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| author | Mike Gilbert <floppym@gentoo.org> | 2019-12-06 20:28:13 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2019-12-09 11:29:06 +0100 |
| commit | fb4b0465abbd96e6d342e5606c61c919c99a82ff (patch) | |
| tree | f34ecbd57ff10e2adc5ac1d78fa1bc18dcded190 /src/test/test-seccomp.c | |
| parent | Add Cube iWork 11 Stylus (diff) | |
| download | systemd-fb4b0465abbd96e6d342e5606c61c919c99a82ff.tar.xz systemd-fb4b0465abbd96e6d342e5606c61c919c99a82ff.zip | |
seccomp: real syscall numbers are >= 0
Real syscall numbers start at 0. The fake seccomp values seem to be
strictly less than 0.
Fixes: 4df8fe8415eaf4abd5b93c3447452547c6ea9e5f
Diffstat (limited to 'src/test/test-seccomp.c')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/test/test-seccomp.c | 20 |
1 files changed, 10 insertions, 10 deletions
diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c index 69b1c788aa..75566199e3 100644 --- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c +++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ #include "virt.h" /* __NR_socket may be invalid due to libseccomp */ -#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket <= 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__) +#if !defined(__NR_socket) || __NR_socket < 0 || defined(__i386__) || defined(__s390x__) || defined(__s390__) /* On these archs, socket() is implemented via the socketcall() syscall multiplexer, * and we can't restrict it hence via seccomp. */ # define SECCOMP_RESTRICT_ADDRESS_FAMILIES_BROKEN 1 @@ -305,14 +305,14 @@ static void test_protect_sysctl(void) { assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { -#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0 +#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, NULL) < 0); assert_se(errno == EFAULT); #endif assert_se(seccomp_protect_sysctl() >= 0); -#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl > 0 +#if defined __NR__sysctl && __NR__sysctl >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR__sysctl, 0, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif @@ -347,14 +347,14 @@ static void test_protect_syslog(void) { assert_se(pid >= 0); if (pid == 0) { -#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0 +#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, -1, NULL, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EINVAL); #endif assert_se(seccomp_protect_syslog() >= 0); -#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog > 0 +#if defined __NR_syslog && __NR_syslog >= 0 assert_se(syscall(__NR_syslog, 0, 0, 0) < 0); assert_se(errno == EPERM); #endif @@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { assert_se(poll(NULL, 0, 0) == 0); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0 +#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); @@ -700,7 +700,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access > 0 +#if defined __NR_access && __NR_access >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_access + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_faccessat + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); @@ -716,7 +716,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0 +#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(-1)) >= 0); @@ -733,7 +733,7 @@ static void test_load_syscall_filter_set_raw(void) { s = hashmap_free(s); assert_se(s = hashmap_new(NULL)); -#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll > 0 +#if defined __NR_poll && __NR_poll >= 0 assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_poll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); #else assert_se(hashmap_put(s, UINT32_TO_PTR(__NR_ppoll + 1), INT_TO_PTR(EILSEQ)) >= 0); @@ -811,7 +811,7 @@ static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) { * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */ -#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open > 0 +#if defined __NR_open && __NR_open >= 0 return (int) syscall(__NR_open, path, flags, mode); #else return open(path, flags, mode); |