-	u_char *digest;
-	u_int digest_len;
-	Buffer b;
-	Key *k;
-
-	buffer_init(&b);
-	buffer_put_cstring(&b, username);
-	if ((k = get_hostkey_by_index(0)) == NULL ||
-	    (k->flags & KEY_FLAG_EXT))
-		fatal("%s: no hostkeys", __func__);
-	switch (k->type) {
-	case KEY_RSA1:
-	case KEY_RSA:
-		if (k->rsa->p == NULL || k->rsa->q == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: RSA key missing p and/or q", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->p);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->rsa->q);
-		break;
-	case KEY_DSA:
-		if (k->dsa->priv_key == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: DSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, k->dsa->priv_key);
-		break;
-	case KEY_ECDSA:
-		if (EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa) == NULL)
-			fatal("%s: ECDSA key missing priv_key", __func__);
-		buffer_put_bignum2(&b, EC_KEY_get0_private_key(k->ecdsa));
-		break;
-	default:
-		fatal("%s: unknown key type %d", __func__, k->type);
-	}
-	if (hash_buffer(buffer_ptr(&b), buffer_len(&b), EVP_sha256(),
-	    &digest, &digest_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-	buffer_free(&b);
-	if (len > digest_len)
-		fatal("%s: not enough bytes for rawsalt (want %u have %u)",
-		    __func__, len, digest_len);
-	memcpy(rawsalt, digest, len);
-	bzero(digest, digest_len);
-	free(digest);
-}
-
-/* ASCII an integer [0, 64) for inclusion in a password/salt */
-static char
-pw_encode64(u_int i64)
-{
-	const u_char e64[] =
-	    "./0123456789ABCDEFGHIJKLMNOPQRSTUVWXYZabcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwxyz";
-	return e64[i64 % 64];
-}
-
-/* Generate ASCII salt bytes for user */
-static char *
-makesalt(u_int want, const char *user)
-{
-	u_char rawsalt[32];
-	static char ret[33];
-	u_int i;
-
-	if (want > sizeof(ret) - 1)
-		fatal("%s: want %u", __func__, want);
-
-	derive_rawsalt(user, rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
-	bzero(ret, sizeof(ret));
-	for (i = 0; i < want; i++)
-		ret[i] = pw_encode64(rawsalt[i]);
-	bzero(rawsalt, sizeof(rawsalt));
-
-	return ret;
-}
-
-/*
- * Select the system's default password hashing scheme and generate
- * a stable fake salt under it for use by a non-existent account.
- * Prevents jpake method being used to infer the validity of accounts.
- */
-static void
-fake_salt_and_scheme(Authctxt *authctxt, char **salt, char **scheme)
-{
-	char *rounds_s, *style;
-	long long rounds;
-	login_cap_t *lc;
-
-
-	if ((lc = login_getclass(authctxt->pw->pw_class)) == NULL &&
-	    (lc = login_getclass(NULL)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: login_getclass failed", __func__);
-	style = login_getcapstr(lc, "localcipher", NULL, NULL);
-	if (style == NULL)
-		style = xstrdup("blowfish,6");
-	login_close(lc);
-	
-	if ((rounds_s = strchr(style, ',')) != NULL)
-		*rounds_s++ = '\0';
-	rounds = strtonum(rounds_s, 1, 1<<31, NULL);
-	
-	if (strcmp(style, "md5") == 0) {
-		xasprintf(salt, "$1$%s$", makesalt(8, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("md5");
-	} else if (strcmp(style, "old") == 0) {
-		*salt = xstrdup(makesalt(2, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
-	} else if (strcmp(style, "newsalt") == 0) {
-		rounds = MAX(rounds, 7250);
-		rounds = MIN(rounds, (1<<24) - 1);
-		xasprintf(salt, "_%c%c%c%c%s",
-		    pw_encode64(rounds), pw_encode64(rounds >> 6),
-		    pw_encode64(rounds >> 12), pw_encode64(rounds >> 18),
-		    makesalt(4, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
-	} else {
-		/* Default to blowfish */
-		rounds = MAX(rounds, 3);
-		rounds = MIN(rounds, 31);
-		xasprintf(salt, "$2a$%02lld$%s", rounds,
-		    makesalt(22, authctxt->user));
-		*scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-	}
-	free(style);
-	debug3("%s: fake %s salt for user %s: %s",
-	    __func__, *scheme, authctxt->user, *salt);
-}
-
-/*
- * Fetch password hashing scheme, password salt and derive shared secret
- * for user. If user does not exist, a fake but stable and user-unique
- * salt will be returned.
- */
-void
-auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(Authctxt *authctxt, BIGNUM **s,
-    char **hash_scheme, char **salt)
-{
-	char *cp;
-	u_char *secret;
-	u_int secret_len, salt_len;
-
-#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
-	debug3("%s: valid %d pw %.5s...", __func__,
-	    authctxt->valid, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd);
-#endif
-
-	*salt = NULL;
-	*hash_scheme = NULL;
-	if (authctxt->valid) {
-		if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2$", 3) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 28) {
-			/*
-			 * old-variant bcrypt:
-			 *     "$2$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 3 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$2a$", 4) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 29) {
-			/*
-			 * current-variant bcrypt:
-			 *     "$2a$", 2 digit rounds, "$", 22 bytes salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 4 + 2 + 1 + 22 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("bcrypt");
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "$1$", 3) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 5) {
-			/*
-			 * md5crypt:
-			 *     "$1$", salt until "$"
-			 */
-			cp = strchr(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd + 3, '$');
-			if (cp != NULL) {
-				salt_len = (cp - authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) + 1;
-				*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-				strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
-				    salt_len);
-				*hash_scheme = xstrdup("md5crypt");
-			}
-		} else if (strncmp(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, "_", 1) == 0 &&
-		    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) > 9) {
-			/*
-			 * BSDI extended crypt:
-			 *     "_", 4 digits count, 4 chars salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 1 + 4 + 4 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt-extended");
-		} else if (strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd) == 13  &&
-		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[0]) &&
-		    valid_crypt_salt(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd[1])) {
-			/*
-			 * traditional crypt:
-			 *     2 chars salt
-			 */
-			salt_len = 2 + 1;
-			*salt = xmalloc(salt_len);
-			strlcpy(*salt, authctxt->pw->pw_passwd, salt_len);
-			*hash_scheme = xstrdup("crypt");
-		}
-		if (*salt == NULL) {
-			debug("%s: unrecognised crypt scheme for user %s",
-			    __func__, authctxt->pw->pw_name);
-		}
-	}
-	if (*salt == NULL)
-		fake_salt_and_scheme(authctxt, salt, hash_scheme);
-
-	if (hash_buffer(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd,
-	    strlen(authctxt->pw->pw_passwd), EVP_sha256(),
-	    &secret, &secret_len) != 0)
-		fatal("%s: hash_buffer", __func__);
-	if ((*s = BN_bin2bn(secret, secret_len, NULL)) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_bin2bn (secret)", __func__);
-#ifdef JPAKE_DEBUG
-	debug3("%s: salt = %s (len %u)", __func__,
-	    *salt, (u_int)strlen(*salt));
-	debug3("%s: scheme = %s", __func__, *hash_scheme);
-	JPAKE_DEBUG_BN((*s, "%s: s = ", __func__));
-#endif
-	bzero(secret, secret_len);
-	free(secret);
-}
-
-/*
- * Begin authentication attempt.
- * Note, sets authctxt->postponed while in subprotocol
- */
-static int
-auth2_jpake_start(Authctxt *authctxt)
-{
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x3_proof, *x4_proof;
-	u_int x3_proof_len, x4_proof_len;
-	char *salt, *hash_scheme;
-
-	debug("%s: start", __func__);
-
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_step1(pctx->grp,
-	    &pctx->server_id, &pctx->server_id_len,
-	    &pctx->x3, &pctx->x4, &pctx->g_x3, &pctx->g_x4,
-	    &x3_proof, &x3_proof_len,
-	    &x4_proof, &x4_proof_len));
-
-	PRIVSEP(auth2_jpake_get_pwdata(authctxt, &pctx->s,
-	    &hash_scheme, &salt));
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP1);
-	packet_put_cstring(hash_scheme);
-	packet_put_cstring(salt);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x3);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->g_x4);
-	packet_put_string(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	packet_put_string(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	bzero(hash_scheme, strlen(hash_scheme));
-	bzero(salt, strlen(salt));
-	free(hash_scheme);
-	free(salt);
-	bzero(x3_proof, x3_proof_len);
-	bzero(x4_proof, x4_proof_len);
-	free(x3_proof);
-	free(x4_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 1 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step1);
-
-	authctxt->postponed = 1;
-	return 0;
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_step1(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x1_proof, *x2_proof, *x4_s_proof;
-	u_int x1_proof_len, x2_proof_len, x4_s_proof_len;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP1, NULL);
-
-	/* Fetch step 1 values */
-	if ((pctx->g_x1 = BN_new()) == NULL ||
-	    (pctx->g_x2 = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-	pctx->client_id = packet_get_string(&pctx->client_id_len);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x1);
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->g_x2);
-	x1_proof = packet_get_string(&x1_proof_len);
-	x2_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 1 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_step2(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->g_x3,
-	    pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2, pctx->x4,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    x1_proof, x1_proof_len,
-	    x2_proof, x2_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->b,
-	    &x4_s_proof, &x4_s_proof_len));
-
-	bzero(x1_proof, x1_proof_len);
-	bzero(x2_proof, x2_proof_len);
-	free(x1_proof);
-	free(x2_proof);
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send values for step 2 */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_STEP2);
-	packet_put_bignum2(pctx->b);
-	packet_put_string(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	bzero(x4_s_proof, x4_s_proof_len);
-	free(x4_s_proof);
-
-	/* Expect step 2 packet from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_step2);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_step2(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	u_char *x2_s_proof;
-	u_int x2_s_proof_len;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_STEP2, NULL);
-
-	if ((pctx->a = BN_new()) == NULL)
-		fatal("%s: BN_new", __func__);
-
-	/* Fetch step 2 values */
-	packet_get_bignum2(pctx->a);
-	x2_s_proof = packet_get_string(&x2_s_proof_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "step 2 received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Derive shared key and calculate confirmation hash */
-	PRIVSEP(jpake_key_confirm(pctx->grp, pctx->s, pctx->a,
-	    pctx->x4, pctx->g_x3, pctx->g_x4, pctx->g_x1, pctx->g_x2,
-	    pctx->server_id, pctx->server_id_len,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len,
-	    &pctx->k,
-	    &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, &pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len));
-
-	bzero(x2_s_proof, x2_s_proof_len);
-	free(x2_s_proof);
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm sending in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Send key confirmation proof */
-	packet_start(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_SERVER_CONFIRM);
-	packet_put_string(pctx->h_k_sid_sessid, pctx->h_k_sid_sessid_len);
-	packet_send();
-	packet_write_wait();
-
-	/* Expect confirmation from peer */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM,
-	    input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm);
-}
-
-/* ARGSUSED */
-static void
-input_userauth_jpake_client_confirm(int type, u_int32_t seq, void *ctxt)
-{
-	Authctxt *authctxt = ctxt;
-	struct jpake_ctx *pctx = authctxt->jpake_ctx;
-	int authenticated = 0;
-
-	/* Disable this message */
-	dispatch_set(SSH2_MSG_USERAUTH_JPAKE_CLIENT_CONFIRM, NULL);
-
-	pctx->h_k_cid_sessid = packet_get_string(&pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len);
-	packet_check_eom();
-
-	if (!use_privsep)
-		JPAKE_DEBUG_CTX((pctx, "confirm received in %s", __func__));
-
-	/* Verify expected confirmation hash */
-	if (PRIVSEP(jpake_check_confirm(pctx->k,
-	    pctx->client_id, pctx->client_id_len,
-	    session_id2, session_id2_len,
-	    pctx->h_k_cid_sessid, pctx->h_k_cid_sessid_len)) == 1)
-		authenticated = authctxt->valid ? 1 : 0;
-	else
-		debug("%s: confirmation mismatch", __func__);
-		
-	/* done */
-	authctxt->postponed = 0;
-	jpake_free(authctxt->jpake_ctx);
-	authctxt->jpake_ctx = NULL;
-	userauth_finish(authctxt, authenticated, method_jpake.name, NULL);
-}
-
-#endif /* JPAKE */
-