diff options
author | Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org> | 2021-07-20 10:58:53 +0200 |
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committer | Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org> | 2021-07-22 13:52:46 +0200 |
commit | 5dc6489bb6026b679eb6cbe696e4227da9c7032e (patch) | |
tree | a567173607b9708303fbf01061e52c33800006df /crypto/rsa | |
parent | OSSL_HTTP_open(): Fix memory leak on TLS connect failure via proxy (diff) | |
download | openssl-5dc6489bb6026b679eb6cbe696e4227da9c7032e.tar.xz openssl-5dc6489bb6026b679eb6cbe696e4227da9c7032e.zip |
Update our EVP_PKEY_METHODs to get low level keys via public APIs
It is possible to call built-in EVP_PKEY_METHOD functions with a provided
key. For example this might occur if a custom EVP_PKEY_METHOD is in use
that wraps a built-in EVP_PKEY_METHOD. Therefore our EVP_PKEY_METHOD
functions should not assume that we are using a legacy key. Instead we
get the low level key using EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA() or other similar functions.
This "does the right thing" if the key is actually provided.
Reviewed-by: Paul Dale <pauli@openssl.org>
Reviewed-by: Nicola Tuveri <nic.tuv@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomas Mraz <tomas@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/16118)
Diffstat (limited to 'crypto/rsa')
-rw-r--r-- | crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c | 67 |
1 files changed, 44 insertions, 23 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c index 110d998ebd..44c819a5c3 100644 --- a/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c +++ b/crypto/rsa/rsa_pmeth.c @@ -111,7 +111,8 @@ static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk) { if (ctx->tbuf != NULL) return 1; - if ((ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(pk->pkey->pkey.rsa))) == NULL) { + if ((ctx->tbuf = + OPENSSL_malloc(RSA_size(EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pk->pkey)))) == NULL) { ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_RSA, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); return 0; } @@ -135,7 +136,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->md) { if (tbslen != (size_t)EVP_MD_get_size(rctx->md)) { @@ -147,8 +153,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, unsigned int sltmp; if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) return -1; - ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, - tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); + ret = RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(0, tbs, tbslen, sig, &sltmp, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return ret; @@ -187,8 +192,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, return -1; } } else { - ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -202,13 +206,18 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->md) { if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_X931_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; - ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, - rctx->tbuf, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, + ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_X931_PADDING); if (ret < 1) return 0; @@ -227,7 +236,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, size_t sltmp; ret = ossl_rsa_verify(EVP_MD_get_type(rctx->md), NULL, 0, rout, &sltmp, - sig, siglen, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); + sig, siglen, rsa); if (ret <= 0) return 0; ret = sltmp; @@ -235,8 +244,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, return -1; } } else { - ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -249,7 +257,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) { RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; - RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); size_t rslen; if (rctx->md) { @@ -302,9 +315,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { - int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa); + int klen = RSA_size(rsa); if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; if (!RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(rctx->tbuf, klen, @@ -313,11 +332,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md)) return -1; - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, - ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); } else { - ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } if (ret < 0) return ret; @@ -331,12 +348,17 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, { int ret; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; + /* + * Discard const. Its marked as const because this may be a cached copy of + * the "real" key. These calls don't make any modifications that need to + * be reflected back in the "original" key. + */ + RSA *rsa = (RSA *)EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) { if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx)) return -1; - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, - ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, rctx->tbuf, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING); if (ret <= 0) return ret; ret = RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(out, ret, rctx->tbuf, @@ -345,8 +367,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, rctx->oaep_labellen, rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md); } else { - ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, - rctx->pad_mode); + ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, rsa, rctx->pad_mode); } *outlen = constant_time_select_s(constant_time_msb_s(ret), *outlen, ret); ret = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_msb(ret), ret, 1); @@ -805,7 +826,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *ossl_rsa_pkey_method(void) static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) { - RSA *rsa; + const RSA *rsa; RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data; const EVP_MD *md; const EVP_MD *mgf1md; @@ -814,7 +835,7 @@ static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) /* Should never happen */ if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) return 0; - rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa; + rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(ctx->pkey); /* If no restrictions just return */ if (rsa->pss == NULL) return 1; |