diff options
| author | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2019-03-12 15:52:06 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net> | 2019-03-12 16:10:55 +0100 |
| commit | b2a3953f817d8db15393e30d1f46e4fa85fcf23a (patch) | |
| tree | 98900e5bce49ed243b8af16bc936505caba146e4 /src | |
| parent | execute: no need to synthesize $HOME for uid==0 again, get_home_dir() already... (diff) | |
| download | systemd-b2a3953f817d8db15393e30d1f46e4fa85fcf23a.tar.xz systemd-b2a3953f817d8db15393e30d1f46e4fa85fcf23a.zip | |
user-util: extra paranoia, make sure $SHELL can't be fucked with in suid programs
It's better to be safe than sorry, let's not allow overriding of the
user shell in suid binaries. Similar for $USER.
Diffstat (limited to 'src')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/basic/user-util.c | 4 |
1 files changed, 2 insertions, 2 deletions
diff --git a/src/basic/user-util.c b/src/basic/user-util.c index 5f1bd5f5a2..a479590e47 100644 --- a/src/basic/user-util.c +++ b/src/basic/user-util.c @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ char* getlogname_malloc(void) { char *getusername_malloc(void) { const char *e; - e = getenv("USER"); + e = secure_getenv("USER"); if (e) return strdup(e); @@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ int get_shell(char **_s) { assert(_s); /* Take the user specified one */ - e = getenv("SHELL"); + e = secure_getenv("SHELL"); if (e && path_is_valid(e) && path_is_absolute(e)) { s = strdup(e); if (!s) |