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-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/md_rand.c1034
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand.h110
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_egd.c356
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_err.c65
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h93
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_lib.c304
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_nw.c110
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_os2.c86
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_unix.c586
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_vms.c167
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/rand_win.c1173
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/randfile.c396
-rw-r--r--crypto/rand/randtest.c278
13 files changed, 2374 insertions, 2384 deletions
diff --git a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
index 2a3a2f4d69..70743e1162 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/md_rand.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -109,11 +109,9 @@
*
*/
-
-
#ifdef MD_RAND_DEBUG
# ifndef NDEBUG
-# define NDEBUG
+# define NDEBUG
# endif
#endif
@@ -137,36 +135,36 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
#ifdef BN_DEBUG
# define PREDICT
#endif
-/* #define PREDICT 1 */
+/* #define PREDICT 1 */
-#define STATE_SIZE 1023
-static int state_num=0,state_index=0;
-static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+#define STATE_SIZE 1023
+static int state_num = 0, state_index = 0;
+static unsigned char state[STATE_SIZE + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
static unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-static long md_count[2]={0,0};
-static double entropy=0;
-static int initialized=0;
+static long md_count[2] = { 0, 0 };
+
+static double entropy = 0;
+static int initialized = 0;
static unsigned int crypto_lock_rand = 0; /* may be set only when a thread
- * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND
- * (to prevent double locking) */
+ * holds CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND (to
+ * prevent double locking) */
/* access to lockin_thread is synchronized by CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2 */
/* valid iff crypto_lock_rand is set */
static CRYPTO_THREADID locking_threadid;
-
#ifdef PREDICT
-int rand_predictable=0;
+int rand_predictable = 0;
#endif
-const char RAND_version[]="RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
+const char RAND_version[] = "RAND" OPENSSL_VERSION_PTEXT;
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx);
@@ -178,502 +176,489 @@ static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
static int ssleay_rand_status(void);
-static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth={
- ssleay_rand_seed,
- ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
- ssleay_rand_cleanup,
- ssleay_rand_add,
- ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
- ssleay_rand_status
- };
+static RAND_METHOD rand_ssleay_meth = {
+ ssleay_rand_seed,
+ ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_cleanup,
+ ssleay_rand_add,
+ ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes,
+ ssleay_rand_status
+};
RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void)
- {
- return(&rand_ssleay_meth);
- }
+{
+ return (&rand_ssleay_meth);
+}
static void ssleay_rand_cleanup(void)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(state,sizeof(state));
- state_num=0;
- state_index=0;
- OPENSSL_cleanse(md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
- md_count[0]=0;
- md_count[1]=0;
- entropy=0;
- initialized=0;
- }
+{
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(state, sizeof(state));
+ state_num = 0;
+ state_index = 0;
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH);
+ md_count[0] = 0;
+ md_count[1] = 0;
+ entropy = 0;
+ initialized = 0;
+}
static int ssleay_rand_add(const void *buf, int num, double add)
- {
- int i,j,k,st_idx;
- long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX m;
- int do_not_lock;
- int rv = 0;
-
- if (!num)
- return 1;
-
- /*
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
- *
- * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
- * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
- * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
- * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
- * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
- * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
- * (which is incremented after each use).
- * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
- * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
- * hash function.
- */
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
- /* check if we already have the lock */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- st_idx=state_index;
-
- /* use our own copies of the counters so that even
- * if a concurrent thread seeds with exactly the
- * same data and uses the same subarray there's _some_
- * difference */
- md_c[0] = md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = md_count[1];
-
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
- state_index += num;
- if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE)
- {
- state_index%=STATE_SIZE;
- state_num=STATE_SIZE;
- }
- else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE)
- {
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_num=state_index;
- }
- /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
-
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE]
- * are what we will use now, but other threads may use them
- * as well */
-
- md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
-
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- for (i=0; i<num; i+=MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)
- {
- j=(num-i);
- j=(j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH:j;
-
- if (!MD_Init(&m))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- k=(st_idx+j)-STATE_SIZE;
- if (k > 0)
- {
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j-k))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),j))
- goto err;
-
- /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
- if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
- goto err;
- /* We know that line may cause programs such as
- purify and valgrind to complain about use of
- uninitialized data. The problem is not, it's
- with the caller. Removing that line will make
- sure you get really bad randomness and thereby
- other problems such as very insecure keys. */
-
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
- goto err;
- md_c[1]++;
-
- buf=(const char *)buf + j;
-
- for (k=0; k<j; k++)
- {
- /* Parallel threads may interfere with this,
- * but always each byte of the new state is
- * the XOR of some previous value of its
- * and local_md (itermediate values may be lost).
- * Alway using locking could hurt performance more
- * than necessary given that conflicts occur only
- * when the total seeding is longer than the random
- * state. */
- state[st_idx++]^=local_md[k];
- if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
- st_idx=0;
- }
- }
-
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- /* Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that
- * other thread's seeding remains without effect (except for
- * the incremented counter). By XORing it we keep at least as
- * much entropy as fits into md. */
- for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++)
- {
- md[k] ^= local_md[k];
- }
- if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
- entropy += add;
- if (!do_not_lock) CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
+{
+ int i, j, k, st_idx;
+ long md_c[2];
+ unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
+ int do_not_lock;
+ int rv = 0;
+
+ if (!num)
+ return 1;
+
+ /*
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage)
+ *
+ * The input is chopped up into units of 20 bytes (or less for
+ * the last block). Each of these blocks is run through the hash
+ * function as follows: The data passed to the hash function
+ * is the current 'md', the same number of bytes from the 'state'
+ * (the location determined by in incremented looping index) as
+ * the current 'block', the new key data 'block', and 'count'
+ * (which is incremented after each use).
+ * The result of this is kept in 'md' and also xored into the
+ * 'state' at the same locations that were used as input into the
+ * hash function.
+ */
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ /* check if we already have the lock */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ } else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ st_idx = state_index;
+
+ /*
+ * use our own copies of the counters so that even if a concurrent thread
+ * seeds with exactly the same data and uses the same subarray there's
+ * _some_ difference
+ */
+ md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+ /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+ state_index += num;
+ if (state_index >= STATE_SIZE) {
+ state_index %= STATE_SIZE;
+ state_num = STATE_SIZE;
+ } else if (state_num < STATE_SIZE) {
+ if (state_index > state_num)
+ state_num = state_index;
+ }
+ /* state_index <= state_num <= STATE_SIZE */
+
+ /*
+ * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num - 1) % STATE_SIZE] are what we
+ * will use now, but other threads may use them as well
+ */
+
+ md_count[1] += (num / MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) + (num % MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 0);
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i += MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) {
+ j = (num - i);
+ j = (j > MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH : j;
+
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ k = (st_idx + j) - STATE_SIZE;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j - k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), j))
+ goto err;
+
+ /* DO NOT REMOVE THE FOLLOWING CALL TO MD_Update()! */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j))
+ goto err;
+ /*
+ * We know that line may cause programs such as purify and valgrind
+ * to complain about use of uninitialized data. The problem is not,
+ * it's with the caller. Removing that line will make sure you get
+ * really bad randomness and thereby other problems such as very
+ * insecure keys.
+ */
+
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m, local_md))
+ goto err;
+ md_c[1]++;
+
+ buf = (const char *)buf + j;
+
+ for (k = 0; k < j; k++) {
+ /*
+ * Parallel threads may interfere with this, but always each byte
+ * of the new state is the XOR of some previous value of its and
+ * local_md (itermediate values may be lost). Alway using locking
+ * could hurt performance more than necessary given that
+ * conflicts occur only when the total seeding is longer than the
+ * random state.
+ */
+ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[k];
+ if (st_idx >= STATE_SIZE)
+ st_idx = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ /*
+ * Don't just copy back local_md into md -- this could mean that other
+ * thread's seeding remains without effect (except for the incremented
+ * counter). By XORing it we keep at least as much entropy as fits into
+ * md.
+ */
+ for (k = 0; k < (int)sizeof(md); k++) {
+ md[k] ^= local_md[k];
+ }
+ if (entropy < ENTROPY_NEEDED) /* stop counting when we have enough */
+ entropy += add;
+ if (!do_not_lock)
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
#if !defined(OPENSSL_THREADS) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
- assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
+ assert(md_c[1] == md_count[1]);
#endif
- rv = 1;
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- return rv;
- }
+ rv = 1;
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ return rv;
+}
static int ssleay_rand_seed(const void *buf, int num)
- {
- return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
- }
+{
+ return ssleay_rand_add(buf, num, (double)num);
+}
static int ssleay_rand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num, int pseudo)
- {
- static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
- int i,j,k,st_num,st_idx;
- int num_ceil;
- int ok;
- long md_c[2];
- unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
- EVP_MD_CTX m;
+{
+ static volatile int stirred_pool = 0;
+ int i, j, k, st_num, st_idx;
+ int num_ceil;
+ int ok;
+ long md_c[2];
+ unsigned char local_md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+ EVP_MD_CTX m;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
- pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+ pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
#endif
- time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
- int do_stir_pool = 0;
+ time_t curr_time = time(NULL);
+ int do_stir_pool = 0;
/* time value for various platforms */
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32
- FILETIME tv;
+ FILETIME tv;
# ifdef _WIN32_WCE
- SYSTEMTIME t;
- GetSystemTime(&t);
- SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
+ SYSTEMTIME t;
+ GetSystemTime(&t);
+ SystemTimeToFileTime(&t, &tv);
# else
- GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
+ GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(&tv);
# endif
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
- struct timespec tv;
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+ struct timespec tv;
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
#elif defined(OPENSSL_SYSNAME_DSPBIOS)
- unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
- tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ unsigned long long tv, OPENSSL_rdtsc();
+ tv = OPENSSL_rdtsc();
#else
- struct timeval tv;
- gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
+ struct timeval tv;
+ gettimeofday(&tv, NULL);
#endif
#ifdef PREDICT
- if (rand_predictable)
- {
- static unsigned char val=0;
-
- for (i=0; i<num; i++)
- buf[i]=val++;
- return(1);
- }
+ if (rand_predictable) {
+ static unsigned char val = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num; i++)
+ buf[i] = val++;
+ return (1);
+ }
#endif
- if (num <= 0)
- return 1;
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
- /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
- num_ceil = (1 + (num-1)/(MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2);
-
- /*
- * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
- *
- * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
- *
- * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
- * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
- * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
- * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
- * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
- * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
- *
- * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
- * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
- * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
- * global 'md'.
- */
-
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
-
- if (!initialized)
- {
- RAND_poll();
- initialized = 1;
- }
-
- if (!stirred_pool)
- do_stir_pool = 1;
-
- ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
- if (!ok)
- {
- /* If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing
- * the PRNG output may help attackers to determine the new
- * state; thus we have to decrease the entropy estimate.
- * Once we've had enough initial seeding we don't bother to
- * adjust the entropy count, though, because we're not ambitious
- * to provide *information-theoretic* randomness.
- *
- * NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
- * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected
- * in a separate input pool and be transferred to the
- * output pool only when the entropy limit has been reached.
- */
- entropy -= num;
- if (entropy < 0)
- entropy = 0;
- }
-
- if (do_stir_pool)
- {
- /* In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret,
- * so we better make sure that the required entropy gets
- * 'evenly distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool.
- * The input function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md',
- * which makes it more suitable for this purpose.
- */
-
- int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
- while (n > 0)
- {
+ if (num <= 0)
+ return 1;
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_init(&m);
+ /* round upwards to multiple of MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ num_ceil =
+ (1 + (num - 1) / (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2)) * (MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2);
+
+ /*
+ * (Based on the rand(3) manpage:)
+ *
+ * For each group of 10 bytes (or less), we do the following:
+ *
+ * Input into the hash function the local 'md' (which is initialized from
+ * the global 'md' before any bytes are generated), the bytes that are to
+ * be overwritten by the random bytes, and bytes from the 'state'
+ * (incrementing looping index). From this digest output (which is kept
+ * in 'md'), the top (up to) 10 bytes are returned to the caller and the
+ * bottom 10 bytes are xored into the 'state'.
+ *
+ * Finally, after we have finished 'num' random bytes for the
+ * caller, 'count' (which is incremented) and the local and global 'md'
+ * are fed into the hash function and the results are kept in the
+ * global 'md'.
+ */
+
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&locking_threadid);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!stirred_pool)
+ do_stir_pool = 1;
+
+ ok = (entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ if (!ok) {
+ /*
+ * If the PRNG state is not yet unpredictable, then seeing the PRNG
+ * output may help attackers to determine the new state; thus we have
+ * to decrease the entropy estimate. Once we've had enough initial
+ * seeding we don't bother to adjust the entropy count, though,
+ * because we're not ambitious to provide *information-theoretic*
+ * randomness. NOTE: This approach fails if the program forks before
+ * we have enough entropy. Entropy should be collected in a separate
+ * input pool and be transferred to the output pool only when the
+ * entropy limit has been reached.
+ */
+ entropy -= num;
+ if (entropy < 0)
+ entropy = 0;
+ }
+
+ if (do_stir_pool) {
+ /*
+ * In the output function only half of 'md' remains secret, so we
+ * better make sure that the required entropy gets 'evenly
+ * distributed' through 'state', our randomness pool. The input
+ * function (ssleay_rand_add) chains all of 'md', which makes it more
+ * suitable for this purpose.
+ */
+
+ int n = STATE_SIZE; /* so that the complete pool gets accessed */
+ while (n > 0) {
#if MD_DIGEST_LENGTH > 20
# error "Please adjust DUMMY_SEED."
#endif
#define DUMMY_SEED "...................." /* at least MD_DIGEST_LENGTH */
- /* Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
- * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash. */
- ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
- n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
- }
- if (ok)
- stirred_pool = 1;
- }
-
- st_idx=state_index;
- st_num=state_num;
- md_c[0] = md_count[0];
- md_c[1] = md_count[1];
- memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
-
- state_index+=num_ceil;
- if (state_index > state_num)
- state_index %= state_num;
-
- /* state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num]
- * are now ours (but other threads may use them too) */
-
- md_count[0] += 1;
-
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- while (num > 0)
- {
- /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
- j=(num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)?MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2:num;
- num-=j;
- if (!MD_Init(&m))
- goto err;
+ /*
+ * Note that the seed does not matter, it's just that
+ * ssleay_rand_add expects to have something to hash.
+ */
+ ssleay_rand_add(DUMMY_SEED, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0.0);
+ n -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH;
+ }
+ if (ok)
+ stirred_pool = 1;
+ }
+
+ st_idx = state_index;
+ st_num = state_num;
+ md_c[0] = md_count[0];
+ md_c[1] = md_count[1];
+ memcpy(local_md, md, sizeof md);
+
+ state_index += num_ceil;
+ if (state_index > state_num)
+ state_index %= state_num;
+
+ /*
+ * state[st_idx], ..., state[(st_idx + num_ceil - 1) % st_num] are now
+ * ours (but other threads may use them too)
+ */
+
+ md_count[0] += 1;
+
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ while (num > 0) {
+ /* num_ceil -= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2 */
+ j = (num >= MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) ? MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 : num;
+ num -= j;
+ if (!MD_Init(&m))
+ goto err;
#ifndef GETPID_IS_MEANINGLESS
- if (curr_pid) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- {
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_pid,
- sizeof curr_pid))
- goto err;
- curr_pid = 0;
- }
+ if (curr_pid) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid))
+ goto err;
+ curr_pid = 0;
+ }
#endif
- if (curr_time) /* just in the first iteration to save time */
- {
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&curr_time,
- sizeof curr_time))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char*)&tv,
- sizeof tv))
- goto err;
- curr_time = 0;
- rand_hw_seed(&m);
- }
- if (!MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c)))
- goto err;
-
-#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
- /* The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small
- * source of entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised
- * it may cause programs such as purify or valgrind to
- * complain. So for those builds it is not used: the removal
- * of such a small source of entropy has negligible impact on
- * security.
- */
- if (!MD_Update(&m,buf,j))
- goto err;
+ if (curr_time) { /* just in the first iteration to save time */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&curr_time, sizeof curr_time))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&tv, sizeof tv))
+ goto err;
+ curr_time = 0;
+ rand_hw_seed(&m);
+ }
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c)))
+ goto err;
+
+#ifndef PURIFY /* purify complains */
+ /*
+ * The following line uses the supplied buffer as a small source of
+ * entropy: since this buffer is often uninitialised it may cause
+ * programs such as purify or valgrind to complain. So for those
+ * builds it is not used: the removal of such a small source of
+ * entropy has negligible impact on security.
+ */
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, buf, j))
+ goto err;
#endif
- k=(st_idx+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2)-st_num;
- if (k > 0)
- {
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2-k))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[0]),k))
- goto err;
- }
- else
- if (!MD_Update(&m,&(state[st_idx]),MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2))
- goto err;
- if (!MD_Final(&m,local_md))
- goto err;
-
- for (i=0; i<MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2; i++)
- {
- /* may compete with other threads */
- state[st_idx++]^=local_md[i];
- if (st_idx >= st_num)
- st_idx=0;
- if (i < j)
- *(buf++)=local_md[i+MD_DIGEST_LENGTH/2];
- }
- }
-
- if (!MD_Init(&m)
- || !MD_Update(&m,(unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]),sizeof(md_c))
- || !MD_Update(&m,local_md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
- goto err;
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- if (!MD_Update(&m,md,MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m,md))
- {
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- goto err;
- }
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- if (ok)
- return(1);
- else if (pseudo)
- return 0;
- else
- {
- RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
- ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
- "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
- return(0);
- }
- err:
- EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
- RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES,ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
- return 0;
-
- }
+ k = (st_idx + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2) - st_num;
+ if (k > 0) {
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2 - k))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[0]), k))
+ goto err;
+ } else if (!MD_Update(&m, &(state[st_idx]), MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2))
+ goto err;
+ if (!MD_Final(&m, local_md))
+ goto err;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2; i++) {
+ /* may compete with other threads */
+ state[st_idx++] ^= local_md[i];
+ if (st_idx >= st_num)
+ st_idx = 0;
+ if (i < j)
+ *(buf++) = local_md[i + MD_DIGEST_LENGTH / 2];
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!MD_Init(&m)
+ || !MD_Update(&m, (unsigned char *)&(md_c[0]), sizeof(md_c))
+ || !MD_Update(&m, local_md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH))
+ goto err;
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ if (!MD_Update(&m, md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH) || !MD_Final(&m, md)) {
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ if (ok)
+ return (1);
+ else if (pseudo)
+ return 0;
+ else {
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED);
+ ERR_add_error_data(1, "You need to read the OpenSSL FAQ, "
+ "http://www.openssl.org/support/faq.html");
+ return (0);
+ }
+ err:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&m);
+ RANDerr(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
+ return 0;
+
+}
static int ssleay_rand_nopseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
- }
+{
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 0);
+}
-/* pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not
- unpredictable */
-static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
- }
+/*
+ * pseudo-random bytes that are guaranteed to be unique but not unpredictable
+ */
+static int ssleay_rand_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
+{
+ return ssleay_rand_bytes(buf, num, 1);
+}
static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
- {
- CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
- int ret;
- int do_not_lock;
-
- CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
- /* check if we already have the lock
- * (could happen if a RAND_poll() implementation calls RAND_status()) */
- if (crypto_lock_rand)
- {
- CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- }
- else
- do_not_lock = 0;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
-
- /* prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again */
- CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
- crypto_lock_rand = 1;
- }
-
- if (!initialized)
- {
- RAND_poll();
- initialized = 1;
- }
-
- ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
-
- if (!do_not_lock)
- {
- /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
- crypto_lock_rand = 0;
-
- CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
- }
-
- return ret;
- }
-
-/* rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG.
- * only currently supports rdrand.
+{
+ CRYPTO_THREADID cur;
+ int ret;
+ int do_not_lock;
+
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_current(&cur);
+ /*
+ * check if we already have the lock (could happen if a RAND_poll()
+ * implementation calls RAND_status())
+ */
+ if (crypto_lock_rand) {
+ CRYPTO_r_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ do_not_lock = !CRYPTO_THREADID_cmp(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_r_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ } else
+ do_not_lock = 0;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock) {
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+
+ /*
+ * prevent ssleay_rand_bytes() from trying to obtain the lock again
+ */
+ CRYPTO_w_lock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ CRYPTO_THREADID_cpy(&locking_threadid, &cur);
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND2);
+ crypto_lock_rand = 1;
+ }
+
+ if (!initialized) {
+ RAND_poll();
+ initialized = 1;
+ }
+
+ ret = entropy >= ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+
+ if (!do_not_lock) {
+ /* before unlocking, we must clear 'crypto_lock_rand' */
+ crypto_lock_rand = 0;
+
+ CRYPTO_w_unlock(CRYPTO_LOCK_RAND);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * rand_hw_seed: get seed data from any available hardware RNG. only
+ * currently supports rdrand.
*/
/* Adapted from eng_rdrand.c */
@@ -682,68 +667,63 @@ static int ssleay_rand_status(void)
defined(__x86_64) || defined(__x86_64__) || \
defined(_M_AMD64) || defined (_M_X64)) && defined(OPENSSL_CPUID_OBJ)
-#define RDRAND_CALLS 4
+# define RDRAND_CALLS 4
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand(void);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
- {
- int i;
- if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
- return;
- for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++)
- {
- size_t rnd;
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return;
- MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
- }
- }
+{
+ int i;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+ return;
+ for (i = 0; i < RDRAND_CALLS; i++) {
+ size_t rnd;
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ MD_Update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&rnd, sizeof(size_t));
+ }
+}
/* XOR an existing buffer with random data */
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
- {
- size_t rnd;
- if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1<<(62-32))))
- return;
- while (num >= sizeof(size_t))
- {
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return;
- *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
- buf += sizeof(size_t);
- num -= sizeof(size_t);
- }
- if (num)
- {
- rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
- if (rnd == 0)
- return;
- while(num)
- {
- *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
- rnd >>= 8;
- buf++;
- num--;
- }
- }
- }
-
+{
+ size_t rnd;
+ if (!(OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[1] & (1 << (62 - 32))))
+ return;
+ while (num >= sizeof(size_t)) {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ *((size_t *)buf) ^= rnd;
+ buf += sizeof(size_t);
+ num -= sizeof(size_t);
+ }
+ if (num) {
+ rnd = OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand();
+ if (rnd == 0)
+ return;
+ while (num) {
+ *buf ^= rnd & 0xff;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ buf++;
+ num--;
+ }
+ }
+}
#else
static void rand_hw_seed(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
- {
- return;
- }
+{
+ return;
+}
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num)
- {
- return;
- }
+{
+ return;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand.h b/crypto/rand/rand.h
index b6949c6538..145edb2d8f 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand.h
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -57,15 +57,15 @@
*/
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_H
-#define HEADER_RAND_H
+# define HEADER_RAND_H
-#include <stdlib.h>
-#include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
-#include <openssl/e_os2.h>
+# include <stdlib.h>
+# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
+# include <openssl/e_os2.h>
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
-#include <windows.h>
-#endif
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS)
+# include <windows.h>
+# endif
#ifdef __cplusplus
extern "C" {
@@ -74,53 +74,53 @@ extern "C" {
/* Already defined in ossl_typ.h */
/* typedef struct rand_meth_st RAND_METHOD; */
-struct rand_meth_st
- {
- int (*seed)(const void *buf, int num);
- int (*bytes)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
- void (*cleanup)(void);
- int (*add)(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
- int (*pseudorand)(unsigned char *buf, int num);
- int (*status)(void);
- };
-
-#ifdef BN_DEBUG
+struct rand_meth_st {
+ int (*seed) (const void *buf, int num);
+ int (*bytes) (unsigned char *buf, int num);
+ void (*cleanup) (void);
+ int (*add) (const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+ int (*pseudorand) (unsigned char *buf, int num);
+ int (*status) (void);
+};
+
+# ifdef BN_DEBUG
extern int rand_predictable;
-#endif
+# endif
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth);
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void);
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine);
-#endif
+# endif
RAND_METHOD *RAND_SSLeay(void);
-void RAND_cleanup(void );
-int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
-int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf,int num);
-void RAND_seed(const void *buf,int num);
-void RAND_add(const void *buf,int num,double entropy);
-int RAND_load_file(const char *file,long max_bytes);
-int RAND_write_file(const char *file);
-const char *RAND_file_name(char *file,size_t num);
+void RAND_cleanup(void);
+int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num);
+void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num);
+void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy);
+int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long max_bytes);
+int RAND_write_file(const char *file);
+const char *RAND_file_name(char *file, size_t num);
int RAND_status(void);
int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes);
int RAND_egd(const char *path);
-int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path,int bytes);
+int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes);
int RAND_poll(void);
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
void RAND_screen(void);
int RAND_event(UINT, WPARAM, LPARAM);
-#endif
+# endif
-#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
+# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
int RAND_init_fips(void);
-#endif
+# endif
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
-/* The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
+/*
+ * The following lines are auto generated by the script mkerr.pl. Any changes
* made after this point may be overwritten when the script is next run.
*/
void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
@@ -128,22 +128,22 @@ void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void);
/* Error codes for the RAND functions. */
/* Function codes. */
-#define RAND_F_FIPS_RAND 102
-#define RAND_F_FIPS_RAND_SET_DT 103
-#define RAND_F_FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED 104
-#define RAND_F_FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE 105
-#define RAND_F_FIPS_X931_SET_DT 106
-#define RAND_F_RAND_GET_RAND_METHOD 101
-#define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES 100
+# define RAND_F_FIPS_RAND 102
+# define RAND_F_FIPS_RAND_SET_DT 103
+# define RAND_F_FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED 104
+# define RAND_F_FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE 105
+# define RAND_F_FIPS_X931_SET_DT 106
+# define RAND_F_RAND_GET_RAND_METHOD 101
+# define RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES 100
/* Reason codes. */
-#define RAND_R_NOT_IN_TEST_MODE 101
-#define RAND_R_NO_KEY_SET 102
-#define RAND_R_PRNG_ERROR 103
-#define RAND_R_PRNG_KEYED 104
-#define RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED 100
-#define RAND_R_PRNG_SEED_MUST_NOT_MATCH_KEY 105
-#define RAND_R_PRNG_STUCK 106
+# define RAND_R_NOT_IN_TEST_MODE 101
+# define RAND_R_NO_KEY_SET 102
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_ERROR 103
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_KEYED 104
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED 100
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_SEED_MUST_NOT_MATCH_KEY 105
+# define RAND_R_PRNG_STUCK 106
#ifdef __cplusplus
}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
index 0f320945a4..53d7a2bb37 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_egd.c
@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -97,207 +97,195 @@
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_MSDOS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
- {
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ return (-1);
+}
+
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
- {
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ return (-1);
+}
-int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path,int bytes)
- {
- return(-1);
- }
+int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
+{
+ return (-1);
+}
#else
-#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
-#include OPENSSL_UNISTD
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/socket.h>
-#ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H
-# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
+# include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
+# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/socket.h>
+# ifndef NO_SYS_UN_H
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS
# include <streams/un.h>
-# else
+# else
# include <sys/un.h>
-# endif
-#else
-struct sockaddr_un {
- short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
- char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
+# endif
+# else
+struct sockaddr_un {
+ short sun_family; /* AF_UNIX */
+ char sun_path[108]; /* path name (gag) */
};
-#endif /* NO_SYS_UN_H */
-#include <string.h>
-#include <errno.h>
+# endif /* NO_SYS_UN_H */
+# include <string.h>
+# include <errno.h>
-#ifndef offsetof
+# ifndef offsetof
# define offsetof(TYPE, MEMBER) ((size_t) &((TYPE *)0)->MEMBER)
-#endif
+# endif
int RAND_query_egd_bytes(const char *path, unsigned char *buf, int bytes)
- {
- int ret = 0;
- struct sockaddr_un addr;
- int len, num, numbytes;
- int fd = -1;
- int success;
- unsigned char egdbuf[2], tempbuf[255], *retrievebuf;
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ struct sockaddr_un addr;
+ int len, num, numbytes;
+ int fd = -1;
+ int success;
+ unsigned char egdbuf[2], tempbuf[255], *retrievebuf;
- memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
- addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
- if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
- return (-1);
- BUF_strlcpy(addr.sun_path,path,sizeof addr.sun_path);
- len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
- fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
- if (fd == -1) return (-1);
- success = 0;
- while (!success)
- {
- if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) == 0)
- success = 1;
- else
- {
- switch (errno)
- {
-#ifdef EINTR
- case EINTR:
-#endif
-#ifdef EAGAIN
- case EAGAIN:
-#endif
-#ifdef EINPROGRESS
- case EINPROGRESS:
-#endif
-#ifdef EALREADY
- case EALREADY:
-#endif
- /* No error, try again */
- break;
-#ifdef EISCONN
- case EISCONN:
- success = 1;
- break;
-#endif
- default:
- goto err; /* failure */
- }
- }
- }
+ memset(&addr, 0, sizeof(addr));
+ addr.sun_family = AF_UNIX;
+ if (strlen(path) >= sizeof(addr.sun_path))
+ return (-1);
+ BUF_strlcpy(addr.sun_path, path, sizeof addr.sun_path);
+ len = offsetof(struct sockaddr_un, sun_path) + strlen(path);
+ fd = socket(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0);
+ if (fd == -1)
+ return (-1);
+ success = 0;
+ while (!success) {
+ if (connect(fd, (struct sockaddr *)&addr, len) == 0)
+ success = 1;
+ else {
+ switch (errno) {
+# ifdef EINTR
+ case EINTR:
+# endif
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+# endif
+# ifdef EINPROGRESS
+ case EINPROGRESS:
+# endif
+# ifdef EALREADY
+ case EALREADY:
+# endif
+ /* No error, try again */
+ break;
+# ifdef EISCONN
+ case EISCONN:
+ success = 1;
+ break;
+# endif
+ default:
+ goto err; /* failure */
+ }
+ }
+ }
- while(bytes > 0)
- {
- egdbuf[0] = 1;
- egdbuf[1] = bytes < 255 ? bytes : 255;
- numbytes = 0;
- while (numbytes != 2)
- {
- num = write(fd, egdbuf + numbytes, 2 - numbytes);
- if (num >= 0)
- numbytes += num;
- else
- {
- switch (errno)
- {
-#ifdef EINTR
- case EINTR:
-#endif
-#ifdef EAGAIN
- case EAGAIN:
-#endif
- /* No error, try again */
- break;
- default:
- ret = -1;
- goto err; /* failure */
- }
- }
- }
- numbytes = 0;
- while (numbytes != 1)
- {
- num = read(fd, egdbuf, 1);
- if (num == 0)
- goto err; /* descriptor closed */
- else if (num > 0)
- numbytes += num;
- else
- {
- switch (errno)
- {
-#ifdef EINTR
- case EINTR:
-#endif
-#ifdef EAGAIN
- case EAGAIN:
-#endif
- /* No error, try again */
- break;
- default:
- ret = -1;
- goto err; /* failure */
- }
- }
- }
- if(egdbuf[0] == 0)
- goto err;
- if (buf)
- retrievebuf = buf + ret;
- else
- retrievebuf = tempbuf;
- numbytes = 0;
- while (numbytes != egdbuf[0])
- {
- num = read(fd, retrievebuf + numbytes, egdbuf[0] - numbytes);
- if (num == 0)
- goto err; /* descriptor closed */
- else if (num > 0)
- numbytes += num;
- else
- {
- switch (errno)
- {
-#ifdef EINTR
- case EINTR:
-#endif
-#ifdef EAGAIN
- case EAGAIN:
-#endif
- /* No error, try again */
- break;
- default:
- ret = -1;
- goto err; /* failure */
- }
- }
- }
- ret += egdbuf[0];
- bytes -= egdbuf[0];
- if (!buf)
- RAND_seed(tempbuf, egdbuf[0]);
- }
+ while (bytes > 0) {
+ egdbuf[0] = 1;
+ egdbuf[1] = bytes < 255 ? bytes : 255;
+ numbytes = 0;
+ while (numbytes != 2) {
+ num = write(fd, egdbuf + numbytes, 2 - numbytes);
+ if (num >= 0)
+ numbytes += num;
+ else {
+ switch (errno) {
+# ifdef EINTR
+ case EINTR:
+# endif
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+# endif
+ /* No error, try again */
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err; /* failure */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ numbytes = 0;
+ while (numbytes != 1) {
+ num = read(fd, egdbuf, 1);
+ if (num == 0)
+ goto err; /* descriptor closed */
+ else if (num > 0)
+ numbytes += num;
+ else {
+ switch (errno) {
+# ifdef EINTR
+ case EINTR:
+# endif
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+# endif
+ /* No error, try again */
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err; /* failure */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (egdbuf[0] == 0)
+ goto err;
+ if (buf)
+ retrievebuf = buf + ret;
+ else
+ retrievebuf = tempbuf;
+ numbytes = 0;
+ while (numbytes != egdbuf[0]) {
+ num = read(fd, retrievebuf + numbytes, egdbuf[0] - numbytes);
+ if (num == 0)
+ goto err; /* descriptor closed */
+ else if (num > 0)
+ numbytes += num;
+ else {
+ switch (errno) {
+# ifdef EINTR
+ case EINTR:
+# endif
+# ifdef EAGAIN
+ case EAGAIN:
+# endif
+ /* No error, try again */
+ break;
+ default:
+ ret = -1;
+ goto err; /* failure */
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ ret += egdbuf[0];
+ bytes -= egdbuf[0];
+ if (!buf)
+ RAND_seed(tempbuf, egdbuf[0]);
+ }
err:
- if (fd != -1) close(fd);
- return(ret);
- }
-
+ if (fd != -1)
+ close(fd);
+ return (ret);
+}
int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
- {
- int num, ret = 0;
+{
+ int num, ret = 0;
- num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, NULL, bytes);
- if (num < 1) goto err;
- if (RAND_status() == 1)
- ret = num;
+ num = RAND_query_egd_bytes(path, NULL, bytes);
+ if (num < 1)
+ goto err;
+ if (RAND_status() == 1)
+ ret = num;
err:
- return(ret);
- }
-
+ return (ret);
+}
int RAND_egd(const char *path)
- {
- return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255));
- }
-
+{
+ return (RAND_egd_bytes(path, 255));
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
index a435b0bfa6..6ab904d981 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_err.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -53,7 +53,8 @@
*
*/
-/* NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
+/*
+ * NOTE: this file was auto generated by the mkerr.pl script: any changes
* made to it will be overwritten when the script next updates this file,
* only reason strings will be preserved.
*/
@@ -65,43 +66,41 @@
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
-#define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,func,0)
-#define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,0,reason)
+# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,func,0)
+# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND,0,reason)
-static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[]=
- {
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_RAND), "FIPS_RAND"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_RAND_SET_DT), "FIPS_RAND_SET_DT"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED), "FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE), "FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_X931_SET_DT), "FIPS_x931_set_dt"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_RAND_GET_RAND_METHOD), "RAND_get_rand_method"},
-{ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES), "SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES"},
-{0,NULL}
- };
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = {
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_RAND), "FIPS_RAND"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_RAND_SET_DT), "FIPS_RAND_SET_DT"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED), "FIPS_SET_PRNG_SEED"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE), "FIPS_SET_TEST_MODE"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_FIPS_X931_SET_DT), "FIPS_x931_set_dt"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_RAND_GET_RAND_METHOD), "RAND_get_rand_method"},
+ {ERR_FUNC(RAND_F_SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES), "SSLEAY_RAND_BYTES"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
-static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[]=
- {
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NOT_IN_TEST_MODE) ,"not in test mode"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_KEY_SET) ,"no key set"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_ERROR) ,"prng error"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_KEYED) ,"prng keyed"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED) ,"PRNG not seeded"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_SEED_MUST_NOT_MATCH_KEY),"prng seed must not match key"},
-{ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_STUCK) ,"prng stuck"},
-{0,NULL}
- };
+static ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[] = {
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NOT_IN_TEST_MODE), "not in test mode"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_NO_KEY_SET), "no key set"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_ERROR), "prng error"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_KEYED), "prng keyed"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_NOT_SEEDED), "PRNG not seeded"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_SEED_MUST_NOT_MATCH_KEY),
+ "prng seed must not match key"},
+ {ERR_REASON(RAND_R_PRNG_STUCK), "prng stuck"},
+ {0, NULL}
+};
#endif
void ERR_load_RAND_strings(void)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
- if (ERR_func_error_string(RAND_str_functs[0].error) == NULL)
- {
- ERR_load_strings(0,RAND_str_functs);
- ERR_load_strings(0,RAND_str_reasons);
- }
+ if (ERR_func_error_string(RAND_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
+ ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_functs);
+ ERR_load_strings(0, RAND_str_reasons);
+ }
#endif
- }
+}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
index 6696b8057b..e2f784479d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lcl.h
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -110,49 +110,48 @@
*/
#ifndef HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-#define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
+# define HEADER_RAND_LCL_H
-#define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
+# define ENTROPY_NEEDED 32 /* require 256 bits = 32 bytes of randomness */
+# if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
+# define USE_SHA1_RAND
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
+# define USE_MD5_RAND
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES)
+# define USE_MDC2_RAND
+# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2)
+# define USE_MD2_RAND
+# else
+# error No message digest algorithm available
+# endif
+# endif
-#if !defined(USE_MD5_RAND) && !defined(USE_SHA1_RAND) && !defined(USE_MDC2_RAND) && !defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SHA1)
-#define USE_SHA1_RAND
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD5)
-#define USE_MD5_RAND
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MDC2) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DES)
-#define USE_MDC2_RAND
-#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_MD2)
-#define USE_MD2_RAND
-#else
-#error No message digest algorithm available
-#endif
-#endif
-
-#include <openssl/evp.h>
-#define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
-#define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
-#if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md5.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-#define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
-#elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
-#include <openssl/sha.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-#define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
-#elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/mdc2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-#define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
-#elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
-#include <openssl/md2.h>
-#define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
-#define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-#define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
-#endif
+# include <openssl/evp.h>
+# define MD_Update(a,b,c) EVP_DigestUpdate(a,b,c)
+# define MD_Final(a,b) EVP_DigestFinal_ex(a,b,NULL)
+# if defined(USE_MD5_RAND)
+# include <openssl/md5.h>
+# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD5_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md5(), NULL)
+# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md5(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_SHA1_RAND)
+# include <openssl/sha.h>
+# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_sha1(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_MDC2_RAND)
+# include <openssl/mdc2.h>
+# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MDC2_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
+# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_mdc2(), NULL)
+# elif defined(USE_MD2_RAND)
+# include <openssl/md2.h>
+# define MD_DIGEST_LENGTH MD2_DIGEST_LENGTH
+# define MD_Init(a) EVP_DigestInit_ex(a,EVP_md2(), NULL)
+# define MD(a,b,c) EVP_Digest(a,b,c,NULL,EVP_md2(), NULL)
+# endif
void rand_hw_xor(unsigned char *buf, size_t num);
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
index 4aa6486c81..2f4dc09155 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -62,211 +62,207 @@
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
-#include <openssl/engine.h>
+# include <openssl/engine.h>
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-#include <openssl/fips.h>
-#include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
+# include <openssl/fips.h>
+# include <openssl/fips_rand.h>
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
-static ENGINE *funct_ref =NULL;
+static ENGINE *funct_ref = NULL;
#endif
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth = NULL;
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
- {
+{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- if(funct_ref)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
- funct_ref = NULL;
- }
+ if (funct_ref) {
+ ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
+ funct_ref = NULL;
+ }
#endif
- default_RAND_meth = meth;
- return 1;
- }
+ default_RAND_meth = meth;
+ return 1;
+}
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
- {
- if (!default_RAND_meth)
- {
+{
+ if (!default_RAND_meth) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
- ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
- if(e)
- {
- default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
- if(!default_RAND_meth)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(e);
- e = NULL;
- }
- }
- if(e)
- funct_ref = e;
- else
+ ENGINE *e = ENGINE_get_default_RAND();
+ if (e) {
+ default_RAND_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(e);
+ if (!default_RAND_meth) {
+ ENGINE_finish(e);
+ e = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+ if (e)
+ funct_ref = e;
+ else
#endif
- default_RAND_meth = RAND_SSLeay();
- }
- return default_RAND_meth;
- }
+ default_RAND_meth = RAND_SSLeay();
+ }
+ return default_RAND_meth;
+}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
- if(engine)
- {
- if(!ENGINE_init(engine))
- return 0;
- tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
- if(!tmp_meth)
- {
- ENGINE_finish(engine);
- return 0;
- }
- }
- /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
- RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
- funct_ref = engine;
- return 1;
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
+ if (engine) {
+ if (!ENGINE_init(engine))
+ return 0;
+ tmp_meth = ENGINE_get_RAND(engine);
+ if (!tmp_meth) {
+ ENGINE_finish(engine);
+ return 0;
+ }
+ }
+ /* This function releases any prior ENGINE so call it first */
+ RAND_set_rand_method(tmp_meth);
+ funct_ref = engine;
+ return 1;
+}
#endif
void RAND_cleanup(void)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->cleanup)
- meth->cleanup();
- RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->cleanup)
+ meth->cleanup();
+ RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
+}
void RAND_seed(const void *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->seed)
- meth->seed(buf,num);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->seed)
+ meth->seed(buf, num);
+}
void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double entropy)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->add)
- meth->add(buf,num,entropy);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->add)
+ meth->add(buf, num, entropy);
+}
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->bytes)
- return meth->bytes(buf,num);
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->bytes)
+ return meth->bytes(buf, num);
+ return (-1);
+}
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
- return meth->pseudorand(buf,num);
- return(-1);
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->pseudorand)
+ return meth->pseudorand(buf, num);
+ return (-1);
+}
int RAND_status(void)
- {
- const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
- if (meth && meth->status)
- return meth->status();
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+ if (meth && meth->status)
+ return meth->status();
+ return 0;
+}
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
-/* FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the
- * rest of OpenSSL.
+/*
+ * FIPS DRBG initialisation code. This sets up the DRBG for use by the rest
+ * of OpenSSL.
*/
-/* Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather
+/*
+ * Entropy gatherer: use standard OpenSSL PRNG to seed (this will gather
* entropy internally through RAND_poll().
*/
static size_t drbg_get_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout,
- int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
- {
- /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
- min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
- *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len);
- if (!*pout)
- return 0;
- if (RAND_SSLeay()->bytes(*pout, min_len) <= 0)
- {
- OPENSSL_free(*pout);
- *pout = NULL;
- return 0;
- }
- return min_len;
- }
+ int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
+{
+ /* Round up request to multiple of block size */
+ min_len = ((min_len + 19) / 20) * 20;
+ *pout = OPENSSL_malloc(min_len);
+ if (!*pout)
+ return 0;
+ if (RAND_SSLeay()->bytes(*pout, min_len) <= 0) {
+ OPENSSL_free(*pout);
+ *pout = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return min_len;
+}
static void drbg_free_entropy(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
- {
- if (out)
- {
- OPENSSL_cleanse(out, olen);
- OPENSSL_free(out);
- }
- }
+{
+ if (out) {
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(out, olen);
+ OPENSSL_free(out);
+ }
+}
-/* Set "additional input" when generating random data. This uses the
- * current PID, a time value and a counter.
+/*
+ * Set "additional input" when generating random data. This uses the current
+ * PID, a time value and a counter.
*/
static size_t drbg_get_adin(DRBG_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pout)
- {
- /* Use of static variables is OK as this happens under a lock */
- static unsigned char buf[16];
- static unsigned long counter;
- FIPS_get_timevec(buf, &counter);
- rand_hw_xor(buf, sizeof(buf));
- *pout = buf;
- return sizeof(buf);
- }
+{
+ /* Use of static variables is OK as this happens under a lock */
+ static unsigned char buf[16];
+ static unsigned long counter;
+ FIPS_get_timevec(buf, &counter);
+ rand_hw_xor(buf, sizeof(buf));
+ *pout = buf;
+ return sizeof(buf);
+}
-/* RAND_add() and RAND_seed() pass through to OpenSSL PRNG so it is
+/*
+ * RAND_add() and RAND_seed() pass through to OpenSSL PRNG so it is
* correctly seeded by RAND_poll().
*/
static int drbg_rand_add(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen,
- double entropy)
- {
- return RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
- }
+ double entropy)
+{
+ return RAND_SSLeay()->add(in, inlen, entropy);
+}
static int drbg_rand_seed(DRBG_CTX *ctx, const void *in, int inlen)
- {
- return RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
- }
+{
+ return RAND_SSLeay()->seed(in, inlen);
+}
int RAND_init_fips(void)
- {
- DRBG_CTX *dctx;
- size_t plen;
- unsigned char pers[32], *p;
- dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
- FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, NID_aes_256_ctr, DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF);
- FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx,
- drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20,
- drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy);
- FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0,
- drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add);
- /* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */
- strcpy((char *)pers, "OpenSSL DRBG2.0");
- plen = drbg_get_adin(dctx, &p);
- memcpy(pers + 16, p, plen);
+{
+ DRBG_CTX *dctx;
+ size_t plen;
+ unsigned char pers[32], *p;
+ dctx = FIPS_get_default_drbg();
+ FIPS_drbg_init(dctx, NID_aes_256_ctr, DRBG_FLAG_CTR_USE_DF);
+ FIPS_drbg_set_callbacks(dctx,
+ drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy, 20,
+ drbg_get_entropy, drbg_free_entropy);
+ FIPS_drbg_set_rand_callbacks(dctx, drbg_get_adin, 0,
+ drbg_rand_seed, drbg_rand_add);
+ /* Personalisation string: a string followed by date time vector */
+ strcpy((char *)pers, "OpenSSL DRBG2.0");
+ plen = drbg_get_adin(dctx, &p);
+ memcpy(pers + 16, p, plen);
- FIPS_drbg_instantiate(dctx, pers, sizeof(pers));
- FIPS_rand_set_method(FIPS_drbg_method());
- return 1;
- }
+ FIPS_drbg_instantiate(dctx, pers, sizeof(pers));
+ FIPS_rand_set_method(FIPS_drbg_method());
+ return 1;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_nw.c b/crypto/rand/rand_nw.c
index 91158b8991..76ef70c773 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_nw.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_nw.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -115,69 +115,65 @@
#if defined (OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)
-#if defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
-#include <nks/thread.h>
-#else
-#include <nwthread.h>
-#endif
+# if defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
+# include <nks/thread.h>
+# else
+# include <nwthread.h>
+# endif
extern int GetProcessSwitchCount(void);
-#if !defined(NETWARE_LIBC) || (CURRENT_NDK_THRESHOLD < 509220000)
-extern void *RunningProcess; /* declare here same as found in newer NDKs */
+# if !defined(NETWARE_LIBC) || (CURRENT_NDK_THRESHOLD < 509220000)
+extern void *RunningProcess; /* declare here same as found in newer NDKs */
extern unsigned long GetSuperHighResolutionTimer(void);
-#endif
+# endif
- /* the FAQ indicates we need to provide at least 20 bytes (160 bits) of seed
- */
+ /*
+ * the FAQ indicates we need to provide at least 20 bytes (160 bits) of
+ * seed
+ */
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- unsigned long l;
- unsigned long tsc;
- int i;
+ unsigned long l;
+ unsigned long tsc;
+ int i;
- /* There are several options to gather miscellaneous data
- * but for now we will loop checking the time stamp counter (rdtsc) and
- * the SuperHighResolutionTimer. Each iteration will collect 8 bytes
- * of data but it is treated as only 1 byte of entropy. The call to
- * ThreadSwitchWithDelay() will introduce additional variability into
- * the data returned by rdtsc.
- *
- * Applications can argument the seed material by adding additional
- * stuff with RAND_add() and should probably do so.
- */
- l = GetProcessSwitchCount();
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),1);
-
- /* need to cast the void* to unsigned long here */
- l = (unsigned long)RunningProcess;
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),1);
+ /*
+ * There are several options to gather miscellaneous data but for now we
+ * will loop checking the time stamp counter (rdtsc) and the
+ * SuperHighResolutionTimer. Each iteration will collect 8 bytes of data
+ * but it is treated as only 1 byte of entropy. The call to
+ * ThreadSwitchWithDelay() will introduce additional variability into the
+ * data returned by rdtsc. Applications can argument the seed material
+ * by adding additional stuff with RAND_add() and should probably do so.
+ */
+ l = GetProcessSwitchCount();
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 1);
- for( i=2; i<ENTROPY_NEEDED; i++)
- {
-#ifdef __MWERKS__
- asm
- {
- rdtsc
- mov tsc, eax
- }
-#elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
- asm volatile("rdtsc":"=a"(tsc)::"edx");
-#endif
+ /* need to cast the void* to unsigned long here */
+ l = (unsigned long)RunningProcess;
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 1);
- RAND_add(&tsc, sizeof(tsc), 1);
+ for (i = 2; i < ENTROPY_NEEDED; i++) {
+# ifdef __MWERKS__
+ asm {
+ rdtsc mov tsc, eax}
+# elif defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ASM) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_INLINE_ASM)
+ asm volatile ("rdtsc":"=a" (tsc)::"edx");
+# endif
+
+ RAND_add(&tsc, sizeof(tsc), 1);
- l = GetSuperHighResolutionTimer();
- RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
+ l = GetSuperHighResolutionTimer();
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
# if defined(NETWARE_LIBC)
- NXThreadYield();
-# else /* NETWARE_CLIB */
- ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
+ NXThreadYield();
+# else /* NETWARE_CLIB */
+ ThreadSwitchWithDelay();
# endif
- }
+ }
- return 1;
+ return 1;
}
-#endif
-
+#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c b/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
index fc1e78b179..9c4a137bb7 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_os2.c
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -59,29 +59,32 @@
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_OS2
-#define INCL_DOSPROCESS
-#define INCL_DOSPROFILE
-#define INCL_DOSMISC
-#define INCL_DOSMODULEMGR
-#include <os2.h>
+# define INCL_DOSPROCESS
+# define INCL_DOSPROFILE
+# define INCL_DOSMISC
+# define INCL_DOSMODULEMGR
+# include <os2.h>
-#define CMD_KI_RDCNT (0x63)
+# define CMD_KI_RDCNT (0x63)
typedef struct _CPUUTIL {
- ULONG ulTimeLow; /* Low 32 bits of time stamp */
- ULONG ulTimeHigh; /* High 32 bits of time stamp */
- ULONG ulIdleLow; /* Low 32 bits of idle time */
- ULONG ulIdleHigh; /* High 32 bits of idle time */
- ULONG ulBusyLow; /* Low 32 bits of busy time */
- ULONG ulBusyHigh; /* High 32 bits of busy time */
- ULONG ulIntrLow; /* Low 32 bits of interrupt time */
+ ULONG ulTimeLow; /* Low 32 bits of time stamp */
+ ULONG ulTimeHigh; /* High 32 bits of time stamp */
+ ULONG ulIdleLow; /* Low 32 bits of idle time */
+ ULONG ulIdleHigh; /* High 32 bits of idle time */
+ ULONG ulBusyLow; /* Low 32 bits of busy time */
+ ULONG ulBusyHigh; /* High 32 bits of busy time */
+ ULONG ulIntrLow; /* Low 32 bits of interrupt time */
ULONG ulIntrHigh; /* High 32 bits of interrupt time */
} CPUUTIL;
-#ifndef __KLIBC__
-APIRET APIENTRY(*DosPerfSysCall) (ULONG ulCommand, ULONG ulParm1, ULONG ulParm2, ULONG ulParm3) = NULL;
-APIRET APIENTRY(*DosQuerySysState) (ULONG func, ULONG arg1, ULONG pid, ULONG _res_, PVOID buf, ULONG bufsz) = NULL;
-#endif
+# ifndef __KLIBC__
+APIRET APIENTRY(*DosPerfSysCall) (ULONG ulCommand, ULONG ulParm1,
+ ULONG ulParm2, ULONG ulParm3) = NULL;
+APIRET APIENTRY(*DosQuerySysState) (ULONG func, ULONG arg1, ULONG pid,
+ ULONG _res_, PVOID buf, ULONG bufsz) =
+ NULL;
+# endif
HMODULE hDoscalls = 0;
int RAND_poll(void)
@@ -91,56 +94,67 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
ULONG SysVars[QSV_FOREGROUND_PROCESS];
if (hDoscalls == 0) {
- ULONG rc = DosLoadModule(failed_module, sizeof(failed_module), "DOSCALLS", &hDoscalls);
+ ULONG rc =
+ DosLoadModule(failed_module, sizeof(failed_module), "DOSCALLS",
+ &hDoscalls);
-#ifndef __KLIBC__
+# ifndef __KLIBC__
if (rc == 0) {
- rc = DosQueryProcAddr(hDoscalls, 976, NULL, (PFN *)&DosPerfSysCall);
+ rc = DosQueryProcAddr(hDoscalls, 976, NULL,
+ (PFN *) & DosPerfSysCall);
if (rc)
DosPerfSysCall = NULL;
- rc = DosQueryProcAddr(hDoscalls, 368, NULL, (PFN *)&DosQuerySysState);
+ rc = DosQueryProcAddr(hDoscalls, 368, NULL,
+ (PFN *) & DosQuerySysState);
if (rc)
DosQuerySysState = NULL;
}
-#endif
+# endif
}
/* Sample the hi-res timer, runs at around 1.1 MHz */
DosTmrQueryTime(&qwTime);
RAND_add(&qwTime, sizeof(qwTime), 2);
- /* Sample a bunch of system variables, includes various process & memory statistics */
+ /*
+ * Sample a bunch of system variables, includes various process & memory
+ * statistics
+ */
DosQuerySysInfo(1, QSV_FOREGROUND_PROCESS, SysVars, sizeof(SysVars));
RAND_add(SysVars, sizeof(SysVars), 4);
- /* If available, sample CPU registers that count at CPU MHz
- * Only fairly new CPUs (PPro & K6 onwards) & OS/2 versions support this
+ /*
+ * If available, sample CPU registers that count at CPU MHz Only fairly
+ * new CPUs (PPro & K6 onwards) & OS/2 versions support this
*/
if (DosPerfSysCall) {
CPUUTIL util;
- if (DosPerfSysCall(CMD_KI_RDCNT, (ULONG)&util, 0, 0) == 0) {
+ if (DosPerfSysCall(CMD_KI_RDCNT, (ULONG) & util, 0, 0) == 0) {
RAND_add(&util, sizeof(util), 10);
- }
- else {
-#ifndef __KLIBC__
+ } else {
+# ifndef __KLIBC__
DosPerfSysCall = NULL;
-#endif
+# endif
}
}
- /* DosQuerySysState() gives us a huge quantity of process, thread, memory & handle stats */
+ /*
+ * DosQuerySysState() gives us a huge quantity of process, thread, memory
+ * & handle stats
+ */
if (DosQuerySysState) {
char *buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(256 * 1024);
if (DosQuerySysState(0x1F, 0, 0, 0, buffer, 256 * 1024) == 0) {
- /* First 4 bytes in buffer is a pointer to the thread count
- * there should be at least 1 byte of entropy per thread
+ /*
+ * First 4 bytes in buffer is a pointer to the thread count there
+ * should be at least 1 byte of entropy per thread
*/
- RAND_add(buffer, 256 * 1024, **(ULONG **)buffer);
+ RAND_add(buffer, 256 * 1024, **(ULONG **) buffer);
}
OPENSSL_free(buffer);
@@ -150,4 +164,4 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
return 0;
}
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_OS2 */
+#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_OS2 */
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
index 04fbc90b75..732ba3b31b 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -118,297 +118,311 @@
#if !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE))
-#include <sys/types.h>
-#include <sys/time.h>
-#include <sys/times.h>
-#include <sys/stat.h>
-#include <fcntl.h>
-#include <unistd.h>
-#include <time.h>
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* should actually be available virtually everywhere */
-# include <poll.h>
-#endif
-#include <limits.h>
-#ifndef FD_SETSIZE
-# define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
-#endif
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
-
-/* The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock
- (RTC) to generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm
- relies upon the uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors
- such as cache misses, interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and
- upon the rather large relative difference between the speed of the
- clock and the rate at which it can be read.
-
- If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is
- more constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the
- clock can be read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the
- results would be far more predictable.
-
- As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of
- seed data. */
+# include <sys/types.h>
+# include <sys/time.h>
+# include <sys/times.h>
+# include <sys/stat.h>
+# include <fcntl.h>
+# include <unistd.h>
+# include <time.h>
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) /* should actually be available virtually
+ * everywhere */
+# include <poll.h>
+# endif
+# include <limits.h>
+# ifndef FD_SETSIZE
+# define FD_SETSIZE (8*sizeof(fd_set))
+# endif
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
+
+/*
+ * The following algorithm repeatedly samples the real-time clock (RTC) to
+ * generate a sequence of unpredictable data. The algorithm relies upon the
+ * uneven execution speed of the code (due to factors such as cache misses,
+ * interrupts, bus activity, and scheduling) and upon the rather large
+ * relative difference between the speed of the clock and the rate at which
+ * it can be read.
+ *
+ * If this code is ported to an environment where execution speed is more
+ * constant or where the RTC ticks at a much slower rate, or the clock can be
+ * read with fewer instructions, it is likely that the results would be far
+ * more predictable.
+ *
+ * As a precaution, we generate 4 times the minimum required amount of seed
+ * data.
+ */
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- short int code;
- gid_t curr_gid;
- pid_t curr_pid;
- uid_t curr_uid;
- int i, k;
- struct timespec ts;
- unsigned char v;
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- long duration;
- extern void s$sleep (long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
- long long duration;
- extern void s$sleep2 (long long *_duration, short int *_code);
-#else
-#error "Unsupported Platform."
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
-
- /* Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some*
- variation between different processes. */
-
- curr_gid = getgid();
- RAND_add (&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
- curr_gid = 0;
-
- curr_pid = getpid();
- RAND_add (&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
- curr_pid = 0;
-
- curr_uid = getuid();
- RAND_add (&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
- curr_uid = 0;
-
- for (i=0; i<(ENTROPY_NEEDED*4); i++)
- {
- /* burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache
- collisions, bus interference, etc. */
- for (k=0; k<99; k++)
- ts.tv_nsec = random ();
-
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
- /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep (&duration, &code);
-#else
-#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
- /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
- duration = 1;
- s$sleep2 (&duration, &code);
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
-#endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
-
- /* get wall clock time. */
- clock_gettime (CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
-
- /* take 8 bits */
- v = (unsigned char) (ts.tv_nsec % 256);
- RAND_add (&v, sizeof v, 1);
- v = 0;
- }
- return 1;
+ short int code;
+ gid_t curr_gid;
+ pid_t curr_pid;
+ uid_t curr_uid;
+ int i, k;
+ struct timespec ts;
+ unsigned char v;
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+ long duration;
+ extern void s$sleep(long *_duration, short int *_code);
+# else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+ long long duration;
+ extern void s$sleep2(long long *_duration, short int *_code);
+# else
+# error "Unsupported Platform."
+# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+ /*
+ * Seed with the gid, pid, and uid, to ensure *some* variation between
+ * different processes.
+ */
+
+ curr_gid = getgid();
+ RAND_add(&curr_gid, sizeof curr_gid, 1);
+ curr_gid = 0;
+
+ curr_pid = getpid();
+ RAND_add(&curr_pid, sizeof curr_pid, 1);
+ curr_pid = 0;
+
+ curr_uid = getuid();
+ RAND_add(&curr_uid, sizeof curr_uid, 1);
+ curr_uid = 0;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < (ENTROPY_NEEDED * 4); i++) {
+ /*
+ * burn some cpu; hope for interrupts, cache collisions, bus
+ * interference, etc.
+ */
+ for (k = 0; k < 99; k++)
+ ts.tv_nsec = random();
+
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA
+ /* sleep for 1/1024 of a second (976 us). */
+ duration = 1;
+ s$sleep(&duration, &code);
+# else
+# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32
+ /* sleep for 1/65536 of a second (15 us). */
+ duration = 1;
+ s$sleep2(&duration, &code);
+# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_IA32 */
+# endif /* OPENSSL_SYS_VOS_HPPA */
+
+ /* get wall clock time. */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &ts);
+
+ /* take 8 bits */
+ v = (unsigned char)(ts.tv_nsec % 256);
+ RAND_add(&v, sizeof v, 1);
+ v = 0;
+ }
+ return 1;
}
-#elif defined __OpenBSD__
+# elif defined __OpenBSD__
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- u_int32_t rnd = 0, i;
- unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
-
- for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
- if (i % 4 == 0)
- rnd = arc4random();
- buf[i] = rnd;
- rnd >>= 8;
- }
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
- memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
-
- return 1;
+ u_int32_t rnd = 0, i;
+ unsigned char buf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+
+ for (i = 0; i < sizeof(buf); i++) {
+ if (i % 4 == 0)
+ rnd = arc4random();
+ buf[i] = rnd;
+ rnd >>= 8;
+ }
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(buf));
+
+ return 1;
}
-#else /* !defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+# else /* !defined(__OpenBSD__) */
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- unsigned long l;
- pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
-#if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
- unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
- int n = 0;
-#endif
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- static const char *randomfiles[] = { DEVRANDOM };
- struct stat randomstats[sizeof(randomfiles)/sizeof(randomfiles[0])];
- int fd;
- unsigned int i;
-#endif
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD
- static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
- const char **egdsocket = NULL;
-#endif
-
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM
- memset(randomstats,0,sizeof(randomstats));
- /* Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD
- * have this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block
- * if it runs out of random entries. */
-
- for (i = 0; (i < sizeof(randomfiles)/sizeof(randomfiles[0])) &&
- (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++)
- {
- if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
-#ifdef O_NONBLOCK
- |O_NONBLOCK
-#endif
-#ifdef O_BINARY
- |O_BINARY
-#endif
-#ifdef O_NOCTTY /* If it happens to be a TTY (god forbid), do not make it
- our controlling tty */
- |O_NOCTTY
-#endif
- )) >= 0)
- {
- int usec = 10*1000; /* spend 10ms on each file */
- int r;
- unsigned int j;
- struct stat *st=&randomstats[i];
-
- /* Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW
- * above, but it's not universally appropriate... */
- if (fstat(fd,st) != 0) { close(fd); continue; }
- for (j=0;j<i;j++)
- {
- if (randomstats[j].st_ino==st->st_ino &&
- randomstats[j].st_dev==st->st_dev)
- break;
- }
- if (j<i) { close(fd); continue; }
-
- do
- {
- int try_read = 0;
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
- /* use poll() */
- struct pollfd pset;
-
- pset.fd = fd;
- pset.events = POLLIN;
- pset.revents = 0;
-
- if (poll(&pset, 1, usec / 1000) < 0)
- usec = 0;
- else
- try_read = (pset.revents & POLLIN) != 0;
-
-#else
- /* use select() */
- fd_set fset;
- struct timeval t;
-
- t.tv_sec = 0;
- t.tv_usec = usec;
-
- if (FD_SETSIZE > 0 && (unsigned)fd >= FD_SETSIZE)
- {
- /* can't use select, so just try to read once anyway */
- try_read = 1;
- }
- else
- {
- FD_ZERO(&fset);
- FD_SET(fd, &fset);
-
- if (select(fd+1,&fset,NULL,NULL,&t) >= 0)
- {
- usec = t.tv_usec;
- if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset))
- try_read = 1;
- }
- else
- usec = 0;
- }
-#endif
-
- if (try_read)
- {
- r = read(fd,(unsigned char *)tmpbuf+n, ENTROPY_NEEDED-n);
- if (r > 0)
- n += r;
- }
- else
- r = -1;
-
- /* Some Unixen will update t in select(), some
- won't. For those who won't, or if we
- didn't use select() in the first place,
- give up here, otherwise, we will do
- this once again for the remaining
- time. */
- if (usec == 10*1000)
- usec = 0;
- }
- while ((r > 0 ||
- (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0 && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
-
- close(fd);
- }
- }
-#endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM) */
-
-#ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD
- /* Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
- * collecting daemon. */
-
- for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED; egdsocket++)
- {
- int r;
-
- r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf+n,
- ENTROPY_NEEDED-n);
- if (r > 0)
- n += r;
- }
-#endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) */
-
-#if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
- if (n > 0)
- {
- RAND_add(tmpbuf,sizeof tmpbuf,(double)n);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf,n);
- }
-#endif
-
- /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */
- l=curr_pid;
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
- l=getuid();
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
-
- l=time(NULL);
- RAND_add(&l,sizeof(l),0.0);
-
-#if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
- return 1;
-#else
- return 0;
-#endif
+ unsigned long l;
+ pid_t curr_pid = getpid();
+# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+ unsigned char tmpbuf[ENTROPY_NEEDED];
+ int n = 0;
+# endif
+# ifdef DEVRANDOM
+ static const char *randomfiles[] = { DEVRANDOM };
+ struct stat randomstats[sizeof(randomfiles) / sizeof(randomfiles[0])];
+ int fd;
+ unsigned int i;
+# endif
+# ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD
+ static const char *egdsockets[] = { DEVRANDOM_EGD, NULL };
+ const char **egdsocket = NULL;
+# endif
+
+# ifdef DEVRANDOM
+ memset(randomstats, 0, sizeof(randomstats));
+ /*
+ * Use a random entropy pool device. Linux, FreeBSD and OpenBSD have
+ * this. Use /dev/urandom if you can as /dev/random may block if it runs
+ * out of random entries.
+ */
+
+ for (i = 0; (i < sizeof(randomfiles) / sizeof(randomfiles[0])) &&
+ (n < ENTROPY_NEEDED); i++) {
+ if ((fd = open(randomfiles[i], O_RDONLY
+# ifdef O_NONBLOCK
+ | O_NONBLOCK
+# endif
+# ifdef O_BINARY
+ | O_BINARY
+# endif
+# ifdef O_NOCTTY /* If it happens to be a TTY (god forbid), do
+ * not make it our controlling tty */
+ | O_NOCTTY
+# endif
+ )) >= 0) {
+ int usec = 10 * 1000; /* spend 10ms on each file */
+ int r;
+ unsigned int j;
+ struct stat *st = &randomstats[i];
+
+ /*
+ * Avoid using same input... Used to be O_NOFOLLOW above, but
+ * it's not universally appropriate...
+ */
+ if (fstat(fd, st) != 0) {
+ close(fd);
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
+ if (randomstats[j].st_ino == st->st_ino &&
+ randomstats[j].st_dev == st->st_dev)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (j < i) {
+ close(fd);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ do {
+ int try_read = 0;
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX)
+ /* use poll() */
+ struct pollfd pset;
+
+ pset.fd = fd;
+ pset.events = POLLIN;
+ pset.revents = 0;
+
+ if (poll(&pset, 1, usec / 1000) < 0)
+ usec = 0;
+ else
+ try_read = (pset.revents & POLLIN) != 0;
+
+# else
+ /* use select() */
+ fd_set fset;
+ struct timeval t;
+
+ t.tv_sec = 0;
+ t.tv_usec = usec;
+
+ if (FD_SETSIZE > 0 && (unsigned)fd >= FD_SETSIZE) {
+ /*
+ * can't use select, so just try to read once anyway
+ */
+ try_read = 1;
+ } else {
+ FD_ZERO(&fset);
+ FD_SET(fd, &fset);
+
+ if (select(fd + 1, &fset, NULL, NULL, &t) >= 0) {
+ usec = t.tv_usec;
+ if (FD_ISSET(fd, &fset))
+ try_read = 1;
+ } else
+ usec = 0;
+ }
+# endif
+
+ if (try_read) {
+ r = read(fd, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
+ ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+ if (r > 0)
+ n += r;
+ } else
+ r = -1;
+
+ /*
+ * Some Unixen will update t in select(), some won't. For
+ * those who won't, or if we didn't use select() in the first
+ * place, give up here, otherwise, we will do this once again
+ * for the remaining time.
+ */
+ if (usec == 10 * 1000)
+ usec = 0;
+ }
+ while ((r > 0 ||
+ (errno == EINTR || errno == EAGAIN)) && usec != 0
+ && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED);
+
+ close(fd);
+ }
+ }
+# endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM) */
+
+# ifdef DEVRANDOM_EGD
+ /*
+ * Use an EGD socket to read entropy from an EGD or PRNGD entropy
+ * collecting daemon.
+ */
+
+ for (egdsocket = egdsockets; *egdsocket && n < ENTROPY_NEEDED;
+ egdsocket++) {
+ int r;
+
+ r = RAND_query_egd_bytes(*egdsocket, (unsigned char *)tmpbuf + n,
+ ENTROPY_NEEDED - n);
+ if (r > 0)
+ n += r;
+ }
+# endif /* defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD) */
+
+# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+ if (n > 0) {
+ RAND_add(tmpbuf, sizeof tmpbuf, (double)n);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmpbuf, n);
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /* put in some default random data, we need more than just this */
+ l = curr_pid;
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+ l = getuid();
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+
+ l = time(NULL);
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0.0);
+
+# if defined(DEVRANDOM) || defined(DEVRANDOM_EGD)
+ return 1;
+# else
+ return 0;
+# endif
}
-#endif /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
-#endif /* !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)) */
-
+# endif /* defined(__OpenBSD__) */
+#endif /* !(defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) ||
+ * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32) ||
+ * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) ||
+ * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_OS2) ||
+ * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) ||
+ * defined(OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE)) */
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
int RAND_poll(void)
- {
- return 0;
- }
+{
+ return 0;
+}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
index 0bfd8ff7e4..a7179a4ba1 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_vms.c
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
/* crypto/rand/rand_vms.c -*- mode:C; c-file-style: "eay" -*- */
-/* Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL
- * project 2000.
+/*
+ * Written by Richard Levitte <richard@levitte.org> for the OpenSSL project
+ * 2000.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 1998-2000 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
@@ -10,7 +11,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -61,88 +62,98 @@
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
-#include <descrip.h>
-#include <jpidef.h>
-#include <ssdef.h>
-#include <starlet.h>
-#ifdef __DECC
-# pragma message disable DOLLARID
-#endif
+# include <descrip.h>
+# include <jpidef.h>
+# include <ssdef.h>
+# include <starlet.h>
+# ifdef __DECC
+# pragma message disable DOLLARID
+# endif
-/* Use 32-bit pointers almost everywhere. Define the type to which to
- * cast a pointer passed to an external function.
+/*
+ * Use 32-bit pointers almost everywhere. Define the type to which to cast a
+ * pointer passed to an external function.
*/
-#if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
-# define PTR_T __void_ptr64
-# pragma pointer_size save
-# pragma pointer_size 32
-#else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
-# define PTR_T void *
-#endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+# if __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64
+# define PTR_T __void_ptr64
+# pragma pointer_size save
+# pragma pointer_size 32
+# else /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 */
+# define PTR_T void *
+# endif /* __INITIAL_POINTER_SIZE == 64 [else] */
+
+static struct items_data_st {
+ short length, code; /* length is amount of bytes */
+} items_data[] = {
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_BUFIO
+ },
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_CPUTIM
+ },
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_DIRIO
+ },
+ {
+ 8, JPI$_LOGINTIM
+ },
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS
+ },
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_PID
+ },
+ {
+ 4, JPI$_WSSIZE
+ },
+ {
+ 0, 0
+ }
+};
-static struct items_data_st
- {
- short length, code; /* length is amount of bytes */
- } items_data[] =
- { { 4, JPI$_BUFIO },
- { 4, JPI$_CPUTIM },
- { 4, JPI$_DIRIO },
- { 8, JPI$_LOGINTIM },
- { 4, JPI$_PAGEFLTS },
- { 4, JPI$_PID },
- { 4, JPI$_WSSIZE },
- { 0, 0 }
- };
-
int RAND_poll(void)
- {
- long pid, iosb[2];
- int status = 0;
- struct
- {
- short length, code;
- long *buffer;
- int *retlen;
- } item[32], *pitem;
- unsigned char data_buffer[256];
- short total_length = 0;
- struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
+{
+ long pid, iosb[2];
+ int status = 0;
+ struct {
+ short length, code;
+ long *buffer;
+ int *retlen;
+ } item[32], *pitem;
+ unsigned char data_buffer[256];
+ short total_length = 0;
+ struct items_data_st *pitems_data;
- pitems_data = items_data;
- pitem = item;
+ pitems_data = items_data;
+ pitem = item;
- /* Setup */
- while (pitems_data->length
- && (total_length + pitems_data->length <= 256))
- {
- pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
- pitem->code = pitems_data->code;
- pitem->buffer = (long *)&data_buffer[total_length];
- pitem->retlen = 0;
- total_length += pitems_data->length;
- pitems_data++;
- pitem++;
- }
- pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
+ /* Setup */
+ while (pitems_data->length && (total_length + pitems_data->length <= 256)) {
+ pitem->length = pitems_data->length;
+ pitem->code = pitems_data->code;
+ pitem->buffer = (long *)&data_buffer[total_length];
+ pitem->retlen = 0;
+ total_length += pitems_data->length;
+ pitems_data++;
+ pitem ++;
+ }
+ pitem->length = pitem->code = 0;
- /*
- * Scan through all the processes in the system and add entropy with
- * results from the processes that were possible to look at.
- * However, view the information as only half trustable.
- */
- pid = -1; /* search context */
- while ((status = sys$getjpiw(0, &pid, 0, item, iosb, 0, 0))
- != SS$_NOMOREPROC)
- {
- if (status == SS$_NORMAL)
- {
- RAND_add( (PTR_T)data_buffer, total_length,
- total_length/2);
- }
- }
- sys$gettim(iosb);
- RAND_add( (PTR_T)iosb, sizeof(iosb), sizeof(iosb)/2);
- return 1;
+ /*
+ * Scan through all the processes in the system and add entropy with
+ * results from the processes that were possible to look at.
+ * However, view the information as only half trustable.
+ */
+ pid = -1; /* search context */
+ while ((status = sys$getjpiw(0, &pid, 0, item, iosb, 0, 0))
+ != SS$_NOMOREPROC) {
+ if (status == SS$_NORMAL) {
+ RAND_add((PTR_T) data_buffer, total_length, total_length / 2);
+ }
+ }
+ sys$gettim(iosb);
+ RAND_add((PTR_T) iosb, sizeof(iosb), sizeof(iosb) / 2);
+ return 1;
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
index c81935c38c..06670ae017 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/rand_win.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
- * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+ * notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -109,559 +109,557 @@
*
*/
-
-
#include "cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINDOWS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32)
-#include <windows.h>
-#ifndef _WIN32_WINNT
-# define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
-#endif
-#include <wincrypt.h>
-#include <tlhelp32.h>
+# include <windows.h>
+# ifndef _WIN32_WINNT
+# define _WIN32_WINNT 0x0400
+# endif
+# include <wincrypt.h>
+# include <tlhelp32.h>
-/* Limit the time spent walking through the heap, processes, threads and modules to
- a maximum of 1000 miliseconds each, unless CryptoGenRandom failed */
-#define MAXDELAY 1000
+/*
+ * Limit the time spent walking through the heap, processes, threads and
+ * modules to a maximum of 1000 miliseconds each, unless CryptoGenRandom
+ * failed
+ */
+# define MAXDELAY 1000
-/* Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
+/*
+ * Intel hardware RNG CSP -- available from
* http://developer.intel.com/design/security/rng/redist_license.htm
*/
-#define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
-#define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
+# define PROV_INTEL_SEC 22
+# define INTEL_DEF_PROV L"Intel Hardware Cryptographic Service Provider"
static void readtimer(void);
static void readscreen(void);
-/* It appears like CURSORINFO, PCURSORINFO and LPCURSORINFO are only defined
- when WINVER is 0x0500 and up, which currently only happens on Win2000.
- Unfortunately, those are typedefs, so they're a little bit difficult to
- detect properly. On the other hand, the macro CURSOR_SHOWING is defined
- within the same conditional, so it can be use to detect the absence of said
- typedefs. */
+/*
+ * It appears like CURSORINFO, PCURSORINFO and LPCURSORINFO are only defined
+ * when WINVER is 0x0500 and up, which currently only happens on Win2000.
+ * Unfortunately, those are typedefs, so they're a little bit difficult to
+ * detect properly. On the other hand, the macro CURSOR_SHOWING is defined
+ * within the same conditional, so it can be use to detect the absence of
+ * said typedefs.
+ */
-#ifndef CURSOR_SHOWING
+# ifndef CURSOR_SHOWING
/*
* Information about the global cursor.
*/
-typedef struct tagCURSORINFO
-{
- DWORD cbSize;
- DWORD flags;
+typedef struct tagCURSORINFO {
+ DWORD cbSize;
+ DWORD flags;
HCURSOR hCursor;
- POINT ptScreenPos;
+ POINT ptScreenPos;
} CURSORINFO, *PCURSORINFO, *LPCURSORINFO;
-#define CURSOR_SHOWING 0x00000001
-#endif /* CURSOR_SHOWING */
-
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW)(HCRYPTPROV *, LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR,
- DWORD, DWORD);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTGENRANDOM)(HCRYPTPROV, DWORD, BYTE *);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT)(HCRYPTPROV, DWORD);
-
-typedef HWND (WINAPI *GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW)(VOID);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *GETCURSORINFO)(PCURSORINFO);
-typedef DWORD (WINAPI *GETQUEUESTATUS)(UINT);
-
-typedef HANDLE (WINAPI *CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)(DWORD, DWORD);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)(HANDLE);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *HEAP32FIRST)(LPHEAPENTRY32, DWORD, size_t);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *HEAP32NEXT)(LPHEAPENTRY32);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *HEAP32LIST)(HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *PROCESS32)(HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *THREAD32)(HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32);
-typedef BOOL (WINAPI *MODULE32)(HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32);
-
-#include <lmcons.h>
-#include <lmstats.h>
-#if 1
-/* The NET API is Unicode only. It requires the use of the UNICODE
- * macro. When UNICODE is defined LPTSTR becomes LPWSTR. LMSTR was
- * was added to the Platform SDK to allow the NET API to be used in
- * non-Unicode applications provided that Unicode strings were still
- * used for input. LMSTR is defined as LPWSTR.
+# define CURSOR_SHOWING 0x00000001
+# endif /* CURSOR_SHOWING */
+
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) (HCRYPTPROV *, LPCWSTR, LPCWSTR,
+ DWORD, DWORD);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CRYPTGENRANDOM) (HCRYPTPROV, DWORD, BYTE *);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT) (HCRYPTPROV, DWORD);
+
+typedef HWND(WINAPI *GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW) (VOID);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *GETCURSORINFO) (PCURSORINFO);
+typedef DWORD(WINAPI *GETQUEUESTATUS) (UINT);
+
+typedef HANDLE(WINAPI *CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (DWORD, DWORD);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT) (HANDLE);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *HEAP32FIRST) (LPHEAPENTRY32, DWORD, size_t);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *HEAP32NEXT) (LPHEAPENTRY32);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *HEAP32LIST) (HANDLE, LPHEAPLIST32);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *PROCESS32) (HANDLE, LPPROCESSENTRY32);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *THREAD32) (HANDLE, LPTHREADENTRY32);
+typedef BOOL(WINAPI *MODULE32) (HANDLE, LPMODULEENTRY32);
+
+# include <lmcons.h>
+# include <lmstats.h>
+# if 1
+/*
+ * The NET API is Unicode only. It requires the use of the UNICODE macro.
+ * When UNICODE is defined LPTSTR becomes LPWSTR. LMSTR was was added to the
+ * Platform SDK to allow the NET API to be used in non-Unicode applications
+ * provided that Unicode strings were still used for input. LMSTR is defined
+ * as LPWSTR.
*/
-typedef NET_API_STATUS (NET_API_FUNCTION * NETSTATGET)
- (LPWSTR, LPWSTR, DWORD, DWORD, LPBYTE*);
-typedef NET_API_STATUS (NET_API_FUNCTION * NETFREE)(LPBYTE);
-#endif /* 1 */
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
+typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETSTATGET)
+ (LPWSTR, LPWSTR, DWORD, DWORD, LPBYTE *);
+typedef NET_API_STATUS(NET_API_FUNCTION *NETFREE) (LPBYTE);
+# endif /* 1 */
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
int RAND_poll(void)
{
- MEMORYSTATUS m;
- HCRYPTPROV hProvider = 0;
- DWORD w;
- int good = 0;
-
-
-#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
-# if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=300
-/* Even though MSDN says _WIN32_WCE>=210, it doesn't seem to be available
- * in commonly available implementations prior 300... */
- {
- BYTE buf[64];
- /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
- /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */
- if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
- CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT))
- {
- if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf))
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
- }
- }
-# endif
-#else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
- /*
- * None of below libraries are present on Windows CE, which is
- * why we #ifndef the whole section. This also excuses us from
- * handling the GetProcAddress issue. The trouble is that in
- * real Win32 API GetProcAddress is available in ANSI flavor
- * only. In WinCE on the other hand GetProcAddress is a macro
- * most commonly defined as GetProcAddressW, which accepts
- * Unicode argument. If we were to call GetProcAddress under
- * WinCE, I'd recommend to either redefine GetProcAddress as
- * GetProcAddressA (there seem to be one in common CE spec) or
- * implement own shim routine, which would accept ANSI argument
- * and expand it to Unicode.
- */
- {
- /* load functions dynamically - not available on all systems */
- HMODULE advapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("ADVAPI32.DLL"));
- HMODULE kernel = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KERNEL32.DLL"));
- HMODULE user = NULL;
- HMODULE netapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("NETAPI32.DLL"));
- CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW acquire = NULL;
- CRYPTGENRANDOM gen = NULL;
- CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT release = NULL;
- NETSTATGET netstatget = NULL;
- NETFREE netfree = NULL;
- BYTE buf[64];
-
- if (netapi)
- {
- netstatget = (NETSTATGET) GetProcAddress(netapi,"NetStatisticsGet");
- netfree = (NETFREE) GetProcAddress(netapi,"NetApiBufferFree");
- }
-
- if (netstatget && netfree)
- {
- LPBYTE outbuf;
- /* NetStatisticsGet() is a Unicode only function
- * STAT_WORKSTATION_0 contains 45 fields and STAT_SERVER_0
- * contains 17 fields. We treat each field as a source of
- * one byte of entropy.
- */
-
- if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanWorkstation", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0)
- {
- RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_WORKSTATION_0), 45);
- netfree(outbuf);
- }
- if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanServer", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0)
- {
- RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_SERVER_0), 17);
- netfree(outbuf);
- }
- }
-
- if (netapi)
- FreeLibrary(netapi);
-
- /* It appears like this can cause an exception deep within ADVAPI32.DLL
- * at random times on Windows 2000. Reported by Jeffrey Altman.
- * Only use it on NT.
- */
-
- if (advapi)
- {
- /*
- * If it's available, then it's available in both ANSI
- * and UNICODE flavors even in Win9x, documentation says.
- * We favor Unicode...
- */
- acquire = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) GetProcAddress(advapi,
- "CryptAcquireContextW");
- gen = (CRYPTGENRANDOM) GetProcAddress(advapi,
- "CryptGenRandom");
- release = (CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT) GetProcAddress(advapi,
- "CryptReleaseContext");
- }
-
- if (acquire && gen && release)
- {
- /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
- /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */
- if (acquire(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
- CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT))
- {
- if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0)
- {
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
- good = 1;
-#if 0
- printf("randomness from PROV_RSA_FULL\n");
-#endif
- }
- release(hProvider, 0);
- }
-
- /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
- if (acquire(&hProvider, 0, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, 0))
- {
- if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0)
- {
- RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
- good = 1;
-#if 0
- printf("randomness from PROV_INTEL_SEC\n");
-#endif
- }
- release(hProvider, 0);
- }
- }
+ MEMORYSTATUS m;
+ HCRYPTPROV hProvider = 0;
+ DWORD w;
+ int good = 0;
+
+# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE)
+# if defined(_WIN32_WCE) && _WIN32_WCE>=300
+ /*
+ * Even though MSDN says _WIN32_WCE>=210, it doesn't seem to be available
+ * in commonly available implementations prior 300...
+ */
+ {
+ BYTE buf[64];
+ /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
+ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */
+ if (CryptAcquireContextW(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+ if (CryptGenRandom(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf))
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ CryptReleaseContext(hProvider, 0);
+ }
+ }
+# endif
+# else /* OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
+ /*
+ * None of below libraries are present on Windows CE, which is
+ * why we #ifndef the whole section. This also excuses us from
+ * handling the GetProcAddress issue. The trouble is that in
+ * real Win32 API GetProcAddress is available in ANSI flavor
+ * only. In WinCE on the other hand GetProcAddress is a macro
+ * most commonly defined as GetProcAddressW, which accepts
+ * Unicode argument. If we were to call GetProcAddress under
+ * WinCE, I'd recommend to either redefine GetProcAddress as
+ * GetProcAddressA (there seem to be one in common CE spec) or
+ * implement own shim routine, which would accept ANSI argument
+ * and expand it to Unicode.
+ */
+ {
+ /* load functions dynamically - not available on all systems */
+ HMODULE advapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("ADVAPI32.DLL"));
+ HMODULE kernel = LoadLibrary(TEXT("KERNEL32.DLL"));
+ HMODULE user = NULL;
+ HMODULE netapi = LoadLibrary(TEXT("NETAPI32.DLL"));
+ CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW acquire = NULL;
+ CRYPTGENRANDOM gen = NULL;
+ CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT release = NULL;
+ NETSTATGET netstatget = NULL;
+ NETFREE netfree = NULL;
+ BYTE buf[64];
+
+ if (netapi) {
+ netstatget =
+ (NETSTATGET) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetStatisticsGet");
+ netfree = (NETFREE) GetProcAddress(netapi, "NetApiBufferFree");
+ }
+
+ if (netstatget && netfree) {
+ LPBYTE outbuf;
+ /*
+ * NetStatisticsGet() is a Unicode only function
+ * STAT_WORKSTATION_0 contains 45 fields and STAT_SERVER_0
+ * contains 17 fields. We treat each field as a source of one
+ * byte of entropy.
+ */
+
+ if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanWorkstation", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) {
+ RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_WORKSTATION_0), 45);
+ netfree(outbuf);
+ }
+ if (netstatget(NULL, L"LanmanServer", 0, 0, &outbuf) == 0) {
+ RAND_add(outbuf, sizeof(STAT_SERVER_0), 17);
+ netfree(outbuf);
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (netapi)
+ FreeLibrary(netapi);
+
+ /*
+ * It appears like this can cause an exception deep within
+ * ADVAPI32.DLL at random times on Windows 2000. Reported by Jeffrey
+ * Altman. Only use it on NT.
+ */
+
+ if (advapi) {
+ /*
+ * If it's available, then it's available in both ANSI
+ * and UNICODE flavors even in Win9x, documentation says.
+ * We favor Unicode...
+ */
+ acquire = (CRYPTACQUIRECONTEXTW) GetProcAddress(advapi,
+ "CryptAcquireContextW");
+ gen = (CRYPTGENRANDOM) GetProcAddress(advapi, "CryptGenRandom");
+ release = (CRYPTRELEASECONTEXT) GetProcAddress(advapi,
+ "CryptReleaseContext");
+ }
+
+ if (acquire && gen && release) {
+ /* poll the CryptoAPI PRNG */
+ /* The CryptoAPI returns sizeof(buf) bytes of randomness */
+ if (acquire(&hProvider, NULL, NULL, PROV_RSA_FULL,
+ CRYPT_VERIFYCONTEXT)) {
+ if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), 0);
+ good = 1;
+# if 0
+ printf("randomness from PROV_RSA_FULL\n");
+# endif
+ }
+ release(hProvider, 0);
+ }
+
+ /* poll the Pentium PRG with CryptoAPI */
+ if (acquire(&hProvider, 0, INTEL_DEF_PROV, PROV_INTEL_SEC, 0)) {
+ if (gen(hProvider, sizeof(buf), buf) != 0) {
+ RAND_add(buf, sizeof(buf), sizeof(buf));
+ good = 1;
+# if 0
+ printf("randomness from PROV_INTEL_SEC\n");
+# endif
+ }
+ release(hProvider, 0);
+ }
+ }
if (advapi)
- FreeLibrary(advapi);
-
- if ((!check_winnt() ||
- !OPENSSL_isservice()) &&
- (user = LoadLibrary(TEXT("USER32.DLL"))))
- {
- GETCURSORINFO cursor;
- GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW win;
- GETQUEUESTATUS queue;
-
- win = (GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW) GetProcAddress(user, "GetForegroundWindow");
- cursor = (GETCURSORINFO) GetProcAddress(user, "GetCursorInfo");
- queue = (GETQUEUESTATUS) GetProcAddress(user, "GetQueueStatus");
-
- if (win)
- {
- /* window handle */
- HWND h = win();
- RAND_add(&h, sizeof(h), 0);
- }
- if (cursor)
- {
- /* unfortunately, its not safe to call GetCursorInfo()
- * on NT4 even though it exists in SP3 (or SP6) and
- * higher.
- */
- if (check_winnt() && !check_win_minplat(5))
- cursor = 0;
- }
- if (cursor)
- {
- /* cursor position */
- /* assume 2 bytes of entropy */
- CURSORINFO ci;
- ci.cbSize = sizeof(CURSORINFO);
- if (cursor(&ci))
- RAND_add(&ci, ci.cbSize, 2);
- }
-
- if (queue)
- {
- /* message queue status */
- /* assume 1 byte of entropy */
- w = queue(QS_ALLEVENTS);
- RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1);
- }
-
- FreeLibrary(user);
- }
-
- /*-
- * Toolhelp32 snapshot: enumerate processes, threads, modules and heap
- * http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/psdk/winbase/toolhelp_5pfd.htm
- * (Win 9x and 2000 only, not available on NT)
- *
- * This seeding method was proposed in Peter Gutmann, Software
- * Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers,
- * http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/gutmann.html
- * revised version at http://www.cryptoengines.com/~peter/06_random.pdf
- * (The assignment of entropy estimates below is arbitrary, but based
- * on Peter's analysis the full poll appears to be safe. Additional
- * interactive seeding is encouraged.)
- */
-
- if (kernel)
- {
- CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT snap;
- CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap;
- HANDLE handle;
-
- HEAP32FIRST heap_first;
- HEAP32NEXT heap_next;
- HEAP32LIST heaplist_first, heaplist_next;
- PROCESS32 process_first, process_next;
- THREAD32 thread_first, thread_next;
- MODULE32 module_first, module_next;
-
- HEAPLIST32 hlist;
- HEAPENTRY32 hentry;
- PROCESSENTRY32 p;
- THREADENTRY32 t;
- MODULEENTRY32 m;
- DWORD starttime = 0;
-
- snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
- GetProcAddress(kernel, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot");
- close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
- GetProcAddress(kernel, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot");
- heap_first = (HEAP32FIRST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32First");
- heap_next = (HEAP32NEXT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32Next");
- heaplist_first = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListFirst");
- heaplist_next = (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListNext");
- process_first = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32First");
- process_next = (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32Next");
- thread_first = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32First");
- thread_next = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32Next");
- module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32First");
- module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32Next");
-
- if (snap && heap_first && heap_next && heaplist_first &&
- heaplist_next && process_first && process_next &&
- thread_first && thread_next && module_first &&
- module_next && (handle = snap(TH32CS_SNAPALL,0))
- != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE)
- {
- /* heap list and heap walking */
- /* HEAPLIST32 contains 3 fields that will change with
- * each entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte
- * of entropy.
- * HEAPENTRY32 contains 5 fields that will change with
- * each entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte
- * of entropy.
- */
- ZeroMemory(&hlist, sizeof(HEAPLIST32));
- hlist.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPLIST32);
- if (good) starttime = GetTickCount();
-#ifdef _MSC_VER
- if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist))
- {
- /*
- following discussion on dev ML, exception on WinCE (or other Win
- platform) is theoretically of unknown origin; prevent infinite
- loop here when this theoretical case occurs; otherwise cope with
- the expected (MSDN documented) exception-throwing behaviour of
- Heap32Next() on WinCE.
-
- based on patch in original message by Tanguy Fautré (2009/03/02)
- Subject: RAND_poll() and CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() stability
- */
- int ex_cnt_limit = 42;
- do
- {
- RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3);
- __try
- {
- ZeroMemory(&hentry, sizeof(HEAPENTRY32));
- hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32);
- if (heap_first(&hentry,
- hlist.th32ProcessID,
- hlist.th32HeapID))
- {
- int entrycnt = 80;
- do
- RAND_add(&hentry,
- hentry.dwSize, 5);
- while (heap_next(&hentry)
- && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY)
- && --entrycnt > 0);
- }
- }
- __except (EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER)
- {
- /* ignore access violations when walking the heap list */
- ex_cnt_limit--;
- }
- } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
- && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY)
- && ex_cnt_limit > 0);
- }
-
-#else
- if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist))
- {
- do
- {
- RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3);
- hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32);
- if (heap_first(&hentry,
- hlist.th32ProcessID,
- hlist.th32HeapID))
- {
- int entrycnt = 80;
- do
- RAND_add(&hentry,
- hentry.dwSize, 5);
- while (heap_next(&hentry)
- && --entrycnt > 0);
- }
- } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
- && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY));
- }
-#endif
-
- /* process walking */
- /* PROCESSENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change
- * with each entry. Consider each field a source of
- * 1 byte of entropy.
- */
- p.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
-
- if (good) starttime = GetTickCount();
- if (process_first(handle, &p))
- do
- RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9);
- while (process_next(handle, &p) && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY));
-
- /* thread walking */
- /* THREADENTRY32 contains 6 fields that will change
- * with each entry. Consider each field a source of
- * 1 byte of entropy.
- */
- t.dwSize = sizeof(THREADENTRY32);
- if (good) starttime = GetTickCount();
- if (thread_first(handle, &t))
- do
- RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6);
- while (thread_next(handle, &t) && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY));
-
- /* module walking */
- /* MODULEENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change
- * with each entry. Consider each field a source of
- * 1 byte of entropy.
- */
- m.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32);
- if (good) starttime = GetTickCount();
- if (module_first(handle, &m))
- do
- RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9);
- while (module_next(handle, &m)
- && (!good || (GetTickCount()-starttime)<MAXDELAY));
- if (close_snap)
- close_snap(handle);
- else
- CloseHandle(handle);
-
- }
-
- FreeLibrary(kernel);
- }
- }
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
-
- /* timer data */
- readtimer();
-
- /* memory usage statistics */
- GlobalMemoryStatus(&m);
- RAND_add(&m, sizeof(m), 1);
-
- /* process ID */
- w = GetCurrentProcessId();
- RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1);
-
-#if 0
- printf("Exiting RAND_poll\n");
-#endif
-
- return(1);
-}
-
-int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
- {
- double add_entropy=0;
-
- switch (iMsg)
- {
- case WM_KEYDOWN:
- {
- static WPARAM key;
- if (key != wParam)
- add_entropy = 0.05;
- key = wParam;
+ FreeLibrary(advapi);
+
+ if ((!check_winnt() ||
+ !OPENSSL_isservice()) &&
+ (user = LoadLibrary(TEXT("USER32.DLL")))) {
+ GETCURSORINFO cursor;
+ GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW win;
+ GETQUEUESTATUS queue;
+
+ win =
+ (GETFOREGROUNDWINDOW) GetProcAddress(user,
+ "GetForegroundWindow");
+ cursor = (GETCURSORINFO) GetProcAddress(user, "GetCursorInfo");
+ queue = (GETQUEUESTATUS) GetProcAddress(user, "GetQueueStatus");
+
+ if (win) {
+ /* window handle */
+ HWND h = win();
+ RAND_add(&h, sizeof(h), 0);
+ }
+ if (cursor) {
+ /*
+ * unfortunately, its not safe to call GetCursorInfo() on NT4
+ * even though it exists in SP3 (or SP6) and higher.
+ */
+ if (check_winnt() && !check_win_minplat(5))
+ cursor = 0;
+ }
+ if (cursor) {
+ /* cursor position */
+ /* assume 2 bytes of entropy */
+ CURSORINFO ci;
+ ci.cbSize = sizeof(CURSORINFO);
+ if (cursor(&ci))
+ RAND_add(&ci, ci.cbSize, 2);
+ }
+
+ if (queue) {
+ /* message queue status */
+ /* assume 1 byte of entropy */
+ w = queue(QS_ALLEVENTS);
+ RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1);
+ }
+
+ FreeLibrary(user);
+ }
+
+ /*-
+ * Toolhelp32 snapshot: enumerate processes, threads, modules and heap
+ * http://msdn.microsoft.com/library/psdk/winbase/toolhelp_5pfd.htm
+ * (Win 9x and 2000 only, not available on NT)
+ *
+ * This seeding method was proposed in Peter Gutmann, Software
+ * Generation of Practically Strong Random Numbers,
+ * http://www.usenix.org/publications/library/proceedings/sec98/gutmann.html
+ * revised version at http://www.cryptoengines.com/~peter/06_random.pdf
+ * (The assignment of entropy estimates below is arbitrary, but based
+ * on Peter's analysis the full poll appears to be safe. Additional
+ * interactive seeding is encouraged.)
+ */
+
+ if (kernel) {
+ CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT snap;
+ CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT close_snap;
+ HANDLE handle;
+
+ HEAP32FIRST heap_first;
+ HEAP32NEXT heap_next;
+ HEAP32LIST heaplist_first, heaplist_next;
+ PROCESS32 process_first, process_next;
+ THREAD32 thread_first, thread_next;
+ MODULE32 module_first, module_next;
+
+ HEAPLIST32 hlist;
+ HEAPENTRY32 hentry;
+ PROCESSENTRY32 p;
+ THREADENTRY32 t;
+ MODULEENTRY32 m;
+ DWORD starttime = 0;
+
+ snap = (CREATETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
+ GetProcAddress(kernel, "CreateToolhelp32Snapshot");
+ close_snap = (CLOSETOOLHELP32SNAPSHOT)
+ GetProcAddress(kernel, "CloseToolhelp32Snapshot");
+ heap_first = (HEAP32FIRST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32First");
+ heap_next = (HEAP32NEXT) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32Next");
+ heaplist_first =
+ (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListFirst");
+ heaplist_next =
+ (HEAP32LIST) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Heap32ListNext");
+ process_first =
+ (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32First");
+ process_next =
+ (PROCESS32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Process32Next");
+ thread_first = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32First");
+ thread_next = (THREAD32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Thread32Next");
+ module_first = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32First");
+ module_next = (MODULE32) GetProcAddress(kernel, "Module32Next");
+
+ if (snap && heap_first && heap_next && heaplist_first &&
+ heaplist_next && process_first && process_next &&
+ thread_first && thread_next && module_first &&
+ module_next && (handle = snap(TH32CS_SNAPALL, 0))
+ != INVALID_HANDLE_VALUE) {
+ /* heap list and heap walking */
+ /*
+ * HEAPLIST32 contains 3 fields that will change with each
+ * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy.
+ * HEAPENTRY32 contains 5 fields that will change with each
+ * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy.
+ */
+ ZeroMemory(&hlist, sizeof(HEAPLIST32));
+ hlist.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPLIST32);
+ if (good)
+ starttime = GetTickCount();
+# ifdef _MSC_VER
+ if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) {
+ /*
+ * following discussion on dev ML, exception on WinCE (or
+ * other Win platform) is theoretically of unknown
+ * origin; prevent infinite loop here when this
+ * theoretical case occurs; otherwise cope with the
+ * expected (MSDN documented) exception-throwing
+ * behaviour of Heap32Next() on WinCE.
+ *
+ * based on patch in original message by Tanguy Fautré
+ * (2009/03/02) Subject: RAND_poll() and
+ * CreateToolhelp32Snapshot() stability
+ */
+ int ex_cnt_limit = 42;
+ do {
+ RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3);
+ __try {
+ ZeroMemory(&hentry, sizeof(HEAPENTRY32));
+ hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32);
+ if (heap_first(&hentry,
+ hlist.th32ProcessID,
+ hlist.th32HeapID)) {
+ int entrycnt = 80;
+ do
+ RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
+ while (heap_next(&hentry)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) <
+ MAXDELAY)
+ && --entrycnt > 0);
+ }
}
- break;
- case WM_MOUSEMOVE:
- {
- static int lastx,lasty,lastdx,lastdy;
- int x,y,dx,dy;
-
- x=LOWORD(lParam);
- y=HIWORD(lParam);
- dx=lastx-x;
- dy=lasty-y;
- if (dx != 0 && dy != 0 && dx-lastdx != 0 && dy-lastdy != 0)
- add_entropy=.2;
- lastx=x, lasty=y;
- lastdx=dx, lastdy=dy;
+ __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
+ /*
+ * ignore access violations when walking the heap
+ * list
+ */
+ ex_cnt_limit--;
}
- break;
- }
-
- readtimer();
- RAND_add(&iMsg, sizeof(iMsg), add_entropy);
- RAND_add(&wParam, sizeof(wParam), 0);
- RAND_add(&lParam, sizeof(lParam), 0);
-
- return (RAND_status());
- }
+ } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY)
+ && ex_cnt_limit > 0);
+ }
+# else
+ if (heaplist_first(handle, &hlist)) {
+ do {
+ RAND_add(&hlist, hlist.dwSize, 3);
+ hentry.dwSize = sizeof(HEAPENTRY32);
+ if (heap_first(&hentry,
+ hlist.th32ProcessID,
+ hlist.th32HeapID)) {
+ int entrycnt = 80;
+ do
+ RAND_add(&hentry, hentry.dwSize, 5);
+ while (heap_next(&hentry)
+ && --entrycnt > 0);
+ }
+ } while (heaplist_next(handle, &hlist)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+ }
+# endif
+
+ /* process walking */
+ /*
+ * PROCESSENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with
+ * each entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of
+ * entropy.
+ */
+ p.dwSize = sizeof(PROCESSENTRY32);
+
+ if (good)
+ starttime = GetTickCount();
+ if (process_first(handle, &p))
+ do
+ RAND_add(&p, p.dwSize, 9);
+ while (process_next(handle, &p)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+
+ /* thread walking */
+ /*
+ * THREADENTRY32 contains 6 fields that will change with each
+ * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy.
+ */
+ t.dwSize = sizeof(THREADENTRY32);
+ if (good)
+ starttime = GetTickCount();
+ if (thread_first(handle, &t))
+ do
+ RAND_add(&t, t.dwSize, 6);
+ while (thread_next(handle, &t)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+
+ /* module walking */
+ /*
+ * MODULEENTRY32 contains 9 fields that will change with each
+ * entry. Consider each field a source of 1 byte of entropy.
+ */
+ m.dwSize = sizeof(MODULEENTRY32);
+ if (good)
+ starttime = GetTickCount();
+ if (module_first(handle, &m))
+ do
+ RAND_add(&m, m.dwSize, 9);
+ while (module_next(handle, &m)
+ && (!good
+ || (GetTickCount() - starttime) < MAXDELAY));
+ if (close_snap)
+ close_snap(handle);
+ else
+ CloseHandle(handle);
+
+ }
+
+ FreeLibrary(kernel);
+ }
+ }
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
+
+ /* timer data */
+ readtimer();
+
+ /* memory usage statistics */
+ GlobalMemoryStatus(&m);
+ RAND_add(&m, sizeof(m), 1);
+
+ /* process ID */
+ w = GetCurrentProcessId();
+ RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 1);
+
+# if 0
+ printf("Exiting RAND_poll\n");
+# endif
+ return (1);
+}
-void RAND_screen(void) /* function available for backward compatibility */
+int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
- RAND_poll();
- readscreen();
+ double add_entropy = 0;
+
+ switch (iMsg) {
+ case WM_KEYDOWN:
+ {
+ static WPARAM key;
+ if (key != wParam)
+ add_entropy = 0.05;
+ key = wParam;
+ }
+ break;
+ case WM_MOUSEMOVE:
+ {
+ static int lastx, lasty, lastdx, lastdy;
+ int x, y, dx, dy;
+
+ x = LOWORD(lParam);
+ y = HIWORD(lParam);
+ dx = lastx - x;
+ dy = lasty - y;
+ if (dx != 0 && dy != 0 && dx - lastdx != 0 && dy - lastdy != 0)
+ add_entropy = .2;
+ lastx = x, lasty = y;
+ lastdx = dx, lastdy = dy;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+
+ readtimer();
+ RAND_add(&iMsg, sizeof(iMsg), add_entropy);
+ RAND_add(&wParam, sizeof(wParam), 0);
+ RAND_add(&lParam, sizeof(lParam), 0);
+
+ return (RAND_status());
}
+void RAND_screen(void)
+{ /* function available for backward
+ * compatibility */
+ RAND_poll();
+ readscreen();
+}
/* feed timing information to the PRNG */
static void readtimer(void)
{
- DWORD w;
- LARGE_INTEGER l;
- static int have_perfc = 1;
-#if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_X86)
- static int have_tsc = 1;
- DWORD cyclecount;
-
- if (have_tsc) {
- __try {
- __asm {
- _emit 0x0f
- _emit 0x31
- mov cyclecount, eax
- }
- RAND_add(&cyclecount, sizeof(cyclecount), 1);
- } __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
- have_tsc = 0;
- }
- }
-#else
-# define have_tsc 0
-#endif
+ DWORD w;
+ LARGE_INTEGER l;
+ static int have_perfc = 1;
+# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_M_X86)
+ static int have_tsc = 1;
+ DWORD cyclecount;
+
+ if (have_tsc) {
+ __try {
+ __asm {
+ _emit 0x0f _emit 0x31 mov cyclecount, eax}
+ RAND_add(&cyclecount, sizeof(cyclecount), 1);
+ }
+ __except(EXCEPTION_EXECUTE_HANDLER) {
+ have_tsc = 0;
+ }
+ }
+# else
+# define have_tsc 0
+# endif
- if (have_perfc) {
- if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&l) == 0)
- have_perfc = 0;
- else
- RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
- }
-
- if (!have_tsc && !have_perfc) {
- w = GetTickCount();
- RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 0);
- }
+ if (have_perfc) {
+ if (QueryPerformanceCounter(&l) == 0)
+ have_perfc = 0;
+ else
+ RAND_add(&l, sizeof(l), 0);
+ }
+
+ if (!have_tsc && !have_perfc) {
+ w = GetTickCount();
+ RAND_add(&w, sizeof(w), 0);
+ }
}
/* feed screen contents to PRNG */
@@ -684,72 +682,71 @@ static void readtimer(void)
static void readscreen(void)
{
-#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
- HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */
- HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */
- BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */
- unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */
- char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */
- int w; /* screen width */
- int h; /* screen height */
- int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
- int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
- BITMAPINFOHEADER bi; /* info about the bitmap */
-
- if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice()>0)
- return;
-
- /* Get a reference to the screen DC */
- hScrDC = GetDC(NULL);
-
- /* Get screen resolution */
- w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES);
- h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES);
-
- /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */
- hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
-
- /* Get bitmap properties */
- GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR)&bm);
- size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
-
- bi.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
- bi.biWidth = bm.bmWidth;
- bi.biHeight = bm.bmHeight;
- bi.biPlanes = bm.bmPlanes;
- bi.biBitCount = bm.bmBitsPixel;
- bi.biCompression = BI_RGB;
- bi.biSizeImage = 0;
- bi.biXPelsPerMeter = 0;
- bi.biYPelsPerMeter = 0;
- bi.biClrUsed = 0;
- bi.biClrImportant = 0;
-
- bmbits = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
- if (bmbits) {
- /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */
- for (y = 0; y < h-n; y += n)
- {
- unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
-
- /* Copy the bits of the current line range into the buffer */
- GetDIBits(hScrDC, hBitmap, y, n,
- bmbits, (BITMAPINFO *)&bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);
-
- /* Get the hash of the bitmap */
- MD(bmbits,size,md);
-
- /* Seed the random generator with the hash value */
- RAND_add(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0);
- }
-
- OPENSSL_free(bmbits);
- }
-
- /* Clean up */
- DeleteObject(hBitmap);
- ReleaseDC(NULL, hScrDC);
-#endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
+# if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_WIN32_CYGWIN)
+ HDC hScrDC; /* screen DC */
+ HBITMAP hBitmap; /* handle for our bitmap */
+ BITMAP bm; /* bitmap properties */
+ unsigned int size; /* size of bitmap */
+ char *bmbits; /* contents of bitmap */
+ int w; /* screen width */
+ int h; /* screen height */
+ int y; /* y-coordinate of screen lines to grab */
+ int n = 16; /* number of screen lines to grab at a time */
+ BITMAPINFOHEADER bi; /* info about the bitmap */
+
+ if (check_winnt() && OPENSSL_isservice() > 0)
+ return;
+
+ /* Get a reference to the screen DC */
+ hScrDC = GetDC(NULL);
+
+ /* Get screen resolution */
+ w = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, HORZRES);
+ h = GetDeviceCaps(hScrDC, VERTRES);
+
+ /* Create a bitmap compatible with the screen DC */
+ hBitmap = CreateCompatibleBitmap(hScrDC, w, n);
+
+ /* Get bitmap properties */
+ GetObject(hBitmap, sizeof(BITMAP), (LPSTR) & bm);
+ size = (unsigned int)bm.bmWidthBytes * bm.bmHeight * bm.bmPlanes;
+
+ bi.biSize = sizeof(BITMAPINFOHEADER);
+ bi.biWidth = bm.bmWidth;
+ bi.biHeight = bm.bmHeight;
+ bi.biPlanes = bm.bmPlanes;
+ bi.biBitCount = bm.bmBitsPixel;
+ bi.biCompression = BI_RGB;
+ bi.biSizeImage = 0;
+ bi.biXPelsPerMeter = 0;
+ bi.biYPelsPerMeter = 0;
+ bi.biClrUsed = 0;
+ bi.biClrImportant = 0;
+
+ bmbits = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
+ if (bmbits) {
+ /* Now go through the whole screen, repeatedly grabbing n lines */
+ for (y = 0; y < h - n; y += n) {
+ unsigned char md[MD_DIGEST_LENGTH];
+
+ /* Copy the bits of the current line range into the buffer */
+ GetDIBits(hScrDC, hBitmap, y, n,
+ bmbits, (BITMAPINFO *) & bi, DIB_RGB_COLORS);
+
+ /* Get the hash of the bitmap */
+ MD(bmbits, size, md);
+
+ /* Seed the random generator with the hash value */
+ RAND_add(md, MD_DIGEST_LENGTH, 0);
+ }
+
+ OPENSSL_free(bmbits);
+ }
+
+ /* Clean up */
+ DeleteObject(hBitmap);
+ ReleaseDC(NULL, hScrDC);
+# endif /* !OPENSSL_SYS_WINCE */
}
#endif
diff --git a/crypto/rand/randfile.c b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
index bbe21f32c1..45f8bb8b3d 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/randfile.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randfile.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@
/* We need to define this to get macros like S_IFBLK and S_IFCHR */
#if !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS)
-#define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
+# define _XOPEN_SOURCE 500
#endif
#include <errno.h>
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-#include <unixio.h>
+# include <unixio.h>
#endif
#ifndef NO_SYS_TYPES_H
# include <sys/types.h>
@@ -84,249 +84,255 @@
#endif
#ifdef _WIN32
-#define stat _stat
-#define chmod _chmod
-#define open _open
-#define fdopen _fdopen
+# define stat _stat
+# define chmod _chmod
+# define open _open
+# define fdopen _fdopen
#endif
#undef BUFSIZE
-#define BUFSIZE 1024
+#define BUFSIZE 1024
#define RAND_DATA 1024
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
-/* This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen
- * for passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89 */
+/*
+ * This declaration is a nasty hack to get around vms' extension to fopen for
+ * passing in sharing options being disabled by our /STANDARD=ANSI89
+ */
static FILE *(*const vms_fopen)(const char *, const char *, ...) =
(FILE *(*)(const char *, const char *, ...))fopen;
-#define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
+# define VMS_OPEN_ATTRS "shr=get,put,upd,del","ctx=bin,stm","rfm=stm","rat=none","mrs=0"
#endif
/* #define RFILE ".rnd" - defined in ../../e_os.h */
-/* Note that these functions are intended for seed files only.
- * Entropy devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c */
+/*
+ * Note that these functions are intended for seed files only. Entropy
+ * devices and EGD sockets are handled in rand_unix.c
+ */
int RAND_load_file(const char *file, long bytes)
- {
- /*-
- * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
- * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
- */
+{
+ /*-
+ * If bytes >= 0, read up to 'bytes' bytes.
+ * if bytes == -1, read complete file.
+ */
- MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+ MS_STATIC unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
- struct stat sb;
+ struct stat sb;
#endif
- int i,ret=0,n;
- FILE *in;
+ int i, ret = 0, n;
+ FILE *in;
- if (file == NULL) return(0);
+ if (file == NULL)
+ return (0);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
-#ifdef PURIFY
- /* struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
- * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
- * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
- * applications such as Valgrind.
- */
- memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
-#endif
- if (stat(file,&sb) < 0) return(0);
- RAND_add(&sb,sizeof(sb),0.0);
+# ifdef PURIFY
+ /*
+ * struct stat can have padding and unused fields that may not be
+ * initialized in the call to stat(). We need to clear the entire
+ * structure before calling RAND_add() to avoid complaints from
+ * applications such as Valgrind.
+ */
+ memset(&sb, 0, sizeof(sb));
+# endif
+ if (stat(file, &sb) < 0)
+ return (0);
+ RAND_add(&sb, sizeof(sb), 0.0);
#endif
- if (bytes == 0) return(ret);
+ if (bytes == 0)
+ return (ret);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- in=vms_fopen(file,"rb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+ in = vms_fopen(file, "rb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
#else
- in=fopen(file,"rb");
+ in = fopen(file, "rb");
#endif
- if (in == NULL) goto err;
+ if (in == NULL)
+ goto err;
#if defined(S_IFBLK) && defined(S_IFCHR) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO)
- if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
- /* this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number
- * of bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered
- * I/O because we will waste system entropy.
- */
- bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
-#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
- setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */
-#endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
- }
+ if (sb.st_mode & (S_IFBLK | S_IFCHR)) {
+ /*
+ * this file is a device. we don't want read an infinite number of
+ * bytes from a random device, nor do we want to use buffered I/O
+ * because we will waste system entropy.
+ */
+ bytes = (bytes == -1) ? 2048 : bytes; /* ok, is 2048 enough? */
+# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF
+ setvbuf(in, NULL, _IONBF, 0); /* don't do buffered reads */
+# endif /* ndef OPENSSL_NO_SETVBUF_IONBF */
+ }
#endif
- for (;;)
- {
- if (bytes > 0)
- n = (bytes < BUFSIZE)?(int)bytes:BUFSIZE;
- else
- n = BUFSIZE;
- i=fread(buf,1,n,in);
- if (i <= 0) break;
+ for (;;) {
+ if (bytes > 0)
+ n = (bytes < BUFSIZE) ? (int)bytes : BUFSIZE;
+ else
+ n = BUFSIZE;
+ i = fread(buf, 1, n, in);
+ if (i <= 0)
+ break;
#ifdef PURIFY
- RAND_add(buf,i,(double)i);
+ RAND_add(buf, i, (double)i);
#else
- /* even if n != i, use the full array */
- RAND_add(buf,n,(double)i);
+ /* even if n != i, use the full array */
+ RAND_add(buf, n, (double)i);
#endif
- ret+=i;
- if (bytes > 0)
- {
- bytes-=n;
- if (bytes <= 0) break;
- }
- }
- fclose(in);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE);
-err:
- return(ret);
- }
+ ret += i;
+ if (bytes > 0) {
+ bytes -= n;
+ if (bytes <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ fclose(in);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ err:
+ return (ret);
+}
int RAND_write_file(const char *file)
- {
- unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
- int i,ret=0,rand_err=0;
- FILE *out = NULL;
- int n;
+{
+ unsigned char buf[BUFSIZE];
+ int i, ret = 0, rand_err = 0;
+ FILE *out = NULL;
+ int n;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO
- struct stat sb;
-
- i=stat(file,&sb);
- if (i != -1) {
-#if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
- if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
- /* this file is a device. we don't write back to it.
- * we "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort
- * of random device. Otherwise attempting to write to
- * and chmod the device causes problems.
- */
- return(1);
- }
-#endif
- }
+ struct stat sb;
+
+ i = stat(file, &sb);
+ if (i != -1) {
+# if defined(S_ISBLK) && defined(S_ISCHR)
+ if (S_ISBLK(sb.st_mode) || S_ISCHR(sb.st_mode)) {
+ /*
+ * this file is a device. we don't write back to it. we
+ * "succeed" on the assumption this is some sort of random
+ * device. Otherwise attempting to write to and chmod the device
+ * causes problems.
+ */
+ return (1);
+ }
+# endif
+ }
#endif
#if defined(O_CREAT) && !defined(OPENSSL_NO_POSIX_IO) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS)
- {
-#ifndef O_BINARY
-#define O_BINARY 0
-#endif
- /* chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file,
- * permissions should be restrictive from the start */
- int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY|O_CREAT|O_BINARY, 0600);
- if (fd != -1)
- out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
- }
+ {
+# ifndef O_BINARY
+# define O_BINARY 0
+# endif
+ /*
+ * chmod(..., 0600) is too late to protect the file, permissions
+ * should be restrictive from the start
+ */
+ int fd = open(file, O_WRONLY | O_CREAT | O_BINARY, 0600);
+ if (fd != -1)
+ out = fdopen(fd, "wb");
+ }
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- /* VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_
- * version of the rand file for each call into this routine, then
- * deleted all existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed
- * the current version as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this
- * resulted in an RMS race condition in rename() which could
- * orphan files (see vms message help for RMS$_REENT). With the
- * fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares the top-level
- * version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
- * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this
- * code will then create a new version of the rand file. Without
- * the delete and rename code, this can result in ascending file
- * versions that stop at version 32767, and this routine will then
- * return an error. The remedy for this is to recode the calling
- * application to avoid concurrent use of the rand file, or
- * synchronize usage at the application level. Also consider
- * whether or not you NEED a persistent rand file in a concurrent
- * use situation.
- */
+ /*
+ * VMS NOTE: Prior versions of this routine created a _new_ version of
+ * the rand file for each call into this routine, then deleted all
+ * existing versions named ;-1, and finally renamed the current version
+ * as ';1'. Under concurrent usage, this resulted in an RMS race
+ * condition in rename() which could orphan files (see vms message help
+ * for RMS$_REENT). With the fopen() calls below, openssl/VMS now shares
+ * the top-level version of the rand file. Note that there may still be
+ * conditions where the top-level rand file is locked. If so, this code
+ * will then create a new version of the rand file. Without the delete
+ * and rename code, this can result in ascending file versions that stop
+ * at version 32767, and this routine will then return an error. The
+ * remedy for this is to recode the calling application to avoid
+ * concurrent use of the rand file, or synchronize usage at the
+ * application level. Also consider whether or not you NEED a persistent
+ * rand file in a concurrent use situation.
+ */
- out = vms_fopen(file,"rb+",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
- if (out == NULL)
- out = vms_fopen(file,"wb",VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+ out = vms_fopen(file, "rb+", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = vms_fopen(file, "wb", VMS_OPEN_ATTRS);
#else
- if (out == NULL)
- out = fopen(file,"wb");
+ if (out == NULL)
+ out = fopen(file, "wb");
#endif
- if (out == NULL) goto err;
+ if (out == NULL)
+ goto err;
#ifndef NO_CHMOD
- chmod(file,0600);
+ chmod(file, 0600);
#endif
- n=RAND_DATA;
- for (;;)
- {
- i=(n > BUFSIZE)?BUFSIZE:n;
- n-=BUFSIZE;
- if (RAND_bytes(buf,i) <= 0)
- rand_err=1;
- i=fwrite(buf,1,i,out);
- if (i <= 0)
- {
- ret=0;
- break;
- }
- ret+=i;
- if (n <= 0) break;
- }
+ n = RAND_DATA;
+ for (;;) {
+ i = (n > BUFSIZE) ? BUFSIZE : n;
+ n -= BUFSIZE;
+ if (RAND_bytes(buf, i) <= 0)
+ rand_err = 1;
+ i = fwrite(buf, 1, i, out);
+ if (i <= 0) {
+ ret = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ ret += i;
+ if (n <= 0)
+ break;
+ }
- fclose(out);
- OPENSSL_cleanse(buf,BUFSIZE);
-err:
- return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
- }
+ fclose(out);
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, BUFSIZE);
+ err:
+ return (rand_err ? -1 : ret);
+}
const char *RAND_file_name(char *buf, size_t size)
- {
- char *s=NULL;
+{
+ char *s = NULL;
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
- struct stat sb;
+ struct stat sb;
#endif
- if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
- s=getenv("RANDFILE");
- if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size)
- {
- if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size) >= size)
- return NULL;
- }
- else
- {
- if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
- s=getenv("HOME");
+ if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
+ s = getenv("RANDFILE");
+ if (s != NULL && *s && strlen(s) + 1 < size) {
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size) >= size)
+ return NULL;
+ } else {
+ if (OPENSSL_issetugid() == 0)
+ s = getenv("HOME");
#ifdef DEFAULT_HOME
- if (s == NULL)
- {
- s = DEFAULT_HOME;
- }
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ s = DEFAULT_HOME;
+ }
#endif
- if (s && *s && strlen(s)+strlen(RFILE)+2 < size)
- {
- BUF_strlcpy(buf,s,size);
+ if (s && *s && strlen(s) + strlen(RFILE) + 2 < size) {
+ BUF_strlcpy(buf, s, size);
#ifndef OPENSSL_SYS_VMS
- BUF_strlcat(buf,"/",size);
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, "/", size);
#endif
- BUF_strlcat(buf,RFILE,size);
- }
- else
- buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
- }
+ BUF_strlcat(buf, RFILE, size);
+ } else
+ buf[0] = '\0'; /* no file name */
+ }
#ifdef __OpenBSD__
- /* given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be
- * seen on a stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it
- * fails, use /dev/arandom instead. this allows the user to
- * use their own source for good random data, but defaults
- * to something hopefully decent if that isn't available.
- */
-
- if (!buf[0])
- if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) {
- return(NULL);
- }
- if (stat(buf,&sb) == -1)
- if (BUF_strlcpy(buf,"/dev/arandom",size) >= size) {
- return(NULL);
- }
+ /*
+ * given that all random loads just fail if the file can't be seen on a
+ * stat, we stat the file we're returning, if it fails, use /dev/arandom
+ * instead. this allows the user to use their own source for good random
+ * data, but defaults to something hopefully decent if that isn't
+ * available.
+ */
+ if (!buf[0])
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
+ return (NULL);
+ }
+ if (stat(buf, &sb) == -1)
+ if (BUF_strlcpy(buf, "/dev/arandom", size) >= size) {
+ return (NULL);
+ }
#endif
- return(buf);
- }
+ return (buf);
+}
diff --git a/crypto/rand/randtest.c b/crypto/rand/randtest.c
index 9e92a70b03..91bcac9906 100644
--- a/crypto/rand/randtest.c
+++ b/crypto/rand/randtest.c
@@ -5,21 +5,21 @@
* This package is an SSL implementation written
* by Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com).
* The implementation was written so as to conform with Netscapes SSL.
- *
+ *
* This library is free for commercial and non-commercial use as long as
* the following conditions are aheared to. The following conditions
* apply to all code found in this distribution, be it the RC4, RSA,
* lhash, DES, etc., code; not just the SSL code. The SSL documentation
* included with this distribution is covered by the same copyright terms
* except that the holder is Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
- *
+ *
* Copyright remains Eric Young's, and as such any Copyright notices in
* the code are not to be removed.
* If this package is used in a product, Eric Young should be given attribution
* as the author of the parts of the library used.
* This can be in the form of a textual message at program startup or
* in documentation (online or textual) provided with the package.
- *
+ *
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@
* Eric Young (eay@cryptsoft.com)"
* The word 'cryptographic' can be left out if the rouines from the library
* being used are not cryptographic related :-).
- * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
+ * 4. If you include any Windows specific code (or a derivative thereof) from
* the apps directory (application code) you must include an acknowledgement:
* "This product includes software written by Tim Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com)"
- *
+ *
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY ERIC YOUNG ``AS IS'' AND
* ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@
* LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY
* OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF
* SUCH DAMAGE.
- *
+ *
* The licence and distribution terms for any publically available version or
* derivative of this code cannot be changed. i.e. this code cannot simply be
* copied and put under another distribution licence
@@ -65,155 +65,145 @@
/* some FIPS 140-1 random number test */
/* some simple tests */
-int main(int argc,char **argv)
- {
- unsigned char buf[2500];
- int i,j,k,s,sign,nsign,err=0;
- unsigned long n1;
- unsigned long n2[16];
- unsigned long runs[2][34];
- /*double d; */
- long d;
+int main(int argc, char **argv)
+{
+ unsigned char buf[2500];
+ int i, j, k, s, sign, nsign, err = 0;
+ unsigned long n1;
+ unsigned long n2[16];
+ unsigned long runs[2][34];
+ /*
+ * double d;
+ */
+ long d;
- i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf,2500);
- if (i < 0)
- {
- printf ("init failed, the rand method is not properly installed\n");
- err++;
- goto err;
- }
+ i = RAND_pseudo_bytes(buf, 2500);
+ if (i < 0) {
+ printf("init failed, the rand method is not properly installed\n");
+ err++;
+ goto err;
+ }
- n1=0;
- for (i=0; i<16; i++) n2[i]=0;
- for (i=0; i<34; i++) runs[0][i]=runs[1][i]=0;
+ n1 = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ n2[i] = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 34; i++)
+ runs[0][i] = runs[1][i] = 0;
- /* test 1 and 2 */
- sign=0;
- nsign=0;
- for (i=0; i<2500; i++)
- {
- j=buf[i];
+ /* test 1 and 2 */
+ sign = 0;
+ nsign = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 2500; i++) {
+ j = buf[i];
- n2[j&0x0f]++;
- n2[(j>>4)&0x0f]++;
+ n2[j & 0x0f]++;
+ n2[(j >> 4) & 0x0f]++;
- for (k=0; k<8; k++)
- {
- s=(j&0x01);
- if (s == sign)
- nsign++;
- else
- {
- if (nsign > 34) nsign=34;
- if (nsign != 0)
- {
- runs[sign][nsign-1]++;
- if (nsign > 6)
- runs[sign][5]++;
- }
- sign=s;
- nsign=1;
- }
+ for (k = 0; k < 8; k++) {
+ s = (j & 0x01);
+ if (s == sign)
+ nsign++;
+ else {
+ if (nsign > 34)
+ nsign = 34;
+ if (nsign != 0) {
+ runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
+ if (nsign > 6)
+ runs[sign][5]++;
+ }
+ sign = s;
+ nsign = 1;
+ }
- if (s) n1++;
- j>>=1;
- }
- }
- if (nsign > 34) nsign=34;
- if (nsign != 0) runs[sign][nsign-1]++;
+ if (s)
+ n1++;
+ j >>= 1;
+ }
+ }
+ if (nsign > 34)
+ nsign = 34;
+ if (nsign != 0)
+ runs[sign][nsign - 1]++;
- /* test 1 */
- if (!((9654 < n1) && (n1 < 10346)))
- {
- printf("test 1 failed, X=%lu\n",n1);
- err++;
- }
- printf("test 1 done\n");
+ /* test 1 */
+ if (!((9654 < n1) && (n1 < 10346))) {
+ printf("test 1 failed, X=%lu\n", n1);
+ err++;
+ }
+ printf("test 1 done\n");
- /* test 2 */
+ /* test 2 */
#ifdef undef
- d=0;
- for (i=0; i<16; i++)
- d+=n2[i]*n2[i];
- d=d*16.0/5000.0-5000.0;
- if (!((1.03 < d) && (d < 57.4)))
- {
- printf("test 2 failed, X=%.2f\n",d);
- err++;
- }
+ d = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ d += n2[i] * n2[i];
+ d = d * 16.0 / 5000.0 - 5000.0;
+ if (!((1.03 < d) && (d < 57.4))) {
+ printf("test 2 failed, X=%.2f\n", d);
+ err++;
+ }
#endif
- d=0;
- for (i=0; i<16; i++)
- d+=n2[i]*n2[i];
- d=(d*8)/25-500000;
- if (!((103 < d) && (d < 5740)))
- {
- printf("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld\n",d/100L,d%100L);
- err++;
- }
- printf("test 2 done\n");
+ d = 0;
+ for (i = 0; i < 16; i++)
+ d += n2[i] * n2[i];
+ d = (d * 8) / 25 - 500000;
+ if (!((103 < d) && (d < 5740))) {
+ printf("test 2 failed, X=%ld.%02ld\n", d / 100L, d % 100L);
+ err++;
+ }
+ printf("test 2 done\n");
+
+ /* test 3 */
+ for (i = 0; i < 2; i++) {
+ if (!((2267 < runs[i][0]) && (runs[i][0] < 2733))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 1, runs[i][0]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (!((1079 < runs[i][1]) && (runs[i][1] < 1421))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 2, runs[i][1]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (!((502 < runs[i][2]) && (runs[i][2] < 748))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 3, runs[i][2]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (!((223 < runs[i][3]) && (runs[i][3] < 402))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 4, runs[i][3]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (!((90 < runs[i][4]) && (runs[i][4] < 223))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 5, runs[i][4]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (!((90 < runs[i][5]) && (runs[i][5] < 223))) {
+ printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
+ i, 6, runs[i][5]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ }
+ printf("test 3 done\n");
- /* test 3 */
- for (i=0; i<2; i++)
- {
- if (!((2267 < runs[i][0]) && (runs[i][0] < 2733)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,1,runs[i][0]);
- err++;
- }
- if (!((1079 < runs[i][1]) && (runs[i][1] < 1421)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,2,runs[i][1]);
- err++;
- }
- if (!(( 502 < runs[i][2]) && (runs[i][2] < 748)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,3,runs[i][2]);
- err++;
- }
- if (!(( 223 < runs[i][3]) && (runs[i][3] < 402)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,4,runs[i][3]);
- err++;
- }
- if (!(( 90 < runs[i][4]) && (runs[i][4] < 223)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,5,runs[i][4]);
- err++;
- }
- if (!(( 90 < runs[i][5]) && (runs[i][5] < 223)))
- {
- printf("test 3 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- i,6,runs[i][5]);
- err++;
- }
- }
- printf("test 3 done\n");
-
- /* test 4 */
- if (runs[0][33] != 0)
- {
- printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- 0,34,runs[0][33]);
- err++;
- }
- if (runs[1][33] != 0)
- {
- printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n",
- 1,34,runs[1][33]);
- err++;
- }
- printf("test 4 done\n");
+ /* test 4 */
+ if (runs[0][33] != 0) {
+ printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 0, 34, runs[0][33]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ if (runs[1][33] != 0) {
+ printf("test 4 failed, bit=%d run=%d num=%lu\n", 1, 34, runs[1][33]);
+ err++;
+ }
+ printf("test 4 done\n");
err:
- err=((err)?1:0);
+ err = ((err) ? 1 : 0);
#ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_NETWARE
- if (err) printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
+ if (err)
+ printf("ERROR: %d\n", err);
#endif
- EXIT(err);
- return(err);
- }
+ EXIT(err);
+ return (err);
+}