chunk 6 of CMP contribution to OpenSSL

Reviewed-by: Bernd Edlinger <bernd.edlinger@hotmail.de>
Reviewed-by: Matt Caswell <matt@openssl.org>
(Merged from https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/10297)

12 files changed, 1517 insertions, 34 deletions

diff --git a/crypto/cmp/build.info b/crypto/cmp/build.info
index 154022762a..760c3423ad 100644
--- a/crypto/cmp/build.info
+++ b/crypto/cmp/build.info
@@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
 LIBS=../../libcrypto
 SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= cmp_asn.c cmp_ctx.c cmp_err.c cmp_util.c \
-        cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c
+        cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c cmp_protect.c cmp_msg.c
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
index 89ecab1413..0bd12f47ac 100644
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
@@ -946,7 +946,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_failInfoCode(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
  * Sets a Boolean or integer option of the context to the "val" arg.
  * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
  */
-int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val) {
+int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val)
+{
     int min_val;
 
     if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -1049,7 +1050,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val) {
  * Reads a Boolean or integer option value from the context.
  * Returns -1 on error (which is the default OSSL_CMP_OPT_REVOCATION_REASON)
  */
-int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_option(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt) {
+int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_option(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt)
+{
     if (ctx == NULL) {
         CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
         return -1;
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
index 683b8472d7..8b4a6ca708 100644
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
 /*
- * Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
- * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
- * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
+ * Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
+ * Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
  *
  * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
  * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
@@ -15,17 +14,69 @@
 #ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
 
 static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMP_str_reasons[] = {
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID), "bad request id"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTID_NOT_FOUND), "certid not found"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND),
+    "certificate not found"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND),
+    "certresponse not found"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH),
+    "cert and key do not match"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION),
+    "error calculating protection"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTCONF),
+    "error creating certconf"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTREP),
+    "error creating certrep"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_ERROR),
+    "error creating error"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENM),
+    "error creating genm"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP),
+    "error creating genp"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_P10CR),
+    "error creating p10cr"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_PKICONF),
+    "error creating pkiconf"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREP),
+    "error creating pollrep"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREQ),
+    "error creating pollreq"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RP), "error creating rp"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RR), "error creating rr"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_PARSING_PKISTATUS),
     "error parsing pkistatus"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE),
+    "error protecting message"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_SETTING_CERTHASH),
+    "error setting certhash"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM),
     "failure obtaining random"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAIL_INFO_OUT_OF_RANGE),
+    "fail info out of range"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS), "invalid args"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_SAN_SOURCES),
-    "multiple san sources"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION),
+    "missing key input for creating protection"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY),
+    "missing private key"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION),
     "missing sender identification"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_SAN_SOURCES),
+    "multiple san sources"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_NO_STDIO), "no stdio"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT), "null argument"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_PKISTATUSINFO_NOT_FOUND),
+    "pkistatusinfo not found"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY), "unexpected pkibody"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID),
+    "unknown algorithm id"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_TYPE), "unknown cert type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM),
+    "unsupported algorithm"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE),
+    "unsupported key type"},
+    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID),
+    "wrong algorithm oid"},
     {0, NULL}
 };
 
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h b/crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h
index b49ead62df..b7ab6454b5 100644
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct ossl_cmp_ctx_st {
     int proxyPort;
     int msgtimeout; /* max seconds to wait for each CMP message round trip */
     int totaltimeout; /* maximum number seconds an enrollment may take, incl. */
-      /* attempts polling for a response if a 'waiting' PKIStatus is received */
+    /* attempts polling for a response if a 'waiting' PKIStatus is received */
     time_t end_time; /* session start time + totaltimeout */
     OSSL_cmp_http_cb_t http_cb;
     void *http_cb_arg; /* allows to store optional argument to cb */
@@ -279,6 +279,7 @@ struct ossl_cmp_pkisi_st {
 } /* OSSL_CMP_PKISI */;
 DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CMP_PKISI)
 DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CMP_PKISI)
+DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
 
 /*-
  *  RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
@@ -526,6 +527,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CMP_GENREPCONTENT)
  *           certConf [24] CertConfirmContent,         --Certificate confirm
  *           pollReq  [25] PollReqContent,             --Polling request
  *           pollRep  [26] PollRepContent              --Polling response
+ *   }
  */
 typedef struct ossl_cmp_pkibody_st {
     int type;
@@ -680,6 +682,13 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMP_PROTECTEDPART)
  */
 
 /*
+ * constants
+ */
+/* certReqId for the first - and so far only - certificate request */
+# define OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID 0
+/* sequence id for the first - and so far only - revocation request */
+# define OSSL_CMP_REVREQSID 0
+/*
  * functions
  */
 
@@ -752,4 +761,91 @@ int ossl_cmp_hdr_check_implicitConfirm(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
 # define OSSL_CMP_SENDERNONCE_LENGTH 16
 int ossl_cmp_hdr_init(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
 
+/* from cmp_msg.c */
+/* OSSL_CMP_MSG bodytype ASN.1 choice IDs */
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR        0
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP        1
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR        2
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP        3
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR     4
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POPDECC   5
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POPDECR   6
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR       7
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP       8
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KRR       9
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KRP      10
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR       11
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP       12
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCR      13
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP      14
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CKUANN   15
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CANN     16
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RANN     17
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CRLANN   18
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF  19
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_NESTED   20
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM     21
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP     22
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR    23
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF 24
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ  25
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP  26
+# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_TYPE_MAX OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP
+const char *ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(int type);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int type);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_create(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
+                                   int err_code);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
+                                   int certReqId, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                                   X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                   STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs, int encrypted,
+                                   int unprotectedErrors);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rr_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                              OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *certId, int unprot_err);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pkiconf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
+                                 STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                                 int errorCode,
+                                 OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *errorDetails,
+                                 int unprotected);
+int ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus,
+                                     const X509 *cert);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info,
+                                    const char *text);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid,
+                                   int64_t poll_after);
+OSSL_CMP_PKISI *
+ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkistatusinfo(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid);
+OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_CertId(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep,
+                                               int rsid);
+OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *
+ossl_cmp_pollrepcontent_get0_pollrep(const OSSL_CMP_POLLREPCONTENT *prc,
+                                     int rid);
+OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *
+ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(const OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crepmsg,
+                                          int rid);
+X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+                                             const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep);
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_load(const char *file);
+/* BIO definitions */
+#  define OSSL_d2i_CMP_MSG_bio(bp, p) \
+    ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, OSSL_CMP_MSG_new, d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bp, p)
+#  define OSSL_i2d_CMP_MSG_bio(bp, o) \
+    ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bp, o)
+
+/* from cmp_protect.c */
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
+                                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
+                                          EVP_PKEY *pkey);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
+int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
+
 #endif /* !defined OSSL_CRYPTO_CMP_LOCAL_H */
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_msg.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_msg.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..00381932f3
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_msg.c
@@ -0,0 +1,996 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
+ * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/* CMP functions for PKIMessage construction */
+
+#include "cmp_local.h"
+
+/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/cmp.h>
+#include <openssl/crmf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+    if (msg == NULL) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    return msg->header;
+}
+
+const char *ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(int type)
+{
+    static const char *type_names[] = {
+        "IR", "IP", "CR", "CP", "P10CR",
+        "POPDECC", "POPDECR", "KUR", "KUP",
+        "KRR", "KRP", "RR", "RP", "CCR", "CCP",
+        "CKUANN", "CANN", "RANN", "CRLANN", "PKICONF", "NESTED",
+        "GENM", "GENP", "ERROR", "CERTCONF", "POLLREQ", "POLLREP",
+    };
+
+    if (type < 0 || type > OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_TYPE_MAX)
+        return "illegal body type";
+    return type_names[type];
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int type)
+{
+    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    msg->body->type = type;
+    return 1;
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
+        return -1;
+
+    return msg->body->type;
+}
+
+/* Add an extension to the referenced extension stack, which may be NULL */
+static int add1_extension(X509_EXTENSIONS **pexts, int nid, int crit, void *ex)
+{
+    X509_EXTENSION *ext;
+    int res;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(pexts != NULL)) /* pointer to var must not be NULL */
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_i2d(nid, crit, ex)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    res = X509v3_add_ext(pexts, ext, 0) != NULL;
+    X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
+    return res;
+}
+
+/* Add a CRL revocation reason code to extension stack, which may be NULL */
+static int add_crl_reason_extension(X509_EXTENSIONS **pexts, int reason_code)
+{
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED *val = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
+    int res = 0;
+
+    if (val != NULL && ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(val, reason_code))
+        res = add1_extension(pexts, NID_crl_reason, 0 /* non-critical */, val);
+    ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(val);
+    return res;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_create(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = OSSL_CMP_MSG_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_init(ctx, msg->header)
+            || !ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(msg, bodytype))
+        goto err;
+    if (ctx->geninfo_ITAVs != NULL
+            && !ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push1_items(msg->header,
+                                                     ctx->geninfo_ITAVs))
+        goto err;
+
+    switch (bodytype) {
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
+        if ((msg->body->value.ir = OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
+        if (ctx->p10CSR == NULL) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_P10CR);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((msg->body->value.p10cr = X509_REQ_dup(ctx->p10CSR)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
+        if ((msg->body->value.ip = OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR:
+        if ((msg->body->value.rr = sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP:
+        if ((msg->body->value.rp = OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF:
+        if ((msg->body->value.certConf =
+             sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF:
+        if ((msg->body->value.pkiconf = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ASN1_TYPE_set(msg->body->value.pkiconf, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ:
+        if ((msg->body->value.pollReq = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP:
+        if ((msg->body->value.pollRep = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM:
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP:
+        if ((msg->body->value.genm = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_new_null()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR:
+        if ((msg->body->value.error = OSSL_CMP_ERRORMSGCONTENT_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        return msg;
+
+    default:
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+ err:
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+#define HAS_SAN(ctx) \
+    (sk_GENERAL_NAME_num((ctx)->subjectAltNames) > 0 \
+         || OSSL_CMP_CTX_reqExtensions_have_SAN(ctx) == 1)
+
+static X509_NAME *determine_subj(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *refcert,
+                                 int bodytype)
+{
+    if (ctx->subjectName != NULL)
+        return ctx->subjectName;
+
+    if (refcert != NULL
+            && (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR || !HAS_SAN(ctx)))
+        /*
+         * For KUR, copy subjectName from reference certificate.
+         * For IR or CR, do the same only if there is no subjectAltName.
+         */
+        return X509_get_subject_name(refcert);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create CRMF certificate request message for IR/CR/KUR
+ * returns a pointer to the OSSL_CRMF_MSG on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
+                              int rid, EVP_PKEY *rkey)
+{
+    OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm = NULL;
+    X509 *refcert = ctx->oldCert != NULL ? ctx->oldCert : ctx->clCert;
+    /* refcert defaults to current client cert */
+    STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *default_sans = NULL;
+    X509_NAME *subject = determine_subj(ctx, refcert, bodytype);
+    int crit = ctx->setSubjectAltNameCritical || subject == NULL;
+    /* RFC5280: subjectAltName MUST be critical if subject is null */
+    X509_EXTENSIONS *exts = NULL;
+
+    if (rkey == NULL
+            || (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR && refcert == NULL)) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+    if ((crm = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_new()) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_certReqId(crm, rid)
+            /*
+             * fill certTemplate, corresponding to CertificationRequestInfo
+             * of PKCS#10. The rkey param cannot be NULL so far -
+             * it could be NULL if centralized key creation was supported
+             */
+            || !OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm), rkey,
+                                            subject, ctx->issuer,
+                                            NULL/* serial */))
+        goto err;
+    if (ctx->days != 0) {
+        time_t notBefore, notAfter;
+
+        notBefore = time(NULL);
+        notAfter = notBefore + 60 * 60 * 24 * ctx->days;
+        if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_validity(crm, notBefore, notAfter))
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    /* extensions */
+    if (refcert != NULL && !ctx->SubjectAltName_nodefault)
+        default_sans = X509V3_get_d2i(X509_get0_extensions(refcert),
+                                      NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+    /* exts are copied from ctx to allow reuse */
+    if (ctx->reqExtensions != NULL) {
+        exts = sk_X509_EXTENSION_deep_copy(ctx->reqExtensions,
+                                           X509_EXTENSION_dup,
+                                           X509_EXTENSION_free);
+        if (exts == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ctx->subjectAltNames) > 0
+            && !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name,
+                               crit, ctx->subjectAltNames))
+        goto err;
+    if (!HAS_SAN(ctx) && default_sans != NULL
+            && !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name, crit, default_sans))
+        goto err;
+    if (ctx->policies != NULL
+            && !add1_extension(&exts, NID_certificate_policies,
+                               ctx->setPoliciesCritical, ctx->policies))
+        goto err;
+    if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_extensions(crm, exts))
+        goto err;
+    exts = NULL;
+    /* end fill certTemplate, now set any controls */
+
+    /* for KUR, set OldCertId according to D.6 */
+    if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR) {
+        OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid =
+            OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(X509_get_issuer_name(refcert),
+                                 X509_get_serialNumber(refcert));
+        int ret;
+
+        if (cid == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        ret = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set1_regCtrl_oldCertID(crm, cid);
+        OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_free(cid);
+        if (ret == 0)
+            goto err;
+    }
+
+    goto end;
+
+ err:
+    OSSL_CRMF_MSG_free(crm);
+    crm = NULL;
+
+ end:
+    sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
+    sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(default_sans, GENERAL_NAME_free);
+    return crm;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int type, int err_code)
+{
+    EVP_PKEY *rkey;
+    EVP_PKEY *privkey;
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
+    OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    rkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 0);
+    if (rkey == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
+
+    if (type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR && type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR
+            && type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR && type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, type)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* header */
+    if (ctx->implicitConfirm && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(msg->header))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* body */
+    /* For P10CR the content has already been set in OSSL_CMP_MSG_create */
+    if (type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR) {
+        if (ctx->popoMethod == OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE && privkey == NULL) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+            goto err;
+        }
+        if ((crm = crm_new(ctx, type, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, rkey)) == NULL
+                || !OSSL_CRMF_MSG_create_popo(crm, privkey, ctx->digest,
+                                              ctx->popoMethod)
+                /* value.ir is same for cr and kur */
+                || !sk_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push(msg->body->value.ir, crm))
+            goto err;
+        crm = NULL;
+        /* TODO: here optional 2nd certreqmsg could be pushed to the stack */
+    }
+
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, err_code);
+    OSSL_CRMF_MSG_free(crm);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
+                                   int certReqId, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                                   X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
+                                   STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs, int encrypted,
+                                   int unprotectedErrors)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *repMsg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *resp = NULL;
+    int status = -1;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, bodytype)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    repMsg = msg->body->value.ip; /* value.ip is same for cp and kup */
+
+    /* header */
+    if (ctx->implicitConfirm && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(msg->header))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* body */
+    if ((resp = OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(resp->status);
+    if ((resp->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si)) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(resp->certReqId, certReqId))
+        goto err;
+
+    status = ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(resp->status);
+    if (status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection
+            && status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting && cert != NULL) {
+        if (encrypted) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+            goto err;
+        }
+
+        if ((resp->certifiedKeyPair = OSSL_CMP_CERTIFIEDKEYPAIR_new())
+            == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        resp->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert->type =
+            OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_CERTIFICATE;
+        if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
+            goto err;
+        resp->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert->value.certificate = cert;
+    }
+
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_push(repMsg->response, resp))
+        goto err;
+    resp = NULL;
+    /* TODO: here optional 2nd certrep could be pushed to the stack */
+
+    if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP && caPubs != NULL
+            && (repMsg->caPubs = X509_chain_up_ref(caPubs)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (chain != NULL
+            && !ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain, 0, 1, 0))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!unprotectedErrors
+            || ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
+        if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+            goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTREP);
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_free(resp);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rr_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS *rd;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->oldCert != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((rd = OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* Fill the template from the contents of the certificate to be revoked */
+    if (!OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(rd->certDetails,
+                                     NULL/* pubkey would be redundant */,
+                                     NULL/* subject would be redundant */,
+                                     X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert),
+                                     X509_get_serialNumber(ctx->oldCert)))
+        goto err;
+
+    /* revocation reason code is optional */
+    if (ctx->revocationReason != CRL_REASON_NONE
+            && !add_crl_reason_extension(&rd->crlEntryDetails,
+                                         ctx->revocationReason))
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_push(msg->body->value.rr, rd))
+        goto err;
+    rd = NULL;
+
+    /*
+     * TODO: the Revocation Passphrase according to section 5.3.19.9 could be
+     *       set here if set in ctx
+     */
+
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RR);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_free(rd);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                              OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid, int unprot_err)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rep = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si1 = NULL;
+    OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid_copy = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL && cid != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    rep = msg->body->value.rp;
+
+    if ((si1 = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_push(rep->status, si1)) {
+        OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si1);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if ((rep->revCerts = sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_new_null()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((cid_copy = OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_dup(cid)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_push(rep->revCerts, cid_copy)) {
+        OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_free(cid_copy);
+        goto err;
+    }
+
+    if (!unprot_err
+            || ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
+        if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+            goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RP);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pkiconf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_PKICONF);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
+{
+    int bodytype;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && itav != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    bodytype = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg);
+    if (bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM
+            && bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    /* value.genp has the same structure, so this works for genp as well */
+    return OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(&msg->body->value.genm, itav);
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
+                                 STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs)
+{
+    int i;
+    OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_num(itavs); i++) {
+        if ((itav = OSSL_CMP_ITAV_dup(sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_value(itavs,i))) == NULL)
+            return 0;
+        if (!ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(msg, itav)) {
+            OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(itav);
+            return 0;
+        }
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Creates a new General Message/Response with an empty itav stack
+ * returns a pointer to the PKIMessage on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static OSSL_CMP_MSG *gen_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int body_type, int err_code)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, body_type)) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (ctx->genm_ITAVs != NULL
+            && !ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(msg, ctx->genm_ITAVs))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, err_code);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return gen_new(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENM);
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    return gen_new(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP);
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
+                                 int errorCode,
+                                 OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *errorDetails,
+                                 int unprotected)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo);
+    if ((msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si))
+        == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (errorCode >= 0) {
+        if ((msg->body->value.error->errorCode = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(msg->body->value.error->errorCode, errorCode))
+            goto err;
+    }
+    if (errorDetails != NULL)
+        if ((msg->body->value.error->errorDetails =
+            sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_deep_copy(errorDetails, ASN1_STRING_dup,
+                                         ASN1_STRING_free)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+
+    if (!unprotected && !ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_ERROR);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_set_certHash() calculates a hash of the certificate,
+ * using the same hash algorithm as is used to create and verify the
+ * certificate signature, and places the hash into the certHash field of a
+ * OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS structure. This is used in the certConf message,
+ * for example, to confirm that the certificate was received successfully.
+ */
+int ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus,
+                                     const X509 *cert)
+{
+    unsigned int len;
+    unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+    int md_NID;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(certStatus != NULL && cert != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    /*-
+     * select hash algorithm, as stated in Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 defs:
+     * the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
+     * as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
+     */
+    if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(X509_get_signature_nid(cert), &md_NID, NULL)
+            && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) != NULL) {
+        if (!X509_digest(cert, md, hash, &len))
+            goto err;
+        if (!ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1_bytes(&certStatus->certHash, hash,
+                                                   len))
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
+        return 0;
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_SETTING_CERTHASH);
+    return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * TODO: handle potential 2nd certificate when signing and encrypting
+ * certificates have been requested/received
+ */
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info,
+                                    const char *text)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_PKISI *sinfo;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->newCert != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((unsigned)fail_info > OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX_BIT_PATTERN) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAIL_INFO_OUT_OF_RANGE);
+        return NULL;
+    }
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((certStatus = OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    /* consume certStatus into msg right away so it gets deallocated with msg */
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_push(msg->body->value.certConf, certStatus))
+        goto err;
+    /* set the ID of the certReq */
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(certStatus->certReqId, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
+     * as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
+     */
+    if (!ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(certStatus, ctx->newCert))
+        goto err;
+    /*
+     * For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field
+     * indicates ACCEPTANCE of the specified certificate.  Alternatively,
+     * explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY
+     * be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at
+     * the CA/RA.
+     */
+    sinfo = fail_info != 0 ?
+        ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection, fail_info, text) :
+        ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted, 0, text);
+    if (sinfo == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    certStatus->statusInfo = sinfo;
+
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTCONF);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ *preq = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    /* TODO: support multiple cert request IDs to poll */
+    if ((preq = OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_new()) == NULL
+            || !ASN1_INTEGER_set(preq->certReqId, crid)
+            || !sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_push(msg->body->value.pollReq, preq))
+        goto err;
+
+    preq = NULL;
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREQ);
+    OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_free(preq);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid,
+                                   int64_t poll_after)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
+    OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *prep;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP)) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if ((prep = OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_new()) == NULL)
+        goto err;
+    if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_push(msg->body->value.pollRep, prep))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(prep->certReqId, crid))
+        goto err;
+    if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(prep->checkAfter, poll_after))
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
+        goto err;
+    return msg;
+
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREP);
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*-
+ * returns the status field of the RevRepContent with the given
+ * request/sequence id inside a revocation response.
+ * RevRepContent has the revocation statuses in same order as they were sent in
+ * RevReqContent.
+ * returns NULL on error
+ */
+OSSL_CMP_PKISI *
+ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkistatusinfo(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_PKISI *status;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(rrep != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((status = sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_value(rrep->status, rsid)) != NULL)
+        return status;
+
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKISTATUSINFO_NOT_FOUND);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns the CertId field in the revCerts part of the RevRepContent
+ * with the given request/sequence id inside a revocation response.
+ * RevRepContent has the CertIds in same order as they were sent in
+ * RevReqContent.
+ * returns NULL on error
+ */
+OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *
+ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_CertId(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid)
+{
+    OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(rrep != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((cid = sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_value(rrep->revCerts, rsid)) != NULL)
+        return cid;
+
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTID_NOT_FOUND);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+static int suitable_rid(const ASN1_INTEGER *certReqId, int rid)
+{
+    int trid;
+
+    if (rid == -1)
+        return 1;
+
+    trid = ossl_cmp_asn1_get_int(certReqId);
+
+    if (trid == -1) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID);
+        return 0;
+    }
+    return rid == trid;
+}
+
+static void add_expected_rid(int rid)
+{
+    char str[DECIMAL_SIZE(rid) + 1];
+
+    BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%d", rid);
+    ERR_add_error_data(2, "expected certReqId = ", str);
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns a pointer to the PollResponse with the given CertReqId
+ * (or the first one in case -1) inside a PollRepContent
+ * returns NULL on error or if no suitable PollResponse available
+ */
+OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *
+ossl_cmp_pollrepcontent_get0_pollrep(const OSSL_CMP_POLLREPCONTENT *prc,
+                                     int rid)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *pollRep = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(prc != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_num(prc); i++) {
+        pollRep = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_value(prc, i);
+        if (suitable_rid(pollRep->certReqId, rid))
+            return pollRep;
+    }
+
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND);
+    add_expected_rid(rid);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * returns a pointer to the CertResponse with the given CertReqId
+ * (or the first one in case -1) inside a CertRepMessage
+ * returns NULL on error or if no suitable CertResponse available
+ */
+OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *
+ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(const OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crm,
+                                          int rid)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = NULL;
+    int i;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(crm != NULL && crm->response != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_num(crm->response); i++) {
+        crep = sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_value(crm->response, i);
+        if (suitable_rid(crep->certReqId, rid))
+            return crep;
+    }
+
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND);
+    add_expected_rid(rid);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * CMP_CERTRESPONSE_get1_certificate() attempts to retrieve the returned
+ * certificate from the given certResponse B<crep>.
+ * Uses the privkey in case of indirect POP from B<ctx>.
+ * Returns a pointer to a copy of the found certificate, or NULL if not found.
+ */
+X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(EVP_PKEY *privkey,
+                                             const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT *coec;
+    X509 *crt = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(crep != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if (crep->certifiedKeyPair
+            && (coec = crep->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert) != NULL) {
+        switch (coec->type) {
+        case OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_CERTIFICATE:
+            crt = X509_dup(coec->value.certificate);
+            break;
+        case OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_ENCRYPTEDCERT:
+            /* cert encrypted for indirect PoP; RFC 4210, 5.2.8.2 */
+            if (privkey == NULL) {
+                CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
+                return NULL;
+            }
+            crt =
+                OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert(coec->value.encryptedCert,
+                                                      privkey);
+            break;
+        default:
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_TYPE);
+            return NULL;
+        }
+    }
+    if (crt == NULL)
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
+    return crt;
+}
+
+OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_load(const char *file)
+{
+    OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
+    BIO *bio = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(file != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb")) == NULL)
+        return NULL;
+    msg = OSSL_d2i_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, NULL);
+    BIO_free(bio);
+    return msg;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000..7db3440f32
--- /dev/null
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
+ * Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "cmp_local.h"
+
+/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/cmp.h>
+#include <openssl/crmf.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+
+/*
+ * This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
+ *
+ * Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
+ * and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
+ *
+ * Either secret or pkey must be set, the other must be NULL. Attempts doing
+ * PBMAC in case 'secret' is set and signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
+ * do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
+ *
+ * returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
+ */
+ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
+                                          const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
+                                          EVP_PKEY *pkey)
+{
+    ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
+    CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
+    const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
+    int len;
+    size_t prot_part_der_len;
+    unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
+    size_t sig_len;
+    unsigned char *protection = NULL;
+    const void *ppval = NULL;
+    int pptype = 0;
+    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
+    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
+    const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
+    EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
+    int md_NID;
+    const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    /* construct data to be signed */
+    prot_part.header = msg->header;
+    prot_part.body = msg->body;
+
+    len = i2d_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
+    if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
+
+    if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
+        goto end;
+    }
+    X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
+
+    if (secret != NULL && pkey == NULL) {
+        if (ppval == NULL) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
+        pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
+        pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
+        if (pbm == NULL) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
+            goto end;
+        }
+
+        if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
+                               secret->data, secret->length,
+                               &protection, &sig_len))
+            goto end;
+    } else if (secret == NULL && pkey != NULL) {
+        /* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
+        /* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
+
+        if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
+                || (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
+                || (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
+            goto end;
+        }
+        if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
+                                        prot_part_der_len) <= 0
+                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
+                || (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
+                || EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
+            goto end;
+        }
+    } else {
+        CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
+        goto end;
+    }
+
+    if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
+        goto end;
+    /* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
+    prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
+    prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
+    if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
+        ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
+        prot = NULL;
+    }
+
+ end:
+    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
+    EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
+    OPENSSL_free(protection);
+    OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
+    return prot;
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
+            && (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctx->clCert != NULL) {
+        /* Make sure that our own cert gets sent, in the first position */
+        if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->clCert))
+            return 0;
+        if (!sk_X509_push(msg->extraCerts, ctx->clCert)) {
+            X509_free(ctx->clCert);
+            return 0;
+        }
+        /* if we have untrusted store, try to add intermediate certs */
+        if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
+            STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
+                ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->clCert);
+            int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
+                                                  1 /* no self-signed */,
+                                                  1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
+            sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
+            if (res == 0)
+                return 0;
+        }
+    }
+
+    /* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
+    if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
+                                     1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
+        return 0;
+
+    /* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
+    if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
+        sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
+        msg->extraCerts = NULL;
+    }
+    return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
+ * the pbm settings in the context
+ * returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
+ */
+static X509_ALGOR *create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
+{
+    X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
+    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
+    unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
+    int pbm_der_len;
+    ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
+
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
+        return NULL;
+
+    alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
+    pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
+                             ctx->pbm_mac);
+    pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
+    if (alg == NULL || pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
+        goto err;
+
+    if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
+        goto err;
+
+    if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
+        goto err;
+    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
+
+    X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
+                    V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
+    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
+    return alg;
+
+ err:
+    ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
+    X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
+    OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
+    OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
+    return NULL;
+}
+
+int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
+{
+    if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
+        return 0;
+
+    if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
+        return 1;
+
+    /* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
+    if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
+        if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+        if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
+                && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
+                                                ctx->referenceValue))
+            goto err;
+
+        /*
+         * add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
+         * while not needed to validate the signing cert, the option to do
+         * this might be handy for certain use cases
+         */
+        if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
+            goto err;
+
+        if ((msg->protection =
+             ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, NULL)) == NULL)
+            goto err;
+    } else {
+        /*
+         * use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
+         * private key is given
+         */
+        if (ctx->clCert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
+            const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
+            int algNID = 0;
+            ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;
+
+            /* make sure that key and certificate match */
+            if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->clCert, ctx->pkey)) {
+                CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
+                if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
+                    goto err;
+
+            if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
+                                        EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
+                CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
+                goto err;
+            }
+            if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+            if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg,
+                                 alg, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
+                ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
+                goto err;
+            }
+
+            /*
+             * set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
+             * to section 5.1.1
+             */
+            subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->clCert);
+            if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
+                    && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
+                goto err;
+
+            /*
+             * Add ctx->clCert followed, if possible, by its chain built
+             * from ctx->untrusted_certs, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
+             */
+            if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
+                goto err;
+
+            if ((msg->protection =
+                 ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, NULL, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
+                goto err;
+        } else {
+            CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
+            goto err;
+        }
+    }
+
+    return 1;
+ err:
+    CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
+    return 0;
+}
diff --git a/crypto/cmp/cmp_status.c b/crypto/cmp/cmp_status.c
index f6b7978a4f..a5f6b29490 100644
--- a/crypto/cmp/cmp_status.c
+++ b/crypto/cmp/cmp_status.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ const char *ossl_cmp_PKIStatus_to_string(int status)
         return "PKIStatus: revocation notification - a revocation of the cert has occurred";
     case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_keyUpdateWarning:
         return "PKIStatus: key update warning - update already done for the cert";
-    default: 
+    default:
         {
             char buf[40];
             BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "PKIStatus: invalid=%d", status);
@@ -299,4 +299,3 @@ OSSL_CMP_PKISI *ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(int status, int fail_info,
     ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(utf8_text);
     return NULL;
 }
-
diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c b/crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c
index 4380156795..8b6657f969 100644
--- a/crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c
+++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c
@@ -235,6 +235,5 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
 ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS) =
     ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0,
                           OSSL_CRMF_MSGS, OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
-    ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
+ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
 IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
-
diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c b/crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
index 6ba3f7ab3f..64dbf80978 100644
--- a/crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
@@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ static int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regCtrl(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
     return 0;
 }
 
- /* id-regCtrl-regToken Control (section 6.1) */
+/* id-regCtrl-regToken Control (section 6.1) */
 IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(regToken, ASN1_STRING, regCtrl)
 
- /* id-regCtrl-authenticator Control (section 6.2) */
+/* id-regCtrl-authenticator Control (section 6.2) */
 #define ASN1_UTF8STRING_dup ASN1_STRING_dup
 IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(authenticator, ASN1_UTF8STRING, regCtrl)
 
@@ -153,11 +153,11 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_PKIPublicationInfo_action(
     return ASN1_INTEGER_set(pi->action, action);
 }
 
- /* id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo Control (section 6.3) */
+/* id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo Control (section 6.3) */
 IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(pkiPublicationInfo, OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO,
                          regCtrl)
 
- /* id-regCtrl-oldCertID Control (section 6.5) from the given */
+/* id-regCtrl-oldCertID Control (section 6.5) from the given */
 IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(oldCertID, OSSL_CRMF_CERTID, regCtrl)
 
 OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(const X509_NAME *issuer,
@@ -188,10 +188,9 @@ OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(const X509_NAME *issuer,
     return NULL;
 }
 
- /*
-  * id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey Control (section 6.6)
-  *
-  */
+/*
+ * id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey Control (section 6.6)
+ */
 IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(protocolEncrKey, X509_PUBKEY, regCtrl)
 
 /*-
@@ -567,7 +566,7 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(const OSSL_CRMF_MSGS *reqs,
          * return 1 if the type of req->popo->value.keyEncipherment
          * is OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE and
          * its value.subsequentMessage == OSSL_CRMF_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE_ENCRCERT
-        */
+         */
     case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYAGREE:
     default:
         CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO,
@@ -702,7 +701,7 @@ X509 *OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE *ecert,
     if ((iv = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))) == NULL)
         goto end;
     if (ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(ecert->symmAlg->parameter, iv,
-                                   EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))
+                                  EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))
         != EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
         CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
                 CRMF_R_MALFORMED_IV);
diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h b/crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h
index 577187f55b..06b32b5378 100644
--- a/crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h
+++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ struct ossl_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
     ASN1_INTEGER *iterationCount;
     X509_ALGOR *mac;
 } /* OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER */;
-#define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
+# define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
 
 /*-
  * POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ struct ossl_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
  *   -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
  * publicKey      SubjectPublicKeyInfo  -- from CertTemplate
  * }
-*/
+ */
 typedef struct ossl_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_authinfo_st {
     int type;
     union {
diff --git a/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c
index c5e08c47de..2dfa84e49b 100644
--- a/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c
+++ b/crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c
@@ -133,8 +133,7 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,
     int ok = 0;
     EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
     EVP_MAC_CTX *mctx = NULL;
-    OSSL_PARAM macparams[3] =
-        { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
+    OSSL_PARAM macparams[3] = {OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END};
 
     if (out == NULL || pbmp == NULL || pbmp->mac == NULL
             || pbmp->mac->algorithm == NULL || msg == NULL || sec == NULL) {
@@ -193,16 +192,15 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,
     mac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbmp->mac->algorithm);
 
     if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, mac_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL)
-        || ((mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(hmac_md_nid)) == NULL)) {
+            || (mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(hmac_md_nid)) == NULL) {
         CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
         goto err;
     }
 
-    macparams[0] =
-        OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
-                                         (char *)mdname, 0);
-    macparams[1] =
-        OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, basekey, bklen);
+    macparams[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
+                                                    (char *)mdname, 0);
+    macparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
+                                                     basekey, bklen);
     if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL)) == NULL
             || (mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL
             || !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mctx, macparams)
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index a39b65382d..70dca14925 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -2066,13 +2066,43 @@ BN_R_PRIVATE_KEY_TOO_LARGE:117:private key too large
 BN_R_P_IS_NOT_PRIME:112:p is not prime
 BN_R_TOO_MANY_ITERATIONS:113:too many iterations
 BN_R_TOO_MANY_TEMPORARY_VARIABLES:109:too many temporary variables
+CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID:108:bad request id
+CMP_R_CERTID_NOT_FOUND:109:certid not found
+CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND:112:certificate not found
+CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND:113:certresponse not found
+CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH:114:cert and key do not match
+CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION:115:error calculating protection
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTCONF:116:error creating certconf
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTREP:117:error creating certrep
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_ERROR:118:error creating error
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENM:119:error creating genm
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP:120:error creating genp
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_P10CR:121:error creating p10cr
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_PKICONF:122:error creating pkiconf
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREP:123:error creating pollrep
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREQ:124:error creating pollreq
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RP:125:error creating rp
+CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RR:126:error creating rr
 CMP_R_ERROR_PARSING_PKISTATUS:107:error parsing pkistatus
+CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE:127:error protecting message
+CMP_R_ERROR_SETTING_CERTHASH:128:error setting certhash
 CMP_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM:110:failure obtaining random
+CMP_R_FAIL_INFO_OUT_OF_RANGE:129:fail info out of range
 CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS:100:invalid args
-CMP_R_MULTIPLE_SAN_SOURCES:102:multiple san sources
+CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION:130:\
+	missing key input for creating protection
+CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY:131:missing private key
 CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION:111:missing sender identification
+CMP_R_MULTIPLE_SAN_SOURCES:102:multiple san sources
 CMP_R_NO_STDIO:194:no stdio
 CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT:103:null argument
+CMP_R_PKISTATUSINFO_NOT_FOUND:132:pkistatusinfo not found
+CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY:133:unexpected pkibody
+CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID:134:unknown algorithm id
+CMP_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_TYPE:135:unknown cert type
+CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM:136:unsupported algorithm
+CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE:137:unsupported key type
+CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID:138:wrong algorithm oid
 CMS_R_ADD_SIGNER_ERROR:99:add signer error
 CMS_R_ATTRIBUTE_ERROR:161:attribute error
 CMS_R_CERTIFICATE_ALREADY_PRESENT:175:certificate already present