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-rw-r--r--crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c407
1 files changed, 407 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c b/crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c
new file mode 100644
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+++ b/crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c
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+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+#include "e_os.h"
+
+#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
+
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <stdarg.h>
+# include <string.h>
+# include <openssl/hmac.h>
+# include <openssl/cms.h>
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# include <openssl/kdf.h>
+# include <openssl/x509.h>
+# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
+# include "internal/evp_int.h"
+# include "kdf_local.h"
+
+# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
+
+struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ unsigned char *secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ int cek_nid;
+ unsigned char *ukm;
+ size_t ukm_len;
+ size_t dkm_len;
+};
+
+/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
+static const struct {
+ int nid;
+ size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
+} kek_algs[] = {
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
+ { NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
+ { NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
+ { NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
+};
+
+/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
+static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
+{
+ int i, tag, xclass;
+ long tmplen;
+ const unsigned char *q = *pp;
+
+ i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
+ if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
+ return 0;
+ if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ q += tmplen;
+ *pp = (unsigned char *)q;
+ *plen -= q - *pp;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Encode the other info structure.
+ *
+ * RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
+ *
+ * OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
+ * partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
+ * suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
+ * }
+ *
+ * KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
+ * algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
+ * counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
+ * }
+ *
+ * |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
+ * |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
+ * suppPubInfo (in bits).
+ * |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
+ * can be NULL.
+ * |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
+ * |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
+ * |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
+ * |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
+ * encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
+ *
+ * Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
+ * Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
+ */
+static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
+ const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
+ unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
+ unsigned char **out_ctr)
+{
+ unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
+ int ret = 0, encoded_len;
+ long tlen;
+ /* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
+ static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
+ X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
+ ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
+ ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
+ alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
+ ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ksi == NULL
+ || alg_oid == NULL
+ || ctr_oct == NULL
+ || !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
+ || !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
+ goto err;
+ /* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
+ alg_oid = NULL;
+ ctr_oct = NULL;
+
+ /* Set the optional partyAInfo */
+ if (ukm != NULL) {
+ ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (ukm_oct == NULL)
+ goto err;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
+ }
+ /* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
+ encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
+ if (encoded_len <= 0)
+ goto err;
+
+ /* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
+ p = encoded;
+ tlen = (long)encoded_len;
+ if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
+ && skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+ && CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
+ *out_ctr = p;
+ *der = encoded;
+ *der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
+ ret = 1;
+ }
+err:
+ if (ret != 1)
+ OPENSSL_free(encoded);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
+ ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
+ X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
+ const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
+ const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
+ unsigned char *ctr,
+ unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
+{
+ int ret = 0, hlen;
+ size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
+ unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned char *out = derived_key;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
+
+ if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
+ || derived_key_len == 0) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
+ if (hlen <= 0)
+ return 0;
+ out_len = (size_t)hlen;
+
+ ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
+ if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
+ goto end;
+
+ if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
+ goto end;
+
+ for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
+ /* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
+ ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
+ ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
+ ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
+ ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
+
+ if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
+ || !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
+ goto end;
+ if (len >= out_len) {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ out += out_len;
+ len -= out_len;
+ if (len == 0)
+ break;
+ } else {
+ if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
+ goto end;
+ memcpy(out, mac, len);
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ ret = 1;
+end:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static EVP_KDF_IMPL *x942kdf_new(void)
+{
+ EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
+
+ if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
+ return impl;
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
+ OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len);
+ memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
+}
+
+static void x942kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+ x942kdf_reset(impl);
+ OPENSSL_free(impl);
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
+{
+ const unsigned char *p;
+ size_t len;
+
+ p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
+ len = va_arg(args, size_t);
+ if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
+ return 1;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(*out);
+ *out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
+ if (*out == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ *out_len = len;
+ return 1;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
+{
+ const EVP_MD *md;
+ char *alg_str = NULL;
+ size_t i;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
+ md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ impl->md = md;
+ return 1;
+
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
+ return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
+
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM:
+ return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->ukm, &impl->ukm_len);
+
+ case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG:
+ alg_str = va_arg(args, char *);
+ if (alg_str == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ impl->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(alg_str);
+ for (i = 0; i < (size_t)OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); ++i) {
+ if (kek_algs[i].nid == impl->cek_nid) {
+ impl->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+
+ default:
+ return -2;
+ }
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
+ const char *value)
+{
+ if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
+ return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
+ value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
+ value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "ukm") == 0)
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
+ value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "hexukm") == 0)
+ return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
+ value);
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "cekalg") == 0)
+ return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG,
+ value);
+
+ return -2;
+}
+
+static size_t x942kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
+{
+ int len;
+
+ if (impl->md == NULL) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
+ return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
+}
+
+static int x942kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ unsigned char *ctr;
+ unsigned char *der = NULL;
+ size_t der_len = 0;
+
+ if (impl->secret == NULL) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (impl->md == NULL) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (impl->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (impl->ukm != NULL && impl->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
+ /*
+ * Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
+ * For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
+ */
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (keylen != impl->dkm_len) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /* generate the otherinfo der */
+ if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(impl->cek_nid, impl->dkm_len,
+ impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len,
+ &der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
+ KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
+ der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
+ OPENSSL_free(der);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+const EVP_KDF x942_kdf_meth = {
+ EVP_KDF_X942,
+ x942kdf_new,
+ x942kdf_free,
+ x942kdf_reset,
+ x942kdf_ctrl,
+ x942kdf_ctrl_str,
+ x942kdf_size,
+ x942kdf_derive
+};
+
+#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */